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Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Russian and Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin developed his theory of military art based on the two cornerstone concepts: annihilation and attrition. Yet these concepts frequently have been misunderstood by his critics, who demoted them from the strategic to the operational level. A close examination of Svechin's legacy allows reinstating annihilation and attrition as characterizations of the overall dynamics of war rather than mere styles of warfare freely adopted by a given belligerent. When viewed in the context of operational/strategic distinction, moreover, the Soviet theorist's concepts remain as important and practically applicable today as they were in the early 20th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article utilizes the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method to decide how to choose an effective weapon system for the A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategy at the Sunda Strait, Indonesia's strategic choke point. The main discussion is limited to selecting the types of weapon systems considered effective in implementing A2/AD at Indonesia's strategic choke points. The next step is to decide which primary, secondary, and alternative criteria are the most important. Each of these will then be put together mathematically by measuring consistency using the Consistency Index (CI), the Consistency Ratio (CR), and the Consistency Hierarchy, which is the ranking as the result of the analysis. This method resulting in a weight for the navigation criteria of 66%, projection of 19%, and operability of 16%. Furthermore, in conclusion, the order of the best weapon systems is RBS15 MK4 with a weight of 66%, Brahmos II at 18%, and Neptune 360ST at 16%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military Strategy is the process of matching the resources provided to military power according to the threat. Threat is about the future rather than the present and involves an assessment based on the predictions. In a sense, it is perception. When perception is far from reality, it leads to unnecessary waste of resources or, conversely, to increased risks for countries. This study aims to explain the impact of threat perception on military strategy during the Cold War period through the case of Türkiye. The findings obtained through document analysis are supported by interviews with retired military officers specialized in military strategy. According to the main argument of the article, Türkiye’s threat perception during the Cold War was determined by the United States (US) and Türkiye’s defence design was based on this threat created by the US. Questioning the dimensions and accuracy of the threat revealed that the threat was overestimated. One of the reasons why the US overestimated the Soviet threat was its need to appropriate its resources by distributing the need for conventional power among its allies, and another reason was its desire to keep the Alliance under control. However, countries like Türkiye had to spend more strategic resources on military power than necessary.

The research into the strategies of the sides in the Russia-Ukraine war is of great relevance, as it is one of the most intense conflicts on the territory of Europe since World War II. Further, the violent actions committed by the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine have had an unprecedented impact on the international peace architecture and international relations; they have caused a humanitarian, economic, and social crisis on a regional and global scale. The present research may, most notably, help understand the causes and consequences of the conflict. For this reason, this paper aims to analyze and cover the peculiarities of the main military and political strategies of Ukraine and the Russian Federation in the context of the 2022 war, as well as evaluate specific actions the enemies took against each other as international actors. The updating of the states’ strategies should be noted, as previously Ukraine was regarded only in the context of European integration and reforms, while the full-scale war increases Ukraine’s subjectivity, particularly in terms of planning and implementation of military decisions and more proactive diplomatic efforts. Russia’s strategies were considered in the context of Western theoretical models aimed at establishing it as a regional leader with extensive military potential. Moreover, the beginning of the full-scale war proved that in the situation of the military conflict against Ukraine and its allies Russia’s strategic resources are limited, which calls for further research. The results of this investigation provide a theoretical basis for further research in the field and are of importance for the understanding of security issues, and safeguarding of peace and stability not only in Ukraine and Europe but all around the world.

The Military Revolution debate has dominated histories of early modern warfare for over sixty years. This essay searches for new analytical avenues by charting the nature, causes, and implications of variations in Mughal warfare in early modern South Asia. It argues that a range of factors--including environmental conditions, military pragmatism, financial considerations, and distance from the imperial heartland--caused Mughal war-making to become heterogeneous over time and across space. This produced variations in strategy, tactics, and deployment of technologies. These variations affected the broader processes of Mughal war-making and empire-building. This line of investigation bears potential to influence the writing of comparative military histories and the study of early modern warfare while looking beyond the Military Revolution framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ethno-territorial civil wars, which factors influence whether rebels choose and retain conventional warfare as their primary military strategy throughout the conflict, or whether they use guerrilla warfare as a primary strategy during periods judged to be less advantageous to conventional warfare? The existing literature almost exclusively emphasizes relative power as the determining factor: rebels use guerrilla warfare because they typically lack the capability to fight conventional wars effectively against states. I find some support for this hypothesis: ethno-territorial rebels are much more likely to fight exclusively conventional wars when external states intervene conventionally on the rebel side. I also find that rebel leaders with more intense, far-reaching nationalist goals are more likely to employ guerrilla warfare as a primary war strategy. For such leaders, the higher costs of using guerrilla methods pending an eventual transition to conventional warfare are made more acceptable by a higher valuation of the far-reaching gains delivered by military victory—gains expected to be made more likely by interim periods in which guerrilla warfare is the primary strategy. Turning to other factors, I do not find that status quo conditions or a high level of state democracy have a significant influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The main purpose of this research is to examine the military threats of the United States and present the military strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran against them.Method: The type of research is applied, and the necessary information is obtained from the study of documents, interviews with experts and questionnaires, and a descriptive method with a mixed approach has been used. The overall statistical population of the research is 70 people and the sample size is consistent with the statistical population and all the numbers have been determined. In order to collect and analyze data, in addition to taking samples from library studies and conducting expert interviews, using document analysis and elite analysis methods, descriptive and inferential statistics methods have also been used.Results: The number of 7 main strategies was calculated based on 73 selected research factors (19 strength factors, 9 weakness factors, 10 opportunity factors and 35 threat factors) relying on the provided partial strategies.Conclusion: The result of the vector on the axis of Cartesian coordinates indicates that the competition of the Islamic Republic of Iran is more focused on strengths than opportunities.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of modern technologies, especially in the space or cyber fields, brought a new interpretation of conflicts, based on modern systems and decisions adapted to these novelties. It is through these considerations that the changing nature of conflicts has presented challenges to traditional military doctrines and strategies. The multi-domain operations approach is used by NATO to identify the unique strengths and capabilities of each force category. By identifying these capabilities, the Alliance is able to create plans that maximize the effectiveness of each force category and enable a more effective response to potential threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Viking Age in popular culture is often set in a dark and lawless era, a Hollywood conception of Ultima Thule, in which individual warriors fought for personal glory. But the archaeological evidence suggests a much different reality; the tale told by the inanimate objects uncovered from archaeological sites is one of a highly organized society in which justice and equality mattered. This view is also supported by the written sources. Most scholars concede that society in Roman Iron Age to Viking Age Scandinavia was well organized, and that a process of state building was under way. Less focus, however, has been put on warfare and military tactics during this period. What was warfare really like in Norway and Scandinavia in the years before, and during, the Viking Age? In this paper, an attempt will be made to analyze the extent to which early Scandinavian society was organized for warfare, and possible external influences on Scandinavian tactics in the Roman Iron Age and up to the Viking Age/ early medieval period will be explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unrestricted war, defined as a war that exceeds limits, has been well-studied since its conceptual origin in 1999. However, in the West, it has been used mainly to analyze the balance of power strategies, ignoring its potential to study intra-state conflicts. This article analyzes how the organized armed group National Liberation Army (ELN) employs unrestricted warfare in Colombia. First, the concept of unrestricted warfare is developed. Then, the ELN is analyzed from its identity, ideology, and interaction with the setting. Finally, eight variables of unrestricted warfare are addressed, evaluating whether the ELN applies them. It is concluded that this group has changed its strategy towards omnidirectionality, and recommendations are made for the Colombian State in its fight against this threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The regular army, rather than citizen-soldiers, drove nineteenth-century U.S. military history (apart from the Civil War). The national standing army was crucial to the defeat of Native Americans, and more important than citizen-soldiers or white pressure on Native American subsistence. Despite new circumstances west of the Mississippi River, the contexts and methods of this warfare did not fundamentally change, and learning (or relearning) and adaptation were crucial to the army's success. The most important learning was strategic, particularly in lessons of patience, persistence, and control over the initiation and conduct of warfare, and in response to external, non-military contexts (the tug of war between citizen land hunger and tax aversion). Army learning and adaptation did not win these wars by itself, but it facilitated the effective and successful use of force at a cost the nation was willing to pay, and reduced the incidence of large-scale atrocity in comparison with operations by citizen-soldiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deterrence studies have experienced four waves. The three first ones mainly focused on nuclear deterrence and the fourth one was aimed at deterring terrorism and the so-called «rogue states». However, deterrence below the threshold of war --that is, the conflict in the gray zone-- has received little attention. This article proposes an exploratory theoretical framework to deter escalation within conflicts in the gray zone. First, and based on a review of both classical and recent literature some fundamental principles of deterrence theory applicable to gray zone escalation are presented. Then, the why and how of escalation in the gray zone are discussed. Next, the article analyzes the challenges to deterrence in the first two rungs of the scalation ladder. Finally, the article presents a series of theoretical keys for the practice of deterrence of conflicts in the gray zone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The redirection of military strategy towards counter-guerrilla warfare in the 1950s and the United States' positioning as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere after World War II enriched the Colombian National Army's doctrine. This article examines the background that enabled implementing the military concept of air mobility -prevalent worldwide in those years-in the Colombian Army's military doctrine to complement the troops' ground maneuver performance. To this end, the article analyzes the 1962 Lazo Plan and the 1969 EJC 3-10 regulation to establish their conceptual advances, American influence, and the circumstances that prompted these new elements, such as Colombia's participation in the Korean War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their action, the Russian authorities use a number of different tools, military strength being one of the key ones. Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions are reflected in the new strategic and doctrinal documents. They follow a more confrontational line and emphasize Russia’s desire to frame a new architecture of international security. In pursuing its strategic goals, Russia has undertaken a comprehensive programme of technical upgrade of its armed forces, launches impressive military exercise programmes and militarizes the society. The worsening international situation at the beginning of the 21st century, as a derivative of the growing power and importance of the Russian Federation, posed a threat to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. The aim of the article is to discuss the military tools employed in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, both direct and indirect. In areas of strategic interest outside the post-Soviet area, they mainly take an indirect form. An example of Russia’s desire to restore its imperial influence is demonstrations of its strategic combat capabilities, including by taking provocative action in the western direction.

The common assumptions-ends-ways-means-risk (AEWMR) military strategy model instructs its users to make reasonable assumptions, balance ends, ways and means, and control for risks. But it does not offer much practical guidance on how this should be done, or how to choose between relevant balanced strategies. To address this problem, recent scholarship has proposed the concept of theory of success as an analytical tool to enhance the ability of strategists to assess, formulate, and validate military strategies. This article seeks to take this body of scholarship to the next level by operationalizing the theory of success concept into a simple easy-to-use practical guide that helps its users to identify the assumptions and causal hypotheses underpinning any military strategy, and to validate it logically and empirically. The article is based on the assumption that greater analytical clarity and rigour is a prerequisite for better military strategy. It expects conceptually clear, logically consistent and empirically validated military strategies to stand a better chance of success than vague, inconsistent, and poorly validated ones. Use of the analytical tool proposed here will of course not guarantee successful outcomes. Politics, biases and flawed intelligence may still result in the adoption of flawed assumptions and formulation of ill-suited strategies. Military strategy from may also continue to fail in the execution phase as a result of clever enemy responses and unforeseen developments.

This special issue seeks to highlight the utility of military strategy for students and for practitioners, civilian and military alike. It seeks to dispel three myths: first, that military strategy is irrelevant for small states because they exist in an anarchic system in which “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides, ca. 400 B.C.E/1982, p. 351); second, that the “science” of causal theory is irrelevant to the “art” of strategic practice on account of the complex and inherently unpredictable nature of war; and, third, that military strategy is relevant only at the strategic level and should therefore not be taught to junior officers. Taken together, the contributions to this special issue illustrate that military strategy is of “use,” and that the practical execution of the common Ends, Ways, and Means model will benefit from making explicit the assumption and causal hypotheses that inevitably underpin strategy. In this way, the underlying logic becomes easier to subject to critical scrutiny – both logical and empirical. The contributions demonstrate that it is a mistake to conceptualize military strategy as either theory/science or practice/art. It is more fruitful to view them as complementary. Indeed, the principal message conveyed by this special issue is that theory, science, and method serve as indispensable tools for enhancing the analytical quality of strategic practice/art.

This article examines how a religious cultural paradigm deriving from the Humanism of the West affects the modern art and science of War. It was in the framework of a religified Humanism, in which man 'stole' God's capabilities and properties, that the worldview of man-god was created. This worldview permeated the development of military strategy, thereby facilitating its transformation in the worldview of a commander-god; this is the same worldview which today threatens to reach extremes, assisted by technological evolution allowing the development of robust C4ISR networks Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. The acronym today is C5ISR, with the addition of Combat Systems. interconnected with precision guided munitions (PGMs) of various configurations. The article then examines the influence of Western intellectualism, which is a basic element of Western Christianity, over the development of modern theories and perceptions on military strategy and the risks that can arise for future Western armies from this impact. As an antidote to this influence, the article suggests a new perception on military strategy which emphasises adaptability and flexibility and is based on a cultural paradigm from the Orthodox Christian Faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to underline the Russian's new role in the Mediterranean region and it is divided into three sections. First, it takes into account the notion of hybrid warfare as it, according to NATO and westerner scholars, represents the new military strategy that Moscow devises to achieve its goals. Consequently, the paper studies the current use of the term "hybrid warfare" and then, using a more historical standpoint, it will show how this concept is neither new nor useful to understand current Russian politics toward the Mediterranean region. As a consequence, the paper's second section elaborates on the notion of gray zone warfare that seems to be more appropriate to describe both Russian military operations and its tools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is necessary to fight for military power. In addition to weapons, technology, the existence of various by-laws, especially operational and martial law, is essential in the strategy of exercising military power. The bylaws teach the techniques and methods of fighting to the military. The overall purpose of this study is to explain the application of the Code of Conduct in the exercise of military power by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The type of research applied is correlational. This article is written in an analytical-descriptive approach and attempts to elaborate on the application of operational and combat codes in the exercise of military power by the Armed Forces. The statistical population of the study includes the commanders and successors of the regional headquarters and the deputies of the AJAF and IRGC. Data collection was done through two questionnaires on the application of martial and operational codes of conduct and the strategy of applying military force to the armed forces. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Pearson correlation coefficient were used to investigate the relationship between the independent variable and the function variable. At the significant level of five percent (5%) the validity of the research hypotheses was confirmed. The results showed that the component of military operations design had the most influence on the military power use of the armed forces. And among these is the preparation of staff estimates, commanders' decision-making, and the preparation of an operational command to enter the field of operations and the combat zone.

The period after the end of the Cold War and the reorganization of the world order brought new challenges to modern military organizations. Total technological progress and completely new threats and opponents in the form of nonlinearity have influenced modern warfare to change its shape and form to such an extent that most theorists believe that we are witnessing revolutionary changes in the character of war. The development of information technology particularly influences the development of new concepts of the use of the armed forces, with the most technologically advanced countries naturally leading the way. The development of information technology has a huge impact on the modernization and transformation of the armed forces, primarily in the West. In order to achieve a qualitatively new, higher level of precision and higher speed in conducting military operations, in the early 1990s, many segments of the US armed forces were specially equipped with modern technology, which is based on information networks. The revolution in military affairs and its implementation in the concept of network-centric warfare have become new military strategic models for the US armed forces, along with the process of redefining security policy, in line with the new situation. Network-centric warfare has set new standards in warfare, relying on information superiority. In this paper, the relation of military strategy and its principles to network-centric warfare is considered.

The article examines the successful Atlanta Campaign of U.S. William Tecumseh Sherman from May to September 1864. The campaign started on May 7 which involved a series of battles in the American Civil War's Western Theater in Atlanta, opposed by Confederate General Joseph. E. Johnson. Also discussed are Sherman's outstanding command of military strategy.

In conclusion, Biddle offers a detailed and systematic study of non-state actor behaviour and military strategy. Biddle moves beyond this dichotomy and maintains that non-state actor military behaviour is really on a continuum. Stephen Biddle offers the first comprehensive explanation of non-state actors' military strategy and tactics. [Extracted from the article]

Based on the military struggle readiness of Winning Informationized Local Wars, the PLA has underscored the need for dominance in space, looking for a privileged and commanding status in the context of space warfare. To further dictate the whole war, the PLA is currently devoted to the development of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to substantiate its Space Control Capability. The correlation between the PLARF and anti-satellite operations can be seen from two aspects. First, transformation of the military strategy towards the ideal of having both nuclear and conventional capabilities and deterring wars in all battlespaces in the wake of the recent military overhaul of the PLA markedly revealed Beijing's unwavering intent to force its influence into space. Second, empirical data of the PLARF's "reconnaissance, control and strike" joint construct and operational equipment showed that the PLARF has entered the developmental stage capable of undertaking successful anti-satellite operations. This study concludes that the PLARF is in charge of anti-satellite operations and then conduct this mission with the vertical commanding architecture from the Central Military Commission, Theatres, down to the PLARF units. This study also argues that for now and the foreseeable future, the PLA will focus all its efforts to integrate information links of the combat systems and extend the range of conventional ballistic missiles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the concepts of manoeuvre and attrition in U.S. military operations. It cites the reasons for rethinking multi-domain operations as a basis for U.S. military doctrine, including the proliferation of new intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities and the advantage of the defense will be expanded by attritable systems and platforms in the battlespace. It discusses the origins and principles of multi-domain operations.

Copyright of Journal of the College Of Basic Education is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What good is military strategy? According to the scholarship on military effectiveness, the answer is “not much”—strategy does not significantly affect the performance of armies in combat. Strategic theory scholarship disagrees and describes four specific mechanisms linking strategy to military effectiveness: Exploiting weaknesses in the adversary’s strategy; causing psychological dislocation in the enemy commanders; creating a favorable center of gravity and pattern of war; and focusing resources and controlling violence in service of political goals. This essay uses a case study from the southern front of the First Arab-Israeli War to explore how strategy affects military performance. We find that Israeli General Yigal Allon’s military strategy significantly increased the combat efficiency and battlefield performance of the Israeli Defense Force, consistent with the mechanisms suggested by strategic theory. These findings suggest that military strategy is indeed an important determinant of military effectiveness.

The confluence of deep cultural, social, and demographic trends with technological change can create conditions to which fundamental aspects of military organization and structure must rapidly adjust. Nomadic steppe warriors with composite bows and stirrups changed balances of power from China to Western Europe and throughout the Middle East; corned gunpowder and naval cannon technology, combined with powerful commercial, religious, and imperialistic forces, made the world a European realm for centuries; nuclear weapons have made civilization-level wars unthinkable (if not, unfortunately, impossible). Today a similar adjustment becomes necessary, as demographic shifts change the worker pools that the military will need to draw on, and technology increasingly removes the warrior from direct combat, changing fundamentally the types of skills that the military will need to cultivate, from the aggression, emotion, and physical stamina of youth to the judgment, wisdom, and patience of older age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the accepted orthodoxies about the Greek Civil War (1946-49) is that the Greek government's eventual victory was achieved only because of Anglo-American training and equipment. This article argues that the Greek National Army developed its own military strategy, and that advice from British or American advisory teams was often disregarded, especially during the final years of the conflict. The Greek National Army learned while fighting, and devised what would be recognised today as a "clear, hold, build" strategy. The learning curve was steep, against a Communist opponent who was ruthless and well equipped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tim Clark MBCS talked with Charlie Bradbury, a public sector security strategy consultant with military experience. The discussed the war in Ukraine and its implications for future conflict and cyberwarfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the origin of every war is an existential conflict and a recourse to violence that opens the "ontic" door of the enemy to transform him. Judgement corresponds to political logic, and violent existential transformation to the logic of war, which is engendered in that political matrix throughout the duration of hostilities. The objective nature of that logic structures the rationale of the theatre in terms of "performative" praxis, with two inseparable aspects: a violence that while destroying one order imposes an alternative one. The subjective nature of that logic is generated in its political matrix throughout the duration of the conflict, determining, in a dynamic way, its most basic formalization. Since war is engendered in politics, it adopts its character, a subjective nature that leads it to seek a peace treaty or a victory. In short, when the war begins, the political totality of each one of the belligerents starts to incorporate a new situation and, therefore, two logics coexist: one engendered in the other, and both conditioning each other. The symbiotic relationship between these two rationalities does not allow politics to dominate it according to the parameters of an instrumental reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few researchers have suggested models for visualising particular strategies applied during wartime. The authors present a new analytical, visual methodology for the conduct of war. It refines Arthur F. Lykke Jr.'s definition of strategy, which emphasises the interaction of three components: ends, ways and means. Moreover, the framework introduced distinguishes between military and civilian components, public declaration and action as well as use and reserve. Thus, a conceptual framework is offered to the scholarly community that aims to both analyse and visualise a party's true strategy during an armed conflict and that is, moreover, applicable to both regular and irregular parties in a specific operational theatre. Furthermore, this methodology supports the teaching of strategic dimensions in an academic setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses that increasing use of unconventional methods is changing the character of warfare and the nature of strategy. It mentions about the aim of hybrid warfare methods to disrupt and disable an opponent's actions without engaging in open hostilities. It also mentions that Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in 2014 helped North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries begin to understand the concept of hybrid war.