Search

What do we learn from Turkey and Tunisia regarding the relationship between political Islamism and democratization? Variables identified by current research such as autonomy, “moderation”, and cooperation with secular actors can cut both ways depending on various political-institutional conditions and prerogatives. Particularly, the article argues that preoccupation with “conquering the state from within as opposed to democratizing it” has been a key priority and intervening variable undermining the democratizing potential of the main Turkish and Tunisian political Islamic actors – primarily the AKP and Ennahda. These actors have prioritized acceptance by and ownership of their respective nation states over other goals and strategies, such as revolutionary takeover or Islamization of the state and confrontations with state elites. This has led to a relative neglect of designing and building institutions, whether for Islamic or democratic transformation. Hence, while contributing to democratization at various stages, these actors have a predisposition to adopt and regenerate, reframe and at times augment the authoritarian properties of their states. Research should ask how secular and religious actors can agree on institutions of vertical and horizontal state accountability that would help to address the past and present sources of the interest of political Islamists in conquering rather than democratizing the state. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Based on a within-case comparative analysis of Turkish democratization since the 1920s and data on elite values, this article develops a general theoretical framework to better explain the moderation of religious and secular politics and democratization. First, it is maintained that the content of moderation and its effects on democracy will vary across countries depending on its domestic and international context – called a country's “centre” – and political rivals’ reactions. Second, moderation can further democratization only insofar as it happens with a democratic centre. Third, absent a democratic centre, moderation may involve adoption, retention and reproduction of the centre's undemocratic attributes. In such cases, the challenge of democratization is not moderation per se but the construction of a new, democratic centre by transcending the existing centre. Fourth, moderation is interactive between religious and secular actors, multidimensional and reversible. Turkish democratization began with the moderation of authoritarian-secular actors, but generated only a semi-democracy because the changes were not institutionalized through explicit and formal compromises to produce a fully democratic centre. Turkish political Islamism moderated during the 1990s. But, despite major achievements, democratization remained ambiguous under the rule of moderate Islamists because they compromised and associated themselves with the semi-democratic centre, and secular-religious cooperation failed while some secular actors de-moderated. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Do political-Islamic elites need to be democrats for participation in democracy, how do their values compare to secular elites’, and how do their values change through participation and affect democratization itself? A comparative-systematic content analysis of three Islamic-conservative and two pro-secular Turkish newspapers over nine years shows that, overall, political-Islamic elites adopt democratic political values. Furthermore, they began to view that liberal-democratic rights and freedoms serve their interests. However, value democratization, and, thus, moderation and democratization, is not a linear and inexorable process automatically resulting from participation or socioeconomic development. It occurs through ruptures such as conflicts with secular actors, and interdependently through the interactions of secular and religious actors. Hence, religious actors’ adoption of more democracy may paradoxically make some secular actors less democratic. The consolidation of pluralistic democracy requires the emergence of both religious and secular democrats by resolving complex problems of commitment, and of clashes in areas like social pluralism where Islamic values are less open to change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

By modelling and analysing Turkey's Kurdish question in light of democratic transition theories, the Scottish Case and recent developments, this article explains the lack of cooperation between the 'moderate' Turkish majority and Kurdish actors pursuing peace and European Union membership. It analyses whether there may be more cooperation in the near future and discusses implications for theories of political moderation. A 'most different case', Scotland, helps in explaining the Turkish case and in avoiding mono-causal explanations based on cultural stereotypes. Among other factors and unlike the Scottish case, cooperation in the Turkish-Kurdish case is constrained by relations with Iraqi Kurds and the difficulty of identifying the moderates: Kurdish actors moderate in the sense of renouncing violence often make more hard-line political and conceptual claims than violent actors do. Theories need more multifaceted conceptualizations of moderation. The recent electoral success of the ruling political party and the presence of a Kurdish political party in Parliament may enable more moderate-moderate cooperation in the future. This will occur if potentially moderate actors can distance themselves from violence and choose conceptual and political compromise over coercion, and if Turkey, Iraqi-Kurds and the United States can reach an agreement on cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]