I develop and defend a metaphysical theory, which I call layered trope nihilism, both as an interpretation of the ontology of the Treasury of Metaphysics of Vasubandhu and as a viable contender on the contemporary metaphysical scene. The Treasury of Metaphysics, written in the 5 th century C.E. in India, is central to the Buddhist tradition, but has received less attention from analytic philosophers than it deserves. In Chapter I, I discuss various interpretations of the Treasury's doctrine of non-self, and develop my own interpretation, which I call Vaibhas&dotbelow;ika Metaphoricalism. On this view, there are no people, chairs, rocks, or other composite material substances. The only things that really exist are simple. However, substance-discourse has great practical utility, so even those who realize the non-existence of composite things might continue to talk as if they existed, thereby engaging in a kind of pretense. In Chapters II and III I use the Ship of Theseus, other problems about substance, and considerations about trope individuation to motivate the claim that substances do not really exist. Instead, the really existing entities are momentary, spatially localized tropes. There are basic physics tropes, such as charge densities, but there are also higher-level tropes, such as acidities and colors, that supervene on the basic physics tropes. This view has several philosophical advantages over other trope theories. I defend the view against the charge of self-contradiction by deploying the Buddhist distinction between conventional and ultimate truth. In Chapter IV I show that key features of layered trope nihilism are anticipated in the Treasury. Vasubandhu's dharmas are very like tropes, and his tutelage cause is a concept of supervenience. The analogy with layered trope nihilism can help with certain problems of interpretation that arise in the Treasury and other Buddhist texts. I explain that I differ from Vasubandhu on the relationship between the mental and the physical, and sketch how my position might be defended. I conclude that the analogy between Buddhism and trope theory is both a fruitful source of interpretive hypotheses and a way of allowing Buddhist thought and analytic philosophy to learn from each other's insights.