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How accurate are individuals in judging the originality of their own ideas? Most metacognitive research has focused on well-defined tasks, such as learning, memory, and problem solving, providing limited insight into ill-defined tasks. The present study introduces a novel metacognitive self-judgment of originality, defined as assessments of the uniqueness of an idea in a given context. In three experiments, we examined the reliability, potential biases, and factors affecting originality judgments. Using an ideation task, designed to assess the ability to generate multiple divergent ideas, we show that people accurately acknowledge the serial order effect-judging later ideas as more original than earlier ideas. However, they systematically underestimate their ideas' originality. We employed a manipulation for affecting actual originality level, which did not affect originality judgments, and another one designed to affect originality judgments, which did not affect actual originality performance. This double dissociation between judgments and performance calls for future research to expose additional factors underlying originality judgments., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest None., (Copyright © 2019. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

The relationship between affect and metacognitive processes has been largely overlooked in both the affect and the metacognition literatures. While at the core of many affect-cognition theories is the notion that positive affective states lead people to be more confident, few studies systematically investigated how positive affect influences confidence and strategic behaviour. In two experiments, when participants were free to control answer interval to general knowledge questions (e.g., Question: "in what year", answer: "it was between 1970 and 1985"), participants induced with positive affect outperformed participants in a neutral affect condition. However, in Experiment 1 positive affect participants showed larger overconfidence than neutral affect participants. In Experiment 2, enhanced salience of social cues eliminated this overconfidence disadvantage of positive affect relative to neutral affect participants, without compromising their enhanced performance. Notably, in both experiments, positive affect led to compromised social norms regarding the answers' informativeness. Implications for both affect and metacognition are discussed.

It is well established in educational research that metacognitive monitoring of performance assessed by self-reports, for instance, asking students to report their confidence in provided answers, is based on heuristic cues rather than on actual success in the task. Subjective self-reports are also used in educational research on cognitive load, where they refer to the perceived amount of mental effort invested in or difficulty of each task item. In the present study, we examined the potential underlying bases and the predictive value of mental effort and difficulty appraisals compared to confidence appraisals by applying metacognitive concepts and paradigms. In three experiments, participants faced verbal logic problems or one of two non-verbal reasoning tasks. In a between-participants design, each task item was followed by either mental effort, difficulty, or confidence appraisals. We examined the associations between the various appraisals, response time, and success rates. Consistently across all experiments, we found that mental effort and difficulty appraisals were associated more strongly than confidence with response time. Further, while all appraisals were highly predictive of solving success, the strength of this association was stronger for difficulty and confidence appraisals (which were similar) than for mental effort appraisals. We conclude that mental effort and difficulty appraisals are prone to misleading cues like other metacognitive judgments and are based on unique underlying processes. These findings challenge the accepted notion that mental effort appraisals can serve as reliable reflections of cognitive load.

Screen inferiority in performance and metacognitive processes has been repeatedly found with text learning. Common explanations for screen inferiority relate to technological and physiological disadvantages associated with extensive reading on screen. However, recent studies point to lesser recruitment of mental effort on screen than on paper. Learning tasks involving a heavy reading burden confound technological and physiological media differences with potential media effects on recruitment of mental effort. The present study focused on media effects on effort recruitment. We examined whether screen inferiority remains even with a brief task that nevertheless requires effort recruitment. In two experiments, participants faced three short math problems that require systematic processing to solve correctly. We examined media effect on solving these problems, and the potential of disturbed perceptual fluency (i.e., disfluent versus fluent fonts) to induce effort investment. Overall, there were no performance differences between the media. However, when collecting confidence ratings, disfluency improved performance on screen and hindered it on paper. Only on paper confidence ratings were sensitive to performance differences associated with fluency, and resolution was better with the disfluent font than with the fluent font. Correspondingly, another sample reported on their preference of media for solving the problems. They expressed a clear reluctance to working on screen despite the task being brief. This preference is suggestive of reliable meta-metacognitive judgments reflecting the general lower quality of metacognitive processes on screen. The findings call for considering medium and presentation format effects on metacognitive processing when designing computerized environments, even for brief tasks.

Memorability studies have revealed a limitation in our ability to accurately judge which images are memorable. Conversely, metacognitive research suggests that individuals can utilize cues to reliably assess their memory performance. Here, we investigated two important stimulus cues potentially underlying subjective memorability, and their relation to actual memory performance. Participants encoded 200 real-world object images while providing Judgements of Learning (JOLs), in which they estimated the likelihood of remembering each image. Subsequently, they completed an old/new memory recognition test on these stimuli. All stimuli were priorly rated by an independent group of participants for their perceived meaningfulness and visual complexity. Results indicated that participants' metacognitive judgements exhibited a relatively good resolution, allowing them to distinguish well-remembered from less-remembered images. Furthermore, analyses conducted at the image level demonstrated that JOLs significantly predicted memory performance, with the meaningfulness of the images emerging as a crucial factor associated with JOLs of both participants and their actual memory performance. The visual complexity factor was correlated only with the actual memory performance. Collectively, these findings suggest that memory performance is closely associated with the meaning of objects. Critically, individuals possess a subjective sense of images' memorability, which is at least partially mediated by perceived meaningfulness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paper-and-pencil learning and testing are gradually shifting to computerized environments. Cognitive and metacognitive researchers find screen inferiority compared to paper in effort regulation, test performance, and extent of overconfidence, in some cases, with unknown differentiating factors. Notably, these studies used reading comprehension tasks involving lengthy texts, which confound technology-related and cognitive factors. We hypothesized that the medium provides a contextual cue which leads to shallower processing on screen regardless of text length, particularly when task characteristics hint that shallow processing is legitimate. To test this hypothesis, we used briefly phrased yet challenging problems for solving on screen or on paper. In Experiment 1, the time frame for solving the problems was manipulated. As with lengthy texts, only time pressure resulted in screen inferiority. In Experiment 2, under a loose time frame, the same problems were now framed as a preliminary task performed before a main problem-solving task. Only the initial task, with reduced perceived importance, revealed screen inferiority similarly to time pressure. In Experiment 3, we replicated Experiment 1's time frame manipulation, using a problem-solving task which involved reading only three isolated words. Screen inferiority in overconfidence was found again only under time pressure. The results suggest that metacognitive processes are sensitive to contextual cues that hint at the expected depth of processing, regardless of the reading burden involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this reply, we provide an analysis of Alter et al. (2013) response to our earlier paper (Thompson et al., 2013). In that paper, we reported difficulty in replicating Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre’s (2007) main finding, namely that a sense of disfluency produced by making stimuli difficult to perceive, increased accuracy on a variety of reasoning tasks. Alter, Oppenheimer, and Epley (2013) argue that we misunderstood the meaning of accuracy on these tasks, a claim that we reject. We argue and provide evidence that the tasks were not too difficult for our populations (such that no amount of “metacognitive unease” would promote correct responding) and point out that in many cases performance on our tasks was well above chance or on a par with Alter et al.’s (2007) participants. Finally, we reiterate our claim that the distinction between answer fluency (the ease with which an answer comes to mind) and perceptual fluency (the ease with which a problem can be read) is genuine, and argue that Thompson et al. (2013) provided evidence that these are distinct factors that have different downstream effects on cognitive processes. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]