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Objective: It has been established that recovery is a common outcome for adults diagnosed with serious mental illness which involves objective and subjective phenomenon. While considerable work has examined objective aspects of recovery, it remains difficult to know how to quantify the processes which support more subjective aspects of recovery related to sense of self. This article explores the potential of recent research on metacognition to offer new avenues to measure the processes which make a sense of self available within the flow of life., Method: Emerging definitions of metacognition using an integrative model of metacognition are reviewed. Research is presented suggesting adults diagnosed with serious mental illness are often confronted by metacognitive deficits which interfere with their ability to make sense of their psychiatric challenges and effectively direct their own recovery., Findings: Metacognitive capacity may be a quantifiable phenomenon which contributes to certain aspects of recovery related to meaning making, agency and self-direction., Conclusions and Implications for Practice: Promoting metacognitive capacity may be a previously unrecognized active element of existing rehabilitative interventions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

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Humanistic psychology has made us aware that any understanding of schizophrenia must see persons diagnosed with this condition as whole persons who are making sense of what wellness and recovery mean to them. This has raised questions about what the diagnosis of schizophrenia means and whether the diagnostic label of schizophrenia is helpful when we try to conceptualize the actions and aims of treatment. To examine this issue we propose it is essential to consider what is systematically occuring psychologicaly in recovery when persons experience, interpret and agentically respond to emerging challenges. We then review how the integrated model of metacognition provides a systematic, person-centered, evidence-based approach to understanding psychological processes which impact recovery, and discuss how this guides a form of psychotherapy, metacognitive reflection and insight therapy, which promotes metacognitive abilities and support recovery. We suggest this work indicates that metacognitive capacity is something that can be diagnosed without stigmatizing persons. It can be used to meaningfully inform clinical practice across various theoretical models and offers concrete implications for rehabilitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Functional deficits are a hallmark of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, but much debate still exists over why and how they originate. One model suggests that disturbances in social functioning are a result of metacognitive deficits or a failure to integrate information to form more complex ideas of themselves and others. It is unclear if this social dysfunction is present across different symptom presentations.We examined the relationship of metacognition, symptoms, and social functioning among a sample of adults with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (N ¼ 334). A latent class analysis produced a four-class model. Groups were classified as follows: diffuse symptoms/moderately impaired social functioning (Class 1), positive and hostility symptoms/mildly impaired social functioning (Class 2), minimal symptoms/good social functioning (Class 3), and negative and cognitive symptoms/severely impaired social functioning (Class 4). Class 3 demonstrated better overall metacognitive capacity than both Classes 1 and 4 but did not differ significantly from Class 2. Classes 2 and 3 both demonstrated better interpersonal functioning than Classes 1 and 4. Together, these findings provide support for models of poor functioning that stem from fragmentation of an individual's experience, leading to diminished abilities to form meaningful connections with others. Additional interpretations, limitations, and research implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]