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We study the impact of public debt limits on economic growth exploiting the introduction of a Mexican law capping the debt of subnational governments. Despite larger fiscal consolidation, states with higher ex-ante public debt grew substantially faster after the law, albeit at the expense of increased extreme poverty. Credit registry data suggests that the mechanism behind this result is a reduction in crowding out. After the law, banks operating in more indebted states reallocate credit away from local governments and into private firms. The unwinding of crowding out is stronger for riskier firms, firms borrowing from banks more exposed to local public debt, and for firms operating in states with lower public spending on infrastructure projects.

We study how firm-level carbon emissions affect bank lending and, through this channel, real decisions in a sample of global firms with syndicated loans. Using bank-level commitments to carbon neutrality to measure changes in banks’ green preferences, we show that firms with higher (lower) scope-1 emission levels borrowing from banks making commitments subsequently receive less (more) bank credit, even controlling for differences in their fundamentals. The bank decisions to reallocate credit more likely reflect their preferences for green rather than their differential response to an increased business risk. The reduction in bank lending to a brown sector lowers this sector’s real investments but even then, these firms do not improve their environmental scores.

We show that negative interest rate policy (NIRP) has expansionary effects on bank credit supply-and the real economy-through a portfolio rebalancing channel, and that, by shifting down and flattening the yield curve, NIRP differs from rate cuts just above the zero lower bound. For identification, we exploit ECB's NIRP and matched administrative datasets-including the credit register-from Italy, severely hit by the Eurozone crisis. NIRP affects banks with higher ex-ante net short-term interbank positions or, more broadly, more liquid balance-sheets. NIRP-affected banks rebalance their portfolios from liquid assets to lending, especially to ex-ante riskier and smaller firms-without higher ex-post delinquencies-and cut loan rates (even to the same firm), inducing sizable firm-level real effects. By contrast, there is no evidence of a retail deposits channel associated with NIRP.

We show that risk mitigating incentives dominate risk shifting incentives in fragile banks. Risk shifting could be particularly severe in banking since it is the most opaque industry and banks are one of the most leveraged corporations with very low skin in the game. To analyze this question, we exploit security trading by banks during financial crises, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. However, in contrast with the risk shifting hypothesis, we find that less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial market stress shocks. We show this using the supervisory ISIN-bank-month level dataset from Italy with all securities for each bank. Our results are over and above capital regulation as we show lower reach-for-yield effects by less capitalized banks within government bonds (with zero risk weights) or within securities with the same rating and maturity in the same month (which determines regulatory capital). Effects are robust to controlling for the covariance with the existence portfolio, and less capitalized banks, if anything, reduce concentration risk. Further, effects are stronger when uncertainty is higher, despite that risk shifting motives may be then higher. Moreover, three separate tests â?? based on different accounting portfolios (trading book versus held to maturity), the distribution of capital and franchise value â?? suggest that bank own incentives, instead of supervision, are the main drivers. Results are confirmed if we consider other sources of balance sheet fragility and different measures of risk-taking. Finally, evidence from the recent COVID-19 shock corroborates findings from the Global Financial Crisis and the Euro Area Sovereign Crisis.

We show that Quantitative Easing (QE) stimulates investment via a corporate-bond lending channel. Fed's large-scale asset purchases of MBS and treasuries through QE creates a vacuum of safe assets, prompting safer firms to invest more by issuing relatively "safe'' bonds. Using micro-data around QE, we find that QE increases firm-level investment by 7.4 percentage points for firms with bond market access. This growth is financed with senior bonds. We find no evidence of higher shareholders' payouts associated to QE. The robust findings are consistent with a model in which reducing the supply of government debt lowers "safe'' corporate bond yields, stimulating investment.

Macroprudential regulators worldwide have introduced regulations to limit household leverage in light of existing evidence which suggests that high leverage is associated with household distress during crisis. We analyse the distributional effects of such a macroprudential policy on mortgage and house price cycles. For identification, we exploit the universe of UK mortgages and a 15%-limit imposed in 2014 on lenders — not households — for high loan-to-income ratio (LTI) mortgages. Despite some regulatory arbitrage (eg increases in LTV and average loan size), more-constrained lenders issue fewer high-LTI mortgages. Partial substitution by less-constrained lenders leads to overall credit contraction to low-income borrowers in local-areas more exposed to constrained-lenders, lowering house price growth. Following the Brexit referendum (which led to house-price correction), the 2014-policy strongly implies — via lower pre-correction debt — better house prices and mortgage defaults during an episode of house price correction.

Data de publicació electrònica: 15-06-2019 This paper studies credit booms exploiting the Spanish matched credit register over 2001–2009. We extend Khwaja and Mian’s (2008) loan-level estimator by incorporating firm-level general equilibrium adjustments. Higher ex-ante bank real-estate exposure increases credit supply to non-real-estate firms, but effects are neutralized by firm-level adjustments for firms with existing banking relationships. However, higher bank real-estate exposure increases risk-taking, by relaxing standards of existing borrowers (cheaper, longer-term and less collateralized credit), and by expanding credit on the extensive margin to first-time borrowers that default substantially more. Results suggest that the mechanism at work is greater liquidity via securitization of real-estate assets. José-Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from project ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

We analyze the effects of monetary policy on nonbank and bank credit supply to firms and households, in particular the associated real effects and the distribution of risk. For identification, we use exhaustive loan-level data since the 1990s and Gertler-Karadi (2015) monetary policy shocks. First, different from the literature showing that low monetary policy rates increase risk-taking in bank loans, we find that higher monetary policy rates lead to an expansion of credit supply and more risk-taking by nonbank lenders. During monetary contractions, credit supply for corporates, mortgages, and consumers shifts from regulated banks to less regulated, more fragile nonbanks. Moreover, this shift is more pronounced for ex-ante riskier borrowers. Second, nonbanks reduce the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary policy at the loan-level. However, this reduction varies substantially by borrower type. Total credit and real effects are largely neutralized in consumer loans and the associated consumption, but not in corporate loans and investment.

We analyze the effects of borrower-based macroprudential policy at the household-level. For identification, we exploit administrative Dutch tax-return and property ownership data linked to the universe of housing transactions, and the introduction of a mortgage loan-to-value limit. The regulation reduces mortgage leverage, with bunching in its limit. Ex-ante more-affected households substantially reduce overall leverage and debt servicing costs but consume greater liquidity to satisfy the regulation. Improvements in household solvency result in less financial distress and, given negative idiosyncratic shocks, better liquidity management. However, fewer households transition from renting into ownership. All of these effects are stronger for liquidity-constrained households.

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk‐taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two‐stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time‐varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long‐term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects. Peydró acknowledges the financial support from project ECO2012-32434 of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.

The eurozone economic activity and banking sector have shown substantial fragility over the last years with remarkable country heterogeneity. Using detailed data on lending conditions and standards, we analyse – along several key dimensions of heterogeneity – how financial fragility has affected the transmission mechanism of the single eurozone monetary policy. The analysis shows that the monetary transmission mechanism is time-varying and influenced by the financial fragility of the sovereigns, banks, firms and households. The impact of monetary policy on aggregate output is stronger during the financial crisis, especially in countries facing increased sovereign financial distress. This amplification mechanism, moreover, operates through the credit channel, both the bank lending and the non-financial borrower balance-sheet channels. Our results suggest that the bank-lending channel has been to a large extent neutralized by the ECB non-standard monetary policy interventions, but the policy framework until the end of 2011 was insufficient to overcome credit availability problems stemming from deteriorated firm net worth and risk conditions, especially for small firms in countries under stress. — Matteo Ciccarelli, Angela Maddaloni and Jose-Luis Peydro

We analyze the impact of financial globalization on business cycle synchronization using a proprietary database on banks’ international exposure for industrialized countries during 1978 to 2006. Theory makes ambiguous predictions and identification has been elusive due to lack of bilateral time-varying financial linkages data. In contrast to conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, we identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country-pair heterogeneity. Similarly, we show divergent economic activity due to higher integration using an exogenous de-jure measure of integration based on financial regulations that harmonized EU markets.

Monetary policy transmission may be impaired if banks rebalance their portfolios towards securities to e.g. risk-shift or hoard liquidity. We identify the bank lending and risk-taking channels by exploiting â?? Italian's unique â?? credit and security registers. In crisis times, with higher ECB liquidity, less capitalized banks react by increasing securities over credit supply, inducing worse firm-level real effects. However, they buy securities with lower yields and haircuts, thus reaching-for-safety and liquidity. Differently, in pre-crisis time, securities do not crowd-out credit supply. The substitution from lending to securities in crisis times helps less capitalized banks to repair their balance-sheets and then restart credit supply with a one year-lag.

Recent studies of monetary policy in developing countries document a weak bank lending channel based on aggregate data. In this paper, we bring new evidence using Uganda's supervisory credit register, with microdata on loan applications, volumes and rates, coupled with unanticipated variation in monetary policy. We show that a monetary contraction reduces bank credit supply---increasing loan application rejections and tightening loan volume and rates---especially for banks with more leverage and sovereign debt exposure. There are associated spillovers on inflation and economic activity---including construction permits and trade---and even social unrest.

Monetary policy transmission may be impaired if banks rebalance their portfolios toward securities. We identify the bank lending and risk-taking channels of monetary policy by exploiting—Italy's unique—credit and security registers. In crisis times, with higher central bank liquidity, less capitalized banks react by increasing securities over credit supply, inducing worse firm-level real effects. However, they buy securities with lower yields and haircuts. Unlike in crisis times, in precrisis times, securities do not crowd out credit supply. The substitution from lending to securities in crisis times helps less capitalized banks repair their balance sheets and restart credit supply with a one-year lag. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 re-search and innovation program (grant agreement no. 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grants ECO2012-32434 and ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and through the Severo Ochoa Program for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).

Inclou additional materials: online appendix; data set We analyze the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit. Monetary policy affects both loan supply and demand, thus making identification a steep challenge. We therefore analyze a novel, supervisory dataset with loan applications from Spain. Accounting for time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that tighter monetary and worse economic conditions substantially reduce loan granting, especiWe analyze the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit. Monetary policy affects both loan supply and demand, thus making identification a steep challenge. We therefore analyze a novel, supervisory dataset with loan applications from Spain. Accounting for time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that tighter monetary and worse economic conditions substantially reduce loan granting, especially from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios; responding to applications for the same loan, weak banks are less likely to grant the loan. Finally, firms cannot offset the resultant credit restriction by applying to other banks.

By providing liquidity to depositors and credit-line borrowers, banks can be exposed to double-runs on assets and liabilities. For identification, we exploit the 2007 freeze of the European interbank market and the Italian Credit Register. After the shock, there are sizeable, aggregate double-runs. In the cross-section, credit-line drawdowns are not larger for banks more exposed to the interbank market; however, they are larger when we condition on the same firms with multiple credit lines. We show that, ex-ante, more exposed banks actively manage their liquidity risk by granting fewer credit lines to firms that run more during crises. Peydró acknowledges financial support from Project ECO2012-32434 of the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness and the European Research Council Grant (Project 648398).

This paper examines the impact of monetary conditions on the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the Czech Republic by analysing the comprehensive credit register of the Czech National Bank. Our duration analysis indicates that expansionary monetary conditions promote risk-taking among banks. At the same time, a lower interest rate during the life of a loan reduces its riskiness. While seeking to assess the association between banks’ appetite for risk and the short-term interest rate we answer a set of questions related to the difference between higher liquidity versus credit risk and the effect of the policy rate conditioned on bank and borrower characteristics. This work was supported by the Czech national Bank (Research Project No. C4/2009) and the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic projects GA CR No. 14-02108S and No. P402/12/G097).

The transmission of monetary policy to credit aggregates and the real economy can be impaired by weaknesses in the contracting environment, shallow financial markets, and a concentrated banking system. We empirically assess the bank lending channel in Uganda during 2010–2014 using a supervisory dataset of loan applications and granted loans. Our analysis focuses on a short period during which the policy rate rose by 1,000 basis points and then came down by 1,200 basis points. We find that an increase in interest rates reduces the supply of bank credit both on the extensive and intensive margins, and there is significant pass-through to retail lending rates. We document a strong bank balance sheet channel, as the lending behavior of banks with high capital and liquidity is different from that of banks with low capital and liquidity. Finally, we show the impact of monetary policy on real activity across districts depends on banking sector conditions. Overall, our results indicate significant real effects of the bank lending channel in developing countries.

To identify the credit channel we disentangle loan supply and demand shocks by using the answers from the confidential Euro area Bank Lending Survey and the U.S. Senior Loan Officer Survey. Embedding this information within a VAR model, we find that: (1) The credit channel of monetary policy is operational through the balancesheets of both banks and non-financial borrowers, and for business, mortgage, and consumer loans. (2) The impact of a monetary policy shock on GDP growth is higher through loan supply than through loan demand, whereas the latter affects more inflation. (3) The bank lending channel is stronger than the balance-sheet channel for firms, whereas the latter is stronger for households. (4) During the recent financial crisis, bank capital and liquidity problems had a strong negative impact on GDP growth by reducing loan supply to businesses. At the same time, the current expansionary monetary policy stance has reduced output decline in the Euro area.

We analyze the impact of financial crises and monetary policy on the supply of wholesale funding liquidity, and also on the compositional supply effects through cross-border and relationship lending. For empirical identification, we draw on the proprietary bank-to-bank European interbank dataset extracted from Target2 and also exploit the Lehman and sovereign crisis shocks as well as the main Eurosystem non-standard monetary policy measures. The robust results imply that the crisis shocks lead to worse access, volumes and spreads (in both the overnight and longer-term maturities). The quantitative impact on interbank access and volume is stronger than on spreads. Liquidity supply restrictions are exacerbated for cross-border lending after the Lehman failure; for banks headquartered in periphery countries, the impact is quantitatively stronger in the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the interbank market – unlike other credit markets – allows to exploit the price dispersion from different lenders on identical credit contracts, i.e. overnight uncollateralized loans in the same morning for the same borrower. This price dispersion increases massively with the crisis, and even more for riskier borrowers. Cross-border and previous relationship lenders charge higher prices for identical contracts in the crisis. Importantly, this price dispersion substantially decreases when the Eurosystem promises unlimited access to liquidity at a fixed price in October 2008 and announces the 3-year LTRO in December 2011, with economically stronger effects for borrowers in weaker countries.

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks. Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higher hoarding of liquidity.

We analyze the impact of the countercyclical capital buffers held by banks on the supply of credit to firms and their subsequent performance. Countercyclical ‘dynamic’ provisioning that is unrelated to specific loan losses was introduced in Spain in 2000, and modified in 2005 and 2008. These policy experiments which entailed bank-specific shocks to capital buffers, combined with the financial crisis that shocked banks according to their available pre-crisis buffers, underpin our identification strategy. Our estimates from comprehensive bank-, firm-, loan-, and loan application-level data suggest that countercyclical capital buffers help smooth credit supply cycles and in bad times have positive effects on firm credit availability, assets, employment and survival. Our findings therefore hold important implications for theory and macroprudential policy.

To study the impact of macroprudential policy on credit supply cycles and real effects, we analyze dynamic provisioning, which implies pro-cyclical bank capital regulation. Introduced in Spain in 2000, revised four times and tested in its counter-cyclicality during the crisis, it affected banks differentially. Accessing an exhaustive credit register, we find that dynamic provisioning smooths credit supply cycles and, in bad times, supports firm performance. A policy-induced one-percentage point (pp) increase in capital buffers extends credit to firms by 9 pp, increasing firm employment (6 pp) and survival (1 pp). Moreover, there are important compositional effects in credit supply related to risk and regulatory arbitrage by non-regulated and regulated-but-less-affected banks.

This article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages. For identification, we exploit an idiosyncratic, sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures. First, we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals. Second, the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals. Third, interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock. Finally, we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects. These results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications. (JEL G01, G21, G28, E58) “Since the onset of the financial turmoil, increased uncertainty, reflected particularly in counterparty risk, has led banks to hoard liquidity. This has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets.” Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, December 2008

We analyse the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking and pricing. Bolivia provides us with an excellent experimental setting to identify this impact. Its small economy is not synchronized with the US economy but its banking system is almost fully dollarized. Consequently the US federal funds rate is the appropriate measure of monetary policy. We study the impact of the federal funds rate on the riskiness and pricing of new bank loans granted in Bolivia between 1999 and 2003, a period of significant variation in the federal funds rate. We find robust evidence that a decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan origination raises the monthly probability of default on individual bank loans. We also find that initiating loans with a subprime credit rating or loans to riskier borrowers with current or past non-performance become more likely when the federal funds rate is low. However, loan spreads do not increase, seemingly even decrease, in changes in the probability of default. Hence banks do not seem to price the additional risk taken. Furthermore, banks with more liquid assets and less funds from foreign financial institutions take more risk when the federal funds rate is low, and reduce loan spreads more despite the additional risk they seemingly take.

Banking crises are recurrent phenomena, often induced by excessive bank risk-taking, which may be due to behavioural reasons (over-optimistic banks neglecting risks) and to conflicts of interest between bank shareholders/managers and debtholders/taxpayers (banks exploiting moral hazard). We test whether US banks' stock returns in the 2007-08 financial crisis are associated with bank insiders' sales of their own bank’s shares in the period prior to 2006Q2 (the peak and reversal in real estate prices). We find that top-five executives' sales of shares predict bank performance during the crisis. Interestingly, effects are insignificant for the sales of independent directors and other officers. Moreover, the top-five executives' impact is stronger for banks with higher exposure to the real estate bubble, where a one standard deviation increase of insider sales is associated with a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period. Finally, even though bankers in riskier banks sold more shares (furthering their own interests), they did not change their bank’s policies, e.g. by reducing bank-level exposure to real estate. The informational content of bank insider trading before the crisis suggests that insiders knew that their banks were taking excessive risks, which has important implications for theory, public policy, and the understanding of crises, as well as a supervisory tool for early warning signals. José M. Marín acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (project ECO2015-69205). This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). José-Luis Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through grant ECO2012-32434 and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).

We show that negative monetary policy rates induce systemic banks to reach‐for‐yield. For identification, we exploit the introduction of negative deposit rates by the European Central Bank in June 2014 and a novel securities register for the 26 largest euro area banking groups. Banks with more customer deposits are negatively affected by negative rates, as they do not pass negative rates to retail customers, in turn investing more in securities, especially in those yielding higher returns. Effects are stronger for less capitalized banks, private‐sector (financial and nonfinancial) securities and dollar‐denominated securities. Affected banks also take higher risk in loans. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the PGC2018‐102133‐B‐I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) grant and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV‐2015‐0563). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, or the Eurosystem.

Includes supplementary data: online appending Recent studies of monetary policy in developing countries document a weak bank lending channel based on aggregate data. In this paper, we bring new evidence using Uganda's supervisory credit register, with microdata on loan applications, volumes and rates, coupled with unanticipated variation in monetary policy. We show that a monetary contraction reduces bank credit supply—increasing loan application rejections and tightening loan volume and rates—especially for banks with more leverage and sovereign debt exposure. There are associated spillovers on inflation and economic activity—including construction permits and trade—and even social unrest. José-Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from project ECO2015-68182-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

In this paper we analyze financial crises and the interactions of macroprudential policy and credit. Financial crises are recurrent systemic phenomena, often triggering deep and long-lasting recessions with large reductions in aggregate welfare, output and employment. Importantly for policy, systemic financial crises are typically not random events triggered by exogenous events, but they tend to occur after periods of rapid, strong credit growth. Moreover, a credit crunch tends to follow in a financial crisis with negative aggregate real effects. Macroprudential policy softens the credit supply cycles, with important positive effects on the aggregate real economy in crisis times. I thank the Editor for helpful comments and acknowledge financial support from project ECO2012-32434 of the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

We analyze the determinants of real estate and credit bubbles using a unique borrower-lender matched dataset on mortgage loans in Spain. The dataset contain real estate credit and price conditions (loan principal and spread, and the appraisal and market price) at the mortgage level, matched with borrower characteristics (such as income, labor status and contract) and the lender identity, over the last credit boom and bust. We find that lending standards are softer in the boom than in the bust. Moreover, despite some adjustment in lending conditions in the good times depending on borrower risk, the results suggest too soft lending standards and excessive risk-taking in the boom. For example, mortgage spreads for non-employed are identical to employed borrowers during the boom. Banks with worse corporate governance problems soften even more the standards. Finally, we analyze the mechanism by which banks could increase the supply of mortgage loans despite of regulatory restrictions on LTVs. The evidence is consistent with banks encouraging real estate appraisal firms to introduce an upward bias in appraisal prices (29 %), to meet loan-to-value regulatory thresholds (40 % of mortgages are just bunched on these limits), thus building-up the credit and the real estate bubble. Montalvo would like to acknowledge the financial support of Project ECO2011-25272 (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion) and the Fellowship ICREA-Academia for Excellence in Research funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya. J. García Villar would like to acknowledge the financial support of Project ECO2012-39553-C04-01 (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad).