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Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Logos: A Journal, of Religion, Philosophy Comparative Cultural Studies & Art (08687692) is the property of Logos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

From October 1940, the activity of the German Military Mission to Romania had multiple consequences over the Romanian-German relations during the regime of Ion Antonescu. The presence of the German troops marked not only Romania's irreversible entry into the German sphere of influence and the beginning of the process of readjustment of the Romanian army to the requirements of modern warfare, but also Romania's involvement in the military plans of the Third Reich. The role of the German Military Mission as a "transmission belt" between the Wehrmacht and the Romanian army would become apparent during the preparations of the operations "Marita" and especially "Barbarossa". To this end, one of the most important tasks of the German Military Mission was to evaluate the combat capacity of the Romanian army in view of the projected operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an overall assessment of the effects based approach to operations. This operating concept emerged during the 1991 Gulf War as a new approach to military targeting; but it evolved as a revolutionary methodology for the planning, conduction and assessment of operations based on the integration of diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments. Encumbered as one of the guiding principles of the military transformation processes, this operating concept was employed in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Lebanon. However, its limited applicability, its mediocre results and the development of new models for the management of complex crisis have entailed its disappearance of the world’s transformational agendas.

The American Civil War (1861-1865) and the Wars of German Unification (1864-1871) have overshadowed the military history of the Second War of Italian Unification (1859-1861). Yet, this war witnessed the integral use of railroads and steam-powered navies to achieve military victory. The histories immediately following the war purposely obscured the extensive military planning and the premeditation of the Franco-Piedmontese general staffs. The Second War of Italian Unification should be given greater attention as one of the first "modern" wars of the industrial age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late eighteenth century, an advisor to the governor of China's Hunan province, Yan Ruyi, tendered a proposal to build fortifications in the west Hunan area of Pushi as, among other advantages, this would improve the regional geomancy (known in Chinese as fengshui). This essay explores why a reference to fengshui is found in a Qing dynasty defense report and, in this context, what relationship geomancy had to military arts in China's imperial history. As will be seen, Yan's readers would not have found the reference odd. Chinese fengshui and military arts share an environmental focus and key concepts (qi and shi), as well as a long history of the use of fengshui methods in intelligencegathering, sabotage, and walled fortification. This compatibility made geomantic considerations significant to both imperial military planning and "militarized" middle Qing culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to traditional narratives the tactic of shock charges imported from Sweden replaced the caracole, a maneuver which involved successive ranks of cavalry advancing, firing their pistols, and retreating to reload, during the English Civil War. A successful cavalry charge was supposed to depend on close order and momentum to maximize the shock of impact. But this theory of shock is anachronistic. Physical shock is largely absent from early seventeenth century English drill books and eyewitness accounts of Civil War battles. The laws of physics and vidence from racing accidents show that if close-order shock charges could be achieved they could not give any tactical advantage. There is similarly little evidence for the continued use of the caracole into this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ancient historians have demonstrated that Edward Luttwak's The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire does not accurately describe Roman grand strategy, and many conclude that there was no Roman imperial grand strategy. But the grand strategy of the Roman Empire can be studied as long as scholars ask questions that the available sources support. The field of strategic studies defines "grand strategy" as the allocation of a state's resources to meet its major objectives. Surviving sources regarding the patterns of troop movements in the Roman Empire show that emperors decided how to allocate resources empire-wide to meet objectives, and thus thought about grand-strategic issues even if they did not recognize the concept or engage in long-term planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to explain the logiс of the main operations of the Second World War in terms of the Allied strategy that was created and constantly updated in the light of the changing situation at the various fronts at the regular Allied summits. Such a 'grand strategy' is also the key to understand most of the problems of the history of warfare, such as the 'problem of the second front', the refusal to use chemical weapons, or the adoption of the Lend-Lease Act, as well as changes in the concepts of its implementation during the war, starting from the 'concept of proxy war' to the 'concept of pool' and 'globalization'. The understanding of the Allied strategy, as well as the Lend-Lease concept, allows for an analysis of the role of the Northern Convoys in the Second World War, not only as the route for strategic supplies a but also as an important actor of one of the main naval theaters of the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the politics of contemporary Western warfare finds an important reference point in discourses on military design. In the 2010s, military design has become a trending topic in military discourses on command and planning methodology. Since Clausewitz, warfare has been considered a phenomenon characterized by a tension between creativity and linear planning, and the ideal commander as someone with the vision to overcome this. By mapping and analyzing tactical, operational, and strategic narratives and practices, the article illustrates how they emphasize a warfare based both on experimentation and artistry and on traditional operational planning. In so doing, military design relies on reductive military concepts to push the tension identified by Clausewitz towards its extreme end-point, idealizing creativity as an objective of warfare. The article ends by asking to what extent military design risks spilling over into other dimensions of social and political life. It concludes that in pushing creativity as part of war, military design builds on and justifies transgressive political practices with the risk of becoming a vital aspect of future governing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's view relating to space exploration for military purposes in the U.S. The author is soundly skeptical of the aggressive uses of space but he emphasizes the importance of surveillance from space of military developments on land, in the sea,and in space itself. One may believe that every new extention of warfare technology and particularly its extension into space would only heighten the nightmare of the arms race, without giving anybody an important military advantage. If the military planners everywhere were to realize that in this scientific age all earth is an open book, it would lessen the danger of war breaking out by misunderstanding or miscalculations.

The article focuses on the impact of science and technology upon military direction in the U.S. during past two decades since the nineteen-forties. The complementary impetus on scientific progress occasioned by military necessity during the same period has been nothing short of enormous. With over 40 percent of all research funds in the country, now coming directly or indirectly from the Department of Defense, the military has become a principal stockholder in the country’s research organization.

Conventional high-precision weapons play an increasingly important role in the defense of Russia. They may also in the future be important in bilateral conflicts where Russia wants to force its will through. In general, the Russian debate on these weapons is more preoccupied with defensive than offensive scenarios. However, there are also those who argue that (a) conventional high-precision weapons are likely to increase the role of military force in foreign policy generally around the world; (b) for Russia they may be particularly efficient in conflicts with highly developed states, since these states are especially vulnerable because of their high concentration of critical stationary installations; and (c) these weapons may be particularly efficient in combination with other military capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hybrid Warfare is an unofficial intellectual construct to describe the combination or integration of conventional and nonconventional approaches used by adversaries to avoid conventional military strengths, often times occurring below the threshold that would trigger a conventional military. The word "hybrid" is used more for its descriptive value to aid concept writers and military planners in understanding the intersection, interaction, and amplification of trends and conditions that impact the scale and scope of military actions. The paper explains the role of space as an essential characteristic of hybrid warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Austrian Civil War of February 1934, historical accounts produced by the victors and the defeated agreed relatively quickly at least on one point: that the fighting had been a purely male affair, with women either absent altogether from the conflict or reduced to the role of passive victims. This assumption has been also widely shared by academics. Against this background, the article aims to reconstruct the „female“ February 1934. It explores a broad variety of actions undertaken by women including logistics, communication, reconnaissance and even military combat. Additionally, it highlights how women were of tremendous importance psychologically. The obvious relevance of women in any military confrontation with state forces poses the question why most of the activities of women during the February fighting were spontaneous and unplanned. Here, the article argues that military strategists’ decision not to incorporate women into military planning was the result not only of patriarchical preconceptions but also of a strategic judgement. After the clashes of July 1927, the leaders of the Social Democratic Schutzbund forces realigned the organization towards expanding the number of its followers and providing a sphere of activity for radical elements: its potential role as an actual militia, meanwhile, was quietly discounted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to reflect the changes in the current security environment, NATO is adapting its processes and procedures to be more responsive, effective and efficient. This includes implementation of the new NATO Defence Planning process and resulting implications into the operational planning process. The changes are also significantly affecting logistics planning and development of logistics capabilities. Logistics support for NATO operations must be designed the way to reduce the level of duplication of national resources, simplify and streamline logistics flows and to provide NATO Commander with visibility, sufficient authority and flexibility to meet operational requirements. The NATO Commander, to be able to adequately exercise his authority to coordinate and prioritize logistical support, need a visibility of available resources, requirements and processes as the general prerequisite for management of continuous logistic support of operating forces. The article is introducing NATO logistics information systems supporting NATO logistics defence planning as well as operational planning and managing required visibility and information sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents the characteristics of hybrid threats and the environment in which the current and future operations of the military are conducted, showing that a natural and necessary consequence is that their planning, preparation and execution should be adapted and improved. In this context, the use of scenario method in planning operations is the optimal solution for the successful development of this process, regardless of its aim – a contingency plan, training, assessment, experimentation. The main objective of using the scenario method is to eliminate uncertainty. This phenomenon leads to concentrating the efforts of planning structures to provide solutions in planning situations that are stressful because of the time shortage, their importance and/or their degree of uncertainty. In other words, the scenario method is a key instrument in planning the operations that are conducted in hybrid operational environment [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Military Science Review / Hadtudományi Szemle is the property of National University of Public Service and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the association between traditional military planning doctrine and methodology and design reflecting the development of specific and scientific-based military plans in the U.S.

When fighting looms, leaders often focus on the opening rounds rather than ultimate strategic success. The US may be particularly prone to neglect the conflict endgame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the celebration of the 155 years since the establishment of the second Section in the General Staff. It states the major responsibilities of the Romanian Armed Forces at all levels of military art including operational, strategic, and tactical. It discusses the achievements that are specific to the Operations Directorate areas of responsibility which include the compliance and harmonisation with the legislative changes.

Military implications, in the author's opinion, should be defined based on respecting the requirements specific to the assumed objectives. They provide visibility into what is required in order to change the military vision regarding the Alliance assuming the risks associated with security threats in the next two decades and to establish the operational requirements that must be met by future capabilities in order to counter them. Thus, in the operational planning process, one should consider that the military forces missions will be materialised both by conventional and by unconventional actions, and the objectives sought will be associated with those of actors that are other than the military. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The challenge presented by China's military modernization has seemingly altered the conventional balance in the Western Pacific, with significant implications for U.S. national security policy, and, thus, deserves the focus of planners and decision-makers. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The author reflects on the importance of collaboration in military operations focusing on designating assignments to task forces, identifying deadlines, and grouping troops according to area, zone and direction. He discusses the 3 models of cooperation including informational, approval, and directive, and recommends an operational task be established to organize methods. He concludes the one of the challenges in military engagement is establishing coordination and organization.

The article presents a study which describes a quantitative model of evaluating an intentional harm caused by alternative courses of action (COA). Two versions of the "Metric of Evil" model are compared. The effectiveness of quantitative models in assessing the evil associated with military COAs is outlined.

Copyright of Bulletin of the 'Carol I' National Defence University / Buletinul Universitatii Nationale de Aparare 'Carol I' is the property of Carol I National Defence University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The mounting challenge posed by China's military modernization has highlighted the need for the United States to analyze its ability to execute a naval blockade. A blockade strategy is viable, but it would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be engaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support of key regional powers. The United States would also need to implement a mix between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict's strategic context. If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese economy and state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors engage in the debate over waste in military force structure planning by rigorously deconstructing the concept of “redundancy.” First, a typology of redundancy is constructed that provides a common framework for identifying variety among redundant structures. These are labeled “true redundancy,” “expanded capacity,” “portfolio diversification,” and “mission overlap.” Further, a number of mechanisms are identified that produce these types of structures, and show the conditions under which planners may utilize redundant structure in the search for optimization. In sum, the article provides refined concepts for analysts and planners to identify when redundancy is deleterious or beneficial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]