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Background and Objectives: Intrusive memories are a core feature of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Cognitive models posit that PTSD symptoms are stimulated by maladaptive appraisals about symptoms. This study aimed to test the causal pathway of maladaptive appraisals about the meaning of intrusions on subsequent intrusive memories., Methods: Forty-five healthy participants were presented with a traumatic film, and were subsequently told either (a) intrusions are indicative of poor psychological functioning, (b) intrusions are not indicative of psychological functioning, or (c) no instructions. Participants subsequently completed a measure of cognitive performance to index potential interference by intrusions, as well as a scale of intrusive memories., Results: Participants who were told that intrusions are indicative of negative psychological state subsequently reported more intrusive memories than those who were told that intrusions have no particular significance., Limitations: Inferences are reduced by lack of group differences in appraisals reported by participants. A stronger index of intrusions would have been achieved through diary keeping in the period after the experimental session., Conclusions: This finding provides initial causal evidence that appraising intrusions as maladaptive may directly enhance the occurrence of intrusions following encoding of an aversive event, and in this sense is supportive of cognitive models of PTSD., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Objective: Auditory hallucinations (hearing voices) have been associated with a range of altered cognitive functions, pertaining to signal detection, source-monitoring, memory, inhibition and language processes. Yet, empirical results are inconsistent. Despite this, several theoretical models of auditory hallucinations persist, alongside increasing emphasis on the utility of a multidimensional framework. Thus, clarification of current evidence across the broad scope of proposed mechanisms is warranted. Method: A systematic search of the Web of Science, PubMed and Scopus databases was conducted. Records were screened to confirm the use of an objective behavioural cognitive task, and valid measurement of hallucinations specific to the auditory modality. Results: Auditory hallucinations were primarily associated with difficulties in perceptual decision-making (i.e. reduced sensitivity/accuracy for signal-noise discrimination; liberal responding to ambiguity), source-monitoring (i.e. self–other and temporal context confusion), working memory and language function (i.e. reduced verbal fluency). Mixed or limited support was observed for perceptual feature discrimination, imagery vividness/illusion susceptibility, source-monitoring for stimulus form and spatial context, recognition and recall memory, executive functions (e.g. attention, inhibition), emotion processing and language comprehension/hemispheric organisation. Conclusions: Findings were considered within predictive coding and self-monitoring frameworks. Of concern was the portion of studies which – despite offering auditory-hallucination-specific aims and inferences – employed modality-general measures, and/or diagnostic-based contrasts with psychologically healthy individuals. This review highlights disparities within the literature between theoretical conceptualisations of auditory hallucinations and the body of rigorous empirical evidence supporting such inferences. Future cognitive investigations, beyond the schizophrenia-spectrum, which explicitly define and measure the timeframe and sensory modality of hallucinations, are recommended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we consider the potential role of metarepresentation—the representation of another representation, or as commonly considered within cognitive science, the mental representation of another individual’s knowledge and beliefs—in mediating definite reference and common ground in conversation. Using dialogues from a referential communication study in which speakers conversed in succession with two different addressees, we highlight ways in which interlocutors work together to successfully refer to objects and achieve shared conceptualizations. We briefly review accounts of how such shared conceptualizations could be represented in memory, from simple associations between label and referent, to triple co-presence representations that track interlocutors in an episode of referring, to more elaborate metarepresentations that invoke theory of mind, mutual knowledge, or a model of a conversational partner. We consider how some forms of metarepresentation, once created and activated, could account for definite reference in conversation by appealing to ordinary processes in memory. We conclude that any representations that capture information about others’ perspectives are likely to be relatively simple and subject to the same kinds of constraints on attention and memory that influence other kinds of cognitive representations.

Abstract: Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based categorization—using either an exemplar or a prototype approach. Empirical estimation is performed on the elicited-belief data from two experiments (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Rutström and Wilcox, 2009) using repeated games with a unique, albeit significantly different, stage mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Model comparisons are performed by cross-validation both within and between these two datasets, and using data from completely unrelated non-strategic tasks. Subjectsʼ beliefs are best described by 2-period pattern detection. Parameter estimates exhibited considerable instability across the two belief-elicitation datasets, and surprisingly, using median values from a wide variety of unrelated studies led to better predictions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: If we look at the human mind as a pattern-recognition device, what is the nature of its pattern-recognizing? And how does it differ from the majority of pattern-recognition methods we have collectively devised over the decades? These broad philosophical questions emerge from the studies of chess thought, and we propose that a major task of the mind is to engage in “experience recognition” (Linhares & Freitas, 2010). One of the basic tenets of that proposal is that pattern recognition, in cognitive science and related disciplines, does not accurately reflect human psychology. As an example, the well-known article by Chase and Simon, “perception in chess”, and the benchmark cognitive computational models of chess, by Gobet et al. were criticized. Lane and Gobet (2011) provide serious skepticism concerning some of those arguments, and here we take the opportunity to respond and expand the theoretical constructs of “experience recognition”. We postulate that the mind''s pattern-recognizing process holds the following properties: it is a highly path-dependent process; it prioritizes internal encodings; it is a self-organizing process in constant change; and it constructs its future information-processing pathways by continuously recognizing the possibilities that lie within the adjacent possible. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: argue that experts use analogical or semantic similarity, similarities that are not available from direct surface representations. LF make their case using a critique of and the presentation of a few chess positions and examples from other domains. Their conclusion is that models such as CHREST () and theories such as the chunking theory () and the template theory () are inadequate for dealing with these issues. They propose an alternative paradigm, which they call “experience recognition.” Although we find this issue an interesting one, the separation between pattern recognition and problem solving is a lot more complex than LF portray. We instead suggest that a “revolution” in our to date successful modelling is not necessary. Especially in the chess domain, LF’s examples do not make the point they claim. Furthermore, their criticisms of CS are incorrect, and they have failed to mention a large number of experimental results that have supported the hypothesis of location-specific encodings. Although we agree that experts use semantic information and similarities, these ideas already possess analogues in CHREST, which can form the basis of further evolution of the theory. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Current decision models of recognition memory are based almost entirely on one paradigm, single item old/new judgments accompanied by confidence ratings. This task results in receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) that are well fit by both signal-detection and dual-process models. Here we examine an entirely new recognition task, the judgment of episodic oddity, whereby participants select the mnemonically odd members of triplets (e.g., a new item hidden among two studied items). Using the only two known signal-detection rules of oddity judgment derived from the sensory perception literature, the unequal variance signal-detection model predicted that an old item among two new items would be easier to discover than a new item among two old items. In contrast, four separate empirical studies demonstrated the reverse pattern: triplets with two old items were the easiest to resolve. This finding was anticipated by the dual-process approach as the presence of two old items affords the greatest opportunity for recollection. Furthermore, a bootstrap-fed Monte Carlo procedure using two independent datasets demonstrated that the dual-process parameters typically observed during single item recognition correctly predict the current oddity findings, whereas unequal variance signal-detection parameters do not. Episodic oddity judgments represent a case where dual- and single-process predictions qualitatively diverge and the findings demonstrate that novelty is “odder” than familiarity. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Recently, several investigators have begun to conceptualise idea generation (IG), the process by which new designs are deliberately produced, as a predominantly memory-based activity. In this paper, we consider how psychological, memory-based IG models can help us to understand design IG. We introduce one such model with modifications for experimentation in conceptual product design. In this model, the IG process is divided into two phases: memory sampling succeeded by idea production. We utilise this model to explicate stimulation and fixation effects in design IG. We evaluated empirically two predictions derived from the model that are relevant to design IG - the effect of contextual cueing on memory sampling, and the effect of verbal stimulation on idea production. These questions were investigated in an experiment involving 50 engineering students working individually. The analysis of generated ideas showed that the manipulations affected the ideas, and the contextual cues especially, were an influential part of the design assignments. We also showed that the absence of context information can activate a contextual defaulting strategy. We reflect on the implications of these findings for design practice and education in the conclusions of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Pattern recognition lies at the heart of the cognitive science endeavor. In this paper, we provide some criticism of this notion, using studies of chess as an example. The game of chess is, as significant evidence shows, a game of abstractions: pressures; force; open files and ranks; time; tightness of defense; old strategies rapidly adapted to new situations. These ideas do not arise on current computational models, which apply brute force by rote-memorization. In this paper we assess the computational models of CHREST and CHUMP, and argue that chess chunks must contain semantic information. This argument leads to a new and contrasting claim, as we propose that key conclusions of influential study stemmed from a non-sequitur. In the concluding section, we propose a shift in philosophy, from “pattern recognition” to a framework of “experience recognition”. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Brewin's dual representation theory, Ehlers and Clark's cognitive appraisal model, and Dalgleish's schematic, propositional, analogue and associative representational systems model are considered in the light of recent evidence on the neural substrates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The models' proposals about the cognitive mechanism of memory dysfunction in PTSD are described and evaluated against current knowledge about the neural pathways and functions disrupted in PTSD. A dual pathway model of memory is consistent with neuroscience of memory. The appraisal model also provides an account of the top-down modulation of memory and arousal problems consistent with current neuroscientific evidence of PTSD. Dalgleish's model is less consistent with the evidence because it relies upon assumptions that cannot yet be tested neuroscientifically. All three models under-specify the causal and maintaining influence of hyperarousal relative to the role it plays in current neuroscientific models of PTSD. Implications of the evidence for improving treatment and prevention are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A novel approach to Episodic Associative Memory (EAM), known as Episodic Associative Memory with a Neighborhood Effect (EAMwNE) is presented in this paper. It overcomes the representation limitations of existing episodic memory models and increases the potential for their use in practical application. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: According to cognitive theorists, intrusive trauma memories have their origin in how information during the event is processed. Two studies investigated functional cognitive strategies during medical crises that might protect against intrusions. In Study 1, interviews with health-care professionals were used to identify cognitive strategies judged to be effective in controlling emotions and dealing with medical crises. Study 2 systematically manipulated the use of those strategies in a trauma analogue film paradigm. Experimental participants reported fewer intrusions, and less fear and avoidance of film-related stimuli during the subsequent week than controls. The manipulation did not affect anxiety during the film or memory disorganization. Implications for cognitive theories of intrusion development are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We describe a system, G2A, that produces ACT-R models from GOMS models. The GOMS models can contain hierarchical methods, visual and memory stores, and control constructs. G2A allows ACT-R models to be built much more quickly, in hours rather than weeks. Because GOMS is a more abstract formalism than ACT-R, most GOMS operators can be plausibly translated in different ways into ACT-R productions (e.g., a GOMS Look-for operator can be carried out by different visual search strategies in ACT-R). Given a GOMS model, G2A generates and evaluates alternative ACT-R models by systematically varying the mapping of GOMS operators to ACT-R productions. In experiments with a text editing task, G2A produces ACT-R models whose predictions are within 5% of GOMS model predictions. In the same domain, G2A also generates ACT-R models that give better predictions than GOMS, providing good predictions of overall task duration for actual users (within 2%), though the models are less accurate at a detailed level. In a separate experiment with a mouse-driven telephone dialing task, G2A produces models that do a better job of distinguishing between competing interfaces than a Fitts’ law model or an ACT-R model built by hand. G2A starts to describe the relationship between two major theories of cognition. This may have appeared a simple relationship, but the complexity of the translation illustrates why this was not done before. G2A shows a way forward for cognitive models, that of higher level languages that compile into more detailed specifications. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper considers the changing cognitive demands of the web as a representative of emerging pervasive and virtually instantaneous global information access environments. Because information retrieval time on the web approaches that of human memory, the appropriate knowledge strategies for seeking and remembering information begin to change. There is strong existing theoretical work on search itself; however, the complete knowledge acquisition cycle ends in memorisation ready for future needs including meta-knowledge of where and how to find information. We present preliminary results in this area but argue that this requires new empirical work and cognitive models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The case of a patient is reported who presented consistently with overt deficits in producing pantomimes in the absence of any other deficits in producing meaningful gestures. This pattern of spared and impaired abilities is difficult to reconcile with the current layout of cognitive models for praxis. This patient also showed clear impairment in a dual-task paradigm, a test taxing the co-ordination aspect of working memory, though performed normally in a series of other neuropsychological measures assessing language, visuo-spatial functions, reasoning function, and executive function. A specific working memory impairment associated with a deficit of pantomiming in the absence of any other disorders in the production of meaningful gestures suggested a way to modify the model to account for the data. Pantomimes are a particular category of gestures, meaningful, yet novel. We posit that by their very nature they call for the intervention of a mechanism to integrate and synthesise perceptual inputs together with information made available from the action semantics (knowledge about objects and functions) and the output lexicon (stored procedural programmes). This processing stage conceived as a temporary workspace where gesture information is actively manipulated, would generate new motor programmes to carry out pantomimes. The model of gesture production is refined to include this workspace. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]