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The authors present and critically analyze contemporary microeconomic models of demand optimization of input factors in different conditions of imperfect competition on input and output markets. The first part of the work considers the problems of optimization of the application of labor and capital input in the conditions of competitive input market and the positions of a perfect monopolist, the input seller. In this part, ideas on the phenomenon of monopolistic labor exploitation are specially considered. Then, it is followed by the consideration of characteristics of input demand optimization in case of monopsony, i.e. optimization in case of competitive output market and the position of the firm as a monopsonist on input market. The concluding part of the work represents the critical analysis of the so-called bilateral monopoly, i.e. supply and demand optimization of some input when a monopolist's market strategy is optimized and harmonized, as the only bidder and monopsonist, i.e. the only buyer of some input.

The authors consider the problems of influence of externalities on the Pareto optimal allocation of economic resources in the market economy. The analysis of the market equilibrium model in the conditions of competitive market and in case of positive and negative externalities shows a suboptimal allocation of production factors. In case of positive externalities, the equilibrium output is under the socially optimal one, i.e. an optimal solution is obtained. Negative externalities result in output that is bigger than socially optimal, i.e. certain economically unjustified hyperinflation. At the end of the work, the authors draw conclusion that interventions are necessary, both in case of positive and negative externalities, in order to modify individual decisions of market actors to eliminate suboptimal equilibrium states, i.e. suboptimal market strategies.

The work gives a presentation and the critical consideration of postulate applicability of new optimization models of consumer choice. The research includes the analysis and illustration of maximization of feasible usefulness of consumers on the so-called Lancaster model of goods characteristics, analysis of postulates and the model of consumer choice in the conditions of uncertainty, analysis of consumer inclination to bear risk and alternatives of consumer choice in “buying” risk insurance. Special attention is paid to the analysis of influences of “gambling” on consumer choice optimization and the consideration of connections between the price of increasing the level of consumers' information and attainable prosperity.

The authors give a critical review and the analysis of possible implementation of Williamson's transaction cost theory. In the first part, they consider the characteristics of participants' behavior in transactions, notion of transaction, transactional costs and the warranty of contractual regulation. The main part of the work includes the dimensional analysis: uncertainty, role of fixed mobility factors and input specialties. Then, considering the so-called problem of “fundamental transformation” of input, frequency of transaction and coordination of transactional relationships follows. The concluding part of the work deals with the estimate of accomplishments, importance and possibility of transactional costs.

The work gives a concise review and critical analysis of the so-called alternative theories of firm behavior. The review includes: a) theory of output pricing in conditions of uncertainty when the target function is not profit maximization; b) considering possibilities of management to carry out business policy outside the owner's interests; c) considering firm behavior when management chooses alternative targets of maximization; d) analyzing the problem causing business efficiency decline because of the uncertainty of some internal process in the firm; and e) researching firm behavior striving to realize “satisfying results”.