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This article discusses the book "Fear, Power, and Hubris: Why the United States Invaded Iraq" by historian Melvyn Leffler. The book offers a revisionist analysis of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, presenting a sympathetic view of the Bush administration's motivations. Leffler argues that fear, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, played a significant role in shaping the administration's actions. While acknowledging the poor planning and execution of the war, Leffler emphasizes the officials' earnest intentions to protect the nation from further attacks. The article also highlights some criticisms of the book, including its sympathetic tone and use of politicized terminology. Overall, the book provides important insights into the decision-making process behind the Iraq War and its long-term consequences. [Extracted from the article]

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The use of biological material as a weapon of war is as old as the war conflicts themselves, but after the signing, in 1972, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (CABT), its military use has practically disappeared. However, it has become part of the attacks of terrorist groups, which constitute a real threat to National Security. Biological weapons are included within the group of so-called "weapons of mass destruction" and include all types of agents, microbial or not, viral, natural or recombinant, and their derived toxins. Among the key factors in the development of this type of intentional biological threats, it is worth mentioning the increase in the appearance of emerging pathogens, the great development of genetic modification and editing technologies, such as CRISPR/Cas9, or the diversion and smuggling of sensitive precursors and materials. To this end, the following measures have been implemented: launch of the National Biosecurity Commission; control of dual-use material exports; strengthening of the Security and Protection Area of the Customs and Special Taxes Department of the Tax Agency; development of the Network of Biological Alert Laboratories (RE-LAB), coordinated by the Carlos III Health Institute; collaboration of the Spanish Technical Assistance and Emergency Response Teams (START). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores how great powers have continued to build their autonomous weapons capacity and have resisted any efforts to ban autonomous weapons on humanitarian grounds. It mentions that states anticipate that autonomous weapons may potentially bring about a new form of warfare, with heavy implications for international security.

The article explores how great powers have continued to build their autonomous weapons capacity and have resisted any efforts to ban autonomous weapons on humanitarian grounds. It mentions that states anticipate that autonomous weapons may potentially bring about a new form of warfare, with heavy implications for international security.

The Obama administration has approved an upgrade to the B61 nuclear bomb that will, through use of a new tail kit assembly, become a guided standoff nuclear bomb. If the upgrade—the 12th modification of the original B61 design—is pursued as planned, the US Air Force will obtain the low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapon it first sought in the 1990s, despite concerns that it could increase the likelihood of use. The weapon’s overall price tag is expected to exceed $10 billion, with each B61-12 estimated to cost more than the value of its weight in gold. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The United States maintains huge stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons use—far larger than needed for any conceivable military contingency. After disposing of the plutonium it has designated as excess to military requirements, the United States will retain enough for some 10,000 nuclear weapons. After disposing of HEU it has deemed excess, the United States will have enough for 10,000 to 16,000 nuclear weapons. Though still grossly oversized, the US nuclear arsenal has dropped to somewhat fewer than 5,000 weapons, including those in reserve. The United States should declare all fissile material above the amount needed for 5,000 weapons as excess to military needs and dispose of it expeditiously. To reduce the risk that terrorists could steal and use US plutonium to make a nuclear weapon, the United States should directly dispose of excess plutonium rather than using it to fuel reactors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

He relied on primary sources from apartheid South Africa and Baathist Iraq to illustrate how those governments employed CW to protect regimes from internal threats.[23] Non-state CW use and assassinations with CW A&H identify eight non-state CW users between 1939 and 2018, but much higher numbers have been offered elsewhere. Nor are they correct to claim that no case studies have examined the role of deterrence in preventing CW use.[10] Indeed, there is compelling evidence that some countries did consider the use of CW, and that threats of retaliation deterred them from doing so. Robinson identified more than eighty instances in which a state supposedly employed CW, but he felt sufficiently confident of the evidence to include only nine in his list of verified state CW employment.[18] He makes the following observation about such allegations: Most of these reports, however, turn out to lack independent verification, and many appear, on closer examination, frankly incredible. It thus was heartening to see Damir Kovacevi'c, Afrimadona, and Martin Claar (KAC) offer a quantitative study to assess the relative roles of deterrence and norms compliance in state decisions to employ chemical weapons (CW). [Extracted from the article]

This article refutes the claim that the Libyan weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs was discovered by the U.S. only through its intelligence community. A deeper review uncovers what might be termed as an iron law of intelligence: as the political salience of an issue rises, the difficulty of deriving objective intelligence estimates increases exponentially. It is not true that the outlines of the Libyan programs were visible only through intelligence. The story of Libya's WMD programs, its voluntary disarmament, and U.S. intelligence appreciations of these developments, is a fable for the age of nuclear proliferation.

The article discusses how opposition in the American Catholic hierarchy against the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is building up. In their annual meeting last November in Washington D. C., the bishops strongly supported the second draft entitled "The Challenge of Peace God's Promise and Our Response." Not only have the bishops informed the present Administration that they will not easily accept military interests and policies. They also opposed some specific programs such as first strike and hard target kill weapons. The second draft merits special consideration due to the way it addresses the controversial issues of use and deterrence of nuclear weapons.

The article focuses on the relationship between nuclear power and the spread of nuclear weapons capability. Along with characterization of the benefits of nuclear power, one should also mention the liabilities associated with this energy source. Some analysts argue that the motivation for the acquisition of nuclear weapons is purely political and the spread of nuclear arms can be prevented through political barriers only. However, they ignore the nonpolitical barriers and dismiss a wide range of options which can help in slowing the spread of weapons-relevant technology.

The article discusses American students' outlook towards contributing their talents and services in producing nuclear weapons. It discusses mixed reactions to the question of making weapons of mass destruction, from aspiring engineers and scientists. To some, more than the moral aspect, economic aspect of taking up the job bothered. Some opined that if the country needed, they wouldn't mind doing it. Some regard it as an unpleasant likelihood, when they would do it out of personal or national emergency. However, nearly everyone cherished the job of researching in nuclear energy.

The article discusses various issues that highlight the significance of an international chemical weapons convention. Chemical weapons conventions should be negotiated before nations accept chemical weapons as conventional agents of war. Actual weapons and equipment for the dissemination of chemical warfare agents should be prohibited. It also informs that all chemical warfare agents should be covered by a prohibition to develop, produce or stockpile them, with regard to the scope of a chemical warfare convention.

The article discusses the implications of the narrowing gap between the destructive power of nuclear and conventional weapons for the United States' approach to armament. The dwindling practical significance of the so-called nuclear threshold bolsters the case for intergovernmental negotiation using qualitative conventional arms limitation as framework. Such a framework, however, has proved inadequate in regard to the criteria of illegality in weapons, and to the concepts of military necessity and proportionality. The use of the laws of war as framework, on the other hand, often suffers from the exclusion of humanitarian emotiveness. The author recommends combining the subtle treatment of security politics and humanitarian concepts into these approaches.

The article reports on the increasing probability of nuclear war as evident in the advances of technology and its worldwide spread. Other main reasons for this conclusion are also mentioned. The United States and Soviet Union have its own strategic nuclear arsenals, however, the recent qualitative developments in offensive and defensive strategic weapons and delivery system are as dangerous, if not more so. A table on the U.S. and Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Systems from 1968-1977, World Nuclear Power Capacity in Operation, and World Military Expenditure are also presented.

The article discusses the origins of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. It states that the laboratory is an outgrowth of America's desire to be the first with the hydrogen bomb. The race between two U. S. scientific laboratories, Los Alamos and Livermore, paved the way for the nation's great leap forward in nuclear weapons design and deployment in the 1950s. The section offers reflections and insights from the scientist who first directed the Livermore lab, including its history and some significant pointers it.

The article reports on the military plan of using nuclear weapons of the U.S. armed forces against Soviet Union. The plan states that more nuclear missiles would be dropped on Soviet military and industrial targets rather than on cities. An effort is also exerted in making the accuracy and explosive power of these weapons increased. Discussions about the nuclear warfare policy of two groups, with the first group concerned on making sure that war will not occur and the second group on assuring that U.S. will win if the war should occur, are presented.

The article focuses on the benefits of the arms limitation conferences for the participants from various countries. According to the author, the most important function of the arms limitations talks is to provide the internal policy-making bodies of each country a better understanding of the full depth of their national interests and how these may affect other countries. The author believes that the overall goal of negotiations about arms limitation will undoubtedly be achieved. In addition, the crucial function of strategic arms is to make sure the use of weapons as defense will not pose a threat to other nations.

The article focuses on the increase military technology in Western and Communist countries, as well as in the Third World. It states that military technology is associated with synergistic challenges to human ingenuity, good will and foresight. Factors constituting to these synergistic challenges which include the military technology itself, the dynamics of interaction between and among nations, and the domestic political and economic forces are discussed. Consequently, it provides technical approach in gaining control over military technology. Furthermore, the article stresses the need for an informed, alert and concerned citizenry, ready to meet the challenges.

The article reports on the challenges faced by the international community on its efforts towards achieving disarmament. Disarmament has become a more lively topic since the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is both hope of success, and fear of failure of any agreement being too late. The hope is kindled by the negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for a strategic arms limitation treaty. But there is also a great fear that the negotiation may be too late to stop the triple escalation of the arms race which is in progress.

The article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear energy for civilian and military purposes. In civilian purposes, nuclear energy is a good power source alternative with benefits ranging from cheaper costs and larger electrical generating capacity, however, the downside is high capital investment and environmental issues. In military cases, nuclear energy is an important tool for war protection, however, the abuse of using such element is so destructive. These characteristics of nuclear energy are of much concern because even though it can be beneficial, it can also be of great danger to the human race.

The article analyzes certain aspects in the selection and potential use of communicable disease agents for biological warfare. While epidemiologists can formulate the set of circumstances which determine epidemics, the great number of biological variables involved in the host-parasite-environment complex frustrates attempts at quantitative or qualitative prediction of individual epidemics. The use of mathematical probability theory to improve predictability in the inception and development of an epidemic has met thus far with little success, although work has been fairly meager in this field.

The article presents a scientist's perspective of issues and topics concerning movements for the cessation of nuclear weapons testing. The author has been one of those who have been involved in the development of the first weapons of mass destruction. Even before the development of the first atomic bomb, it became clear to the scientific world that there existed the possibility of developing a new source of power, whose first manifestations probably, almost certainly, could be turned into destructive channels. This realization has turned the minds of many people with even greater intensity to the determination of ending the arms race and preserve peace for all of humanity.

The article reflects the author's view regarding the cessation of bomb tests between Russia and U.S. He believes that continuation of testing for the purpose of developing bombs which are suitable for being carried by anti-missile missiles that may be developed for the purpose of destroying incoming long-range rockets in flight is a futile arms race. He stresses that if it were really true that the development of the anti-missile missiles requires the further development of bombs rather than of missiles, then the stopping of bomb tests might perhaps serve the purpose of preventing the futile arms race to which the development of anti-missile missiles might lead. Other arguments, contentions, and analyses of the author are presented.

The article reflects on the problems presented with the advent of the atomic bomb and other weapons of mass destruction. In the years after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, men of good will have thought that the problem posed by the bomb could be solved by getting rid of it in the foreseeable future. However, no one can be certain that this is, or that it ever really was, a promising approach to the problem. America and Russia might well be forced to retain for an indefinite period of time. For one, or more than one generation, substantial stockpiles of large hydrogen bombs, as well as the means suitable for their delivery.

The article offers information about the development of a hydrogen bomb that can be considered a cleaner superbomb that can be perceived as a humanitarian weapon. The index of dirtiness is the measure of relative dirtiness of the bomb, which will depend upon the ratio of the energy released by fusion and fission. However, the development of a cleaner superbomb has presented the military with a choice of weapons. Nonetheless, science has not succeeded in making it any cleaner. War will always remain to be a dirty business.

The article focuses on the limitation of using nuclear weapons in times of war and the factors that should be considered by scientists in developing weapons and techniques during warfare. It cites the effects of the first nuclear weapon that have devastated Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and have implicated that in the context of world power, all precedents in the politico-strategic sphere are irrelevant. It also mentions the viewpoints of several notable politicians such as Belgian Minister M. Spaak and Lord Russell on the deterrent effect of hydrogen bombs during warfare. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of limiting the use of tactical weapons in wars.

The article reports on problems facing social scientists in the atomic age. One of the most firmly established generalizations about social change is that, over the long sweep of time, technological development has been accelerating. The most spectacular example of this cultural acceleration is in military technology. The development of fission and fusion nuclear bombs is a specific instance of the immense increases in destructive power which are now taking place in this accelerating development.

The article offers insights on the nuclear weapons policy in United States. It is a popular knowledge that nuclear weapons were incorporated by the government in the plans for the defense of Europe. They were developed for many tactical military uses such as on anti-submarine campaign, air campaign and ground campaign. According to the author, there are three reforms which the U.S. government should consider concerning its nuclear policies. The first action concerns the need of the U.S. government to be open to its officials, representatives and people regarding nuclear-related information. The second one concerns the need of the government to be open to its major allies regarding its nuclear technology and the last one, concerns the improvement of civil defense.

The author comments on the book "Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy," by P.M.S. Blackett. He states that Blackett's estimates of about 400 improved bombs required to do damage to Germany is a narrow and cautious one since it ignores the fact that atomic bombs cause human losses compared to ordinary bombs. He adds that Blackett does not expect the Soviets to have bombs and his extreme appraisal on any war could bring ravage to modern society. He contends that the remarkable aspects of Blackett's book are easy to point out and his conclusion that atomic weapons will justify the Soviets' plan to enslave other countries of Eastern Europe. Lastly, he points out that the book possesses advantage of refusing the theories that atomic energy is an important decisive military factor.

This article focuses on weapons of mass destruction. In February 2004, the U.S. President George W. Bush established the "WMD Commission" in response to public demands for a deeper inquiry into the fiasco of pre-war intelligence. Bush widened the post-mortem beyond Iraq to cover weapons of mass destruction in general. He ordered the investigation to be secret and told the commission to report by March 31, 2005, which it did. Despite flaws, the report is essential reading for anyone seriously interested not only in the Iraq intelligence issue but also in broader questions of proliferation. In nearly 600 pages of history and prescription, the commission report delves into five major cases (Iraq, Libya, Al Qaeda, Iran, and North Korea) and provides nine chapters of analysis, with suggestions on intelligence organization and proliferation management. Bush selected a strong group of commissioners, but they had very little knowledge of or experience with intelligence work. The final report is surprisingly good, given the commission's starting point.

This paper describes a conceptual model to identify and interrelate indicators of intent of non-state actors to use chemical or biological weapons. The model expands on earlier efforts to understand intent to use weapons of mass destruction by building upon well-researched theories of intent and behavior and focusing on a sub-set of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to account for the distinct challenges of employing different types of WMD in violent acts. The conceptual model is presented as a first, critical step in developing a computational model for assessing the potential for groups to use chemical or biological weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the views of the author on the need for an international security system that is limited to defensive weapons. Despite several arms control treaties signed among nations, the last two-and-a-half decades have seen the development of weapons of mass destruction, the accumulation of nuclear weapons by superpowers, and huge military expenditures.