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The article focuses on the author's view on the practical defense system in the U.S. The author argues that the belief that war among the great powers has become impossible, or even if war came, the enemy could not hurt the country, or an effective civil defense is not practical are unsound and dangerous. He believes that the American defense system is not cheap and it is not guaranteed, nonetheless it makes conceivable that a recognizable American society could survive a nuclear war. Furthermore, the system would add considerably to the probability that such a war would not occur. However, it does not guarantee that there will be no war.

History has taught us that the threat of communicable diseases to operational readiness should not be underestimated. The unique operational challenges of a decade at war in Southwest Asia have left us with many new lessons about prevention and mitigation of disease. The successes of military immunization programs demonstrated the successful application of military science to modern combat. Historic maladies such as tuberculosis and malaria continue to challenge our Army health leadership while new challenges with diseases like Q fever and rabies led to questions about our preparedness. These conflicts also brought awareness of issues about the broader deployed community, and the often unique risks that arise when US service members interact more frequently with foreign militaries, local nationals, and third country nationals. Application of these lessons to predeployment training and integration into leadership decision-making will improve our ability to maintain force readiness in future confl icts and adapt Army policy to current evidence and intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a number of events, during World War II in Belarus collaboration of the local people with the German occupation authorities took place. One of the most obvious episodes of collaboration was the establishment and the activity of the Belarusian National Defence. The armed unit was formed at the end of spring and in the beginning of summer 1944 through mobilization and was intended for armed combat with Soviet partisans and the Red Army. The article analyzes the process of establishing the unit, its numbers, the degree of combat readiness and participation in warfare. In summer 1944, after withdrawal of German forces from Belarus some of the soldiers of the Belarusian National Defence turned up at the Western front. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The requirements for the logistic support in multinational operations are not totally different than those for classic operations, as we know them at the present moment. But what differentiates them for sure, is the multinational framework that incorporates the military actions, the multiculturalism of tactics, techniques and procedures by which NATO and non-NATO member states, that participate in the multinational operation, understand to provide the logistic support to their own troops, as well as the different roles accepted to be fulfilled by one country or another (Lead Nation for Logistics, Specialized Role Nation, Host Nation Support, etc). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the factors that caused so much strain on the Armed Force in the U.S. He cites the culture of the Americans who are prone to technological optimism, leveraging technology to gain qualitative superiority over its enemies. However, the author asserts that such approach has resulted to the escalating procurement costs and logistics needs of the military.

The article discusses the military strategies in war and peace. It explores the wrong use of the word strategy and how two well-known modern commanders, Erich Ludendorff in World War I and Bernard Montgomery in World War II have also never understood the term. It states that the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary has conducted an international Strategy Workshop which asked students about their notion of military strategies and establish a definition of national policy. It states that policy and strategy were closely intertwined along with alliance-building and alliance-denial.

The article discusses the strategic military planning implored by France in 1914. It explores the inconsistencies between French foreign policy and military planning and how the country make bad choices. It mentions the research paper presented by the Royal Military College (RMC), which offers details on the French military strategy in 1914 and the cognitive processes that made French leaders comfortable with their strategy. The author affirms that it is important for French soldiers to clearly and carefully think about the possible nature of future war.

The article discusses the significance of the Balkans as a strategic operational area for over 3,000 Bundeswehr servicemen and women who have been deployed in the region since 1995. It mentions that the Bundeswehr has faced two other challenges since 1989, which include the unification of the two German states and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. It states that the changes in foreign affairs policy had implications for the home affairs situation, with the public showing concern over the consequences of the fundamental changes in the political and military foundations of the country.

The article discusses the strategy implored by the Soviet Union for the war in June 1941. It mentions that despite poor operational-strategic deployment and operations and tactical inadequacies during the Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army was able to survive two seasons in 1941 due to implementing a combination of improvements at the operation and tactical levels. It states that the union launched the Five-Year Plans of 1928, which aims towards the long-term defense and expansion of heavy industry in the state.

The article discusses thoughts on the grand strategy and the condition of the U.S. in the 21st century. It mentions that the strategy is said to be more often than not about the ability to adjust to the reality that resources, will, and interests will inevitably find themselves out of balance in some areas. It states that it demands a recognition of and ability to react to the ever-shifting environments of war and peace. It explores how the U.S. develop effective approaches to grand strategy in meeting the demands of war and gain military effectiveness.

The article discusses new approaches to the assessment and calculation of combat worthiness which is an indicator showing the combat potential of military units. It discusses combat readiness, or readiness to fight, which is another type of combat potential indicator. Furthermore, it states that the goal of assessing the combat readiness of military formations is to indicate the type of mission they are ready to accomplish at any time and up to what extent.

The article focuses on the assessment and calculation of the combat worthiness level of military subunits and units. It presents several things to consider in assessing combat worthiness of subunits which include the exclusion of battle readiness in the calculation, the five components of combat worthiness such as the state of the personnel, and the levels of these components. It notes that the combat worthiness of a particular unit depends on the combat worthiness level of its various subunits.

The article focuses on identified Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) by the Congress and senior defense officials as a means of responding to future threats to U.S. space systems. The ORS focus includes the ability to launch, activate and employ low-cost, militarily useful satellites to provide surge capability, reconstitute or augment existing constellations, or provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities.

Testing and evaluation (T&E) of the effectiveness of unmanned autonomous systems (UAS) is a very serious challenge. UAS are ideal target platforms for implementation of intelligent and cognitive capabilities. UAS are often used in hostile and harsh environments where human presence is not desirable, including air, space, surface, or undersea operations. This requires a high degree of UAS autonomy and human independence. To increase effectiveness, UAS may exhibit some social behavior, interacting with each other in a dynamic and flexible fashion. Finally, UAS are capable of carrying lethal weapons. Design and implementation of such intelligent systems is a very difficult task indeed, but even more difficult is the task of T&E of capabilities and operational readiness of these systems. In this article we attempt to lay the system-theoretic foundation for analysis and testing of cognitive and social capabilities of UAS. We propose a cognitive analysis framework and then show how this leads into analysis of the social interaction capabilities of UAS. This cognitive framework is a key to development of comprehensive UAS T&E methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the problems encountered in the organization of joint coordinated actions of multi-agency military formations in Russia Federation during a special operation. These problems were classified as legal, theoretical, organizational and technical. Also examined were the combat training system for multi-agency military units.

The article provides an analysis regarding the deployment of the joint grouping of aviation and air defense troops and the qualifying features and conditions for the realization of military activity modes. It examines the necessity of using radio-technical formations as well as electronic warfare units in air battles. It stresses the significance of a common design and elaborated plan for the deployment of the joint grouping of aviation and of air defense troops in the operation.

The article discusses the theory of interaction on the concept of operation of military troops. It reveals the essence of interaction pertaining to military activities including that it is a solution of a contradiction between centralization of control and flexibility, build up horizontal control of military operations, and the coordination in the actions of troops is achieved through preparation of an operation. Three models on interaction are given.

The article focuses on the analysis of the military activity in the context of military sciences using various methods of disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, and sociology. It points out that an approach to the military activity concept is not at all casual in society since it stems from the previous development stages of the native scientific idea. However, such interpretation of the relations between culture and military science is overcome as it lacks adequate conformity.

The article discusses the form of defense, a type of combat action in which one of the opposing sides realizes its combat capability. It is noted that defense operations are always a retaliatory reaction to initiative displayed by an advancing adversary. The ultimate objective of the defense will be neutralization of an attacking force. The main method of achieving defense objectives is depriving the adversary of its offensive capability.

The article presents a theoretical discussion of military logistics. The author begins by broadly defining logistics as the link between a state's general economic resources and its defense-military subsystems. He follows this with a discussion of both the Prussian and the French schools of logistics. He illustrates the importance of logistics in modern warfare with an analysis of some combat variables, then dwells on the phenomenon of the logistic vacuum, and describes the way military logistic systems function. Finally, he presents a case study analysis of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, otherwise known as Operation Barbarossa.

On the basis of archival and printed sources, this article examines the role that Russian military intelligence played in miscalculating the Japanese threat before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05. The treatment focuses on three general problem areas: assessments of Japanese military and naval strength and combat readiness; perceptions of war imminence and the related possibility of surprise; and Japanese intentions. Evidence indicates that the overall quality of intelligence was uneven, although reasonably accurate with regard to the Japanese navy. However, genuine situational and structural constraints clouded perceptions of the Japanese ground forces. Still other constraints obscured Russian perceptions of war imminence and Japanese intentions. The cumulative result was that Russia would enter far eastern conflict at a substantial disadvantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs that the core of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's military-technical policy in the operation and maintenance of arms and military equipment (AME) is ensuring the combat readiness of AME as the key component of the combat system of the Armed Forces. It takes into account the general systemic and branch of service priorities of its development; introduces advanced and economical resource saving procedures and technologies for the operation, maintenance, and disposal of AME and new information and analysis systems and technologies to control these processes on different levels.

Ideally, early warning analysis provides information in a form that is easily digested by senior decision makers, serving as a first step in planning conflict prevention and preparedness measures. This paper outlines how practical early warning analysis can be undertaken, identifying seven central early warning factors within which individual indicators can be aggregated. While we can continue to search for the holy grail of early warning – that is the parsimonious polynomic equation which yields robust predictions, this should not come at the cost of the policy relevant tin cup that can be used today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the changes in the forms and methods of warfare employed in various branches and arms of service and special task force. Details on the combat readiness of missile and artillery units; Accounts on the organizational aspects of the creation and development of a Missile Forces and Artillery (MFA) automated command and control system; Assessment of command and control impacts on MFA performance in combat.

Focuses on the organization and conduct of Air Force tactical exercises (TE) in Russia. Importance of tactical exercises in combat training; Factors that influence the organization and conduct of TE; Account of problems generated by the factors.

Focuses on the unified combat training and indoctrination system for the Russian Armed Forces. Account of factors influencing combat capability of combined units, military units and subunits; Problem with the influence of the morale on the course and outcome of warfare; Assertion concerning the goal for the entire training of troops and indoctrination of personnel.

Focuses on the control of moral and psychological support (MPS) of combat operations of the Russian Armed Forces. Problem concerning the mechanism development of the efficient operation of MPS; Explanations with regard to the development of a combat operations MPS model; Account of basic tasks of combat operations MPS.

Provides information on the methods and modes of warfare. Significance of air operations in warfare; Account of organizational characteristics of air operations; Implications of the failure of troops to operate according to an earlier developed concept.

Focuses on the importance of appropriate methods for modeling armed confrontation processes. Explanations concerning the method for evaluating the situation by elements of an operation plan; Problem with the evaluation of the situation by elements; Significance of the formalized representation of the modes of operations by troops.

Discusses the role of full combat support in the preparation and implementation of measures designed to maintain high combat readiness and operational effectiveness of troops. Combat principle that has undergone much change in the past 100 years; Four main types comprised in full support; Factors predetermining the complex system of the combat principle.

Formulates a working concept of network-centric warfare that is critical to the United States' military power. Technological revolution involved in increasing the impact of military force; Optimization of combat efficiency; Methods in increasing the ability of network-centric forces to undertake effects-based operations; Self-synchronization and asymmetric warfare.

Since World War II we have felt compelled for the first time in our history to maintain large standing forces. It is technology though. not numbers. that provides our edge in the continuing military competition with the Soviet Union. Acquiring advanced weapons is a complex process greatly complicated by our governmental system. which intentionally fragments political power. Mechanisms for improving the efficiency of the weapons acquisition process. however. threaten the very values that we seek to protect with our military power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]