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The research is dedicated to the study of the coordinate system of a real language personality. The purpose of the work is to analyze the multilevel coordinate system of a real linguistic personality on the material of contemporary artistic discourse. The subject of our study is the study of the linguistic image of the Polish writer Olga Tokarchuk, winner of the Nobel Prize 2018, the object is the text of the novel «Bieguni» / «Runners». The main research methods are contextual and semantic ones, as well as definitional analysis. It is ascertained that the key idea of travel in the form of transit passage from one country to another through intermediate territories is considered by O. Tokarchuk as a psychological phenomenon that makes a person move, relocate. Sedentary lifestyle makes it easier for moral evil to attack people, and therefore the only salvation in this situation is «life on the trip», constant movement from place to place. The novel reproduces a special type of thinking and the level of intelligence, temperament, character, degree of emotional tension, sensuality, intuition and erudition of the Polish writer, which impress with global personification, cross-associations, strange and paradoxical metaphors, aphorisms, reiterations and syntactic devices, etc. Conclusions. Linguistic analysis of the coordinate system of language personality in the novel «Runners» revealed that Olga Tokarchuk belongs to the linguo-creative original elite personality, as evidenced by social and individual parameters at the cognitive, verbal-semantic, pragmatic, valuable, cultural and personal levels. We observe the conceptual predominance of non-procedural characteristics and the verbal predominance of procedural differences. We see prospects in the further development of methods for studying the real linguistic personality recorded in artistic texts, and the characteristics of the linguistic parameters of gender identity.

Argument z projektu, przeformułowany obecnie przez sympatyków ruchu Inteligentnego Projektu, jest oparty przede wszystkim na przeciwstawieniu rzeczy zaprojektowanych rzeczom niezaprojektowanym. Fakt ten jest jednak kłopotliwy dla chrześcijan. Skoro bowiem twierdzą oni, że Bóg zaprojektował cały Wszechświat, to jak można mówić, że coś nie jest zaprojektowane? W mojej opinii problem ten jest równoważny problemowi wolnej woli, czy też moralnego zła, a jako taki może znaleźć rozwiązanie na gruncie dawnych koncepcji filozoficznych, które dotyczyły tych kwestii – chodzi zwłaszcza o pojęcie różnych poziomów opisu oraz Augustyńską koncepcję różnych poziomów zdolności.

Zdarzenia w rodzaju trzęsień ziemi i wyniszczających chorób często uważane są za coś złego i skłaniają do zadawania kłopotliwych pytań o Bożą dobroć. Chociaż nauka nie uznaje takich zdarzeń za złe, to jednak dostarcza pewnych wskazówek na temat ich pochodzenia. Teodycea podejmuje próbę teologicznego wyjaśnienia pochodzenia zła oraz celu, w jakim Bóg pozwala mu istnieć. Pytanie, czy ewolucja może być jednym z Boskich mechanizmów stwórczych, uzyskuje inną odpowiedź w świetle założeń teodycei augustiańskiej, a inną w ramach teodycei ireneuszowej. Uznając, że każda prawda jest prawdą Bożą, chrześcijanie starają się stworzyć pogląd na świat, który łączyłby naukowe i teologiczne spojrzenie na prowadzące do cierpienia zdarzenia przyrodnicze.

Between 1935 and 1979 the importation and sale of contraception and the publication of information about birth control was illegal in Ireland. Political discourse on the issue was grounded in religious doctrine and the issue was virtually invisible in terms of media content. But in the 1960s as the state embraced free trade and introduced free second level education, the nature of the women’s pages of the national newspapers changed. Amid the international rise of feminism, the pages moved away from an exclusive focus on domestic-related concerns to make visible the demand for bodily autonomy and the legalisation of contraception. Such a change not only had the effect of making these long ignored issues visible in public debate, it also helped to frame those issues as a political rather than a moral issue. Such an approach incurred the wrath of those who viewed contraception as a moral evil and saw those who advocated its legalisation as a threat to the existing order. This article assesses the media invisibility of the issue in the early decades of the Irish state, examines the changing nature of the women’s pages in the 1960s, and assesses their contribution to the development of public discussion of birth control and its legalisation in 1979.

The direct reference point for these analyses is the process of making moral decisions, but a particular point of interest is the difficulty associated with making decisions when acting subjects are aware that their choice of moral good can lead to the breakdown of relationships with those close to them (family members or friends) or to their exclusion from the group(s) that have been most important to them so far in their lives, consequently causing them to experience loneliness. This difficulty is a challenge for education, which in supporting the moral development of a maturing person should prepare her/him for choosing moral good even if this requires personal sacrifices. In these analyses, assuming that knowledge of moral good is not sufficient for morally good actions, I refer mainly to the virtues of character that facilitate making morally good decisions and I seek the answer to the question: what character traits (moral virtues) should be shaped in maturing persons, so that as adults they can resist moral evil, even when this will clearly lead to the experience of loneliness? I propose these character traits as expressing moral virtues—especially the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude (neo-Thomistic approach). In this way, I join in the discussion relating to the teleology of education. I do not touch on the methodology of education, however. The argument is presented in two parts. In the first, I introduce the problem of decision-making implying consent to loneliness. In the second, I reflect on the characteristics of a person who is capable of making such a decision.

Abstract. Background: Condemnatory reactions toward suicide are prevalent in Africa, yet no study has examined how society reacts to suicides from the perspective of suicide-bereaved persons. Aims: This qualitative study explored societal reactions to suicides so as to further our understanding of the problem in Ghana. Method: Using a semi-structured interview guide, we interviewed 45 close relations of 14 men who took their lives. Results: The reactions followed ontological questions of what suicide means (construing the act), its impact (consequences), why it happened and who to blame (attributions and allocation of responsibility), and how to remedy perceived damages (damage control). Limitations: Focusing on suicides of only men might have limited the range of societal reactions to suicide in general. Conclusion: Reparative and retributive societal reactions to suicides were influenced predominantly by views that suicide is an extraordinary moral evil in the setting. Increased culturally focused suicide education can improve people's understanding and enhance responsive suicide prevention and postvention.

The article analyses the understanding of tolerance in psychology and determines its role in human life and human relations. The article notes that a complete, agreed by many scholars, scientific theoretical concept of tolerance has not yet formed, which is explained by the ambiguity, multi-aspect and the complex nature of this phenomenon. We divided the definitions of tolerance into three groups: 1) tolerance understood as a moral quality of a person; 2) it included into the system of human values; 3) the role of tolerance in effective interactions at interpersonal relations to achieve mutual understanding and consent of people. However, factually, different definitions of tolerance combine different understandings of it, emphasizing the complex nature of this phenomenon. The scholars propose to distinguish tolerance to any person (to Other), who differs in appearance, psychological characteristics, lifestyle, nationality, race, religion, etc., and intolerance to their immoral actions. The violations of the norms of universal human and public morality are the limit of tolerance. We proposed to distinguish the hierarchy of tolerance types, according to the degree of its manifestation: 1) tolerance as a conscious and unconditional acceptance of Other; 2) as acceptance of another people, if they do not commit evil; 3) internal non-acceptance, but respect to the rights and freedoms of Other; 4) non-acceptance with the wish to reconcile with the differences of another person for the sake of communication with them and mutual agreement; 5) non-acceptance with the suppression of disagreement with Other for the sake of mutual understanding and cooperation. The study results are generalized in the conclusion that since the phenomenon of tolerance was analyzed in different sciences, and there were quite a large number of interpretations of this concept, it is worth admitting its complicated, complex nature, dependence on a specific science and social situation of its development, and the importance of this phenomenon for the existence and development of society and civilization as a whole. The article concludes that tolerance is a personal trait manifested in a well-disposed and unprejudiced attitude to another person, who could differ in any way, as to an equal personality, who has the right to their own system of life values, principles and world outlook and freedom to choose their way of life and achieve happiness but does not commit moral evil (harm) to another person, nature or civilization.

Evil is a key concept in Confucianism and other world religions. The problem of evil is therefore central to our interreligious discussion of human nature and the world. In Western scholarship, however, Confucian moral idealism is occasionally criticized for being too optimistic or unable to articulate the nature of evil; it is philosophically or theologically weak, also due to the absence of an omnipotent, omniscient God (divine law-giver). If we take the Confucian doctrine of innate human goodness for granted, how do we explain the active presence of evil in the human world? This article discusses the heart of T’oegye’s thought by focusing on the problem of evil and the way to transcend it. Yi Hwang 李滉 (T’oegye 退溪, 1501– 1570) was an eminent Korean thinker who greatly influenced Neo-Confucian ethics and spirituality. By using a textual and interpretive approach, I present his major works including the Sŏnghak sipto 聖學十圖 (Ten diagrams on sage learning), Chasŏngnok 自省錄 (Record of self-reflection), and “Four-Seven Debate Letters.” T’oegye eloquently criticized the origin of moral evil and emphasized a selftranscending way to remove evil and do good. What is important about his interpretation and how does it enrich our global understanding of good and evil? I conclude by considering this and related questions from a comparative and interreligious standpoint.

Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to the god-faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion raises two theological worries. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to tribalism. If God hates idolatry and moral evil, why would he give rise to mind with such biases? A Plantingian response would point to the noetic effects of sin. Such a response, however, would have to assume that God is restoring the minds of believers. This paper considers empirical reasons to doubt that such a process is taking place.

Interpretacja rzeczownika φθόνος w Mdr 2,24 może rodzić pewne trudności. We egzegezie φθόνος jest generalnie odnoszony do postawy diabła, który, zazdrosny o człowieka, buntuje się przeciw Bogu. Takie znaczenie pojawia się już w literaturze apokryficznej i patrystycznej. Ten artykuł ukazuje kontekst analizowanego wersetu, kwestie związane z jego tłumaczeniem oraz możliwe interpretacje. Bada najpierw naturę śmierci, stara się ukazać, jaka rzeczywistość kryje się za terminem διάβολος i dlaczego autor opisuje jego działanie jako motywowane zawiścią. Opierając się na tekstach Filona z Aleksandrii, argumentuje, że zawiść rozumiana jako smutek związany z brakiem różnych dóbr, które posiadają inni, to tylko określenie istoty tego uczucia. Wydaje się, że autor natchniony chciał przede wszystkim ukazać zawiść jako postawę negatywną, radykalnie przeciwstawną idei mądrości, cnoty i bliskości Boga. W takiej interpretacji zawiść objawia stan moralnego zła, absolutnego braku mądrości, który skutkuje oddzieleniem od Boga, wprowadza niezgodę między ludźmi i ostatecznie doprowadza do duchowej śmierci. The interpretation of the noun φθόνος in Wis 2:24 may raise some difficulties. In exegesis, φθόνος is generally referred to the attitude of the devil who, jealous of man, rebelled against God. This meaning already appears in apocryphal and patristic literature. This article presents the context of the analyzed verse, issues related to its translation, and possible interpretations. First, it explores the nature of death, then tries to show what reality is behind the term διάβολος and why the author describes his action as motivated by envy. Based on the texts of Philo of Alexandria, the article argues that envy, understood as sadness related to the lack of various goods that others have, is only a definition of the essence of this feeling. It seems that the inspired author primarily wanted to show envy as a negative attitude, radically opposed to the idea of wisdom, virtue and closeness to God. In such an interpretation, envy reveals a state of moral evil, an absolute lack of wisdom, which results in separation from God, causes discord between people, and ultimately leads to spiritual death.

Fremstedal offers an account of Kant as a predecessor of existentialism. More specifically, Kant is claimed to anticipate existentialism by emphasizing human finitude and holding human consciousness to be characterized by mineness or self-referentiality. In addition, Kant makes human freedom the central philosophical issue, arguing that freedom is inescapable for human agents. Kant not only introduces the influential concept of autonomy, but he also holds that awareness of freedom leads to anxiety, and that anxiety in turn precedes moral evil. Because of moral evil, human agents suffer from self-deception, something that necessitates a radical self-choice, or conversion, by which the agent takes responsibility for himself as a natural and moral being. Finally, Kant prepares the ground for existentialism by developing an existential interpretation of religion that criticizes theodicies and emphasizes the hiddenness of God.

Many disagreements characterize the nature of morality. I briefly summarize these conflicting viewpoints. Is morality rooted in reason or the emotions? Is morality a form of objective truth or is it false and oppressive? How should we confront moral evil and moral uncertainty? The answers to these difficult questions comes not only from moral philosophers but also from respected role models such as family, teachers, clergy, friends and experience.

This paper aims to compare and analyze mental growth in Heart of Darkness and The Great Gatsby and to find out similarities and differences between two heroes: Marlow and Nick. The major results in this study are shown as follows; In Heart of Darkness Kurtz’s tragic death results from inner evil in human nature in the light of moral corruption embodied in him. Joseph Conrad reveals his tragic vision of human nature through multiple narrators and change in Marlow’s vision. Kurtz’s last word before his death is quite enlightening. Marlow undergoes a transformation and see the truth. Marlow realized that Kurtz’s evil are deeply rooted in self and in civilization. In The Great Gatsby, F, Scott Fitzgerald infuses a romantic optimism into Gatsby. Because Gatsby is a romantic, he has retained an ability to see a life of limitless possibilities. In the end, Nick, narrator, major character and critic, returns to the West, hometown, because of the corrupted materialism embodied in Tom and Daisy. Nick’s return to West means Nick’s transformation of consciousness or mental growth. In conclusion, Heart of Darkness and The Great Gatsby represent the desire for quest, mental growth, moral sense and self-recognition. But there is a critical difference in that the former reveals Dark Power, that is, moral evil in human nature and the latter shows the importance of romantic sensibility and moral corruption embodied in face value of money-centered society.

Mass shootings have received widespread media attention due to their extreme violence. People who report greater belief in pure evil (BPE; the tendency to attribute harmdoing to dispositionally sadistic individuals) generally favor harsher criminal punishment, regardless of whether criminals exhibit stereotypically “evil” traits. We examined whether BPE predicted evaluations of gun violence perpetrators despite different situational factors related to the shooter's and crime's circumstances. An online, national sample (N = 275) read an allegedly real USA Today article about a mall shooting. We manipulated the shooter's evilness; whether the shooter exhibited a brain tumor, which could have accounted for his violent behavior; and, whether the event was a mass shooting. Results showed that individuals who reported greater BPE demonized, dehumanized, and punished the shooter more across all experimental conditions. Thus, results indicate that stronger pre-existing beliefs in pure evil may override key situational information when punishing violent offenders.

The past two decades have witnessed a growing consensus among policy analysts, political elites, and advocates that corruption is a moral evil with significant deleterious consequences for national...

El concepto de ética antigua está ligado a una vertiente que viene de Sócrates (y los Sofistas), pasando por Platón, y que tiene su clímax en Aristóteles. En general, ninguna de estas teorías concibe la ética como un conjunto de consejos o normas sobre lo que los demás deben hacer. En este sentido, la ética antigua cumple una de las exigencias de Moore (1907), cuando afirma: “It is not the business of the ethical philosopher to give personal advice or exhortation”A excepción de la ética de Aristóteles, la de Sócrates y de Platón están plagadas de lo que algunos estudiosos, como Guthrie (1984) han llamado intelectualismo ético, esto es, la idea de que la bondad moral está ligada a la sabiduría y, por ende, a la educación y que, por el contrario, la maldad moral es el producto de la ignorancia, de la ineducación o de la mala educación. El Estagirita, en cambio, se pregunta por cuál es el bien para el individuo y para la pólis, concluyendo que se trata de la eudaimonía o felicidad, la cual es el fn de la acción humanaAl respecto, ha sido ampliamente notado que Aristóteles no se pregunta por qué acciones debe realizar el individuo, tampoco da un conjunto de normas o consejos sobre lo que debemos hacer, sino que sencillamente se pregunta cuál es el bien que el individuo y la pólis deben buscar. Su repuesta es categórica: este supremo bien es la eudaimonía.Aristóteles, no obstante, no es el primer pensador que aborda el problema ético. Antes de él lo hicieron Sócrates y los sofistas, y desde luego Platón. Pero a diferencia de ellos, Aristóteles lo hizo de manera sistemática.Debido a lo anterior, en nuestro estudio de la ética antigua abordaremos algunos aspectos del pensamiento ético de Sócrates, bajo el supuesto de que sus ideas al respecto las encontramos en los así llamados diálogos juveniles o socráticos de Platón. Luego de ello, pasaremos directamente al pensamiento ético de Aristóteles.AKADEMOS, Año 11, Vol. 2, No 29, Julio-Diciembre 2017: 59-75

Like the Heads of Leviathan: The Concept of Evil in Western CultureIn this article I discuss the concept of evil. I begin by showing that the concept of evil is not religiously neutral. Here, I will discuss the Western view of evil, influenced by Judaism and Christianity. Subsequently, I discuss Leibniz's classic distinction between three forms of evil - metaphysical, physical and moral - and introduce the categories of natural and non-moral evil. Next, I show that one and the same event may be good in one respect and evil in another. Thus, the passion of Christ is a physical evil when we look at the suffering undergone, a moral evil when we look at the act of those who inflict it on Him, and a moral good when we look at the act of Christ: He gives His life for His friends. This I call the ambiguity of evil. Finally, I discuss two views on the origin of evil: dualism and the view of evil as a privation of a good that should be there, and argue in favour of the second.

Gerald Harrison has recently argued the evidential problem of evil can be resolved if we assume the moral facts are identical to God’s commands or favorings. On a theistic metaethics, the moral facts are identical to what God commands or favors. Our moral intuitions reflect what God commands or favors for us to do, but not what God favors for Herself to do. Thus, on Harrison’s view, while we can know the moral facts as they pertain to humans, we cannot know the moral facts as they pertain to God. Therefore, Harrison argues, the evidential problem of evil inappropriately assumes God to be intuitively moral, when we have no reason to suppose a perfectly good being would match the expectations provided by our moral intuitions. Harrison calls his view a new form of skeptical theism. In response, I show Harrison’s attempt to dissolve the problem of evil exacerbates well-known skeptical consequences of skeptical theism. Harrison’s new skeptical theism leaves us with problems motivating a substantive religious life, the inability to provide a variety of theological explanations, and, despite Harrison’s comments to the contrary, worsens problems having to do with the possibility of divine deception.

I argue that we should emancipate the problem of evil and suffering from theodicist assumptions that lead to a chronic non-acknowledgment of the sufferers’ experiential point of view. This also entails emancipating the problem of evil and suffering from the need to consider the so-called argument from evil. In the argument ‘from’ evil, evil and suffering are seen as pieces of empirical evidence against theism. This presupposes understanding theism as a hypothesis to be tested in an evidentialist game of argumentation. Such a presupposition already fails to acknowledge the depth and variety of both religious and nonreligious approaches to living with evil and suffering. One way of cashing out what moral antitheodicism amounts to is to analyze theodicism as a failure of recognizing others’ suffering. Furthermore, one way of cashing out what this mis- or nonrecognition amounts to is to analyze the unforgivability of evil. Focusing on recognition and forgiveness here can be understood as an attempt to...

According to the Felix Culpa Theodicy (FCT), worlds containing atonement and incarnation are of such great value that God is justified in actualizing such a world, despite all of the moral evil that has accompanied it. Focusing upon Alvin Plantinga’s articulation of this theodicy, I argue against FCT on the basis of normative ethical considerations. On the one hand, the deontic status of at least some actions depends upon the consequences of those actions. On the other hand, the existence of atonement depends upon the deontic status of at least one action. Under certain circumstances, this two-way dependence yields a contradiction if atonement has the kind of value conferred upon it by FCT. I conclude by discussing some implications for Molinism and evidential arguments from moral evil.

In this article, I assess three contemporary criticisms levelled at Kant’s theory of evil in order to evaluate whether his theory can be saved. Critics argue that Kant does not adequately distinguish between evil and mundane wrongdoing, making his use of the term ‘evil’ emotional hyperbole; by defining evil as the subordination of the moral law to self-love his analysis is seemingly overly simplistic and empirically false; and by focusing solely on the moral character of the perpetrator of evil, Kant’s theory apparently ignores the most salient aspect of evil – the suffering of victims. While I will not claim that Kant provides us with a fully adequate theory of evil, I respond to each of these criticisms and conclude that Kant’s theory can still provide significant insight into both the nature of evil and the moral psychology of perpetrators of evil.

The article substantiates the validity of claims about the two, fairly selfcontained lines of human evolution, allowing one to speak of "historical parallelism". The first line is predominantly biological development (and finding expression in the dominance of material, bodily needs); the second is mostly suprabiological development (which finds expression in the predominance of spiritual needs). These two lines are deployed with sufficient autonomy from each other. The development of man thus appears not homogeneous, but heterogeneous contrary (multidirectional) process. These two lines of evolution give grounds to speak about "two births" of a person, one of which can be explained by natural, the other – by supernatural (divine) causes. In this case, evolutionary biology and religious (wider, metaphysical) point of view, explaining the origin and development of the person, do not exclude but complement each other. Deployable approach offers a new "reading" problems of theodicy: moral evil is committed (and with ease) by carnal souls (living mainly by biological priorities), since such evil does not exist for them, but only physical evil (causing physical suffering, the suffering of the carnal soul). Throughout its historical path, humanity has been biologically wholesome, but metaphysically diverse. Man in the mass has not yet appeared. From this point of view, the history of mankind as integrity is, in essence, still the background for its free essential self-disclosure.

Among scholars, how to interpret and evaluate Kant’s rejection of diabolical evil remains controversial. This article has two aims. First, I will examine all six forms of (quasi-)diabolical evil either discussed by Kant or implicitly contained in his texts, thereby demonstrating the reasons why each of these forms must be rejected (or admitted) within his framework. The conclusion of this text analysis is that the extremity of human evil for Kant is quasi-diabolical Willkur which does evil for the sake of self-assertion. Second, I will offer a moderate defense of Kant’s view of (quasi-)diabolical evil as a whole. On the one hand, the legitimacy of Kant’s rejection of both diabolical Wille and full-fledged diabolical Willkur (which precludes inner conflicts between different incentives) can be confirmed within his theory of practical freedom. On the other hand, faced with the possibility of ‘occasionally doing evil qua evil’, a critical defense of Kant’s moral psychology can be established, i.e. a ...

Philosophical hermeneutics of the Qurʾān in the classical period has three major characteristics that are discussed in this paper in light of Ibn Sīnā’s work. First, philosophical hermeneutics falls under the category of symbolic interpretation (taaʾwīl)1 rather than technical/linguistic exegesis (tafsīr). Second, it selectively chooses Qurʾānic passages that lend themselves to philosophical interpretations. Third, it tends primarily towards metaphysical and moral issues, and is, for the most part, disinterested in ideological biases. This paper examines Ibn Sīnā’s interpretation of sūrat al-Falaq (Kor 113), and has two objectives: to elucidate the hermeneutical methodology adopted by Ibn Sīnā, and to investigate the consistency between the philosopher’s understanding of evil as well as the discourse used in his interpretation of al-Falaq and the treatment of the same issue in his major and minor philosophical writings. It demonstrates that, in the commentary on al-Falaq, evil emerges at the level of “particular realization” (qadar), while at the level of predetermination (qaḍā) evil is only a latent potentiality. Ibn Sīnā, in both his commentary on al-Falaq and his philosophical texts, tries to prove that evil at the level of predetermination can be explained as intended by accident (bi- al-ʿaraḍ).

On a traditional account, God causes sinful acts and their properties, insofar as they are real, but God does not cause sin, since only the sinner causes the privations in virtue of which such acts are sinful. After explicating this privation solution, I defend it against two objections: (1) that God would cause the sinful act’s privation simply by causing the act and its positive features; and (2) that there is no principled way to deny that God causes the privation yet still affirm that the sinner causes it. I close by considering a limitation of the privation solution.

Even philosophers of religion working on the problem of non-human animal suffering have ignored the suffering of creatures like insects. Sensible as this seems, it’s mistaken. I am not sure whether creatures like these can suffer, but it is plausible, on both commonsensical and scientific and philosophical grounds, that many of them can. If they do, their suffering makes the problem of evil much worse: their vast numbers mean the amount of evil in the world will almost certainly be increased by many, many orders of magnitude, the fact that disproportionately many of them live lives which are nasty, brutish, and short means that the proportion of good to evil in the world will be drastically worsened, and their relative lack of cognitive sophistication means that many theodicies, including many specifically designed to address animal suffering, would apply to their suffering only with much greater difficulty, if at all. Philosophers of religion should therefore more seriously investigate whether these beings can suffer and what, if anything, could justify God in allowing as much.

In the elaboration of his soul-making theodicy, John Hick agrees with a controversial point made by compatibilists Antony Flew and John Mackie against the free will defense. Namely, Hick grants that God could have created humans such that they would be free to sin but would, in fact, never do so. In this paper, I identify three previously unrecognized problems that arise from his initial concession to, and ultimate rejection of, compatibilism. The first problem stems from the fact that in two important texts, Hick rejects compatibilism (after having endorsed it as effective against the free will defense) for different and seemingly contradictory reasons. His various explanations of soul-making theodicy’s relationship to compatibilism are therefore in conflict. The second problem is closely related to the first. It turns out that when Hick’s concession to compatibilism is closely examined, soul-making theodicy appears unable to explain the existence of moral evil. The final problem consists in understanding why Hick would have made any concessions to compatibilism in the first place given that he ultimately opts for incompatibilist free will. After identifying these three problems, I develop a distinctive way in which to interpret Hick’s soul-making theodicy that solves the first two. This distinctive interpretation, moreover, has the added benefit of solving another, well-recognized problem that has long plagued Hick’s exposition: the problem of the hypnotist metaphor. Finally, I address the third problem by suggesting a rationale for Hick’s initial concession to the compatibilists.

In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (1) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (2) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.

Spenser’s The Faerie Queene presumes a stable distinction between good and evil characters, and the structure of the narrative depends upon the clarity of those categories. When good characters behave badly, there is no trouble. The poem’s characteristic work is to reconcile action and identity. When bad characters behave kindly, particularly when they treat each other well, they pose a greater interpretive challenge. In such episodes we glimpse the possibility of a care that is morally meaningless, of a value in life itself, neither good nor evil. Care may be the most grave and dangerous temptation in Spenser’s poem of temptations.

The aim of the article is to present and to compare the view on human freedom called hard incompatibilism with the contemporary Christian doctrine on human free will. Hard incompatibilism claims that human free will understood both in a libertarian and compatibilist way does not exist. One stresses in the paper that there is a similarity between hard incompatibilism and Christian wisdom rooted in the Bible and this similarity consists in the fact that humans are deeply dependent in their existence on external conditions. Hard incompatiblism identifies that conditions simply as the external or physical world and Christian wisdom points to God as an ontological and axiological foundation of human being and prospects. However, one argues in the paper that the doctrine of human freedom and responsibility for sin and moral evil is a crucial part of the Christian theology and philosophy. Thus, the Christian doctrine is incoherent with hard incompatibilism. There is a proposal, put forth in the last part of the article, how one can reconcile metaphysical indeterminism—which is coherent with hard incompatibilism—with the libertarian doctrine on the human free will, which is coherent with the Christian view on the nature of human freedom.

I argue that Kant's doctrine of the radical evil in human nature does not involve the claim that all human beings are evil as a matter of fact. Such a claim would conflict both with the boundaries of human knowledge and with Kant's doctrine of moral freedom. On my reading, Kant holds that every human agent ought to adopt the presupposition that she has an evil character, not because we know this presupposition to be true, but because this presupposition plays a crucial role in our quest for moral progress and greater virtue.

Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-12T17:27:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2016-12-01. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2021-07-14T17:51:48Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 S1982-88372016000300021.pdf: 346190 bytes, checksum: d43b90203cb9961aabf77363060fd773 (MD5) Resumo Ricoeur (1988) nos diz que a conceituação do mal é um problema que atravessa séculos, devido a sua necessidade de coerência lógica. Já se discutiu sua origem, suas causas e seus efeitos, porém nunca se chegou a um termo que eliminasse a contradição em seu cerne. Neste espaço, as obras literárias de Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811) apresentam uma temática que abarca uma quebra de limites entre os conceitos de maldade e bondade desenvolvidos durante a Aufklärung, evidenciando essa problemática. Essa quebra nos parece estar fortemente associada à relação existente entre o eu e o mundo caótico em que este está inserido, implicando em uma complexidade das fontes do mal moral que diluem as barreiras entre bem e mal e nos levam à contestação destes limites estanques. Procuraremos, portanto, neste texto, demonstrar em que consiste essa quebra de limites e como a composição de uma realidade pautada no engano integra o universo literário kleistiano, principalmente na obra Michael Kohlhaas. Abstract Ricoeur (1988) tells us that the concept of evil is a problem that goes through the centuries, due to its need for logical consistency. Already discussed its origin, its causes and its effects, but never came to a term that would eliminate the contradiction at its core. In this space, the literary works of Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811) present a theme that includes a break of boundaries between the concepts of evil and goodness developed during the Aufklärung, highlighting this problem. This break seems to be strongly associated with the relationship between the I and the chaotic world in which it is inserted, resulting in a complexity of the sources of moral evil that dilutes the boundaries between good and evil and lead us to challenge these tight limits. Therefore, we try to demonstrate in this paper what this boundary break is made of and how the composition of a reality guided by mistakes integrates Kleist's literary universe, especially in the work Michael Kohlhaas. Universidade Estadual Paulista Julio de Mesquita Filho Universidade Estadual Paulista Julio de Mesquita Filho

According to Jean Baudrillard, evil cannot be reduced to anything specific; rather, it is omnipresent. He calls this force Symbolic Evil in order to differentiate it from the common conception of moral evil. Symbolic Evil fuels metamorphosis and thus can be seen positively and negatively in great revolutionaries who tap into evil as the energy of challenge, defiance, creativity, and renewal. This chapter examines this concept in the context of Canadian and U.S. systems of schooling at the classroom, school, district, and national levels, noting the power of Symbolic Evil to help us redefine educational concerns like student “success.”

In three studies, we tested the assertion that the need for meaning motivates belief in magical evil forces. Believing that there are magical evil forces at work in the world, though unpleasant, may contribute to perceptions of meaning in life as the existence of such forces supports a broader meaning-providing religious worldview. We assessed religiosity, measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) perceptions of meaning, and assessed the extent to which participants attributed a murderer’s actions to magical evil causes (e.g., having a dark soul). Low levels of perceived meaning or experimentally threatened meaning were associated with a greater tendency to make magical evil attributions, but only among individuals reporting high levels of religiosity. In Study 3, we assessed religiosity, experimentally threatened perceptions of meaning, and measured general belief in magical evil forces. Meaning threat increased belief in magical evil, but only among those reporting high levels of religiosity.

Respondents to the argument from evil who follow Michael Bergmann’s development of skeptical theism hold that our failure to determine God’s reasons for permitting evil does not disconfirm theism (i.e. render theism less probable on the evidence of evil than it would be if merely evaluated against our background knowledge) at all. They claim that such a thesis follows from the very plausible claim that (ST) we have no good reason to think our access to the realm of value is representative of the full realm of value. There are two interpretations of ST’s strength, the stronger of which leads skeptical theists into moral skepticism and the weaker of which fails to rebut the argument from evil. As I demonstrate, skeptical theists avoid the charge of moral skepticism while also successfully rebutting the argument from evil only by embracing an equivocation between these two interpretations of ST. Thus, as I argue, skeptical theists are caught in a troubling dilemma: they must choose between moral skepticism and failure to adequately respond to the argument from evil.

The main aim of the paper is the analysis and critique of axiological relativism, typical of contemporary Western culture. Its supporters deny the objective status of moral norms and values. Axiological relativism leads to moral indifference based on blurring the difference between good and evil, and negating the belief that human action may be morally better or worse. I present the anti­‑relativistic position of St. John Paul II, particularly in relation to the truth, understood as a cognitive and moral value. According to the Pope, a civilization based on the belief of the relative nature of good and evil leads to widespread hypocrisy and is destined to a slow decline.

The purpose of the paper is to show a mutual interaction of Platonic and Christian ideas in the pear theft narrative from Book Two of the Confessions. Augustine is provocatively questioning the Platonic theory of good, evil, and love by suggesting that in the theft he loved evil itself. He is considering three possible explanations, but is not fully content with any of them. Not having any better theory than the Platonic one, Augustine is suggesting that moral evil is completely beyond understanding. What is new in Augustine’s provocative analysis is placing the irrationality and incomprehensibility of moral evil in the context of the “I-Thou” relationship of the soul with God.

The HBO series, The Leftovers, provides a thought-provoking platform for discussing Baudrillard's conceptualization of evil and the implications for contemporary pedagogical discourse about student (dis)engagement. The dystopic scenario of 2% of the world's population suddenly disappearing might help us rethink our own society, including education. Baudrillard distinguishes between a creative Evil force that can be positive or negative in its outcome and a moral evil seen as wholly negative. By examining the situation created by the modern confusion of evil and misfortune, it becomes apparent that disengagement moves beyond personal characteristics. Unveiling such underlying issues allows for a reconceptualization of youth at risk, and thus has repercussions for the explanation of disengaged youth in our classrooms.

The article shall discuss the question of the origin of evil, limitations and contingency of creatures and moral evil. Then, it discusses the topic of evil spirit, who is a liar, and a man's wants to plunge into solitude. Finally, in the Person of the Son of God, a triumph over the liar, lies, and all evil is shown. The successive stages of this victory are the Resurrection, Ascension and joyfully awaited by Christ's friends the Last Judgment. God in the created world, of which He is Lord and Master, permits physical and moral evil. A mystery of evil God explains us through his Son. Jesus Christ vanquishes evil, sin and Satan by his death and resurrection. The Creator would not permit an evil if he would not derive some good from that evil. This good we shall fully know only in eternal life and then we can understand the way of God's Providence.

The article shall discuss the question of the origin of evil, limitations and contingency of creatures and moral evil. Then, it discusses the topic of evil spirit, who is a liar, and a man’s wants to plunge into solitude. Finally, in the Person of the Son of God, a triumph over the liar, lies, and all evil is shown. The successive stages of this victory are the Resurrection, Ascension and joyfully awaited by Christ’s friends the Last Judgment. God in the created world, of which He is Lord and Master, permits physical and moral evil. A mystery of evil God explains us through his Son. Jesus Christ vanquishes evil, sin and Satan by his death and resurrection. The Creator would not permit an evil if he would not derive some good from that evil. This good we shall fully know only in eternal life and then we can understand the way of God’s Providence.

Extending earlier work on a nontheistic theology, in this article I explore a humanist framing of death. I begin with a critique of theistic framings of death as a matter of isolation and transition to a greater situation. In place of theistic understandings of death, here I argue that humanist theology, drawing insights from literature and Albert Camus' moralism, provides a way to “naturalize” death, to understand death as already and always a dimension of life.

Replying to James Sterba&rsquo, s argument for the incompatibility of the world&rsquo, s evils with the existence of the God of traditional theism, I argue for their compatibility, using the proposition that God has reasons for permitting these evils. Developing this case involves appeal to an enlarged version of both the Free Will Defence and Hick&rsquo, s Vale of Soul-Making Defence, in the context of God&rsquo, s decision to generate the kind of natural regularities conducive to the evolution of a range of creatures, including free and rational ones. Sterba writes as if God would be required to authorise frequent infringements of these regularities. Sterba&rsquo, s arguments from ethics and from the inadequacy of post-mortem compensation are problematised. Predicates used of God must bear a sense appropriate to the level of creator, and not of a very powerful cosmic observer. The ethics that applies within creation should not be confused with the ethics of creating.

Schelling and Schopenhauer both operate in the German idealist tradition initiated by Kant, although both are critical of some of its developments. Schelling's interest in evil – which is at its most intense in his 1809 Freedom essay – stems from his belief that Kant's account of morality. In the Freedom essay Schelling links these theories with the traditional Christian conception of evil as a privation, and attempts by contrast to develop a concept of "radical" or "positive" evil that grounds both our freedom and individual personality. Evil as folly is a corollary of the Socratic identification of virtue with knowledge. The distinguishing feature of the free-will defenses is that god is logically constrained to permit moral evil if God creates a world with moral freedom. It is consistent with such defenses that God is (in some sense) responsible for creating evil, but God's actions are all things considered justified.

In this paper, Robert Audi’s thoughts on the ineffaceable problem of evil are critically discussed. Audi develops his thought on God and evil within a broader framework that seeks to defend the possibility of rational religious commitment. He proposes a theocentric solution to the problem, which is focused on the divine experience with creation and which asks for the conditions a world has to fulfill in order to be good enough for being created by an omnicompetent God. Following this line of thought, the problem of evil can be solved if the enormous value of divine experience made in the world and with all creatures that live on earth is included in the overall comparison of good and evil. The paper provides a detailed reconstruction of Audi’s argumentation and locates it within its broader philosophical contexts. Furthermore, it considers three difficulties Audi’s theocentric solution has to resolve: Firstly, a theocentric theodicy cannot fully explain the existence of natural evil, especially horrendous natural evil. Secondly, such a position seemingly has to accept fairly burdensome metaphysical assumptions regarding the character of divine experience. Finally, an alternative theocentric conception that allows for divine regret seems to be in line with Audi’s philosophy of religion and might eventually be more responsive to human experience with great moral evil.

En el presente artículo se estudia la concepción del mal de santo Tomás de Aquino, tarea abordada a partir de la identificación de los principios metafísicos sobre los que se sustenta, en orden a determinar el marco filosófico en el que se integra. Se reconoce en su especulación sobre la causa del mal moral de culpa aquel elemento de su doctrina que puede ser relacionado con el que es uno de los temas centrales de la reflexión contemporánea sobre el mal, a saber, el problema de la responsabilidad humana ante el mal, lo que permite proponer su pensamiento como un posible aporte a esta discusión.

Philosophers theorizing about ‘evil’ usually distinguish evil actions from acts of ordinary wrongdoing. They either attempt to isolate some quality or set of qualities shared by all evil actions that is not found in other wrongful actions, or they concede that their account of evil is only distinguished by capturing the very worst acts on the scale of moral wrongness. The idea that evil is qualitatively distinct from wrongdoing has recently been under contention. We explore the grounds for this contention, and argue that there is a third option that might be useful for a variety of philosophical accounts of evil. The alternate form of distinctness we propose is called quality of emphasis distinctness (QE distinctness). We illustrate this form of concept distinctness with a modified version of Hillel Steiner’s account of evil. We then explain how QE distinctness could also be applied to more complex theories of evil, such as the theories proposed by Claudia Card, John Kekes, and Todd Calder.

The paper argues that God does not act but is creative activity, which helps to overcome evil by the possibilities of the good that it opens up for creatures in the face of evil.

Artykuł prezentuje filozoficzną koncepcję zła moralnego w myśli Martina Bubera (†1965) jako braku ukierunkowania życia. Źródłem inspiracji dla koncepcji Bubera były mity biblijne i perskie. Artykuł ma cztery części: 1) pojęcie mitu (świadectwo spotkania z Absolutem i narzędzie w odkryciu prawdy egzystencjalnej); 2) przesłanie mitów biblijnych (przeciwieństwa wpisane w naturę ludzką oraz wezwanie do ukierunkowania swego życia na Boga); 3) przekaz mitów perskich (niebezpieczeństwo kłamstwa egzystencjalnego oraz braku decyzji); 4) filozoficzne ujęcie zła (zło jako życie człowieka w chaosie możliwości i braku ukierunkowania swego życia na Boga).