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Objective: Patterns of rediversion in two postbooking jail diversion programs in Florida were examined to better understand the extent to which diversion programs served repeating clients. Rediversion occurs when a former or current diversion program participant is booked into jail on a new charge and diverted once again through the same diversion program., Methods: Data from 18 months of consecutive entries into the Hillsborough County jail diversion program (N = 336) and Broward County mental health court (N = 800) were examined., Results: Similar rediversion patterns were observed for the two diversion programs. About one-fifth of those who were diverted during the 18-month study period were rediverted at least once. Nearly half of those who experienced rediversion did so within 90 days of their initial diversion. Although fewer than 6 percent were rediverted two or more times, these individuals accounted for a disproportionately large number of overall diversions and were rediverted more quickly than those with only one rediversion., Conclusions: The diversion programs examined here appear to be experiencing a level of repeating clients similar to that observed in other pathways for accessing mental health treatment.

This study examined the relationship between psychopathy and malingering in a subsample of male prison inmates (n = 55) participating in a larger study of the clinical utility of various assessment measures in correctional settings. Participants' capacity to feign major mental illness successfully was evaluated using standard cutoff scores for the detection of malingering on a variety of instruments, including the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; G. P Smith & G. O. Burger, 1997), the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; R. Rogers, R. M. Bagby, & S. E. Dickens, 1992), and the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; L. Morey, 1991). Psychopathic traits were assessed via the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; S.O. Lilienfeld & B. P Andrews, 1996). Correlations between the malingering indices and the PPI were low (-.14 to .14) and not statistically significant. These findings fail to support the clinical intuition that individuals with higher levels of psychopathy are likely to be more adept at malingering.

The Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) is a relatively new self-report measure that has shown considerable promise as an index of psychopathic traits in both nonoffender and offender samples. The present study examined the construct validity and predictive utility of the PPI by examining its association with theoretically relevant scales of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991) among 60 male prison inmates, and its ability to predict institutional misbehavior in an expanded sample (n = 89). As expected, correlations with the PAI scales were highest for the Antisocial Features (ANT) and Aggression (AGG) scales (rs = .68 and .57, respectively). The PPI also predicted various forms of nonviolent and physically aggressive disciplinary infractions significantly better than chance (point biserial correlations ranging from .26 to .37).

Relatively little is known about the processes in which "successful" malingerers engage to avoid detection. This study summarizes the response strategies used by participants (N = 540) instructed to feign a specific mental disorder while completing various self-report instruments designed to detect faking. Postexperiment questionnaires indicated that those who were able to appear symptomatic while avoiding being detected as feigning (n = 60) were more likely to endorse a lower rate of legitimate symptoms, to avoid overly unusual or bizarre items, and to base their responses on their own personal experiences.

A set of measures assessing abilities related to legal standards for competence in the adjudicative process were administered to mentally-disordered criminal defendants with diagnoses of schizophrenia, affective disorder, other psychiatric disorders, and to criminal defendants without diagnosed mental disorder. Mentally-disordered defendants were recruited from two groups: those who had been committed for restoration of competence and those who had been identified by jail personnel as mentally ill. Significant impairments in competence-related abilities were found for approximately half of the defendants with schizophrenia. Defendants with schizophrenia scored lower on measures of understanding, reasoning, and appreciation related to the adjudication process. The association between symptoms and competence-related abilities was explored within diagnostic groups. Conceptual disorganization was found to be inversely correlated with performance on all measures in both defendants with schizophrenia and those with affective disorders. For other psychotic symptoms, differing patterns of correlations were found in the two major diagnostic groups. The implications for policy designed to safeguard the rights of defendants to be tried while competent are discussed.

Assessment of competence to stand trial is a common evaluation that can have substantial consequences for defendants and the criminal justice system. Despite a voluminous literature, much remains unknown. An obstacle to progress in understanding what is better termed "adjudicative competence" is the absence of structured, standardized research measures for assessment of defendants. This article presents the legal framework, assessment strategy, instrument description, psychometric properties, and construct validation of the MacArthur Structured Assessment of the Competencies of Criminal Defendants (MacSAC-CD). The measures meet or exceed accepted indices of internal consistency, and interscorer agreement. Observed patterns of correlations among measures support the underlying theoretical structure of competence-related abilities. Moreover, the MacSAC-CD distinguishes groups of competent and incompetent defendants; reflects changes in competence status; and correlates positively with clinical judgments, negatively with psychopathology and impaired cognitive functioning, and negligibly with cynicism toward the justice system.

Half a decade ago, the Zinermon court announced the need for clinicians to evaluate the competence of people with mental illness to consent to voluntary hospital admission, but the court did not specify the test of capacity that mental health professionals should use. As has occurred in other areas dealing with legal competence, there is a need for the field to develop standardized assessment procedures for evaluating capacity to consent to voluntary hospitalization. Both theoretical and practical considerations suggest that these procedures should be modeled after what S. K. Hoge has termed a "weak" model of consent. This and other studies of the ability of mentally ill persons to understand disclosed information suggest that their level of understanding may be assessed optimally with measures that utilize recognition rather than recall response elicitation formats.

The legal construct of competence to stand trial, or "adjudicative competence," is based on the premise that some mentally disordered defendants have impaired abilities when compared with most defendants and that adjudication should be barred if these competence-related abilities are significantly impaired. Where the line is drawn between sufficient and insufficient abilities has important consequences: as a result of being adjudicated incompetent, defendants may be detained and treated involuntarily and their trials will be delayed. However, no studies have systematically compared the capacities of relevant groups of defendants. In this study, 84 criminal defendants--42 of whom were hospitalized as incompetent and 42 of whom were regarded as unquestionably competent--were administered three instruments measuring capacity to understand legally relevant information. Incompetent defendants performed more poorly on all measures of understanding. Twenty-eight incompetent defendants were administered the measures a second time, after restoration to competence. Restored defendants improved their performance on all measures of understanding and their performance was similar to that of normal, competent defendants.