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This paper shows, using probit analysis, that low national savings increase the risk of macroeconomic crisis. Foreign savings are a poor substitute of national savings not only for domestic investment (Feldstein-Horioka result), but also for stability. It is found that deeper financial integration does not cure low investment and can improve the situation only to the extent that the risks of the foreign saving portfolio can be kept under control. Overall, a fundamental conclusion is that strong national savings are key for robust growth. Extending the probit analysis, the paper shows that the composition of foreign assets and liabilities matters substantially for portfolio risk and derives an index to assess the associated country risk.

In this paper we analyze the long-run relationship between output collapses—defined as GDP falling substantially below trend—and total factor productivity (TFP). We use a panel of 76 developed and developing countries during the period 1960–2004 to identify episodes of output collapse and estimate counterfactual post-collapse TFP trends. Collapses are concentrated in developing countries, especially Africa and Latin America, and were particularly widespread in the 1980s in Latin America. Overall, output collapses are systematically associated with long-lasting declines in TFP. We explore the conditions under which collapses are least or most damaging, as well as the type of shocks that make collapses more likely or severe. Furthermore, we provide a quantification of the associated welfare loss with output collapses.

This paper examines the countercyclical policy options available to Latin American countries in the face of the current global economic crisis, concluding that most of the major countries in the region appear to possess the fiscal space (as measured by credible fiscal sustainability and debt headroom) to run prudent countercyclical fiscal deficits. Those countries should undertake a constrained fiscal expansion focused on productive public spending and financed by “rainy day” funds—large stocks of foreign exchange reserves that they have accumulated during recent years—rather than by market borrowing. The recent surge in multilateral financial activity to alleviate market illiquidity, whether intended for reserve or budget support, strengthens the case for this policy prescription: with multilateral support, the appropriate policy response is more expansionary, and its financing is less reliant on market borrowing.

The negative effects on exports and FDI flows of an exchange rate misalignment are amplified when the misalignment is among countries that share a regional integration agreement. Such agreements strengthen the well-established relationship between real appreciation and currency crises. We conclude that coordination to achieve real-exchange-rate consistency within blocs is key to macro stability and, a fortiori, sustainable trade agreements.

At the time of writing there were widespread concerns about the health of the U.S. economy. There is conclusive evidence that the pace of growth has slowed, which has prompted the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates on two occasions (a total of 100 basis points thus far). As usual, when faced with this kind of turning point, analysts and policy makers alike wonder whether the United States will achieve a "soft landing" or whether the downturn is more serious and protracted in the worst scenario, the new weakness could signal the end of the new economy. Furthermore, recent inflation surprises have not been encouraging, as higher-than expected inflation numbers may curtail the Federal Reserve's desire and ability to act counter cyclically.

Recent financial crises and contagion call into question the wisdom of capital account liberalization. There is consensus that something is terribly wrong in the way international financial markets work for developing countries and that fixing is urgent. But what is wrong? Most views in developed countries identify the problems with too much capital flows, attracted by moral hazard. However, our analysis shows that the role of this distortion is being grossly exaggerated and that, in contrast, the main distortions in international financial markets are associated with capital flows being too little, restricted by sovereign risk, and too volatile because of market failures.

It has been common to attribute financial crises to short-term capital inflows, while foreign direct investment (FDI) is seen as a safer form of finance. The relationship between crises and the composition of capital flows is particularly relevant at present because the flow of capital to Latin America is becoming increasingly dominated by FDI. This paper asks whether the composition of capital inflows and of the stock of foreign liabilities is relevant for financial crises, be it their frequency, depth, or length. It explores the possible role of FDI as a benign form of external liability relative to other classes of liabilities, reviewing both analytical and empirical arguments.

After being excluded from world capital markets during the debt crisis, many developing countries have experienced large capital inflows in the past five years. The challenges these inflows pose for domestice policy have generated a substantial literature. The authors review and extend that literature. They characterize the new inflows, assess their causes and the likelihood of sustainability, analyze the policy issues they raise, and evaluate the possible policy responses. Their conclusions tie desirable policy responses to characteristics of both the flows themselves and to those of the recipient economy. Regarding the forces driving the current episode, they conclude that generally, the role of foreign interest rates as a "push" factor driving capital inflows and determining their magnitude has been well-established. On the other hand, country creditworthiness has helped determine both the timing and destination of the new capital flows. Even if creditworthiness is maintained, the early level of inflows is unlikely to be sustained. The pace of reduction in flows to countries that have been receiving them since the early 1990s depends on the path of foreign interest rates and the role of stock adjustment. But a loss of creditworthiness caused by a deterioration in domestic policy would stop inflows quickly and, depending on the circumstances, inflows may be replaced by substantial outflows and an outright balance of payments crisis.What are the implications for policy in recipient countries? Briefly, the receipt of capital inflows may strengthen the case for removing macroeconomic distortions, either because such inflows aggravate the cost of such distortions or because they ease the constraints that originally motivated their adoption. While direct intervention may not be feasible (because controls may be easily evaded), controls may sometimes be a second-best policy. To the extent that capital inflows are permitted to materialize, the desirability of foreign exhcange intervention depends on what is required for macroeconomic stability. Sterilized foreign exchange intervention to prevent overstimulation of demand with a fixed exchange rate may not be feasible or effective. A commensurate reduction in the money multiplier, achieved by increasing reserve requirements, may also have limited effects. The effectiveness of both measures depends on the structure of the domestic financial system. If domestic monetary expansion is not avoided, or if an expansionary financial stimulus is transmitted outside the banking system, the stabilization of total demand will require fiscal contraction.

An undistorted free market economy endowed with perfectly rational and informed agents overborrows, i.e., borrows beyond the efficient level, because of the agents' failure to internalize credit rationing resulting from sovereign risk. It follows that the elimination of the market overborrowing will not cure private overborrowing. This paper explores the possibilities of economic policy as a remedy to the problem.

This paper generates a typology of balance-of-payments crises under rational expectations, namely liquidity and solvency crises. The ex-post application of official financial rescue packages of sufficient size is a perfect cure for liquidity crises, but amounts to an ineffective and costly bailout of private investors in the case of solvency crises. Rescue program anticipation encourages borrowing, which offsets any solvency improvement. Due to likely imperfections in implementation, actual rescue programs entail official financial losses and may easily be counterproductive due to moral hazard.

This empirical study finds that while debt reduction and policy reforms in debtor countries have been important determinants of renewed access to international capital markets, changes in international interest rates have been the dominant factor. We calculate the effects of changes in international interest rates for a 'typical' debtor country. We conclude that increases in interest rates associated with business cycle upturn in industrial countries could depress the secondary market prices of existing debt to levels inconsistent with continued capital inflows.