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This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular action is intelligent depends, in part, on whether it was produced by an exercise of skill. These claims promote a picture of intelligence that is in tension with a strongly intellectualist picture, though they are not in tension with a number of prominent claims recently made by intellectualists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author analyzes the different ways in which one can speak of an end of philosophy. The author shows the way in which the continuation of philosophy in our days is only achieved by overcoming sophistry and skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses several arguments that support the theory of constrastivism. He examines how such arguments were challenged in different ways through published criticisms of constrastivism and outlines its theoretical advantages. However, the author asserts that despite the theoretical benefits of the theory, there are compelling reasons that made it false.

The article discusses on epistemology. It states that the greatest challenge to epistemology comes from the rapid development of humanitarian knowledge and from the need to take a new look at the integrity of science as such and in this connection the acute issue of the so called turn towards language and accordingly of the mediators on any cognition, including semiotic and symbolic systems of various kinds. The problems emerged in the realm of humanitarian knowledge before acquiring a more general status and eventually stimulating the creation of corresponding categories thus enriching the arsenal of conceptual means of epistemology.

In the "Unreality of Time", McTaggart famously offers various, significant objections against the possibility of an A-series. After presenting his more famous puzzles, he offers a brief (and often overlooked) argument against an A-series view that would argue for the objective existence of past, present, and future based on the presence of experience, i.e., the specious present. The thrust of McTaggart's argument against an A-series grounded on a specious present consists in his claiming that events of experience extend over varying durations. In claiming that a particular event can cease to be part of one person's immediate experience while it remains part of another's immediate experience, McTaggart notes that a paradox arises in which one and the same event is both past and present (according to the measure of experience). Accordingly, McTaggart denies that a specious present could ground an objective A-series. In the following paper, I consider McTaggart's argument against the specious present account, and argue that an A-series theorist could maintain that the presence of experience (i.e., the specious present) could serve as the objective present, whether or not the presence of experience can extend over varying durations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Background: Much has been published related to the epistemology of Heideggerian hermeneutic research. We seek to reveal insights from our experience of enacting such research. Objective: To articulate the lived experience of ‘doing’ Heideggerian hermeneutic research. Design: The authors of this paper shared their experiences with the primary author towards articulating the process of ‘doing’ such research. Participants: The authors all have long experience with Heideggerian hermeneutic research and meet regularly at the Institute for Interpretive Phenomenology. They supervise student''s research and are mindful of the process of coming to understand how to work in a phenomenological/hermeneutic manner. Methods: First the section on philosophical underpinnings was written by the primary author and then shared with all authors. There was published data related to the experience of three of the participants already available. This provided a spring board to further conversations when the primary author visited America, able to engage in daily conversations with three of the co-authors. In the spirit of phenomenology this paper represents a process of reading, talking, writing, talking, reading, re-writing, re-talking and so forth. Results: The process of doing hermeneutic phenomenology is represented as a journey of ‘thinking’ in which researchers are caught up in a cycle of reading-writing-dialogue- which spirals onwards. Through such disciplined and committed engagement insights ‘come’. The researcher is always open to questions, and to following a felt-sense of what needs to happen next. However, it is not a process of ‘do whatever you like’ but rather a very attentive attunement to ‘thinking’ and listening to how the texts speak. Conclusion: This paper argues that alongside a disciplined understanding of the methodology, both researcher and reader need to share a commitment to ‘thinking’ which is willing to question, and open to trusting the resonance of understanding that ‘comes’ without expecting answers that are declared ‘truth’ for all time. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Unger (1974/2000 ) presents an argument for skepticism that significantly differs from the more traditional arguments for skepticism. The argument is based on two premises, to wit, that knowledge would entitle the knower to absolute certainty, and that an attitude of absolute certainty is always inadmissible from an epistemic viewpoint. The present paper scrutinizes the arguments that Unger provides in support of these premises and shows that none of them is tenable. It thus concludes that Unger's argument for skepticism fails to threaten the possibility of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that speakers do not voice their thoughts directly. Rather, our actions of voicing our thoughts are justified by decisions we make (albeit rapidly) about what words to use. Along the way, I raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We propose a concept of intellectual values as (a) shared within a group and defined by the extent to which intellectual engagement is regarded as worthwhile to the group''s interests, (b) supported by an epistemological belief system, and (c) an important dimension of sociocultural practice and learning. A series of studies is described in which assessments of intellectual values and epistemological beliefs were found to show similar patterns of variation across cultural and subcultural groups of parents and children. Such groups may play a role in highlighting to their youth the intrinsic value of intellectual engagement (versus its instrumental value in achieving individual recognition and status). Intrinsically valued intellectual engagement, we suggest, provides the firmest basis for sustaining intellectual motivation through adolescence and into adulthood. Developing mature epistemological understanding, moreover, is key to this enterprise. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article discusses modal epistemology. Philosophy abounds in modal arguments. A surprisingly high proportion of these arguments have the following features as they are formally valid; one of their premises is far more controversial than any of the others; it is a model premise. It is not always possible to invert a possibility argument. But it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise.

This study addresses the problems involving the adaptation of cybernetic models to operational realities. More precisely, three epistemological views are in turn investigated so as to determine the problems regarding information transfer between a model and the real world. Of the three epistemologies under investigation: realism, a priorism, and phenomenology, the latter demonstrates the most promise in terms of opening up operational possibilities for the model, but introduces problems involving the adaptation of the model to the reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]