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The ongoing stream of sensory experience is so complex and ever-changing that we tend to parse this experience at "event boundaries," which structures and strengthens memory. Memory processes undergo profound change across early childhood. Whether young children also divide their ongoing processing along event boundaries, and if those boundaries relate to memory, could provide important insight into the development of memory systems. In Study 1, 4-7-year-old children and adults segmented a cartoon, and we tested their memory. Children's event boundaries were more variable than adults' and differed in location and consistency of agreement. Older children's event segmentation was more adult-like than younger children's, and children who segmented events more like adults had better memory for those events. In Study 2, we asked whether these developmental differences in event segmentation had their roots in distinct neural representations. A separate group of 4-8-year-old children watched the same cartoon while undergoing an fMRI scan. In the right hippocampus, greater pattern dissimilarity across event boundaries compared to within events was evident for both child and adult behavioral boundaries, suggesting children and adults share similar event cognition. However, the boundaries identified by a data-driven Hidden Markov Model found that a different brain region-the left and right angular gyrus-aligned only with event boundaries defined by children. Overall, these data suggest that children's event cognition is reasonably well-developed by age 4 but continues to become more adult-like across early childhood. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Adults naturally break their experience into events, which structures and strengthens memory, but less is known about children's event perception and memory. Study 1 had adults and children segment and remember events from an animated show, and Study 2 compared those segmentations to other children's fMRI data. Children show better recognition and temporal order memory and more adult-like event segmentation with age, and children who segment more like adults have better memory. Children's and adults' behavioral boundaries mapped onto pattern similarity differences in hippocampus, and children's behavioral boundaries matched a data-driven model's boundaries in angular gyrus., (© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

During early ontogeny, the rapid and cumulative acquisition of world knowledge contrasts with slower improvements in the ability to lay down detailed and long-lasting episodic memories. This emphasis on generalization at the expense of specificity persists well into middle childhood and possibly into adolescence. During this period, recognizing regularities, forming stable representations of recurring episodes, predicting the structure of future events, and building up semantic knowledge may be prioritized over remembering specific episodes. We highlight recent behavioral and neuroimaging evidence suggesting that maturational differences among subfields within the hippocampus contribute to the developmental lead-lag relation between generalization and specificity, and lay out future research directions., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Although the hippocampus is implicated in both spatial navigation and associative memory, very little is known about whether individual differences in the 2 domains covary. People who prefer to navigate using a hippocampal-dependent place strategy may show better performance on associative memory tasks than those who prefer a caudate-dependent response strategy (Bohbot, Gupta, Banner, & Dahmani, 2011), but not all studies suggest such an effect (Woollett & Maguire, 2009, 2012). Here we tested nonexpert young adults and found that preference for a place strategy positively correlated with spatial (object-location) associative memory performance but did not correlate with nonspatial (face-name) associative memory performance. Importantly, these correlations differed from each other, indicating that the relation between navigation strategy and associative memory is specific to the spatial domain. In addition, the 2 associative memory tasks significantly correlated, suggesting that object-location memory taps into processes relevant to both hippocampal-dependent navigation and nonspatial associative memory. Our findings also suggest that individual differences in spatial associative memory may account for some of the variance in navigation strategies., ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

The ability to remember spatial locations is critical to human functioning, both in an evolutionary and in an everyday sense. Yet spatial memories and judgments often show systematic errors and biases. Bias has been explained by models such as the Category Adjustment model (CAM), in which fine-grained and categorical information about locations are combined in a Bayesian manner (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). However, experiments testing this model have largely used locations contained in simple geometric shapes and, more recently, 2D scenes. Do the results generalize to location memory in the complex natural world, as they should if the CAM is to provide an over-arching framework for thinking about spatial memory? Here, this issue is addressed using a novel extension of the location memory paradigm that allows for testing of location memory in an everyday, 3D environment. The results support two predictions of the CAM: that memory for locations is biased toward central values, and that the magnitude of error increases with the retention interval., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Previous research has suggested that performance for items requiring memory-binding processes improves between ages 4 and 6 (J. Sluzenski, N. Newcombe, & S. L. Kovacs, 2006). The present study suggests that much of this improvement is due to retrieval, as opposed to encoding, deficits for 4-year-olds. Four- and 6-year-old children (N = 48 per age) were given objects, backgrounds, and object + background combinations to remember. Younger children performed equivalently to 6-year-olds during a working memory task for all types of memory questions but were impaired during a long-term memory task for the object + background combinations. Furthermore, this deficit was completely due to differences in false alarm rates, suggesting that separate analyses of hits and false alarms may be preferable to corrected recognition scores when studying memory development.

Young children have informal knowledge of fractions before learning about fraction symbols in school. In the current study, we followed 103 children in the Mid-Atlantic United States from the fall to the spring of first grade to characterize the development of individual differences in early informal fraction knowledge, as well as its relation to other mathematical and cognitive skills. Most children in our sample showed some early fraction knowledge at the beginning of first grade, especially with nonsymbolic fractions and halving, and this knowledge improved over the school year without explicit instruction in fractions. However, there were large individual differences in early fraction knowledge at the start of first grade, which explained significant variance in math achievement at the end of first grade, even when controlling for whole number knowledge and a variety of cognitive skills. Start-of-year whole number knowledge, but not spatial scaling or proportional reasoning, also predicted early end-of-year fraction knowledge. These data can inform activities for learning in the early years to foster both early fraction and integer knowledge in parallel, which may better prepare students for later formal instruction in fractions.

Episodic memory relies on discriminating among similar elements of episodes. Mnemonic discrimination is relatively poor at age 4, and then improves markedly. We investigated whether motivation to encode items with fine-grain resolution would change this picture of development, using an engaging computer-administered memory task in which a bird ate items that made her healthier (gain frame), sicker (loss frame), or led to no change (control condition). Using gain-loss framing led to enhanced mnemonic discrimination in 4- and 5-year-olds, but did not affect older children or adults. Despite this differential improvement, age-related differences persisted. An additional finding was that loss-framing led to greater mnemonic discrimination than gain-framing across age groups. Motivation only partially accounts for the improvement in mnemonic discrimination.

In the real word, we perceive our environment as a series of static and dynamic views, with viewpoint transitions providing a natural link from one static view to the next. The current research examined if experiencing such transitions is fundamental to learning the spatial layout of small-scale displays. In Experiment 1, participants viewed a tabletop array from 4 orientations in 1 of 3 conditions. The control condition presented the array sequentially, as a series of static views. In the remaining conditions, participants experienced the transition between viewpoints by rotating the array or moving around it. Both transitions improved spatial performance. Experiment 2 added a passive rotation condition to examine the effect of watching the transition without actively generating it. Spatial performance was equivalent across active and passive rotation conditions, with both outperforming static views. Together, these findings suggest that continuous visual flow is key to small-scale spatial learning.

Although the hippocampus is implicated in both spatial navigation and associative memory, very little is known about whether individual differences in the 2 domains covary. People who prefer to navigate using a hippocampal-dependent place strategy may show better performance on associative memory tasks than those who prefer a caudate-dependent response strategy (Bohbot, Gupta, Banner, & Dahmani, 2011), but not all studies suggest such an effect (Woollett & Maguire, 2009, 2012). Here we tested nonexpert young adults and found that preference for a place strategy positively correlated with spatial (object-location) associative memory performance but did not correlate with nonspatial (face-name) associative memory performance. Importantly, these correlations differed from each other, indicating that the relation between navigation strategy and associative memory is specific to the spatial domain. In addition, the 2 associative memory tasks significantly correlated, suggesting that object-location memory taps into processes relevant to both hippocampal-dependent navigation and nonspatial associative memory. Our findings also suggest that individual differences in spatial associative memory may account for some of the variance in navigation strategies.

Memory for spatial location is typically biased, with errors trending toward the center of a surrounding region. According to the category adjustment model (CAM), this bias reflects the optimal, Bayesian combination of fine-grained and categorical representations of a location. However, there is disagreement about whether categories are malleable. For instance, can categories be redefined based on expert-level conceptual knowledge? Furthermore, if expert knowledge is used, does it dominate other information sources, or is it used adaptively so as to minimize overall error, as predicted by a Bayesian framework? We address these questions using images of geological interest. The participants were experts in structural geology, organic chemistry, or English literature. Our data indicate that expertise-based categories influence estimates of location memory--particularly when these categories better constrain errors than alternative ("novice") categories. Results are discussed with respect to the CAM.

Memories for spatial locations often show systematic errors toward the central value of the surrounding region. The Category Adjustment (CA) model suggests that this bias is due to a Bayesian combination of categorical and metric information, which offers an optimal solution under conditions of uncertainty (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). A fundamental assumption of this model is that representations of locations are unbiased but uncertain; during combination, greater metric uncertainty results in relatively greater emphasis on categorical information, ultimately leading to increased bias (but also minimizing error across multiple estimates). Sampaio and Wang (2009) have demonstrated that metric information is not lost during this combination process, supporting the CA model's assumption that underlying spatial representations are undistorted. Here, we examine the 2nd half of the CA model's central assumption: that increasing metric uncertainty drives the combination process. Participants recognized point locations within visually complex images in a 4-choice task. Our results indicate that individuals recognized the correct location over other, biased alternatives, confirming that metric information is unbiased at the time of retrieval. In addition, we found that, when participants make errors, they are more likely to select locations that are biased toward the category prototype. In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that categorically biased locations are most likely to be chosen under conditions of uncertainty. Indeed, under these conditions, categorically biased locations were chosen more frequently than the correct location. These results suggest that systematic errors are the result of combination across multiple levels of spatial representations that are undistorted but somewhat uncertain.

Episodic memory involves binding together what-where-when associations. In three experiments, we tested the development of memory for such contextual associations in a naturalistic setting. Children searched for toys in two rooms with two different experimenters; each room contained two identical sets of four containers, but arranged differently. A distinct toy was hidden in a distinct container in each room. In Experiment 1, which involved children between 15 and 26 months who were prompted with a very explicit cue (a part of the hidden toy), we found a marked shift in performance with age: while 15- to 20-month-olds concentrated their searches on the two containers that sometimes contained toys, they did not distinguish between them according to context, but 21-26-month-olds did. However, surprisingly, without toy cues, even the youngest children showed a fragile ability to disambiguate the two containers by room context. In Experiment 2, we tested 34- to 40-month-olds and 64- to 72-month-olds without toy cues. The 5-year-olds were nearly perfect, and the 3-year-olds showed a significant preference for the correct container given only the context. In Experiment 3, we filled in the age range, and also investigated the effects of the use of labels (i.e. names of experimenters and rooms) and of familiarization time, in groups of 34- to 40-month-olds, 42- to 48-month-olds, and 50- to 56-month-olds. Neither labels nor familiarization time had an effect. Across experiments, there was regular age-related improvement in context-based memory. Overall, the results suggest that children's episodic memory may undergo an early qualitative change, yet to be precisely characterized, and that continuing increments in the use of contextual cues occur throughout the preschool period. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DkwEFw0UEz4&list=PLwxXcOKHPC0llAPVcJyW4EtzlA934A2Rz&index=1

There are marked individual differences in the formation of cognitive maps both in the real world and in virtual environments (VE; e.g., Blajenkova, Motes, & Kozhevnikov, 2005; Chai & Jacobs, 2010; Ishikawa & Montello, 2006; Wen, Ishikawa, & Sato, 2011). These differences, however, are poorly understood and can be difficult to assess except by self-report methods. VEs offer an opportunity to collect objective data in environments that can be controlled and standardized. In this study, we designed a VE consisting of buildings arrayed along 2 separated routes, allowing for differentiation of between-route and within-route representation. Performance on a pointing task and a model-building task correlated with self-reported navigation ability. However, for participants with lower levels of between-route pointing, the Santa Barbara Sense of Direction scale (Hegarty, Richardson, Montello, Lovelace, & Subbiah, 2002) did not predict individual differences in accuracy when pointing to buildings within the same route. Thus, we confirm the existence of individual differences in the ability to construct a cognitive map of an environment, identify both the strengths and the potential weaknesses of self-report measures, and isolate a dimension that may help to characterize individual differences more completely. The VE designed for this study provides an objective behavioral measure of navigation ability that can be widely used as a research tool.

The ability to remember spatial locations is critical to human functioning, both in an evolutionary and in an everyday sense. Yet spatial memories and judgments often show systematic errors and biases. Bias has been explained by models such as the Category Adjustment model (CAM), in which fine-grained and categorical information about locations are combined in a Bayesian manner (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). However, experiments testing this model have largely used locations contained in simple geometric shapes and, more recently, 2D scenes. Do the results generalize to location memory in the complex natural world, as they should if the CAM is to provide an over-arching framework for thinking about spatial memory? Here, this issue is addressed using a novel extension of the location memory paradigm that allows for testing of location memory in an everyday, 3D environment. The results support two predictions of the CAM: that memory for locations is biased toward central values, and that the magnitude of error increases with the retention interval. (Contains 1 table and 5 figures.)

Memories for spatial locations often show systematic errors toward the central value of the surrounding region. This bias has been explained using a Bayesian model in which fine-grained and categorical information are combined (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). However, experiments testing this model have largely used locations contained in simple geometric shapes. Use of this paradigm raises 2 issues. First, do results generalize to the complex natural world? Second, what types of information might be used to segment complex spaces into constituent categories? Experiment 1 addressed the 1st question by showing a bias toward prototypical values in memory for spatial locations in complex natural scenes. Experiment 2 addressed the 2nd question by manipulating the availability of basic visual cues (using color negatives) or of semantic information about the scene (using inverted images). Error patterns suggest that both perceptual and conceptual information are involved in segmentation. The possible neurological foundations of location memory of this kind are discussed. (Contains 6 figures and 1 footnote.)

Retention of source information is enhanced by focus on speakers' feelings about statements even though recognition is reduced for both adults and children. However, does any focus on another person lead to enhanced source monitoring, or is a particular kind of focus required? Does other-focus enhance source monitoring, or does self-focus detract from it? In Experiment 1, 4- and 6-year-olds watched two speakers make statements in a no-focus control or with focus directed on how they (or a speaker) felt about the statements or on perceptual features about themselves (or the speaker). Source monitoring decisions were enhanced by other-focus in both the perceptual and emotional conditions. However, the effect was larger for the emotional condition, and source monitoring exceeded no-focus controls only for this condition. Experiment 2 showed no effect of other-focus versus self-focus on source monitoring when questions were semantic. (Contains 4 tables and 2 figures.)

This research was an investigation of children's performance on a task that requires memory binding. In Experiments 1 and 2, 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds, and adults viewed complex pictures and were tested on memory for isolated parts in the pictures and on the part combinations (combination condition). The results suggested improvement in memory for the combinations between the ages of 4 and 6 years but not in memory for the isolated parts. In Experiments 2 and 3, the authors also examined the developmental relationship between performance in the combination condition and free recall of a naturalistic event, finding preliminary evidence that performance on a memory task that requires binding is positively related to performance in episodic memory.

Adults' source judgments are more accurate when they focus on speakers' emotions than when adults focus on their own emotions. Focusing on speakers may lead to better source memory because it encourages processing of the perceptual characteristics of the source and binding of that information to the content of what is being said. The purpose of the current work was to evaluate whether young children's source memory similarly benefits from this outward encoding focus and whether this effect changes developmentally. In Experiment 1, when 4- and 5-year-olds heard an audiotape of two dissimilar speakers, only the 5-year-olds showed better source memory when asked to adopt an other-focus. In Experiment 2, when 4- and 5-year-olds watched a videotape of two similar speakers, the same pattern was found. However, in Experiment 3, when 4-year-olds watched a videotape of two dissimilar speakers (a more optimal encoding condition in which 5-year-olds showed ceiling performance), 4-year-olds benefited from taking an other-focus during encoding. Overall, the data suggest that the benefit for source memory of focusing on another person develops over the preschool years.

Six experiments examined whether there were circumstances in which toddlers could use landmarks for spatial reorientation. Findings confirmed that geometric information is used for reorientation by toddlers, but give reason to doubt that the use of this information is achieved using a module impenetrable to nongeometric information. (Author/KB)

Examined elementary school children's memories for faces of preschool classmates after a three-year interval. Found that children recognized their classmates at an above-chance level but significantly below that of the preschool teachers. The classmate advantage on the face-matching task decreased across the three-year interval. Findings suggest the functional independence of implicit and explicit memory. (JPB)

The study of development vacillates between a focus on change (i.e., studying how and why infants are so different from adults) and excitement about early competence and continuity (i.e., studying how capable infants are, and marveling at how similar they turn out to be to adults). The study of memory development has been no exception. This article discusses the findings and shortcomings of several studies that focus on memory development in infants. Areas of focus include: (1) Infantile amnesia; (2) Explicit memory with the subtypes semantic and episodic memory; (3) Nonspatial relational memory, spatial relational memory, and episodic memory; and (4) Unitary representations and separated representations. Recommendations for future research include studying the role of age-related changes in sleep patterns in creating age-related changes in hippocampally-dependent memory functions, as well as whether changes in memory after the age of 4 years are entirely linked to change at the cortical level. While researchers are tantalizingly on the brink of exciting breakthroughs in the understanding of the development of memory and the relation of behavioral and neural change, there is much that is still not understood.

Memory for spatial location is typically biased, with errors trending toward the center of a surrounding region. According to the category adjustment model ( CAM), this bias reflects the optimal, Bayesian combination of fine-grained and categorical representations of a location. However, there is disagreement about whether categories are malleable. For instance, can categories be redefined based on expert-level conceptual knowledge? Furthermore, if expert knowledge is used, does it dominate other information sources, or is it used adaptively so as to minimize overall error, as predicted by a Bayesian framework? We address these questions using images of geological interest. The participants were experts in structural geology, organic chemistry, or English literature. Our data indicate that expertise-based categories influence estimates of location memory-particularly when these categories better constrain errors than alternative ('novice') categories. Results are discussed with respect to the CAM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of spatial representation generally focus on flat environments and visual input. However, the world is not flat, and slopes are part of most natural environments. In a series of 4 experiments, we examined whether humans can use a slope as a source of allocentric, directional information for reorientation. A target was hidden in a corner of a square, featureless enclosure tilted at a 50 angle. Finding it required using the vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual cues associated with the slope gradient. In Experiment I, the overall sample performed above chance, showing that slope is sufficient for reorientation in a real environment. However, a sex difference emerged; men outperformed women by 1.4 SDs because they were more likely to use a slope-based strategy. In Experiment 2, attention was drawn to the slope, and participants were prompted to rely on it to solve the task; however, men still outperformed women, indicating a greater ability to use slope. In Experiment 3, we excluded the possibility that women's disadvantage was due to wearing heeled footwear. In Experiment 4, women required more time than men to identify the uphill direction of the slope gradient; this suggests that, in a bottom-up fashion, a perceptual or attentional difficulty underlies women's disadvantage in the ability to use slope and their decreased reliance on this cue. Overall, a bi-coordinate representation was used to find the goal: The target was encoded primarily with respect to the vertical axis and secondarily with respect to the orthogonal axis of the slope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research was an investigation of children's performance on a task that requires memory binding. In Experiments 1 and 2, 4-year-olds, 6-year-olds, and adults viewed complex pictures and were tested on memory for isolated parts in the pictures and on the part combinations (combination condition). The results suggested improvement in memory for the combinations between the ages of 4 and 6 years but not in memory for the isolated parts. In Experiments 2 and 3, the authors also examined the developmental relationship between performance in the combination condition and free recall of a naturalistic event, finding preliminary evidence that performance on a memory task that requires binding is positively related to performance in episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Adults’ source judgments are more accurate when they focus on speakers’ emotions than when adults focus on their own emotions. Focusing on speakers may lead to better source memory because it encourages processing of the perceptual characteristics of the source and binding of that information to the content of what is being said. The purpose of the current work was to evaluate whether young children’s source memory similarly benefits from this outward encoding focus and whether this effect changes developmentally. In Experiment 1, when 4- and 5-year-olds heard an audiotape of two dissimilar speakers, only the 5-year-olds showed better source memory when asked to adopt an other-focus. In Experiment 2, when 4- and 5-year-olds watched a videotape of two similar speakers, the same pattern was found. However, in Experiment 3, when 4-year-olds watched a videotape of two dissimilar speakers (a more optimal encoding condition in which 5-year-olds showed ceiling performance), 4-year-olds benefited from taking an other-focus during encoding. Overall, the data suggest that the benefit for source memory of focusing on another person develops over the preschool years. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The purpose of this study was to contrast children's event-related potentials (ERPs) with those of adults in an item recognition memory task. Four-year-old children and adults were presented with pictorial images, one half of which had been previously shown, and were asked to indicate whether each picture had been seen before. In both samples, an old-new effect was found in the ERP, namely that responses to correctly recognized old pictures elicited more positive-going ERPs than responses to correctly rejected new pictures. However, there were differences between adults' and children's ERPs with respect to the asymmetric scalp distribution and the time course of the old-new difference. In adults, the ERP differences between old and new pictures were bilateral, whereas in children the differences had a tendency to be stronger over the right hemisphere. In addition, children's ERP effects for correct discrimination between old and new pictures began around 400 to 500 msec later than it did in adults. The similarities and differences between the child and adult findings are discussed in terms of developmental changes in cognitive abilities that may be mirrored through corresponding changes in ERPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human episodic memory is not functionally evident until about 2 years of age and continues to develop into the school years. Behavioral studies have elucidated this developmental timeline and its constituent processes. In tandem, lesion and neurophysiological studies in non-human primates and rodents have identified key neural substrates and circuit mechanisms that may underlie episodic memory development. Despite this progress, collaborative efforts between psychologists and neuroscientists remain limited, hindering progress. Here, we seek to bridge human and non-human episodic memory development research by offering a comparative review of studies using humans, non-human primates, and rodents. We highlight critical theoretical and methodological issues that limit cross-fertilization and propose a common research framework, adaptable to different species, that may facilitate cross-species research endeavors. Bevandić et al. review human, non-human primate, and rodent studies on the ontogeny of episodic and episodic-like memory. They identify theoretical and methodological obstacles that currently limit cross-species insights and propose a common research framework to facilitate comparative studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans and animals use mental representations of the spatial structure of the world to navigate. The classical view is that these representations take the form of Euclidean cognitive maps, but alternative theories suggest that they are cognitive graphs consisting of locations connected by paths. We review evidence suggesting that both map-like and graph-like representations exist in the mind/brain that rely on partially overlapping neural systems. Maps and graphs can operate simultaneously or separately, and they may be applied to both spatial and nonspatial knowledge. By providing structural frameworks for complex information, cognitive maps and cognitive graphs may provide fundamental organizing schemata that allow us to navigate in physical, social, and conceptual spaces. Spatial navigation has been suggested to rely either on Euclidean cognitive maps or on graph-like representations of routes between locations. Instead of being competing hypotheses, cognitive maps and cognitive graphs may coexist in the same individuals, with their availability and use depending on environmental characteristics and navigational demands. Cognitive maps and cognitive graphs are instantiated by partially distinct but partially overlapping neural systems in the hippocampal formation, frontal lobes, and scene-selective cortical regions. Both representational systems can likely support abstract thought; Euclidean maps are suited for representing content varying along continuous dimensions, whereas cognitive graphs are suited for representing state transitions and discrete associations between items. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are marked individual differences in the formation of cognitive maps both in the real world and in virtual environments (VE; e.g., Blajenkova, Motes, & Kozhevnikov, 2005; Chai & Jacobs, 2010; Ishikawa & Montello, 2006; Wen, Ishikawa, & Sato, 2011). These differences, however, are poorly understood and can be difficult to assess except by self-report methods. VEs offer an opportunity to collect objective data in environments that can be controlled and standardized. In this study, we designed a VE consisting of buildings arrayed along 2 separated routes, allowing for differentiation of between-route and within-route representation. Performance on a pointing task and a model-building task correlated with self-reported navigation ability. However, for participants with lower levels of between-route pointing, the Santa Barbara Sense of Direction scale (Hegarty, Richardson, Montello, Lovelace, & Subbiah, 2002) did not predict individual differences in accuracy when pointing to buildings within the same route. Thus, we confirm the existence of individual differences in the ability to construct a cognitive map of an environment, identify both the strengths and the potential weaknesses of self-report measures, and isolate a dimension that may help to characterize individual differences more completely. The VE designed for diis study provides an objective behavioral measure of navigation ability that can be widely used as a research tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memories for spatial locations often show systematic errors toward the central value of the surrounding region. This bias has been explained using a Bayesian model in which fine-grained and categorical information are combined (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). However, experiments testing this model have largely used locations contained in simple geometric shapes. Use of this paradigm raises 2 issues. First, do results generalize to the complex natural world? Second, what types of information might be used to segment complex spaces into constituent categories? Experiment 1 addressed the 1st question by showing a bias toward prototypical values in memory for spatial locations in complex natural scenes. Experiment 2 addressed the 2nd question by manipulating the availability of basic visual cues (using color negatives) or of semantic information about the scene (using inverted images). Error patterns suggest that both perceptual and conceptual information are involved in segmentation. The possible neurological foundations of location memory of this kind are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]