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We argue that analyzing everyday memory failures in terms of the "unity of consciousness" can elucidate the bases of such failures. A perfect unity amongst one's mental states is rare. In extreme cases the unity of consciousness can breakdown in dramatic fashion (e.g., in Dissociative Identity Disorder), but such breakdowns also occur in less dramatic ways that affect us in everyday life. For example, disruptions in the unity of consciousness can result in everyday memory failures, such as forgetting to put on a tie for an important formal meeting. After providing some philosophical background into the notions of "unity of consciousness" and "functionalism," we offer preliminary analyses of three examples of everyday memory failure. We then introduce and develop what we call the "unity model" of memory failure and show how it explains the examples. We also describe different ways that unity can break down which, in turn, can lead to memory failure and inappropriate behavior. We then show how slips of action and other kinds of cognitive failures (e.g., memory blocks) differ from everyday memory failures. Finally, we examine alternative models (e.g., Absentmindedness and Multimodal) arguing that the unity model is preferable, and then show how our model is consistent with some experimental results.

Memory research, like other scientific research, disregards many variables in order to bring the full force of the scientific method to bear on clearly important variables. The reasons why memory research attends to certain variables and disregards others emanate largely from theoretical assumptions that distinguish memory systems from other psychological systems, and that distinguish variables intrinsic to memory from those extrinsic to memory. Nevertheless, a number of these 'forgotten' variables affect memory performance. Regardless of past practice, it is a mistake for memory research to continue to ignore relevant variables. Doing so introduces measurement error that contaminates memory performance measures, and classification error that precludes the discovery of legitimate memory variables. It is proposed here that if forgotten memory variables are controlled, manipulated, and measured more extensively, then future memory research will have greater power and memory theories will have greater validity.

Undergraduate students were presented with word pairs (e.g., egg-yolk) and were timed as they decided whether one word named part of the thing named by the other word. In Experiment 1, "no" responses to nonpart pairs (e.g., fish-flaps) were slowed by the similarity of the stimulus part (flaps) to a part that the stimulus object did possess (fins). This suggested that decisions were made by retrieving parts of the stimulus object from memory and comparing them to the stimulus part. Whereas the parts used as stimuli in Experiment 1 were nonspecific, belonging to several different types of object (e.g., wheel), those selected for Experiment 2 were specific to a single type of object (e.g., thumb). In Experiment 2, "no" responses to nonpart pairs (e.g., foot-thumb) were slowed by similarity of the stimulus object (foot) to an object that the stimulus part (thumb) belonged to (hand). This suggested that decisions were made by retrieving the object to which the stimulus part belonged and comparing it to the stimulus object. The results support a hybrid model of part-whole decisions that includes directed retrieval of relational knowledge from memory and a comparison process.