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Law enforcement in the Military Court System in the settlement of criminal cases committed by TNI soldiers is seen as not yet fully guaranteeing legal protection for the rights of suspects, this is due to the absence of a control agency that oversees the actions of law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties and authorities as is the case in the system. General Court. This condition should not drag on indefinitely, because it will affect the law enforcement process and harm the suspect to fight for his rights to obtain justice which results in human rights violations (TNI soldiers). The purpose of the establishment of the Pretrial Institution is as stated in the Elucidation of Article 80 of the Criminal Procedure Code which states that this article intends to uphold law, justice, and truth through horizontal supervision. Settlement of criminal cases in Indonesia in addition to the Code of Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) which applies to civil society, we also recognize the existence of the Military Criminal Procedure Code which is regulated in Law Number 31 of 1997 concerning Military Courts, namely the law that regulates the procedure for resolving criminal cases. a criminal case committed by a TNI soldier. The Law on Military Courts includes the provisions of the litigation process (Military Criminal Procedure Law) starting from the investigation stage, submission of cases, the examination process at trial to the implementation of decisions. 31 of 1997 does not regulate pretrial. In several cases in the Military Court where a suspect was detained without a warrant for detention or was late in obtaining a warrant for detention, therefore such actions may conflict with the principles applicable in the provisions of criminal law so that they do not respect the position of the suspect as a creature created by God, even the act can lead to human rights violators. Therefore, in the military justice system in Indonesia, pretrial institutions are needed as a form of horizontal external supervision.

Despite minor amendments to the Royal Navy's Articles of War throughout the eighteenth century, and a major reworking in 1749, both capital and corporal punishments were frequently employed as punishment for minor offences in a system that made England's ‘Bloody Code’ look positively humane. The 1860 Naval Discipline Act provided the first substantive overhaul of the original Articles of War, but historians have generally lamented this act as providing little comprehensive change to the governance of the navy. Using statistical data collected from thousands of courts martial records, this article takes a broad look at trends in naval courts martial, studying how these courts interacted with the legislative changes of the 1860s. Viewing how charges and sentences altered on the global scale, it becomes clear that the ‘arbitrary and cruel punishments’ of the previous century had at last given way to a centralized, formal expression of discipline.

The artcle considers the history of establishing, developing and functioning ofRoyal Military College in the town of Sandhurst (Great Britain), on the base of whichmodern Royal military Academy was created. It tackles the admission process, educationalactivities, and the transformation the institution had undergone throughout the 19 and thefirst half of the 20th centuries. It has been determined that at first the educational processwas more oriented towards civilian disciplines such as mathematics, Latin, German andFrench but in the second half of the 19th century a shift was made towards militaryeducation which was caused by increasing the number of military faculty and addingmilitary disciplines. The "Gentlemen Cadets" of late-nineteenth-century Sandhurst studiedMilitary Engineering, Military Administration, Military Law, Topography, French,German, Military Exercises (Drill, Gymnastics, and Riding), and Tactics. Those whohad passed Board room examinations, were recommended to the Queen for commissions inthe Army. The social significance of the Sandhurst experience notwithstanding, what thecadets learned and what the professors taught them influenced the military mind-set of thegeneration of officers that would lead the British military forces during the wars of the 19thand the 20th centuries. Of particular interest to the faculty at Sandhurst were the two greatestmilitary minds: Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. The tactical principlesemployed by these two innovative and successful battlefield leaders were the foundationof the British tactical doctrine.Although most sports were not a formal part of the curriculum, the principlesembodied in organized physical activity fit in well with the values of the Royalmilitary college. Sport required mental focus and discipline, and forced theparticipants to operate within a given set of rules and parameters. Athletic competitionstressed thought and activity within a certain collection of boundaries, and theworkouts were an entertaining diversion, which had the added benefit of keeping thefuture officers of the army physically fit and, therefore, reinforced the rigid tacticallaws learned in the classroom.

The use of cyber-technologies in times of armed conflict poses serious interpretive challenges, such as what type of cyber operations amount to an ‘attack’ for the purposes of Article 49 of Additional Protocol I. The notion of attack is the cornerstone of the law of targeting, a set of rules that includes the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, aimed at limiting the amount of violence that belligerents can lawfully employ on the battlefield. The rationale of these rules is that of increasing the protection of the dignity of the civilian population, which constitutes the main objective of modern international humanitarian law (IHL). In light of these considerations, my article argues that the prevailing interpretation of the notion of attack in the cyber context is too restrictive and cannot adequately protect the civilian population from cyber operations taking place in armed conflict. Consequently, it argues for a human-dignity based interpretation of the notion of ‘violence’ that underlies the notion of attack in the cyber context, going beyond the mere causation of physical violence to include serious psychological violence and serious economic violence as necessary prerequisites to qualify a cyber operation as an ‘attack’. L’utilisation des cybertechnologies en période de conflit armé soulève d’importantes questions d’interprétation, notamment sur le type de cyberopération qui peut être considérée comme une ‘attaque’ au sens de l’article 49 du protocole additionnel I. La notion d’attaque est la pierre angulaire du droit du ciblage, un ensemble de règles comprenant les principes de distinction, de proportionnalité et de précaution, visant à limiter le degré de violence que des belligérants peuvent légalement utiliser sur le champ de bataille. La raison d’être de ces règles est de renforcer la protection de la dignité de la population civile, qui constitue l’objectif principal du DIH moderne. À la lumière de ces considérations, l’article avance que l’interprétation dominante de la notion d’attaque dans le contexte cybernétique est trop restrictive et ne peut pas protéger efficacement la population civile des cyberopérations lors de conflits armés. Par conséquent, l’article plaide pour une interprétation de la notion de ‘violence’, sous-jacente à la notion d’attaque dans le contexte cybernétique, basée sur la dignité humaine, allant au-delà de la seule violence physique pour inclure la violence psychologique grave et la violence économique grave dans les conditions pour qu’une cyberopération puisse être qualifiée d’ ‘attaque’. Het gebruik van cybertechnologieën in tijden van gewapend conflict stelt ons voor serieuze interpretatieve uitdagingen, zoals de vraag welk type cyberoperaties neerkomen op een 'aanval' in de zin van Art. 49 van het Aanvullend Protocol I. Het begrip aanval is de hoeksteen van het recht van doelbestrijding, een geheel van regels dat de beginselen van onderscheid, evenredigheid en voorzorg omvat, en dat tot doel heeft de hoeveelheid geweld te beperken die oorlogvoerende partijen rechtmatig op het slagveld kunnen aanwenden. De grondgedachte achter deze regels is de bescherming van de waardigheid van de burgerbevolking te vergroten, hetgeen de voornaamste doelstelling van het moderne IHR is. In het licht van deze overwegingen betoogt mijn artikel dat de gangbare interpretatie van het begrip aanval in de cybercontext te restrictief is en de burgerbevolking niet adequaat kan beschermen tegen cyberoperaties die plaatsvinden in een gewapend conflict. Bijgevolg wordt gepleit voor een op menselijke waardigheid gebaseerde interpretatie van het begrip ‘geweld’ dat ten grondslag ligt aan het begrip aanval in de cybercontext, waarbij verder wordt gegaan dan het louter veroorzaken van fysiek geweld en ook ernstig psychologisch geweld en ernstig economisch geweld worden beschouwd als noodzakelijke voorwaarden om een cyberoperatie als een ‘aanval’ te kunnen aanduiden. El uso de tecnologías cibernéticas en tiempos de conflicto armado plantea serios desafíos interpretativos, tales como qué tipo de operaciones cibernéticas equivalen a un ‘ataque’ a los efectos del art. 49 del Protocolo Adicional I. El concepto de ataque es la piedra angular de la ley de selección de objetivos, un conjunto de reglas que incluye los principios de distinción, proporcionalidad y precaución, destinados a limitar la medida de violencia que los beligerantes pueden emplear legalmente en el campo de batalla. La razón fundamental de estas normas es aumentar la protección de la dignidad de la población civil, que constituye el principal objetivo del DIH moderno. A la luz de estas consideraciones, este artículo sostiene que la interpretación predominante del concepto de ataque en el contexto cibernético es demasiado restrictiva y no puede proteger adecuadamente a la población civil frente a las operaciones cibernéticas que tienen lugar en un conflicto armado. En consecuencia, aboga por una interpretación centrada en la dignidad humana del concepto de ‘violencia’ que subyace a la noción de ataque en el contexto cibernético, yendo más allá de la mera causalidad de la violencia física para incluir la violencia psicológica grave y la violencia económica grave como requisitos previos necesarios para calificar una operación cibernética como un ‘ataque’. L'uso di tecnologie informatiche in tempi di conflitto armato pone gravi sfide interpretative, come ad esempio quale tipo di operazioni informatiche equivalgono ad un attacco ai fini dell'Art. 49 del Protocollo Addizionale I. La nozione di attacco è la base della legge di targeting, un insieme di regole che include i principi di distinzione, proporzionalità e precauzione, volte a limitare la quantità di violenza che i belligeranti possono legittimamente impiegare sul campo di battaglia. La logica di queste regole è quella di aumentare la protezione della dignità della popolazione civile, che costituisce l'obiettivo principale del moderno IHL. Alla luce di queste considerazioni, l'articolo sostiene che l'interpretazione prevalente della nozione di attacco nel contesto informatico sia troppo restrittiva e non possa proteggere adeguatamente la popolazione civile dalle operazioni informatiche che si svolgono in conflitti armati. Di conseguenza, sostiene un'interpretazione basata sulla dignità umana della nozione di violenza che sta alla base della nozione di attacco nel contesto informatico, andando oltre l’essere la mera causa di violenza fisica per includere la violenza psicologica grave e la violenza economica grave come prerequisiti necessari per qualificare un'operazione cibernetica come un ‘attacco’. Die Verwendung von Cybertechnologien in Zeiten eines bewaffneten Konflikts stellt uns vor schwere interpretative Herausforderungen, wie die Frage, welche Art von Cyberoperationen einen ‘Angriff’ im Sinne von Art. 49 des Zusatzprotokolls I darstellen. Der Begriff ‘Angriff’ ist der Eckstein der Zielgesetze, einer Sammlung von Regeln, die die Grundsätze der Unterscheidung, Verhältnismäßigkeit und Vorsorge umfassen, welche zum Ziel haben, das Maß von Gewalt, das Krieg führende Staaten rechtmäßig auf dem Schlachtfeld verwenden können, zu beschränken. Der Grundgedanke dieser Regeln besteht darin, den Schutz der Würde der Zivilbevölkerung, der das Hauptziel des modernen internationalen humanitären Rechts ausmacht, zu erhöhen. Angesichts dieser Betrachtungen, argumentiert mein Artikel, dass die gängige Interpretation des Begriffs ‘Angriff’ im Cyber-Kontext zu restriktiv ist und die Zivilbevölkerung nicht adäquat vor der Durchführung von Cyberangriffen in bewaffneten Konflikten schützen kann. Folglich befürwortet der Artikel eine auf Menschenwürde basierte Interpretation des dem Begriff ‘Angriff’ im Cyber-Kontext zugrunde liegenden Begriffs ‘Gewalt’, die über die reine Verursachung physischer Gewalt hinausgeht und auch schwere psychische und wirtschaftliche Gewalt als notwendige Bedingungen umfasst, um eine Cyberoperation als einen ‘Angriff’ zu bezeichnen.

Several armed conflicts have marked the past two decades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As a result, the DRC is facing an unprecedented humanitarian disaster with the death of hundreds of thousands of people, the large-scale displacement of civilians and the rape of thousands of women, girls and men. These armed conflicts have led to the metamorphosis of the concept of ‘crime’ with the emergence of new forms of sexual violence, particularly the widespread sexual violence used by armed groups as a tactic of war. In response to this avalanche of sexual violence, the DRC has taken a series of legislative measures. It began with the ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) on 11 April 2002. This was followed by the promulgation of the Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code on 18 November 2002 (MJC and MCC, respectively) criminalizing, inter alia, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In 2006, the Congolese legislator criminalized various forms of sexual crimes as defined by international law in the Military Penal Code. On 31 December 2015, the Congolese authorities promulgated Law No. 15/022, amending and supplementing the Military Penal Code, for the implementation of the Rome Statute. Through this Law, the legislator has included in the Congolese Ordinary Criminal Code rape and other sexual assaults constituting war crimes, and in some circumstances, crimes against humanity. In terms of prosecutions, around 40 cases of rape classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity have been tried by Congolese military courts, and a few other cases are being investigated. This article seeks to assess the progress made by the DRC in prosecuting rape as a war crime and the challenges to such prosecutions. La République démocratique du Congo (RDC) a été marquée par plusieurs conflits armés au cours des deux dernières décennies. Il en résulte que ce pays est confronté à une catastrophe humanitaire sans précédent avec la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes, le déplacement à grande échelle de civils et le viol de milliers de femmes, de filles et d'hommes. Ces conflits armés ont entraîné une métamorphose du concept de ‘crime’ avec l'émergence de nouvelles formes de violence sexuelle, notamment la violence sexuelle généralisée utilisée par les groupes armés comme tactique de guerre. En réponse à cette avalanche de violences sexuelles, la RDC a adopté une série de mesures législatives. La première fut la ratification du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale (Statut de Rome) le 11 avril 2002. Cette ratification fut suivie par la promulgation du Code judiciaire militaire et du Code pénal militaire le 18 novembre 2002 (respectivement le CMJ et le CCM) qui criminalisent, entre autres, les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l'humanité et le génocide. En 2006, le législateur congolais a incriminé dans le Code pénal militaire diverses formes de crimes sexuels tels que définis par le droit international. Le 31 décembre 2015, les autorités congolaises ont promulgué la loi no 15/022, modifiant et complétant le Code pénal militaire, pour la mise en œuvre du Statut de Rome. A travers cette loi, le législateur a inclus dans le Code pénal ordinaire congolais les viols et autres agressions sexuelles constitutifs de crimes de guerre, et dans certaines circonstances, de crimes contre l'humanité. En termes de poursuites, une quarantaine de cas de viols qualifiés de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre l'humanité ont été jugés par les tribunaux militaires congolais, et quelques autres cas sont en cours d'instruction. Cet article vise à évaluer les progrès réalisés par la RDC en matière de poursuites pénales pour viol en tant que crime de guerre et les défis auxquels ces poursuites sont confrontées. Verschillende gewapende conflicten hebben de afgelopen twee decennia hun stempel gedrukt op de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC). Als gevolg daarvan wordt de DRC geconfronteerd met een ongekende humanitaire ramp die gepaard gaat met de dood van honderdduizenden mensen, de grootschalige ontheemding van burgers en de verkrachting van duizenden vrouwen, meisjes en mannen. Die gewapende conflicten hebben geleid tot een metamorfose van het begrip ‘misdaad’ met de opkomst van nieuwe vormen van seksueel geweld, in het bijzonder het wijdverspreide seksuele geweld dat door gewapende groepen als oorlogstactiek wordt gebruikt. Als reactie op die lawine van seksueel geweld heeft de DRC een reeks wetgevende maatregelen genomen. Het begon met de ratificatie van het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof (Statuut van Rome) op 11 april 2002, gevolgd door de afkondiging van het militair gerechtelijk wetboek en het militair strafwetboek op 18 november 2002. Daarin worden onder meer oorlogsmisdaden, misdaden tegen de mensheid en genocide strafbaar gesteld. In 2006 heeft de Congolese wetgever verschillende vormen van seksuele misdrijven, zoals omschreven in het internationaal recht, strafbaar gesteld in het militair strafwetboek. Op 31 december 2015 hebben de Congolese autoriteiten wet nr. 15/022 tot wijziging en aanvulling van het militair strafwetboek uitgevaardigd, met het oog op de uitvoering van het Statuut van Rome. Met die wet heeft de wetgever verkrachting en andere vormen van seksueel geweld die te beschouwen zijn als oorlogsmisdaden, en in sommige omstandigheden misdaden tegen de mensheid, in het gewone Congolese Wetboek van Strafrecht opgenomen. Wat vervolging betreft, zijn ongeveer 40 gevallen van verkrachting die als oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de mensheid werden aangemerkt, door de Congolese militaire rechtbanken berecht, en enkele andere gevallen worden momenteel onderzocht. Deze studie heeft tot doel na te gaan welke vooruitgang de DRC heeft geboekt bij de vervolging van verkrachting als oorlogsmisdaad en voor welke uitdagingen dergelijke vervolgingen staan. Varios conflictos armados han dejado huella en las dos décadas pasadas en la República Democrática del Congo (RDC). A resultas de ello, la RDC se está enfrentando a un desastre humanitario sin precedentes con la muerte de cientos de miles de personas, desplazamiento de civiles a gran escala y la violación de miles de mujeres, niñas y hombres. Estos conflictos armados han llevado a la metamorfosis del concepto de ‘crimen’ con la aparición de nuevas formas de violencia sexual, en particular el uso generalizado de la violencia sexual por grupos armados como táctica de guerra. En respuesta a esta avalancha de violencia sexual, la RDC ha adoptado una serie de medidas legislativas. Todo comenzó con la ratificación del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional (Estatuto de Roma) el 11 de abril de 2002. A esto siguió la promulgación del Código Judicial Militar y del Código Penal Militar el 18 de noviembre de 2002 (Código Judicial Militar y Código Penal Militar, respectivamente), penalizando, entre otros, los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio. En 2006, el legislador congoleño introdujo en el Código Penal Militar varias modalidades de crimen sexual tal y como se definen en el Derecho Internacional. El 31 de diciembre de 2015, la autoridades congoleñas promulgaron la Ley Núm. 15/022, reformando y complementando el Código Penal Militar, con objeto de implementar el Estatuto de Roma. A través de esta ley, el legislador ha tipificado en el Código Penal Común la violación y otros ataques sexuales que constituyen crímenes de guerra y, en algunas circunstancias, crímenes contra la humanidad. En términos de procedimientos instruidos, cerca de 40 casos de violación tipificada como crímenes de guerra y crímenes contra la humanidad han sido tramitados por los tribunales militares congoleños, y varios casos más continúan siendo objeto de investigación. Este estudio busca valorar el progreso de la RDC en la persecución de la violación como crimen de guerra y los retos a los que se ha tenido que hacer frente en dicha tarea. Gli ultimi due decenni della Repubblica Democratica del Congo (RDC) sono stati segnati da diversi conflitti armati. Di conseguenza, la RDC sta affrontando un disastro umanitario senza precedenti con la morte di centinaia di migliaia di persone, lo sfollamento di civili su larga scala e lo stupro di migliaia di donne, ragazze e uomini. Questi conflitti armati hanno portato alla metamorfosi del concetto di ‘crimine’ con l'emergere di nuove forme di violenza sessuale, in particolare la diffusa violenza sessuale usata dai gruppi armati come tattica di guerra. In risposta a questa valanga di violenza sessuale, la RDC ha adottato una serie di misure legislative. È iniziato tutto con la ratifica dello Statuto della Corte penale internazionale (Statuto di Roma) l'11 aprile 2002. A ciò è seguita la promulgazione del Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code il 18 novembre 2002 (rispet­tivamente Codice giudiziario militare e Codice penale militare), che hanno criminalizzato, tra l'altro, crimini di guerra, crimini contro l'umanità e genocidio. Nel 2006, il legislatore congolese ha definito come crimini varie forme di reati sessuali così come definito dal diritto internazionale nel Codice Penale Militare. Il 31 dicembre 2015 le autorità congolesi hanno promulgato la Legge n. 15/022, che modifica e integra il Codice Penale Militare, per l'attuazione dello Statuto di Roma. Attraverso questa legge, il legislatore ha incluso nel Codice penale Ordinario congolese lo stupro e altre aggressioni sessuali definiti crimini di guerra e, in alcune circostanze, crimini contro l'umanità. In termini di procedimenti penali, circa 40 casi di stupro classificati come crimini di guerra e crimini contro l'umanità sono stati processati dai tribunali militari congolesi e alcuni altri casi sono oggetto di indagine. Questo studio cerca di valutare i progressi compiuti dalla RDC nel perseguire lo stupro come crimine di guerra e l’impegno in tali procedimenti penali. Mehrere bewaffnete Konflikte haben die vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnte in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo (DRK) geprägt. Als Folge dessen steht die DRK vor einer beispiellosen humanitären Katastrophe mit dem Tod von Hunderttausenden von Menschen, der massiven Vertreibung von Zivilisten und der Vergewaltigung von Tausenden von Frauen, Mädchen und Männern. Diese bewaffneten Konflikte haben zu einer Metamorphose des Begriffs ‘Verbrechen’ mit dem Aufkommen neuer Formen sexueller Gewalt geführt, insbesondere der weit verbreiteten sexuellen Gewalt, die von bewaffneten Gruppen als Kriegstaktik eingesetzt wird. Als Reaktion auf diese Lawine sexueller Gewalt hat die DRK eine Reihe von gesetzlichen Maßnahmen ergriffen. Es begann mit der Ratifizierung des Statuts des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs (Römisches Statut) am 11 April 2002. Es folgte die Verkündung des Militärgerichtsgesetzbuchs und des Militärstrafgesetzbuchs am 18. November 2002, die unter anderem Kriegsverbrechen, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und Völkermord unter Strafe stellen. Im Jahr 2006 hat der kongolesische Gesetzgeber im Militärstrafgesetzbuch verschiedene Formen von Sexualverbrechen im Sinne des Völkerrechts unter Strafe gestellt. Am 31. Dezember 2015 haben die kongolesischen Behörden das Gesetz Nr. 15/022 zur Änderung und Ergänzung des Militärstrafgesetzbuchs im Hinblick auf die Umsetzung des Römischen Statuts verkündet. Mit diesem Gesetz hat der Gesetzgeber Vergewaltigung und andere sexuelle Übergriffe, die Kriegsverbrechen und unter gewissen Umständen auch Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit darstellen, in das kongolesische ordentliche Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommen. Was die Strafverfolgung anbelangt, so wurden etwa 40 Fälle von Vergewaltigung, die als Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit eingestuft werden, von kongolesischen Militär­gerichten abgeurteilt, und einige weitere Fälle werden derzeit untersucht. Diese Studie versucht, die Fortschritte der DRK bei der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung von Vergewaltigung als Kriegsverbrechen und die Herausforderungen für solche Verfolgungen zu bewerten.

This paper addresses the question of the criminalization of war crimes, which are compared at the international and internal legislative level under military law. Considering current threats to the international legal order and security system, justice and defence sector actors, military lawyers and research fellows in military law are faced with the problems of the concept of responsibility for the most serious crimes in the world. The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 raises the question of the internal legislation validity. The states Parties to International Criminal Court should revise the established conceptual approaches of responsibility for war crimes. The comparative analysis was made of the core and international military law.

Article based on a presentation delivered at the Conference on War in Cities: ‘Searching for practical solutions to the contemporary challenges’, April 2019.

Given that the Geneva Convention of 1929 placed prisoners of war under the laws of the detaining state, Nazi courts martial could sentence prisoners of war for offences that did not exist in the western democracies, such as insults to the Führer, or severely punish them for acts leading only to mild disciplinary sanctions in Britain or America. Moreover, convicted prisoners of war had to experience the singularly brutal German prison system. These asymmetries, which influenced the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war of 1949, challenge the paradigm of reciprocity and symmetry in prisoner of war regimes between Germany and the western countries in World War II.

In June 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced judgment in the case of R v Stillman, upholding the military justice system’s ability to try serious civil offences. The Stillman decision highlighted one key mechanism of military justice reform: court judgments. This article argues, however, that military legal experts have overlooked Parliamentary debate as a key driver of military reform. By drawing on analysis of Hansard from past decades, this article argues that the Canadian Parliament has historically pushed for radical reform to the military justice system. This reformist consensus continues to shape Parliamentary discussions on military justice in the twenty-first century.

RESUMEN El artículo examina el estado del diálogo convencional en Chile, tomando como referencia tres sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos que consideran igual número de problemas muy sensibles de nuestra transición a la democracia: nos referimos, en primer lugar, a la impugnación de la amnistía a las violaciones de derechos en dictadura; en segundo lugar, a la desmedida extensión de la competencia de los tribunales militares para juzgar civiles; y en tercer lugar, al conflicto mapuche a través de un proceso penal resuelto en lo convencional. Si bien el Estado ha asumido, en general, las obligaciones que le han impuesto las decisiones de la Corte, veremos que no lo ha hecho de manera oportuna, obediente y completa. Además, en lo interno está muy lejos de aplicar el control de convencionalidad en forma plena, es decir, desplazando la norma por la contenida en el pacto. Este es el mayor déficit que existe en el proceso de integración del Estado chileno a la jurisdicción de derechos humanos. ABSTRACT This article examines the state of the conventional dialogue in Chile, taking three sentences of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as a reference by considering also three very sensitive problems of our transitions towards democracy: we refer, in the first place, to the impugnation to the human rights violation, to the excessive extension of the competence of the military courts for processing civilians, and to the Mapuche conflict through a legal process resolved conventionally. While it is true that the State has assumed, in general, the obligations imposed by the decisions of the court, it can be seen that it has not done it in a timely, appropriate and obedient manner. Furthermore, internally it is far from applying conventionality control completely, i.e., displacing the norm by that contained in the pact. This is the greatest deficit in the integration progress of the Chilean State to the Human Rights jurisdiction. RESUMO Este artigo analisa o estado do diálogo convencional no Chile tendo como referencia três sentenças da Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos que consideran o mesmo número de problemas muito sensíveis da nossa transição à democracia: em primeiro lugar, faz-se referência à impugnação da anistia às violações de direitos na ditadura; em segundo, à extensão sem controle da competência dos tribunais militares para julgar civis; em terceiro lugar, ao conflito mapuche por meio de um processo penal resolvido no convencional. Embora o Estado tenha assumido, em geral, as obrigações que as decisões da Comissão lhe impuseram, vemos que não tem sido de maneira oportuna, obediente e completa. Além disso, no interno, está longe de aplicar o controle de convencionalidade de forma plena, isto é, substituindo a norma pela contida no pacto. Esta é a maior deficiência que existe no processo de integração do Estado chileno à jurisdição de Direitos Humanos.

On 12 November 1970, the Bhola Cyclone swept across the southern districts of East Pakistan, killing over 300,000 people. Small islands were swept away and dead bodies of humans and cattle lay strewn across the devastated landscape. Following the news of the destruction, journalists, students, artists, and political workers rushed to the affected area with basic relief supplies, without waiting for the Military Law Administration (MLA) to intervene. The cyclone's occurrence just three weeks prior to the first general elections in Pakistan added a new dimension to the already simmering political crisis. The extensive media coverage of the disaster brought the pitiful state of infrastructural development and lack of governance in East Pakistan under local and global scrutiny. The cyclone and the corresponding issues soon became embroiled within the larger political demand for regional autonomy. The MLA came under attack from sections of East Pakistan's politicians, press, and public, as well as international political actors, for its poor disaster governance. This article uses the Bhola Cyclone of 1970 as the lens to explore the complex interconnections between environmental disasters and a key issue of governance. While the Bhola Cyclone has been a subject of recent discussions, this article uses a disaster-politics analytical framework to understand the disaster's role in the subsequent political turbulence and the emergence of Bangladesh. Ministry of Education (MOE) National Research Foundation (NRF) Published version

Many publications are devoted to the identification of social conditionality of criminal regulations. However, the science of criminal law does not have any comprehensive research on the social conditionality of establishing criminal responsibility and punishment for military personnel. In this regard, its essence, features and criteria for identification remain practically unknown. The paper reveals the problematic aspects of the concept and meaning of social conditionality of establishing criminal responsibility and punishment for military personnel; the author’s definition is given. Based on the widespread opinion in the theory of criminal law that the mechanism for identifying this social condition consists of criteria that are studied by the legislator at the appropriate stages of the processes of criminalization (decriminalization) and penalization (depenalization) of military socially dangerous acts, the author analyses them in detail. The problem of ways of legal regulation of criminal responsibility and punishment of military personnel is touched upon. It is stated that the peculiarity of the definition of this social conditionality is the resolution by the legislator, among other dilemmas, of the question of the need for normative fixing of a special military or ordinary prohibition and (or) fixing of the corresponding special military regulationsin the general part of the Criminal Law.The author concludes that the identification of social conditionality of the criminal-normative prescription on responsibility and punishment of military personnel is one of the important tasks of modern science of criminal law, which necessitates the development of a unified approach to the structure and content of this process. The establishment of the theoretical and legal essence of this conditionality should be considered as the most important step in this direction. The author offers the following definition. It is the compliance of criminal regulations that establish responsibility and punishment for criminal behavior of military personnel, resulting from the demand of society in the objective need for criminal law protection of military law and order and other public relations that are most important for the individual, society and the state.

O presente artigo analisa as competências da Justiça militar, de acordo com o Código Penal Militar, identificando a sua aplicabilidade. Sabe-se que a lei militar é aquela que determina direitos e deveres dos militares, distinguindo-se do Código Penal Comum. Surge a necessidade de refletir sobre o Direito Penal na área militar, verificando quais são os crimes militares e como é realizado o procedimento de investigação e de aplicação da pena, nesses casos. O direito penal militar pode ser entendido como um conjunto de normas que elencam os crimes militares, bem como as penas aplicadas para assegurar o bem estar e a ordem jurídica da instituição. Através de pesquisa bibliográfica, busca-se compreender como a justiça militar atua no Brasil. Com a Lei nº 13.491 de 13 de outubro de 2017, houve a ampliação dos crimes militares. Daí a importância de compreender e estudar a competência da Justiça Militar e o que diz o Código Penal Militar sobre a temática.

The treatment of draft dodgers and miscarriages of justice by Argentine military courts provoked mobilisations by families, communities and the major political parties. An examination of the debates and discussions around these issues reveals a widespread sentiment that rarely questioned neither the right of the armed forces to draft young men nor the legitimacy of the armed forces. By adopting the language of patriotism and civic obligation, individual and community petitioners and politicians who represented them challenged the state's broad claim of power over the bodies of young men from a reformist position. Military justice formed a critical platform through which citizens debated the meaning of citizenship and the place of the armed forces in society.

У статті, з урахуванням історичного аспекту проблеми та міжнародного досвіду, розкрито організаційні та функціональні особливості здійснення судової та правоохоронної діяльності у Збройних Силах України. Підкреслено, що оборонна міць збройних сил визначається не тільки кількістю військовослужбовців, рівнем їх професіоналізму та майстерності, якістю військової техніки. Боєздатність військових частин та з'єднань напряму залежить від стану законності та правопорядку в них. Тому міжнародний досвід свідчить про те, що у більшості розвинутих країн, які мають сучасні збройні сили і які у той же час відомі своїми демократичними традиціями (США, Великобританія, Франція, Канада, Іспанія – всього близько 40) органи військової юстиції успішно діють і виконують завдання по зміцненню військової дисципліни та правопорядку. Постійним Комітетом Ради Європи з прав людини (м. Страсбург) у червні 2003 р. була взагалі визначена потреба органів військової юстиції, а щодо військових судів висловлена думка про те, що їх наявність в країні не суперечить Конвенції про захист прав людини і її основоположних свобод, а також зобов'язанням держав, які підписали цю конвенцію. Зазначено, що військові суди можуть бути визнані незалежними і неупередженими судами. Звертається увага на те, що в Україні, в умовах раніше – антитерористичної операції, а зараз – операції об'єднаних сил, а фактично проведенні реальних бойових дій на певних територіях країни, нажаль, йде процес ліквідації органів військової юстиції. Так, військові суди були ліквідовані ще у 2010 році, й до цього часу не відновлені, хоча це питання вирішувалося на всіх необхідних рівнях органів державної влади, військові прокуратури зараз на межі ліквідації. У наявності лише органи Військової служби правопорядку, але з вельми обмеженими повноваженнями, виключно профілактичної спрямованості. Наведені аргументи на користь подальшого реформування військової юстиції у Збройних Силах України, з формуваннями спеціалізованих судових і правоохоронних органів, а саме, їх тріади у складі: військових судів, військової прокуратури та органів Військової служби правопорядку (у майбутньому – військової поліції). Тільки у такому разі буде реально забезпечений належний рівень законності, правопорядку та військової дисципліни у Збройних Силах України.

The statute states that the provision of theoretical and legal ambushes for the functioning of the military justice bodies in the sphere of service and combat activity of the law enforcement forces is currently relevant.By means of the statutes is the pre-ambush of the functions of the military justice bodies in the sphere of military service of the law enforcement forces and the establishment and consolidation of the organizational theoretical and legal basis of the legal basis for the normative and legal basisThe reasons for the creation of military justice are the following: the numerical increase in offenses and crimes among servicemen of the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine (law enforcement forces); distribution of weapons from certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions to the rest of territory of Ukraine; incompetence of civil courts and the prosecutor's office in the efficient and prompt consideration and resolution of military cases; lack of professional bodies of inquiry and investigation in the military sphere; low efficiency of the existing organizational and legal mechanism for prevention, detection and investigation of war crimes, etc.The theory of service and combat efficiency of the law enforcement forces of Ukraine is apparently safe in the young science, and from now on, not in the new world, a system of subordinate rights of protection has been formed. For the results of the conducted advancement to the warehouse of forces, law enforcement, you can add the organizers of the military justice of Ukraine. The mechanisms of the formation of the military justice bodies are based on the already existing national legislation and the specifics of the service and combat activity of the law enforcement forces.The submitted scientific developments will be directed to the more detailed normative and legal regulation of the functioning of the military justice bodies in the sphere of service and combat activity of the law enforcement forces.

What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforcement has become increasingly militarized over the last three decades, with civilian police operating more like armed forces and soldiers replacing civilian police in law enforcement tasks. Scholarly, policy, and journalistic attention has mostly focused on the first type, but has neglected the study of three main areas toward which we seek to contribute: 1) the constabularization of the military—i.e., when the armed forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement agencies, 2) the extent to which this process has taken place outside of the United States, and 3) its political consequences. Toward this end, we unpack the concept of militarized law enforcement, develop theoretical expectations about its political consequences, take stock of militarization in Latin America, and evaluate whether expectations have played out in the region. We show that the distinction between civilian and military law enforcement typical of democratic regimes has been severely blurred in the region. Further, we argue that the constabularization of the military has had important consequences for the quality of democracy in the region by undermining citizen security, human rights, police reform, and the legal order.

Chile has a quite positive record of compliance with decisions issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACmHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), despite the absence of a law on implementation. Nevertheless, several measures related to specific issues, namely amnesties, indigenous rights and military justice have not been implemented for years or even decades. Chile has recently adopted its first National Human Rights Plan, based on the recommendations of UN treaty bodies, the Inter-American System, and its national human rights institution. This should help bringing national legislation and practice in line with international human rights law (IHRL) before the ‘kind’ reminder by an international judgment. Despite a comparatively good record of implementation of international judgments, the country also lacks a consistent and efficient mechanism to apply IHRL in its domestic judicial decisions, both in the judiciary and in the Constitutional Tribunal. There are challenges especially with regard to the correct interpretation of IHRL by national courts, while its use has increased in recent years. Police violence during manifestations and riots after 18 October 2019 found strong criticism by international human rights bodies, with the IACmHR visiting Chile in January 2020. The report has not yet been issued. No precautionary measures were requested in the Inter- American System of Human Rights. Most claims on arbitrary detentions, inhuman treatment, torture, and disproportionate use of force are still pending in domestic tribunals or administrative justice.

In this paper, the sociocultural, ethical, and political impact of civilian and military uses of AI and data will be explored. In an increasingly multi-polar world, a fierce global contest has emerged between NATO, China, and Russia concerning the ethics, governance and regulation of data, artificial intelligence, autonomous decision systems (ADS), and autonomous weapons systems (AWS). The use of AI and data systems like AWS in the military has been widely criticized for use cases like an algorithm determining targets for drone strikes. These systems carry the risk of algorithmic bias due to flaws in underlying training data and its interpretation, difficulty in maintaining meaningful human control, the potential for more conflict due to fewer barriers to military engagement, and uncertainty in accountability for machine error. This represents one of the principle challenges of “remote warfare” conducted through AWS. In turn, the interchange between AI and data technologies for civilian and military purposes risks blurring the traditional legal and normative lines between these domains. To address these challenges, it is important to consider the increasing convergence of civilian and military logics in the deployment of new technologies, following on a longstanding trend of military to civilian transfers of technology, research and development (R&D), hardware, software, culture, and personnel. It is thus argued that the trends toward integrating civilian and military law enforcement domains threaten to erode important normative and legal safeguards around human rights which are central to liberal democracy. By blurring the lines between civilian and combatant in the eyes of law enforcement, one risks accelerating the retreat of liberal democracy globally, giving rise to authoritarian police states.

National audience; This paper questions the concept of safety zones, tracing it to maritime and military law, in order to unpack its potential legal uses, applications and implications in the current context of the New Space economy. To achieve this, it starts by investigating the historical foundations of safety zones rooted in the Cold-War-era legal literature and then move on to a larger discussion of how such zones can be balanced with the non-appropriation principle. Then, this paper examines a number of legal analogies, as they appear in maritime law, aviation law as well as relevant examples in outer-space law. Lastly, it attempts to sketch the outline of a “solution ”that identifies the criteria, to be used in order to model a potential safety zone that strikes a balance between the industry’s growing concerns and requirements on one hand, and the legal prohibitions that preclude sovereign claims on outer space on the other hand. Particular attention is given to the special case of the United States’ extraterritorial jurisdiction in outer space.

The article is dedicated to determining the definition, features and structure of the legal culture of servicemen.The definition of the legal culture of a serviceman is presented as a complex of judicial values, abilities and skills whichaltogether determine his legal behavior.There’re arguments provided in favor of the idea that the culture of servicemen happens to have the following features: a) avariety of the general culture of the serviceman which happens to develop in the course nurturing within the family and the initialsocialization in the system of common middle-professional education; b) is characterized by a number of layers and consists ofthe legal culture of the citizen, which includes the legal culture of a serviceman and which in its turn consists of the legal cultureof a cadet, officers, sergeants and non-commissioned officers and privates etc; c) has influence on both the behavior of theserviceman, but also the existing overall level of legal culture of military entities.Based on the analyses of the elements of the legal culture of the serviceman it was possible to determine the followingelements of its structure: а) the theoretic-legal culture (doctrinal knowledge with regard to the essence and the peculiarities oflaw, the legal norm, state, rights and freedoms of the individual and other legal phenomena, that indirectly influence the socialrelations in a state and determine the content of the generic and special legislation); b) the military-legal culture (knowledge inthe field of military law, abilities and skills in terms of his implementation in different situations in the line of duty); c) theinformational-legal culture (the complex of knowledge, abilities and skills of legally just behavior in informational relations). Itincludes a pretty broad spectrum of elements – starting with the behavior of the servicemen on the social media and finishes withthe protection of personal data of one’s subordinates; d) the linguistic-legal culture ( the complex of knowledge, ability and skills,which allow to freely operate with the foreign military terminology, including the one that is implemented in administrative,operative, and NATO material-technical standards; e) the pedagogical-legal culture (the complex of special methods and meansto develop knowledge, abilities and skills, value orienteers and persuasions based on the realization of the rule of law among thesubordinates and other servicemen).

Purpose: This paper examines the problems of changing the systems of the structures of governance in the first years of the existence of Soviet rule using the example of the armed forces, the redistribution of powers between them, the strengthening of the administrative influence of individual departments on the most important decisions in this area. Methodology: The basis of scientific research is the dialectical materialist method, which allows revealing the patterns of development of the relevant legal industry and suggesting the most likely options for the development of legislation and law enforcement practice. In addition, the authors use the historical-chronological method, the historical-systemic method, the formal-logical method, the method of comparative law, the system-structural method, the technical-legal method, etc. Result: a dramatic change in internal political line with the advent of the Bolsheviks predetermined the sweeping changes in the approaches to public administration. Having no experience in organizing public authority, the leaders of the revolutionary movement proposed and approved numerous ideas related to improving the efficiency of the management of uniformed services, which was very important in the conditions of the civil war and foreign intervention. Applications: This research can be used for universities, teachers, and students. Novelty/Originality: In this research, the model of the development of the Soviet state system in 1918-1940 is presented in a comprehensive and complete manner.

With the implementation of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), former military soldiers who were because of the armed conflict have been able to reduce sentences and obtain freedom. This document analyses the perception of the JEP by these soldiers based on a survey that identified the type of criminal conviction, the economic and family context, and the perception of the post-conflict for each of the participant soldiers. The results demonstrate that the interviewees consider the main harms of their imprisonment are a family breakdown and unfair treatment between the military and other actors. They hope that being included in the JEP will allow them to have job opportunities and get their families back. JEL: D74; J52; D78; 055. RESUMEN Con la implementación de la Justicia Especial para la Paz (JEP), los militares judicializados en Colombia a raíz del conflicto armado han podido reducir penas y obtener libertad. Este documento analiza la percepción de la JEP que estos militares tienen, a partir de una encuesta que identificó el tipo de proceso penal, la situación económica y familiar, y la percepción del posconflicto. Los resultados muestran que, para los entrevistados, los principales daños son la ruptura familiar y el tratamiento injusto entre militares y demás actores. Ellos esperan que estar en la JEP les permita tener posibilidades laborales y recuperar sus familias. JEL: D74; J52; D78; 055. RÉSUMÉ Avec la mise en place de la Justice Spéciale pour la Paix (JEP selon son sigle en espagnol), les militaires qui ont été condamnés en Colombie à cause du conflit armé ont pu bénéficier d'une réduction de peine et obtenir la liberté. Ce document analyse la perception qu'ont ces militaires de la JEP à partir d'une enquête qui a identifié le type de procédure pénale, la situation économique et familiale et la perception de l'après-conflit. Les résultats montrent que, pour les personnes interrogées, les principaux dommages sont la rupture familiale et le traitement injuste entyre les militaires et autres acteurs. Ils espèrent qu'être dans la JEP leur permettra d'avoir des possibilités de travail et de récupérer leurs familles. JEL: D74; J52; D78; 055. RESUMO Com a implementação da Justiça Especial para a Paz (JEP), os militares processa-dos na Colômbia após o conflito armado conseguiram reduzir penas e obter liberdade. Este documento analisa a percepção que esses militares têm da JEP, com base em uma pesquisa que identificou o tipo de processo penal, a situação económica e familiar e a percepção do pós-conflito. Os resultados mostram que, para os entrevistados, os principais danos são a separação familiar e o tratamento injusto entre militares e outros atores. Eles esperam que estar no JEP lhes permita ter oportunidades de emprego e recuperar suas famílias. JEL: D74; J52; D78; 055.

This paper considers ‘consent-based’ and ‘coercion-based’ models of defining rape. It argues that the ability of these models to adequately protect against violations of sexual autonomy is dependent on their engagement with the broader circumstances within which sexual choices are made. Following an analysis of both models it is argued that attempts to contextualise consent and coercion are often undermined by evaluative framings that encourage scrutiny of the complainant’s actions at the expense of a thorough engagement with the broader circumstances. This is particularly problematic where rape occurs as a result of non-violent coercion and the victim does not verbally or physically demonstrate their lack of consent. The paper draws from United States Military law to provide a way forward. It argues that the doctrine of constructive force, which has been used to deal with instances of non-violent coercion in these contexts, has the potential to progressively reshape our contextual and evaluative framings in domestic contexts.

A country’s judicial system cannot be separated from the legal system in force in the country. In other words, a country’s justice system is a sub-system of the country’s justice system. Because the legal system that applies in Indonesia is a legal system based on the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the judicial system in Indonesia must also be based on Pancasila values and articles in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This study was conducted by using normative juridical method by reviewing various legal materials; primary, secondary and tertiary legal materials. While the data collection method was carried out through library studies. The analysis technique used descriptive method with prescriptive approach. The result of this study showed that the four judicial environments are under the Indonesia Supreme Court; general justice, religious justice, military justice and state administrative courts, as sub-judicial systems in Indonesia, each of which has an institutional, authority and legal structure separate events that differ from one another according to the specificity and absolute competence of each that cannot be mixed up. In contrast to other judicial environments which have adjusted to the changes in the new judicial power law, the institutional structure and authority of the courts within the military court which is part of the judicial system under the Supreme court of the Republic of Indonesia is still regulated in Law Number 31 of 1997 concerning Military justice and not yet adjusted to Lay Number 14 of 2004 concerning Judicial Power, because the Amendment Draft to the Law on Military Justice which had been discussed since 2005 has not yet been agreed upon by the DPR and the Government. Even when the Lay on Military Justice cannot be adjusted to Law Number 4 of 2004, on October 29, 2009 Law Number 4 of 2004 was revoked and then replaced with Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning the latest Judicial Power.

In the article, bas ed on the study of the experience of resolving the military conflict in the east of Ukraine and the analysis of the current legislation in the field of military justice, it is emphasized the expediency of creating a system of human rights bodies whose main task will be to protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of individuals and legal entities, but with special powers that take into account the specifics of wartime. Procedural bases of functioning of military justice bodies in Ukraine are analyzed. The types of investigation units that will conduct pre-trial investigations in the military justice system and their main procedural powers are identified. The issue of the jurisdiction of the military courts is discussed separately. Attention is paid to the absence in the current legislation of procedures for the division of lawyers into specializations by particular branches of law or lines of activity, including military direction. A model of military attorney authority has been developed. The procedural aspects of referring servicemen, veterans, combatants to the range of legal aid subjects, including free legal aid, are discussed. The conclusion was made about the need to amend the legislation in this area. The problems of interaction with the security and defense sector of each of the components of the military justice system are investigated. It is emphasized that cooperation with the security and defense sector consists in the cooperation of military justice bodies with the subjects of the security and defense sector, defining the system of accountability and accountability, the procedure of creation and liquidation. The issue of interaction of the formed military police with other law enforcement and judicial bodies is considered. The creation of a model of interaction by which the military police can be assigned to perform joint tasks with the units of the National Guard of Ukraine on the protection and maintenance of public order, detection and termination of criminal offenses among civilians in areas where the regime of martial law or state of emergency is imposed .

The contribution examines the institution of the right of access to administrative documents between coarse and pretentious denials in the Italian public administration and particularly the case of the reiterated illegitimate denials of access to the Military Court of Verona. The age of transparency between information to the consumer, right of access to documents and civic and the lack of responsibility of the public employee for abnormal denial is therefore still connoted by abnormal and inadmissible cases of denial of access particularly by the military state administration unable to adapt to the principle of transparency.

The issue of teaching in military schools the discipline «military hygiene» is being considered. The experience of the Russian army shows that from the fourth quarter of the 19th century, and until 1917 military hygiene was an academic discipline in the training of cadets and officers. At the same time, programs and textbooks were created, even for training at the accelerated courses of cadets and officers during the First World War. The textbooks contained sections on the basics of international military law, human anatomy and physiology, food hygiene, water supply, placement of military personnel in stationary and field conditions, hygiene uniforms, bath and laundry services, personal hygiene, rules for maintaining the territory and cleaning battlefields. Separate chapters presented the issues of urgent illnesses for the troops and their prevention. At the same time, comparative statistics are provided on the irrecoverable losses of troops from weapons and mainly from diseases. In addition, the textbooks contained information on the organization of the army’s sanitary service, the rules for the arrangement of premises for the sick and wounded were considered. In the applications, even the «highest approved» Instruction for protecting the health of the military ranks of the active army, various methods and tools for hygienic analysis, methods, disinfectants and others were presented. Here you can find a list of control questions on the sections of the discipline and the answers to them, which indicates the control over the assimilation of the material.

Sociologists have largely ignored the study of military tribunals and justice systems. We offer a descriptive overview of military systems of justice intended for use by political and military sociologists, focusing on the case of the United States armed services. We contextualize the principal military systems of justice and provide extended discussions of how the American case connects through formal and informal channels to international legal structures. American military law and justice link three key legal realms: international law on conflict and security at the global level; the so called National Security Constitution at the national level; and the Uniform Code of Military Justice at the institutional level.

International audience; The rules and fonctionning of military justice have created a Prison Web over Palestinian territories, i.e., a reality of massive arrests and imprisonment and a virtuality, a larger possibility of detaining, that is to say a suspended detention. Through mass incarceration policies, it tackles individuals and their networks. Punishment is linked to and organizes Palestinians’ mobility even after their release from jail. The judiciary and prison practices applied to Palestinians are main control devices that are contributing to a bordering system anchored on a specific mobility regime. They are shaping a dematerialized, networked and highly individualized bordering system. Through neoliberal reforms (outsourcing, privatization of services, etc.), the monetarization of military justice and expansion of its action scope, the Prison Web turned sustainable: costs were reduced and offloaded onto Palestinians and international actors. These control and mobility management systems projected within the Occupied Territories have multiplied the border: it has become mobile, suspended and endless.

This chapter delivers solutions in order to incorporate adequately international criminal law in the Mexican legal system. Amendments to the existing laws and selective adaptation of specific provisions are suggested. The major objective of these suggestions is to avoid gaps between international and domestic law. Legislative measures are suggested to the Mexican Constitution, Federal Criminal Code, Code of Military Justice and other secondary bodies of law which relate to international criminal law. Historical, Political and factual considerations are made when drawing upon these suggestions. Legislative steering also needs granting effectiveness to these rules and translating them into actual investigations and prosecutions. This requires political will, however the measures suggested would bring recognition for victims, promote civic trust, and contribute to the strengthening of the rule of democratic law. A transitional justice approach is also suggested as it provides clarification of facts, which in turn leads to the dismantling of corrupt structures, thereby fulfilling the preventive function of law enforcement vis-a-vis criminality.

A president’s long-recognized discretion to pardon just about any offense for literally any reason at almost any time leaves little room to argue that such power can be constrained any further by law. Supreme Court decisions, scholarship, and presidential precedent over the last two centuries amply (though grudgingly) support a theory of nearly unilateral and “unfettered” authority, perhaps a last vestige of the British monarchy left in the hands of a democratically accountable chief executive – controversial, but nevertheless constitutional. But when it comes to a specific class of misconduct – war crimes – interpreting and applying this constitutional power requires a second look, for it invariably intersects with another Article II power – a president’s role and authority as the military’s commander-in-chief. Rather than amplifying this other long-recognized discretionary power to wage war, the pardon power arguably weakens it under certain conditions. This intersection is not merely an academic puzzle on the nature of presidential power; it is a collision of a president’s right with a series of quite specific presidential responsibilities and authorities over the military’s criminal justice system he has only because Congress believes that a commander-in-chief should wield them. The collateral damage from this collision ironically harms the very institution and profession the president relies on for military action, advice, and ability. Whether this damage is historically contingent on particular presidents or is a predictable consequence of all such pardons is a question that cannot be answered yet. That is because President Trump’s three war crime pardons in 2019 were historic firsts: never before had a president pardoned any soldier for conduct incidental to combat action that violently victimized a non-combatant who was otherwise protected by the international laws of war from unlawful armed force. They were a proof of concept that a president could indeed “go there;” but they were also a proof of consequences not yet fully explored in the literature and not at all by the courts. In exercising his singular strength by pardoning war crimes, a president’s power and credibility is paradoxically weakened for three reasons: he ignores or rejects the duties imposed on the very institution he relies on to achieve political objectives through armed force; he devalues the professional expertise of his military agents; and he delegitimizes the military criminal justice system that this institution relies on to promote, enforce, and signal its professional commitments to certain martial values, norms, and requirements – including adhering to the laws of war. Flexing muscle on one arm atrophies muscle on the other. The contrary view is that constitutionally required civilian control of the armed forces means his discretion to flex or atrophy his credibility with the military whenever he wants. Trump’s war crime pardons offer an opportunity to explore whether common arguments and conventional applications of the pardon power are entirely relevant to this class of offenses and this kind of offender. This article suggests, because they lead to a self-defeating paradox (the collision between two independent and stout express Article II powers), that they are categorically distinct; it sketches this new prudential argument for curtailing war crime pardons based on a president’s “standing” or relationship he necessarily bears to the military as its commander-in-chief and to the conduct he absolves. Any future case for judicially invalidating such a pardon, for legislating a containment strategy to (at least) deter such a pardon, or for adopting a set of principles for presidential self-restraint, must account for this challenge.

One of the cornerstones of the international law on military operations is the issue of the legal position of armed forces personnel serving on the territory of another sovereign State with the consent of the State hosting the foreign forces. Generally, the issue is defined in international agreements concluded between the Host State and the State sending its forces abroad or an international entity on behalf of the Sending States involved. These so-called Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) deal with a host of subjects, most importantly the criminal jurisdiction over the deployed troops. As it is a particular sensitive subject affecting the sovereign rights of the States involved as well as the effectiveness of the deployed forces, the jurisdictional provisions included in SOFAs have a different scope than can be expected based on general international law regarding the immunity of States and State officials.

On 29 January 2021, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada will hear a series of joined appeals concerning the independence of the military judiciary in the Canadian Forces. This issue dominated the landscape of the Code of Service Discipline over the courts of 2020. It has led to stays of prosecution in several courts martial and threatens the confidence that members of the Canadian Forces and the Canadian public might have in the Code of Service Discipline. It has open a rift between the military judiciary and the senior leadership of the Canadian Forces. Arguably, the dialogue between the judiciary and the executive has broken down. This paper anticipates the manner in which the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada will review the judgments at court martial that have led to these appeals and how the Court may examine the central issue of judicial independence within the context that has arisen over the past several months. The anticipated remedy is that the Court Martial Appeal Court will declare that section 60 of the National Defence Act, which establishes the jurisdiction of the Code of Service Discipline, will have no force or effect as it pertains to military judges, until and unless the executive or Parliament create or enact sufficient safeguards for the independence of the military judiciary. This remedy will correct problematic conclusions of several judgments at court martial. It will recognize the central problem while permitting courts martial to continue. This will help restore confidence in the Code of Service Discipline, while offering an opportunity for the executive and legislature to improve the framework that could protect judicial independence. It will support renewed dialogue between the judiciary and the executive. It will break the deadlock.

Money laundering is an extra ordinary and transnational crime that can threaten the stability and integrity of a country's economy and even damage the joints of the country. This criminal act can be committed by all segments of society, but mostly are those who have more power and intelligence. The active Indonesian National Army (TNI) that is given more authority by the Law in Indonesia also has the potential to commit Money Laundering crime. Regulations regarding the legal process against active soldiers of the TNI who commit criminal acts are under the authority of military investigations, as stipulated in article 24 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power in conjunction with Law Number 31 of 1997 concerning Military Courts. Recently, if there are cases of active TNI soldiers who have committed criminal acts such as corruption and / or money laundering, considering that there is no specific legal framework yet, then to fill the loopholes, provisions in the Military Court Law are used.

This chapter focuses on a particularly specialized area of legal practice, i.e. American military law, and the manner in which its principles and mechanisms may be conveyed in an online context such as that of Q&A sections. The American armed forces represent the institutionalization of military culture, which encompasses the “military-as-context” and the “military-as-discourse”. Accordingly, military justice “aims to maintain order and discipline within its boundaries, including adherence to a host of requirements and prohibitions that have no counterpart in civilian society” and connects professional and personal conduct and ethics such as “disobedience, disrespect, or unauthorized absence” with legal provisions and practices. Military communication is a specialized professional discourse in its own right and seeks to avoid ambiguity and complex sentence structures while incorporating very specific technical language and terminology through abbreviations, references and rules that are based on shared and exclusive knowledge.

The article analyzes some signs of the objective side of disobedience, namely the method of committing a crime, its consequences, as well as qualifying and especially qualifying signs. It is proved that the principle of unity of command of commanders permeates all spheres of military activity, allows the military organization of the state to ensure the defense capability of Ukraine. Disobedience is the crime that destroys military-service relations between the commander (chief) and subordinate, directly affects the combat effectiveness of a military unit and, therefore, has an increased degree of public danger. In the scientific literature there are views proving the increased public danger of an open refusal to comply with the order of the commander (chief), motivating this thesis that a soldier shows a greater degree of determination to violate his duties, a greater willpower, which has already passed a period of hesitation. According to the author, an open and public refusal to comply with the order of the chief is more socially dangerous than cases of other intentional failure to comply with the order. Disobedience not only threatens the combat effectiveness of a military unit, but also significantly affects the state of military law and order and discipline. We believe that the court in all cases of criminal proceedings on the fact of disobedience or other intentional non-execution of the order, pointing out the grave consequences, should reason its point of view. It is concluded that the disposition of Article 402 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine requires some improvements that are relevant to modern times. These improvements will help strengthen military discipline and the rule of law. Submitted suggestions by «delega ferende» that will correct significant legislative errors

In response to recent calls for major reforms to the American military justice system, which are apparently based on continuing Congressional concerns about sexual assaults in the military, the authors present statistical data on sexual assaults from a number of sources: national crime statistics; military crime statistics; crime statistics from several states, and statistics from a university. The authors also present information on the tremendous strides that have been made in recent years to protect the rights of military victims of sexual assault, noting that some of those rights are not found in federal or state criminal justice systems. Finally, the authors conclude that the rate of sexual assaults in the military is lower than for other civilian jurisdictions. Military victims report offenses at a higher rate than the jurisdictions examined.

In Polish literature on the subject, the military governor’s office is usually associated with the organisation of the administrative system that prevailed in the partitioning states (Poland’s Partitions 1791-1918). However, the governor’s office had already been known in Poland during the Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815), when it was, like many other solutions of administrative and military law, imported directly from France. In the structure of Polish public organs, the office of governor was created for the first time during the Polish-Austrian war in 1809. Although no documents have survived from which we could learn of the competences of a Polish governor in those times, what is known is that the description of his authority followed closely the model set out by the French legislation. It was not before the Polish-Russian war in 1830-1831 that first attempts were made to independently set out the authority o f a governor of the Polish state, but even then, at least initially, the solutions set forth by the regime o f the Napoleonic decree were directly referred to and copied. In the second half of the 19th century, shortly before the collapse of the November Uprising, a draft describing the office and competences of a Polish governor was finally ready to be put forward for parliamentary discussion, but it was already too late for the Sejm to deal with it.

The article presents an analysis of military law in the legal system of the Republic of Poland. On the one hand, it is a very specialized area of law, and on the other, it is a very extensive field regulated in several hundred national legal acts of varying importance (universally and internally binding), as well as by international law. The author attempts to organize the subject matter of military law and to specify its elements divided into subject-specific blocks. At the same time, in order to ensure a better understanding of the nature of military law, the article discusses the role of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in times of peace, crisis, and war.The author used critical analysis of literature on legal science and security sciences, and source materials: mainly acts of universally binding law (the Constitution, acts, and regulations), as well as acts of internally binding law (instructions, ordinances, resolutions, decisions, guidelines, and agreements of various state authorities).

Following a series of aggressive military campaigns across India, by the early nineteenth century, the East India Company had secured a more definitive political space for itself in India. However, in taking over the administration of the diwani, or administration and revenue collection duties in Bengal, the Company gained responsibility for the taxes that governed the production and sale of alcohol and drugs—the abkari system. The abkari duties represented an opportunity and challenge for the colonial state. What followed changed the social landscape of India as the Company developed a series of regulations to govern alcohol in both military and civil space. These laws quickly moved beyond earlier Mughal dictates on alcohol, revealing the state’s intent to mould society through taxation.\ud \ud This article frames these colonial taxes on alcohol as a tool of governmentality. It argues that the state utilised the abkari department not simply as a means of generating revenue, but as a means of managing social relations and economic life in nineteenth-century India. It explores the path that the colonial state sought to forge between arguing for the ‘moral uplift’ of drinking populations and securing reliable revenue for Company (and later Crown) coffers. The laws themselves were often race- (and class-) specific, suggesting, for example, the pre-disposition of certain peoples to particular drinks. Moreover, the drinks themselves, whether toddy or ‘European’-style distilled spirits, were assigned a racial identity. While European observers viewed toddy as ‘natural’ and even beneficial when drunk by poor Indian labourers, in the throats of European soldiers it was labelled ‘dangerous’ or even lethal. Conversely, later Indian campaigners warned that ‘alien’ distilled spirits, such as whisky or rum, were completely foreign to India and that their introduction suggested a darker, less benevolent, side to India’s colonial rule. As such, these colonial controls on alcohol, and the debates that swirled around them, illuminate the ways in which the colonial state both understood and attempted to shape its subjects and servants.

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.

A wealth of criminological research examines punishment outcomes in state and federal courts, but virtually no research examines the thousands of defendants punished in the military justice system each year. Military courts are characterized by unique case processing norms and distinctive socio-cultural influences that shape punitive decision-making in key ways. The current study provides a broad, systematic analysis of the correlates of criminal case processing in this rarely examined court context. It analyzes a large sample of Air Force court-martial cases, evaluating the evidence for gender and racial/ethnic disparities and the influence of military-specific considerations. Findings indicate that some factors, like offense seriousness, exert influences that are largely consistent with the civilian court literature, but others including gender, race/ethnicity and case processing decisions operate in ways that are particular to military courts. Results are interpreted in light of contemporary sentencing...

Humanitarian operations may pose challenges to which armed forces prepared for warfighting seem rather ill-equipped. It is the aim of this article to examine in what way military ethics should be adapted to humanitarian tasks. Two ideal types of military ethics are defined here: warfighting and humanitarian. The warfighting ethic is supposed to maximise the utility of the military in war and combat and to that end utilises the virtues of loyalty and honour. In contrast, humanitarian obligations require to a larger extent the development of personal integrity and an ability to follow one’s own conscience. The adaptation of military ethics is demonstrated in the case studies of the UK armed forces and the German Bundeswehr. Whereas the moral code of the UK armed forces remains anchored in the principles of the warfighting ethic, the case of the Bundeswehr presents a military ethic closely approximating the humanitarian ideal type.

This paper examines the ways in which the military infringes on the social and political rights of soldiers who joined the Zimbabwe National Army in post-independence Zimbabwe. Contrary to the scho...

The article describes inter-religious relations in the Polish Armed Forces between years 1918 and 1939. The Polish Constitution compelled Catholics and the representatives of all other religions to military service. The pastoral care was provided by the Bishop's Curia – the Field Bishop's Curia (for Catholics) or the Department of Non-Catholic Religions – the Bureau of Non-Catholic Religions of the Ministry of Military Affairs (for non-Catholics). At the end of the 1920s there were over 100 full-time and 30 auxiliary Catholic military chaplains, accompanied by 35 full-time and 20 auxiliary non-Catholic chaplains.

This textbook is about the modern military justice system of the United States. It covers court-martial procedures, substantive criminal law, and nonjudicial punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in addition to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain acts committed abroad. The Third Edition includes several recent cases and updates that address the significant changes made in the 2019 Manual for Courts-Martial, the Military Justice Act of 2016, and other recent legislation.

Throughout the course of English history from the Middle Ages onwards, courts martial were considered courts at law as they exercised the judicial power of the sovereign in military matters. This historical or traditional classification has relevance in the Australian context as the High Court of Australia has held that recourse may be had to historical or traditional classifications of a body to fully understand what that body truly is. Notwithstanding that, it is argued the High Court of Australia has chosen to give little weight to this important classification when it has considered the constitutional basis of courts martial in Australia. The validity of the current courts martial system in Australia, established under the DFDA, has now been directly challenged before the High Court on seven occasions. In each instance the High Court held the exercise of judicial-like powers by a non-Chapter III court, in respect of defence disciplinary matters, did not offend Chapter III of the Constitution due to the constitutional doctrine of ‘exceptionalism’. That is, although military service tribunals exercise judicial power, the High Court has held they do not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth under Chapter III but rather exercise an ‘exceptional’ power, and the source of such power is s 51(vi) of the Constitution – that is, the defence power. A properly constituted system of military justice requires an appellate system which is fair and operates independently of the chain of command. Since 1955, the ADF has been provided with an appellate tribunal system in the form of the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Tribunal (DFDAT). The DFDAT is not a Chapter III court, however, it operates outside the chain of command and has been well accepted by the ADF for over 60 years. The objectives of a properly functioning system of military justice are independence and impartiality. This chapter will analyse the issues of independence and impartiality so as to better understand whether the ADF has or can achieve these objectives.