Oxford University Press, 1998. £22.99 (pbk) (viii + 248 pages)ISBN 0 198 52441 2In the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy1xThe More than Complete Hitchhiker's Guide. Adams, D. See all References1, a computer named Deep Thought churns for 7.5 million years to answer the Great Question of Life, the Universe and Everything. The answer turns out to be forty-two, and as Deep Thought surmises, the people do not like it. The Prefrontal Cortex: Executive and Cognitive Functions attempts to answer a less universal question: What are the functions of the primate prefrontal cortex? Are its answers any more satisfying than Deep Thought's?If not, no fault lies with the editors of the present volume. They assembled a stellar cast and prepared an effective, concise volume based on a meeting of the Royal Society in 1996. In just 15 chapters, many current ideas about the functions of prefrontal cortex appear, including planning action, devising strategies, making decisions, selecting goals, using feedback, monitoring and ordering events, suppressing routine behavior, and subserving working memory, to recount a partial list that excludes language. However, because such a long list of functions remains fundamentally dissatisfying, it seems that every publishing house from Oxford University Press to Megadodo Publications would like to redress that discontent by launching a volume on prefrontal cortex. Some of these publications strive to synthesize an astronomical quantity of literature into a guide to the frontal lobe, such as the Passingham2xThe Frontal Lobes in Voluntary Action. Passingham, R.E. See all References2 and Fuster3xThe Prefrontal Cortex: Anatomy, Physiology, and Neuropsychology of the Frontal Lobe. Fuster, J.M. See all References3 monographs. Others, like the present anthology, offer readers a galaxy of authoritative progress reports from the authors' clinics and laboratories.This volume's most noteworthy contributions focus on memory (Baddeley and Della Sala; Shallice and Burgess; Petrides), strategies and response selection (Robbins; Passingham), the role of dopamine in development (Diamond), and the potential contribution of prefrontal dysfunction to schizophrenia (Weinberger and Berman; Frith; Cohen, Braver and O'Reilly). Damasio's chapter explains his somatic marker hypothesis, which holds that a central representation of body state (gut feeling) plays an essential role in decisions concerning oneself and others. Certain patients have a normal repertoire of social knowledge, but nevertheless make socially inappropriate decisions. The finding that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex disrupts gut feelings and causes disadvantageous, inappropriate judgments represents an important advance. However, as Rolls points out in his chapter, the somatic marker hypothesis brings to mind older ideas. Like others before him, Teuber4xNeurophysiology, effects of focal brain lesions. Teuber, H-L. Neurosci. Res. Prog. Bull. 1972; 10: 381–384PubMedSee all References4 emphasized that ‘patients with frontal lobe disease… seem to perceive the mistakes they make, but are unable to use the information to guide their behavior’. Likewise, one patient's statement during psychological testing exemplifies the distinction between judgments and actions:if I put this card down, it will be wrong. You see – I am right – this one is wrong! And this one – wrong! and wrong again!’ He then proceeds in this fashion by contradicting in his actions what he can announce verbally as the correct procedure, evidently aware of the contradiction but incapable of avoiding it5xUnity and diversity of frontal lobe function. Teuber, H-L. Acta Neurobiol. Exp. 1972; 32: 615–656PubMedSee all References5.The somatic marker hypothesis helps to explain such machine-like behavior.This likable book does have its defects, however. Certain chapters contain material omissions, and only a minority of the authors address each others' views. Among this minority, Rolls, Robbins, Petrides, and Diamond contribute particularly useful discussions. In other chapters, the neglect of their many mutual contradictions creates some doubt about whether their authors attended the meeting that brought this book into being. Discordance among chapters is probably inevitable, but some contributions even lack internal consistency. For example, one author laments the confusion caused by the “ill-defined terms of ‘executive processing’ and ‘higher-order cognitive processing’” but later considers the ‘cognitive mechanisms that contribute to higher-order executive processing’ with little elucidation of those terms. However, these are relatively minor quibbles. If this book fails to dispel discontentment over our level of understanding the prefrontal cortex, they are not the reasons.Perhaps we find the current state of the art so unsatisfying because most of the prevailing ideas leave the impression of timelessness. As Fulton6xPhysiology of the Nervous System. Fulton, J.F. See all References6 commented a half century ago:The earliest experiments on the frontal areas were those of the French neurologist Flourens (1824), who, on the basis of ablation studies, cast to the four winds the then current phrenological doctrines… He attributed to the frontal lobes, acting in harmony with the rest of the brain, the higher perceptual, associative, and executive functions of the mind.Have ideas about the prefrontal cortex changed fundamentally in our time? Inferences first drawn at the dawn of neuroscience appear in new guises to undergo relentless promotion as the key advance. The quest for synthesis encourages the neglect of sound evidence. And the unearthing of the global function of prefrontal cortex – announced every few years – yields a remarkably familiar account. By now, virtually every possibility has been suggested, so future theories of the prefrontal cortex, too, will probably echo much from the past. As those new or resurrected concepts evolve, will any time-honored ideas become extinct? As Fulton pointed out in the quotation above, the field had already cast aside one view of prefrontal function by 1824, but that feat has seldom been replicated in the intervening 175 years. The habit of recycling and rarely rejecting a limited constellation of ideas suggests that we already know the most likely functions of the primate prefrontal cortex. Perhaps our dissatisfaction results not from failing to have the answers, but from not liking the answers that we do have. Twenty-first century authorities may conclude that our contemporaries rejected so few conceptions concerning prefrontal cortex because, as a group, the ideas of our time suffered from the twin nuisances of untestability and validity. As Gaffan7xInteraction of temporal lobe and frontal lobe in memory. Gaffan, D. : 129–138CrossrefSee all References7 has advised, ‘let us accept at the outset that the prefrontal cortex is involved in all types of memory’, to which one might add all other aspects of information processing important to the life history of primates. Like forty-two, some answers are simply unsatisfying.