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he transition from high- to lower-carbon production systems increasingly creates regulatory and market risks for high-emitting firms. We test to what extent equity market investors demand a premium to compensate for such risks and thus might raise firms' cost of equity capital (CoE). Using data for 1,897 firms spanning 50 countries over the years 2008–2016, we find a distinct and robust positive impact of carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of output) on CoE: On average, a standard deviation higher (sector-adjusted) carbon intensity is associated with a CoE premium of 6 (9) basis points or 1.7% (2.6%). This effect is primarily explained by systematic risk factors: high-emitting assets are significantly more sensitive to economy-wide fluctuations than low-emitting ones. The CoE impact of carbon intensity is more pronounced in high-emitting sectors, EU countries, and firms subject to carbon pricing regulation. Our results suggest that carbon emission reduction might serve as a valuable risk mitigation strategy.

The Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) is on a finishing path to replace US dollar LIBOR. A key issue remains, however, namely the lack of credit sensitive, termed rates equivalent to LIBOR rates. Back to SOFR’s root in the Treasury repo market, we compute SOFR term rates by pricing Treasury repos across different tenors. Recognizing that SOFR mixes in different segments of the overnight market, term rates are computed per segment and a volume weighted average is taken as the SOFR term rate. The tri-party segment shows three month repo spread of 45 basis points during the global financial crisis, and the bilateral segment has 59 bps. Contrary to the new risk-free-rates label, we show that SOFR has a credit component, but it is not strong enough comparing to LIBOR. A credit sensitive benchmark is still needed to fully replace LIBOR.

Does gross or net debt matter for long-term sovereign spreads in emerging markets? The topic is important for undestanding the borrowing cost implications of public assetliability management decisions (e.g. using assets to lower debt). We investigate this question using data on emerging market economies (EMEs) over the period 1998–2014. We find that both gross debt and assets have a significant impact on long-term sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets, with effects roughly offsetting each other (coefficients of opposite sign and similar magnitude). Hence, net debt seems more appropriate than gross debt when evaluating the impact of indebtedness on spreads. The empirical results suggest that an increase in net debt by 10 percentage points of GDP implies an increase in the spread by 100–120 basis points, and the effect is larger during periods of domestic distress. The key results from this empirical study are quite robust to alternative specifications and subgroups of EMEs.

By allowing different agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to be traded based on limited characteristics, the to-be-announced (TBA) market generates liquidity and benefits the MBS market broadly. We quantify effects of the TBA structure on mortgage borrowers. Exploiting discontinuities in TBA eligibility, we estimate that TBA eligibility reduces mortgage rates by 7 to 28 basis points. The TBA eligibility benefit is larger for mortgages with higher expected prepayments. We also find that TBA eligibility affects refinancing, which has implications for monetary policy transmission. Our finding is relevant for housing policies, such as housing finance reforms and uniform MBS. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We find dealer-level evidence that recent regulation on the leverage ratio requirement causes deviations from covered interest parity. Our analysis uses a unique data set of currency derivatives with disclosed counterparty identities together with exogenous variation introduced by the U.K. leverage ratio framework. Dealers who are affected by the regulatory shock charge an additional premium of about 20 basis points per annum for synthetic dollar funding relative to unaffected dealers. This finding holds even after controlling for changes in clients' demand. Also, some clients increase their trading activity with unaffected dealers with whom they already had a preexisting relationship.

This paper investigates price discovery in foreign exchange (FX) swaps. Using data on inter-dealer transactions, we find a 1 standard deviation increase in order flow (i.e. net pressure to obtain USD through FX swaps) increases the cost of dollar funding by up to 4 basis points after the 2008 crisis. This is explained by increased dispersion in dollar funding costs and quarter-end periods. We find central bank swap lines reduced the order flow to obtain USD through FX swaps, subsequently affecting the forward rate. In contrast, during quarter-ends and monetary announcements we observe high frequency adjustment of the forward rate.

I develop a structural model of mortgage demand and lender competition to study how leverage regulation affects the U.K. mortgage market. Using variation in risk‐weighted capital requirements across lenders and mortgages with different loan‐to‐values (LTVs), I show that a 1‐percentage‐point increase in risk‐weighted capital requirements increases lenders' marginal cost of originating mortgages by about 26 basis points (11%) on average. I use the estimated model to study proposed leverage regulations. Counterfactual analyses show that large lenders exploit a regulatory cost advantage, which increases concentration by about 20%, and suggest that banning high‐LTV mortgages may reduce large lenders' equity buffer.

In 1985, James A. Baker III's “Program for Sustained Growth” proposed a set of economic policy reforms including, inflation stabilization, trade liberalization, greater openness to foreign investment, and privatization, that he believed would lead to faster growth in countries then known as the Third World, but now categorized as emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). A country-specific, time-series assessment of the reform process reveals three clear facts. First, in the ten-year period after stabilizing high inflation, the average growth rate of real GDP in EMDEs is 2.6 percentage points higher than in the prior ten-year period. Second, the corresponding growth increase for trade liberalization episodes is 2.66 percentage points. Third, in the decade after opening their capital markets to foreign equity investment, the spread between EMDEs average cost of equity capital and that of the US declines by 240 basis points. The impact of privatization is less straightforward to assess, but taken together, the three central facts of reform provide empirical support for the Baker Hypothesis and suggest a simple neoclassical interpretation of the unprecedented increase in growth that has taken place in EMDEs since the early 1990s.

The yield spread of South African to United States 10 year government bonds over the last 5 years has increased substantially to levels approaching those last seen during the mid-1980s. This yield spread increase is replicated in spreads relative to long-term German bonds, as well as for the spread of state owned enterprises (ESKOM) to United States and German bonds. This paper examines the association between the spread and macroeconomic fundamentals over the 1960-2019 sample period, under the GARCH and GARCH-M class of estimators. We find that higher South African economic growth, lower inflation, public and private debt, as well as Rand-Dollar appreciation are all associated with a statistically significantly lower South African - United States yield spread. The strongest impact is associated with the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Mean spread levels do not appear to be influenced by yield volatility. Finally, while there is no evidence of sign bias in the impact of shocks on yield volatility (negative shock impacts are no di¤erent than positive), there is evidence of size bias for both positive and negative shocks: larger shocks have a larger impact on volatility than small, regardless of their sign. Collectively, and even ignoring the impact of private sector leveraging, South Africa’s performance in these macroeconomic fundamentals is associated with an increase in the SA-US yield spread of 363 basis points (since 2012). This constitutes a substantial proportion of the current 741 basis point spread.

In this paper, we build an endogenous growth model into a stochastic small open economy framework to study the long-run economic cost of a sudden stop. In this economy, productivity growth is determined by successful implementation of business ideas, yet the quality of ideas is heterogeneous and good ideas are scarce. A representative financial intermediary screens and selects the most promising ideas, which gives rise to a trade-off between mass (quantity) and composition (quality) in the entrant cohort. Chilean firm-level data from the sudden stop triggered by the Russian sovereign default in 1998 confirms the main mechanism of the model, as firms born during the credit shortage are fewer, but better. A calibrated version of the economy shows the importance of accounting for heterogeneity and selection, as otherwise the permanent loss of output generated by the forgone entry after a 100 basis point increment in the interest rate is overestimated by 45%.

We document persistent superior trading performance among a subset of individual investors. Investors classified in the top performance decile in the first half of our sample subsequently earn risk-adjusted returns of about 6% per year. These returns are not confined to stocks in which the investors are likely to have inside information, nor are they driven by illiquid stocks. Our results suggest that skilled individual investors exploit market inefficiencies (or perhaps conditional risk premiums) to earn abnormal profits, above and beyond any profits available from well-known strategies based on size, value, momentum, or earnings announcements. (JEL G11, G14, G40, G51) Received: October 11, 2020 Editorial decision: January 4, 2021 Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff

Management quality is known to influence depository institution performance, but less understood are the characteristics of managers that influence performance. We empirically examine how the political ideology of a credit union’s CEO influenced decision making and performance during the financial crisis. Our results indicate that the return on assets of credit unions run by conservative CEOs are 22 basis points lower during the crisis relative to liberal CEOs. Returns are shown to be lower as a direct result of credit unions with conservative CEOs applying more conservative accounting practices for loan losses than their counterparts during the crisis, despite similar loan quality.

We study the effect of retail investor attention on odd lot trading. We observe that increases in abnormal Google search volume predict odd-lot trading. Importantly, this relationship is share price-sensitive: For stocks priced below $11, an increase in abnormal search volume leads to less odd lot trading. For stocks priced above $46, on the other hand, an increase in abnormal search volume leads to more odd lot trading. For a stock priced at $78 – the mean share price in our sample – a one standard deviation increase of abnormal search volume increases the average share of odd lot trading by 10 basis points. This effect is even stronger for more expensive stocks. Our results are consistent with attention-induced trading when investors face wealth constraints and are robust to alternative channels including news and institutional investor attention.

Using security-level holdings for all euro-area investors, we study portfolio rebalancing during the quantitative easing program from March 2015 to December 2017. Foreign investors outside the euro area accommodated most of the Eurosystem’s purchases. Duration, government credit, and corporate credit risk did not get concentrated in particular regions or investor sectors. We estimate a demand system for government bonds by instrumental variables to relate portfolio rebalancing to yield changes. Government bond yields decreased by 65 basis points on average, and this estimate varies from 38 to 83 basis points across countries.

This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the premium for money-likeness. The 2014 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reform of the money market fund (MMF) industry reduced the money-likeness of prime MMFs by increasing their information sensitivity, while leaving government MMFs unaffected. Investors fled from prime to government MMFs, with total outflows exceeding one trillion dollars. Using a difference-in-differences design, we estimate the premium for money-likeness to be between 20 and 30 basis points (bps). These premiums are not due to changes in investors’ risk tolerance or funds’ risk taking. Our results support recent developments in monetary theory identifying information insensitivity as a key feature of money.

We show that U.S. dollar movements affect syndicated loan terms for U.S. borrowers, even for those without trade exposure. We identify the effect of dollar movements using spread and loan amount adjustments during the syndication process. Using this high-frequency, within loan variation, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the dollar index increases spreads by up to 15 basis points and reduces loan amounts and underpricing by up to 2 percent and 7 basis points, respectively. These effects are concentrated in dollar appreciations. Our results suggest that global factors reflected in the dollar affect U.S. borrowing costs.

Regression discontinuity estimates indicate that home buying is highly responsive to interest rates in a large segment of the population. A surprise 50 basis point cut in the effective interest rate for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) led to an immediate 14 percent increase in home buying among the FHA-reliant population. We show that this large, extensive-margin effect arises from the rate cut helping borrowers overcome maximum debt payment to income (DTI) thresholds. We conclude that binding DTI constraints are an important feature of the mortgage market that amplify the effect of interest rate shocks.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the presence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy in the Sierra Leone. This study uses a dynamic panel data method namely generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure, employing quarterly bank-level data spanning the period 2014-2018, to empirically investigate whether or not changes in the monetary policy in Sierra Leone influence bank lending behaviour, i.e., existence of a bank lending channel. It also examines the extent to which bank-level characteristics-size, liquidity and capital-affect the effectiveness of the monetary policy. Our result revealed that the monetary policy rate significantly and negatively influences banks’ loan supply. Specifically, a 100 basis point increase in the monetary policy rate leads to a 0.43 percent decrease in loan supply to the economy. This lends support for the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Sierra Leone and that banks do play a role in Sierra Leone’s monetary transmission mechanism. In addition, the interaction term between monetary policy variable and size has the positive sign and is statistically significant. The positive sign of the interaction term with size is consistent with the theoretical explanation of the bank lending channel, which assumes that lending volumes of larger banks are less sensitive to monetary policy conditions than that for smaller banks. Furthermore, commercial banks’ loan supply in Sierra Leone is also explained by past loan supply, economic activity (Real GDP) and inflation. However, we find that liquidity and bank capital do not influence banks’ loan supply. The statistical insignificance of the interaction term with capital and liquidity suggests that bank capital and liquidity are not a source of asymmetric response of banks to monetary policy stance. The main policy implications that can be gleaned from this study are that, in assessing the stance of the monetary policy, beside the Monetary policy rate, it is important for the Central Bank to monitor the micro-dynamics of individual bank characteristics, as it relates to size, in order to enhance the efficacy of monetary policy impact on the real sector in Sierra Leone.

Investor preferences for holding speculative assets are likely to be more pronounced ahead of firms’ earnings announcements, probably because of lower inventory costs and immediate payoffs or because of enhanced investor attention. We show that the demand for lottery-like stocks is stronger ahead of earnings announcements, leading to a price run-up for these stocks. In sharp contrast to the standard underperformance of lottery-like stocks, lottery-like stocks outperform non-lottery stocks by about 52 basis points in the 5-day window ahead of earnings announcements. However, this return spread is reversed by 80 basis points in the 5-day window after the announcements. Moreover, this inverted-V-shaped pattern on cumulative return spreads is more pronounced among firms with a greater retail order imbalance, among firms with low institutional ownership, and in regions with a stronger gambling propensity, and it is also robust after controlling for past 12-month returns and various proxies for investor attention.

This paper investigates the asset pricing implications of rollover risk, i.e., the risk that firms might not be able to refinance their due liabilities. I find that firm-specific rollover risk coupled with deteriorating credit market conditions significantly increase firms' credit spreads. During the 2008–2009 financial crisis period, the one-year CDS spreads for high rollover risk firms are 32–72 basis points higher than the spreads of low rollover risk firms. Longer maturity CDS spreads show similar patterns with smaller magnitudes. During normal periods, however, CDS spreads are mostly explained by fundamental variables and rollover risk is not a significant determinant. Similar rollover risk effect is also observed in other financial markets, including corporate bond, stock, and options markets.

This paper explores the relation between air pollution and trading performance of stock investors. Using a sample of trades by over 100,000 investors from 28 cities in China, we find a negative relation between air pollution and trade performance. Our calendar-time portfolio tests show that the trades made by investors on days with poor air quality underperform those made on days with good air quality by 0.612 to 0.673 basis points per day at the average investment horizon of 40 trading days. This relation is more pronounced among females and elderly and is driven mainly by trades in stocks of firms that are more cognitively challenging to value, namely, small-cap firms, firms with low analyst coverage, and firms with high idiosyncratic volatility. Moreover, the negative relation between air pollution and trade performance persists after controlling for local weather conditions, city-fixed effects, and time-fixed effects. Overall, the results highlight a hitherto unexplored cost associated with ambient air pollution, namely underperformance of stock market investors.

Post crisis, bank loan spreads increased and have remained elevated despite central bank actions, low LIBOR rates and observed Treasury yields. Using large syndicated loan dataset, this paper estimates that a 1 percentage point to GDP increase in government deficits increases spreads by around 9 basis points on average. This is consistent with partial crowding out. Weaker country risk ratings, larger loan size also increase spreads. Finally, the paper provides evidence that US deficit spending results in a crowding out of around one-half in loan markets and have some crowding out of loans in other markets.

PurposeThis paper aims to revisit the extant evidence on gender bias in the market. Specifically, it revisits reaction to CEO announcements. Also, it explores whether the development of the bias over time and by firm size aligns with existing theory.Design/methodology/approachThe paper examines cumulative abnormal returns around CEO announcements from 1992 through 2016 using a modified event study methodology. This evidence shown examines market reactions over time and by firm size.FindingsFinancial markets react more favorably to male CEO announcements, with a cumulative abnormal return of 49 basis points above the reaction to their female counterparts. Moreover, the paper finds that market reaction varies over time, which may be because of the increasing proportion of female CEOs, and by firm size, which may be due to the differences in new information available to investors.Research limitations/implicationsLimitations include sample size due to the paucity of female CEO announcements. This paper does not examine the effect of industry, detailed CEO characteristics or announcement content on market reaction. In addition, using an extended event window may increase the likelihood of capturing confounding events, such as mergers or earnings announcements, which limits the interpretability of the results.Practical implicationsGender bias in financial markets creates another institutional barrier for the advancement of female professionals, as well as implies inefficient capital allocation in markets.Originality/valueThe literature in this field is still inconclusive. Furthermore, bias development over time and the effect of information on bias remain unexplored. This study aims to fill that gap; furthermore, it introduces an extended event-window approach.

This study provides a data‐rich analysis of the dynamics of government debt and economic growth for a longer period (1960–2009). It spans across different debt regimes and involves a worldwide sample of countries that is more representative than that of studies confined to advanced countries. This study observes a negative relationship between government debt and growth. The point estimates of the range of econometric specifications suggest that a 10‐percentage point increase in the debt‐to‐gross domestic product ratio is associated with 23 basis point reduction in average growth. The results establish the nonlinear relationship between debt and growth. Further, by employing panel vector autoregressions approach, this study decomposes the cause and effect relationship between debt and growth and offers an answer to the question—Does high debt lead to low growth or low growth leads to high debt? The results derived from the impulse–response functions and variance decomposition show the evidence of the long‐term effect of debt on economic growth. The results indicate that the effect is not uniform for all countries but depends mostly on the debt regimes and other important macroeconomic variables like inflation, trade openness, general government final consumption expenditure, and foreign direct investment.

Recent decades have witnessed several waves of buyout activity. We find leveraged buyouts (LBOs) to be a significant concern for bondholders by showing that a) intra-industry credit spreads increase upon an LBO announcement, b) yields on bonds without event risk covenants are, on average, 21 basis points higher than those on same-firm bonds with such covenants, and c) structural models calibrated to historical LBO events imply an impact of 18–21 basis points on 10-year credit spreads. The impact is strongest in expansion periods and for bonds with maturities of 10–20 years.

Theory posits that investors can rationally infer the implications of strategic nondisclosure for firm value, pressuring managers to disclose information voluntarily. This study documents that the lack of an earnings guidance predicts an abnormal return of −41 basis points around the subsequent quarterly earnings announcement, suggesting that investors do not fully incorporate the implications of nonguidance. Further analyses demonstrate that limitations in price efficiency, driven by investors' limited attention and short‐selling constraints, explain the mispricing of nonguidance and are associated with less guidance issuance. Our results collectively highlight limited price efficiency as another friction when studying managers' strategic disclosure decisions.

We investigate whether state-to-state political ties with a global superpower affects the pricing of international syndicated bank loans. We find statistically and economically significant effects of stronger state political ties with the United States, arguably the most dominant global superpower of our times, on the pricing of global syndicated loans. A one standard deviation improvement in state political ties between the U.S. and the government of a borrower's home country is associated with 14 basis points lower loan spread. This is equivalent to a cumulative savings in loan interest payments of about 10 million USD for the average loan in our sample. The effect of political ties on loan pricing is also stronger when lead arrangers are U.S. banks, during periods in which the U.S. is engaged in armed conflicts such as in the Afghan, Iraq and Syrian wars, when the U.S. president belongs to the Republican Party, and for borrowers with better balance sheets and prior lending relationships. Notably, we find that not all firms exploit this mechanism, as cross-listed firms and firms in countries with strong institutional quality and ability to attract institutional investors are much less reliant on political ties for lowering their borrowing costs.

We analyze the period before the zero lower bound and show that the state of investor sentiment strongly affects the transmission of monetary policy to the stock market. The impact of Federal funds rate (FFR) surprises is mostly potent when sentiment-driven overvaluation is followed by a correction, whereby the stock market increases by 0.8% in response to an unexpected FFR cut of 10 basis points. Our findings suggest that monetary easing surprises during sentiment-waning phases boost the stock market by alleviating investors’ fear. The ability of sentiment to drive the observed state dependence is hard to reconcile with rational pricing.

We study the role that recourse plays the in commercial real estate loan contracts in the portfolios of the largest US banks. We find that recourse is valued by lenders and is treated as a substitute for conventional equity. At origination, recourse loans receive loan rate spreads that are at least 20 basis points lower and loan-to-value ratios that are at least 3 percentage points higher. Dynamically, recourse affects loan modification negotiations by providing additional bargaining power to the lender. Loans with recourse were half as likely to receive accommodation during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the modifications that did occur entailed a relatively smaller reduction in payments.

In April 2020, the U.S. government sent economic impact payments (EIPs) directly to households as part of its measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic. We characterize these stimulus checks as a wealth shock for households and examine their effect on retail trading in Bitcoin. We find a significant increase in Bitcoin buy trades of size $1,200, which is the modal EIP amount. We find similar increases in trading for other countries that paid out stimulus checks. We estimate that the EIPs have a significant impact on the U.S. dollar–Bitcoin trading pair, increasing buy volume by 3.8% and the price by 0.6%. We also find that demand for Bitcoin is highly price inelastic compared with the demand for stocks. We suggest the demographic characteristics that make people more resilient to the COVID-19 economic shock—single, computer literate, and educated—are also characteristics of people who are more interested in Bitcoin. This paper was accepted by Bruno Biais, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4790 .

In April 2020, the US government sent economic impact payments (EIPs) directly to households, as part of its measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic. We characterize these stimulus checks as a wealth shock for households and examine their effect on retail trading in Bitcoin. We find a significant increase in Bitcoin buy trades for the modal EIP amount of $1,200. The rise in Bitcoin trading is highest among individuals without families and at exchanges catering to nonprofessional investors. We estimate that the EIP program has a significant but modest effect on the US dollar–Bitcoin trading pair, increasing trade volume by about 3.8 percent. Trades associated with the EIPs result in a slight rise in the price of Bitcoin of 7 basis points. Nonetheless, the increase in trading is small compared to the size of the stimulus check program, representing only 0.02 percent of all EIP dollars. We repeat our analysis for other countries with similar stimulus programs and find an increase in Bitcoin buy trades in these currencies. Our findings highlight how wealth shocks affect retail trading.

We study local loan conditions when, under external pressure, banks close branches. After the closure of nearby branches of their credit granting banks, firms that locally and hurriedly transfer to other banks receive an equivalent interest rate. However, and in stark contrast, where branch closures do not take place firms that purposely switch banks receive a 63 basis points discount. At the same time, the loan default rate for the (more expensive) transfer loans is on average a full percentage point lower than that for the (cheaper) switching loans. This suggests that firms that establish new relationships after their bank branch closes are “better” than regular switchers in terms of unobservable characteristics. Taken together, these findings provide evidence of losses for firms when banks close branches, even if local markets remain competitive.

Securities laws prohibit open‐end mutual funds from borrowing more than one‐third of their capital structure because of concerns that too much borrowing may harm investors. This is the first article to examine the performance of open‐end funds that borrow money within these permissible limits. We construct a database from annual filings of open‐end domestic equity mutual funds covering 17 years from 2000 to 2016. Eighteen percent of funds borrowed money for leverage within that time. We find that borrowing funds underperform their nonborrowing peers by 62 basis points per year on a total return basis, while also incurring greater risk. After accommodating for the greater risk taking, we find that borrowers underperform by 48 to 72 basis points annually. By contrast, funds that use derivatives and other financial instruments perform about as well as unlevered mutual funds, before and after adjusting for risk, and with less volatility. This suggests that many mutual funds use derivatives to hedge risk rather than as a substitute for leverage through the capital structure. Thus borrowing may present a greater risk than derivatives, which have received more attention than borrowing. Fund investors and regulators would benefit from greater transparency into mutual fund capital structure.

Do bond issuers successfully time the market? To answer this question, we compare market conditions on an issue day with conditions on days in a window around the issue day. We find that compared with windows of 21 days around issue days, bond issuers time the risk-free rate better than pure chance, with an average gain of 8 basis points; bond issuers also time the CDS spread better than pure chance, with an average gain of 12 basis points. Issuers who issue bonds more frequently do better than less frequent issuers do. Both risk-free rates and CDS spreads are lower on days when shelf-registered bonds are issued than they are on the days surrounding the issue days. Only CDS spreads are lower on days when privately placed bonds are issued.

US corporate default rates increased dramatically from an annual average of 0.32% between 1950 and 1984 up to 1.65% since 1985. Meanwhile, credit spreads rose by just 6 basis points. We argue that financial development—intended as an exogenous reduction in the fixed cost of borrowing—accounts for this evidence. In a heterogeneous firm model financial development boosts both default rates and firms’ expected recovery rates. These two effects offset each other, muting the change in the credit spreads. The model explains 63% of the rise in default rates and predicts a 6 basis point drop in the credit spreads.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of mayors’ corruption on the municipal interest rate set by lenders. Design/methodology/approach The sample consists of a panel data for all the Spanish cities with population over 50,000 for 2002–2013 (130 municipalities). In line with previous literature and the structure of the panel data, the authors use a generalized method of moments equation to the main model and three robustness checks. Findings The results, robust to different specifications, indicate that banks do not take mayors’ corruption as a significant risk component of the municipal solvency. The data show a “corruption premium” ranging from −1 to 33 basis points, which aligns with the size of the “corruption premium” found by the literature, but the significance is low. This finding is connected, on the one hand, with the rigid, thorough Spanish legal framework ruling municipal financial management, and on the other hand, with the characteristics of mayors’ corruption. Robust evidence shows that key financial indicators influence interest rates: current saving, with a strong influence, and level of indebtedness, to a lesser extent. Besides, more populated cities pay lower interest rates. Research limitations/implications The main limitation stems from the calculation of interest rate, because but sharp debt changes may decrease the accuracy. Practical implications The data prove that banks value this surplus as a sign of solvency and set lower interest rates. Considering that this financial indicator is key for setting the interest rate, as a point for practitioners, current saving should be monitored by the municipal financial officer, as a way to reduce the financial cost. Besides, legislation should consider current saving as a benchmark to set balanced budget rules or to establish conditions for municipalities to get into greater indebtedness. Originality/value This is the first research on municipal interest rate premium due to corruption in Spain.

Purpose The European Parliament and Commission are considering introducing a green supporting factor (GSF) or brown penalty (BP) for capital reserve requirements. This paper aims to estimate the potential impact such a policy intervention may have on both capital reserves of European banks and the cost and availability of capital to “green” and “brown” investments. Design/methodology/approach The paper draws on the existing empirical and theoretical literature on the impacts of changes to capital reserve requirements on the real economy. It applies these estimates on the particular policy intervention currently being discussed at EU level to estimate the potential range of impacts on the cost of capital – measured in basis points – and the availability of capital – measured in per cent changes to lending. Findings A GSF would have a limited effect on overall capital requirements of banks compared to a BP – given the larger universe of assets on which such a penalty would be applied. The estimated effect is a reduction in capital requirements associated with a GSF of around €3-4bn based on baseline “green” definitions. In terms of cost of capital, the paper estimates a reduction of 5 to 26 basis points for green projects (with inverse expected effects for a BP). In terms of availability of capital, analysing a BP suggests a potential reduction in lending to brown assets of up to 8 per cent. Originality/value The paper provides direct evidence, with the first quantitative analysis of the potential impact of the current policy proposition discussed at EU-level.

In this work we deal mostly with the recent (2008-present) Federal Reserve operated monetary policies, which are two unprecedented and distinct monetary policy regimes. The Zero Interest Rate Regime (2008:12-2015:11) and the New Regime (2015:12-2018:12). These different monetary policy regimes provided various outcomes for inflation, interest rates, financial markets, personal consumption, personal savings, real economic growth, and social welfare. Some of the important results are that monetary policy appears to be able to affect long-term real interest rates, risk, the prices of the financial assets, and very little the real personal consumption, personal savings, and the real economic growth during the recent period of extreme monetary policy, in which the Fed held short-term interest rates abnormally low for an extended period (2008-2015) and the present time, which keeps the federal funds rate below the inflation rate. The Fed’s interest rate target was set during those seven years at 0% to 0.25%. On December 16, 2015, the Fed started increasing the target rate by 25 basis points approximately in each FOMC meeting, from 0.25% to 0.50% to 0.75%, and presently to 2.50%. We want to explain the low level of long-term interest rates and the real rate of interest (cost of capital) in the economy. The evidence suggests that it is the Fed the main cause of the low (negative) real interest rate following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This monetary policy was not very effective (the zero interest rate target of the Fed). It has created a new bubble in the financial market, future inflation, and a redistribution of wealth from risk-averse savers to banks and risk-taker speculators. In addition, it has increased the risk (RP) by making the real risk-free rate of interest negative. The effects on growth, prices, and employment were gradual and very small, due to outsourcing and unfair trade policies, which have affected negatively the social welfare. The dual mandate (price stability and maximum employment) of the Fed is not sufficient to maximize the social welfare of the country.

I study the pricing of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on FOMC announcement days. I add to Savor and Wilson (2014) and Du and Hu (2015) by documenting that ADRs yield a significant fraction of their cumulative excess returns (about 36.16%) on FOMC announcement days characterized by a negative monetary surprise that account for less than 1% of total trading days between January 1997 and December 2016. One potential explanation might be found in the economically and statistically highly significant world market risk premia in the magnitude of 55.81 basis points on FOMC meeting days with negative monetary surprise.

We assess the impact of the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP), the corporate arm of the ECB’s quantitative easing policy, in its first year of activity (June 2016 – May 2017). Focusing on the primary bond market, we find evidence of a significant impact of the CSPP on yield spreads, both directly on targeted bonds and indirectly via the portfolio rebalancing channel. While spreads on eligible bonds have declined since the start of the programme (by 60 basis points in 2016), non-eligible bonds remained unaffected until 2017, when the entire corporate market recorded a further decline in spreads of 56 basis points.

I examine the ability of the U.S. investor protection regime to limit insider trading returns, absent Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the short-swing rule). I find that in this setting, U.S. insiders execute short-swing trades that i) beat the market by approximately 15 basis points per day and ii) systematically divest ahead of disappointing earnings announcements. These results indicate that the bright-line rule restricting short-horizon round-trip insider trading plays a substantial role in protecting outside investors from privately informed insiders in the United States.

Auto lenders were perhaps the biggest winners of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform. Cars depreciate quickly, so borrowers often owe more than their car is worth. Prior to the Reform, these borrowers could reduce the principal on their auto loan to the market value of the car through a ?cramdown? in Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Reform prohibited cramdowns during the first two and a half years of an auto loan. This paper is the first to estimate the causal effect of this anticramdown provision on the price and quantity of auto credit. The authors use a novel empirical strategy that relies on the fact that eliminating cramdowns affected only one of the two types of consumer bankruptcy: Chapter 13. They exploit persistent historical variation in states? usage of Chapter 13 generated by differences in local legal culture. Using difference-in-differences regressions, their empirical strategy compares pre-Reform and post-Reform auto loans across states with persistent historical differences in the share of bankruptcies filed under Chapter 13. They find that eliminating cramdowns decreased interest rates on auto loans in the average state by 15 basis points, with a larger decline in states where Chapter 13 is more common. The decline in interest rates occurs in the exact month that the Reform went into effect, and the authors rule out other aspects of the Reform as possible causes. Next, the authors estimate the effect on the quantity of auto credit. Using quarterly data from the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel based on Equifax credit reports, they examine the effect of eliminating cramdowns on the number and size of new auto loans. The estimates show a small, negative, and insignificant impact on the number of new auto loans. The authors do find some evidence, however, that loan sizes increased among subprime borrowers.

The introduction of collective action clauses in advanced economies’ sovereign bonds is an understudied phenomenon. An important concern is whether these clauses produce segmentation, pushing apart the price of those bonds issued with and without collective action clauses (CACs). This paper uses the introduction in 2013 of mandatory two-limb CACs in euro area sovereign bonds issued under domestic law to evaluate the price impact of these provisions. In the euro area, bonds with CACs trade at a small premium. On average for those bonds, yields were up to six basis points lower. This average, however, masks heterogeneity. While Germany and Netherlands have not seen a sustained reduction in borrowing costs, in Italy and Spain the effect has been large (between five and ten basis points). These findings support the argument that the introduction of euro CACs in domestic law bonds helped investors reassess the risks associated with those instruments in both countries. impact of these provisions. In the euro area, bonds with CACs trade with a small premium. On average, for those bonds yields were up to six basis points lower. This average, however, masks heterogeneity. While Germany and Netherlands have not seen a sustained reduction in borrowing costs, in Italy and Spain the effect has been large (between five and ten basis points). These findings provide support to the argument that the introduction of euro CACs in domestic law bonds helped investors reassess the risk associated with those instruments in both two countries

This paper identifies anticipated (news) and unanticipated (surprise) shocks to the U.S. Fed Funds rate using Fed Funds futures contracts, and assesses their propagation to emerging economies. Anticipated shocks are identified as the expected change in the Fed Funds rate orthogonal to expected U.S. business cycle conditions while unanticipated shocks are the one-step ahead forecast error. Anticipated shocks explain around half of the narrative series of U.S. monetary policy shocks. To identify the effects of both shocks, I estimate a Panel VAR using a sample of emerging economies. An anticipated 25 basis points contractionary U.S. interest rate shock induces a fall of 0.5% in GDP from its trend two quarters before the shock materializes. Both anticipated and unanticipated changes in the U.S. interest rate cause significant and quantitatively similar effects. The increase of the U.S. BAA corporate spread in response to both shocks significantly exacerbates the response of emerging economies. After accounting for anticipation, U.S. interest rate shocks explain 14% of business cycle fluctuations in emerging economies.

There have been various studies of potential violations of put-call parity in US equity options markets, and the purpose of this study is to examine one potential explanation of these anomalous results. Cremers and Weinbaum [1] indicate a potential trading strategy that can obtain excess returns of up to 50 basis points per week, which is quite remarkable. However, none of these studies consider the fact that options markets have historically maintained different trading hours than those of their underlying security markets. While the US stock market has traditionally closed at 3:00 PM CST, options markets have variously closed between 3:10 and 3:02 PM CST over the past two decades. Using over ten million individual options implied volatility estimations since 1996, it is documented that these anomalies have all but disappeared since stock and option markets synchronized their trading hours. Beginning in the late 1990’s, stock prices often move slightly or to a larger degree in “after-hours” trading, enabled by the advent of electronic trading platforms. Options markets that are still open may adjust to subsequent stock market movements, although closing stock prices are reported as of 3:00 PM CST. Prior studies may have ignored these effects, and this is the first study to indicate that apparent deviations from put-call parity have decreased markedly over recent years, if they were ever economically significant at all.

Between June 2004 and December 2005 the Federal Reserve conducted a relatively aggressive contractionary policy that saw a steady increase in the effective federal funds rate of over300 basis points. Yet the 10-year treasury rate fluctuated little over 60 basis points and ultimately declined slightly over the period. This was dubbed Greenspan’s Conundrum after a famous speech by the former chairperson in February 2005. This highlights the importance of understanding the efficacy with which the central bank may impact term premia through changes in the short-term rate. I find hikes in interest rates lead to reductions in rate spreads at first, before turning positive roughly about a year post shock. These findings are statistically significant for a variety of interest rate spreads over two different samples. Following a contractionary monetary policy action, the yield curve experiences a clockwise tilt at first and an eventual counterclockwise rotation after some delay. A counterfactual analysis suggests that augmenting the federal funds rate hike of 2004 with a similar action to the Fed’s 2011 Operation Twist—but conducive to contraction rather than expansion—could have mitigated Greenspan’s Conundrum of 2004–2005.

This study examines the effect of the lender’s social capital on the link between the borrower’s social capital and the cost of bank loans. We exploit the last financial crisis as an exogenous shock to trust during which social capital becomes more valuable. Our findings suggest that when a lender’s social capital is high, borrowers with high social capital pay 46.22 basis points less on their bank loans than those with low social capital., Cette étude examine l’effet du capital social du prêteur sur le lien entre le capital social de l’emprunteur et le coût des prêts bancaires. On a exploité la dernière crise financière, comme un choc exogène à la confiance des acteurs du marché financier, au cours duquel le capital social a pris plus de valeur. Nos résultats suggèrent que lorsque le capital social du prêteur est élevé, les emprunteurs ayant un capital social élevé paient 46,22 points de base de moins sur leurs prêts bancaires que les emprunteurs ayant un capital social faible., En este trabajo se estudia el efecto del capital social del prestador sobre el vínculo entre el capital social del prestatario y el coste de los préstamos bancarios. Se ha aprovechado la última crisis financiera como un choque exógeno de confianza, durante la cual el capital social se volvió más valioso. Los resultados sugirieron que cuando el capital social de un prestador es alto, los prestatarios con alto capital social pagan 46.22 puntos básicos menos en sus préstamos bancarios que aquellos que lo tienen más bajo.

Though most central banks actively intervene on the foreign exchange market, the literature offers mixed evidence on their effectiveness: particularly for unannounced interventions. We use new, declassified data from the archives of the Bank of England and the institutional features of the Bretton Woods era to estimate the effects of intervention on the exchange rate. We find that a purchase of pounds equivalent to 1% of the money supply causes a statistically significant, 4-5 basis point appreciation in the pound.

We study the impact of mortgage lender concentration on household credit access. An extensive literature has found little to no relationship between local lender concentration and mortgage interest rates; consequently, federal regulators regard mortgage markets as national and view their local concentration as irrelevant to financial regulation and monetary policy. We argue that this view is incomplete, showing that although local concentration has no influence on interest rates, it strongly affects lending standards and upfront fees. In more concentrated areas, mortgage application rejection rates are higher (this effect is particularly pronounced for low-income, female, and racial-minority applicants), and the pool of originated mortgages is less risky in terms of both ex-ante credit scores and ex-post default. On the intensive margin, lenders charge higher fees in more concentrated markets: non-interest fees are on average 35 basis points higher in the 10% most concentrated markets than in the 10% least concentrated markets. Again, these effects are strongest among minority applicants. Our findings suggest that contrary to current policy, regulators concerned with credit access should regard mortgage markets as local when making policy decisions such as bank merger approvals.

A major puzzle in financial contracting is consumers' aversion to adjustable rates. In the mortgage market, the empirical mix of contracts (80% fixed-rate) is inconsistent with standard life-cycle consumption models. We argue that these choices reflect the longlasting effect of the Great Inflation, and have sizable welfare implications. First, we show that consumers who have experienced higher inflation expect higher future interest-rate increases, which explains their preference for fixed-rate financing. Next, we quantify the influence of personal inflation experiences on mortgage financing using linked data from the Census Bureau's Residential Finance Survey. We estimate a discrete-choice model over mortgage financing alternatives. The structural parameters indicate that one additional percentage point of experienced inflation increases a borrower's willingness to pay for a fixed-rate mortgage by 6 to 14 basis points, compared to the adjustable-rate alternative in a given origination year. This experience effect has a major impact on the product mix of FRMs versus ARMs: Nearly one in seven households would switch to an ARM if not for the longlasting effect of personal inflation experiences. Our simulations suggest that households who would otherwise have switched pay $8,000-$16,000 in year-2000, after-tax dollars for the embedded inflation protection of the FRM.