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Research indicates that a subtle shift in language—silently referring to oneself using one’s own name and non–first-person-singular pronouns (i.e., distanced self-talk)—promotes emotion regulation. Yet it remains unclear whether the efficacy of distanced self-talk depends on the intensity of the negative experience reflected on and whether the benefits extend to emotionally vulnerable individuals. Two high-powered experiments addressed these issues. Distanced as opposed to immersed self-talk reduced emotional reactivity when people reflected on negative experiences that varied in their emotional intensity. These findings held when participants focused on future and past autobiographical events and when they scored high on individual difference measures of emotional vulnerability. The results also generalized across various types of negative events. These findings illuminate the functionality of language for allowing people to regulate their emotions when reflecting on negative experiences across the spectrum of emotional intensity and highlight the need for future research to examine the clinical implications of this technique.

OBJECTIVES: Many people report uncertainty when appraising their risk of cancer and other diseases, but prior research about the topic has focused solely on cognitive risk perceptions. We investigated uncertainty related to cognitive and affective risk questions. We also explored whether any differences in uncertainty between cognitive and affective questions varied in magnitude by item-specific or socio-demographic characteristics.DESIGN: Secondary analysis of data collected for a 2 × 2 × 3 full-factorial risk communication experiment (N = 835) that was embedded within an online survey.METHODS: We investigated the frequency of 'don't know' responses (DKR) to eight perceived risk items that varied according to whether they assessed (1) cognitive versus affective perceived risk, (2) absolute versus comparative risk, and (3) colon cancer versus 'any exercise-related diseases'. Socio-demographics were as follows: sex, age, education, family history, and numeracy. We analysed the data using multilevel logistic regression.RESULTS: The odds of DKR were lower for affective than cognitive perceived risk (OR = 0.64, p < .001). This difference occurred for absolute but not comparative risk perceptions (interaction effect, p = .004), but no interactions for disease type or demographic characteristics were found (ps > .05).CONCLUSIONS: Lower uncertainty for affective (vs. cognitive) absolute perceived risk items is consistent with research stating: (1) Risk perceptions are grounded in people's feelings about a hazard, and (2) feelings are easier for people to access than facts. Including affective perceived risk items in health behaviour surveys may reduce missing data and improve data quality. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Many people report that they don't know their risk (i.e., risk uncertainty). Evidence is growing for the importance of feelings of risk in explaining health behaviour. Feelings are easier for people to access than facts. What does this study add? Don't know responding is higher for absolute cognitive than absolute affective risk questions. This difference does not vary in magnitude by demographic characteristics. Affective perceived risk questions in surveys may reduce missing data and improve data quality.

Mindfulness theorists suggest that people spend most of their time focusing on the past or future rather than the present. Despite the prevalence of this assumption, no research that we are aware of has evaluated whether it is true or what the implications of focusing on the present are for subjective well-being. We addressed this issue by using experience sampling to examine how frequently people focus on the present throughout the day over the course of a week and whether focusing on the present predicts improvements in the 2 components of subjective well-being over time-how people feel and how satisfied they are with their lives. Results indicated that participants were present-focused the majority of the time (66%). Moreover, focusing on the present predicted improvements in life satisfaction (but not happiness) over time by reducing negative rumination. These findings advance our understanding of how temporal orientation and well-being relate. (PsycINFO Database Record

Emotions are not confined to short momentary states but carry on over time, facilitating the perception and interpretation of the environment in mood-congruent ways. Yet, the (neural) mechanism linking affective stimulation at a certain time-point to such altered, mood-congruent processing of stimuli presented at a subsequent time-point remains unknown. Recent research suggests that such a link could be explained by transient effects of affective stimulation on the organization of intrinsic macro-scale neural networks. It remains, however, unclear whether these changes in network organization are influencing subsequent perception in a mood-congruent way. Addressing this gap the current study investigated whether changes in network organization, measured in terms of network efficiency, mediate the relation between mood-induction and mood-congruent processing as measured by reaction-times during an emotional Stroop task. The results demonstrated that negative mood-induction increased the efficiency of the Salience Network and decreased the efficiency of the Central Executive Network. This modulation of network efficiency fully mediated the effects of mood-induction on reaction-times to negative words. These findings indicate that transient shifts in the organization of macro-scale neural networks are an essential part of the emotional response and can help to explain how affect shapes our interaction with the environment. ispartof: Social Cognitive And Affective Neuroscience vol:14 issue:9 pages:987-995 ispartof: location:England status: published

Social network sites are ubiquitous and now constitute a common tool people use to interact with one another in daily life. Here we review the consequences of interacting with social network sites for subjective well-being—that is, how people feel moment-to-moment and how satisfied they are with their lives. We begin by clarifying the constructs that we focus on in this review: social network sites and subjective well-being. Next, we review the literature that explains how these constructs are related. This research reveals: (a) negative relationships between passively using social network sites and subjective well-being, and (b) positive relationships between actively using social network sites and subjective well-being, with the former relationship being more robust than the latter. Specifically, passively using social network sites provokes social comparisons and envy, which have negative downstream consequences for subjective well-being. In contrast, when active usage of social network sites predicts subjective well-being, it seems to do so by creating social capital and stimulating feelings of social connectedness. We conclude by discussing the policy implications of this work.

Emotions are fundamentally temporal processes that dynamically change over time. This temporal nature is inherently involved in making emotions adaptive by guiding interactions with our environment. Both the size of emotional changes across time (i.e. emotional instability) and the tendency of emotions to persist across time (i.e. autocorrelation of emotional experience, emotional inertia) are key features of a person’s emotion dynamics, and have been found central to maladaptive functioning and psychopathology as well as linked to social functioning. However whether different (neural) mechanisms are underlying these dynamics as well as how they are related to the processing of (socio-)emotional information is to date widely unknown. Using a combination of Experience Sampling methods and fMRI (involving a social feedback paradigm), we examine how emotional instability and inertia in everyday life are associated with different aspects of the neural response to socio-emotional events. The findings indicate that while emotional instability is connected to the response of the core salience network, emotional inertia is associated to responses in the parahippocampal gyrus and lateral orbitofrontal cortex. This is the first study showing that different aspects of the neural response to socio-emotional events are associated with different aspects of the temporal dynamics of emotion in real life. ispartof: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience vol:12 pages:1-10 ispartof: location:Switzerland status: published

Prior research indicates that Facebook usage predicts declines in subjective well-being over time. How does this come about? We examined this issue in 2 studies using experimental and field methods. In Study 1, cueing people in the laboratory to use Facebook passively (rather than actively) led to declines in affective well-being over time. Study 2 replicated these findings in the field using experience-sampling techniques. It also demonstrated how passive Facebook usage leads to declines in affective well-being: by increasing envy. Critically, the relationship between passive Facebook usage and changes in affective well-being remained significant when controlling for active Facebook use, non-Facebook online social network usage, and direct social interactions, highlighting the specificity of this result. These findings demonstrate that passive Facebook usage undermines affective well-being.

Emotions unfold over time with episodes differing in explosiveness (i.e., profiles having a steep vs. a gentle start) and accumulation (i.e., profiles increasing over time vs. going back to baseline). In the present fMRI study, we wanted to replicate and extend previous findings on the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying emotion explosiveness and accumulation. Specifically, we aimed to: (a) replicate the finding that different neural mechanisms are associated with emotion explosiveness and accumulation, (b) replicate the finding that adopting a self-distanced (vs. self-immersed) perspective decreases emotion explosiveness and accumulation at the level of self-report, and (c) examine whether adopting a self-distanced (vs. self-immersed) perspective similarly modulates activity in the brain regions associated with emotion explosiveness and accumulation. Participants in an fMRI scanner were asked to adopt a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective while reading and thinking about negative social feedback, and to report on felt changes in negative affect during that period using an emotion intensity profile tracking approach. We replicated previous findings showing that emotion explosiveness and accumulation were related to activity in regions involved in self-referential processing (such as the medial prefrontal cortex) and sustained visceral arousal (such as the posterior insula), respectively. The finding that adopting a self-distanced (vs. self-immersed) perspective lowers emotion explosiveness and accumulation was also replicated at a self-report level. However, perspective taking did not impact activity in the neural correlates of emotion explosiveness and accumulation. ispartof: PLoS One vol:13 issue:11 pages:1-19 ispartof: location:United States status: Published online

It has been widely believed that individuals transform high-intensity shame into anger because shame is unbearably painful. This phenomenon was first coined "humiliated fury," and it has since received empirical support. The current research tests the novel hypothesis that shame-related anger is not universal, yet hinges on the cultural meanings of anger and shame. Two studies compared the occurrence of shame-related anger in North American cultural contexts (where shame is devalued and anger is valued) to its occurrence in Japanese contexts (where shame is valued and anger is devalued). In a daily-diary study, participants rated anger and shame feelings during shame situations that occurred over one week. In a vignette study, participants rated anger and shame in response to standardised shame vignettes that were generated in previous research by either U.S. or Japanese respondents. Across the two studies, and in line with previous research on humiliated fury, shame predicted anger for U.S.PARTICIPANTS: Yet, neither in the daily diary study nor for the Japanese-origin vignettes, did we find shame-related anger in Japanese participants. Only when presented with U.S.-origin vignettes, did Japanese respondents in the vignette study report shame-related anger. The findings suggest that shame-related anger is a culture-specific phenomenon.

Some emotions last longer than others. However, duration differences have only been explored for a small number of emotions and the observed differences have not been explained. The aim of the present study is to provide a detailed picture of variability in duration between emotions and to account for this variability. Participants were asked to recollect recent emotional episodes, report their duration, and answer questions regarding appraisals and regulation strategies. Out of 27 emotions, sadness lasted the longest, whereas shame, surprise, fear, disgust, boredom, being touched, irritation, and relief were the shortest emotions. One appraisal dimension and one regulation strategy accounted for almost half of the variability in duration between emotions. In particular, compared to short emotions, persistent emotions are typically elicited by events of high importance, and are associated with high levels of rumination. This conclusion holds across emotion duration definitions, and remains valid when taking emotion recency and intensity into account.

Emotions are processes that unfold over time. As a consequence, a better understanding of emotions can be reached only when their time–related characteristics can be assessed and interpreted adequately. A central aspect in this regard is the duration of emotional experience. Previous studies have shown that an emotional experience can last anywhere from a couple of seconds up to several hours or longer. In this article, we examine to what extent specific appraisals of the eliciting event may account for variability in emotion duration and to what degree appraisal–duration relations are universal or culture specific. Participants in 37 countries were asked to recollect emotional episodes of fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame and guilt. Subsequently, they were asked to report the duration of these episodes and to answer a number of questions regarding their appraisal of the emotion–eliciting event. Multi–level analyses revealed that negative emotions last especially long when the eliciting event and its consequences are perceived to be incongruent with the individual's goals, values and self–ideal, creating a mismatch. These relations are largely universal, although evidence for some limited variability across countries is found as well. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology

Time is given a central place in theoretical models of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 2015), but key questions regarding the role of time remain unanswered. We investigated 2 such unanswered questions. First, we explored when different emotion regulation strategies were used within the course of an emotional episode in daily life. Second, we investigated the association between the temporal deployment of strategies and negative emotional experience. We conducted a daily diary study in which participants (N = 74) drew an intensity profile depicting the temporal unfolding of their negative emotional experience across daily events (N = 480), and mapped their usage of emotion regulation strategies onto this intensity profile. Strategies varied in their temporal deployment, with suppression and rumination occurring more at the beginning of the episode, and reappraisal and distraction occurring more toward the end of the episode. Strategies also varied in their association with negative emotion: rumination was positively associated with negative emotion, and reappraisal and distraction were negatively associated with negative emotion. Finally, both rumination and reappraisal interacted with time to predict negative emotional experience. Rumination was more strongly positively associated with negative emotions at the end of the episode than the beginning, but reappraisal was more strongly negatively associated with negative emotion at the beginning of the episode than the end. These findings highlight the importance of accounting for timing in the study of emotion regulation, as well as the necessity of studying these temporal processes in daily life. (PsycINFO Database Record

An emotional experience can last for only a couple of seconds up to several hours or even longer. In the present study, we examine to which extent covert intrapersonal actions (cognitions both related and unrelated to the emotion-eliciting stimulus) as well as overt interpersonal actions (social sharing) account for this variability in emotion duration. Participants were asked to report the duration of their anger, sadness, joy, and gratitude episodes on a daily basis during five days. Furthermore, information was collected with regard to their cognitions during the episodes and their social sharing behavior. Discrete-time survival analyses revealed that for three of the four emotions under study, stimulus-related cognitions with the same valence as the emotion lead to a prolongation of the episode; in contrast, both stimulus-related and stimulus-unrelated cognitions with a valence opposite to the emotion lead to a shortening. Finally, for the four emotions under study, social sharing was associated with a prolongation. The findings are discussed in terms of a possible process basis underlying the time dynamics of negative as well as positive emotions.

The authors present 2 studies to explain the variability in the duration of emotional experience. Participants were asked to report the duration of their fear, anger, joy, gratitude, and sadness episodes on a daily basis. Information was further collected with regard to potential predictor variables at 3 levels: trait predictors, episode predictors, and moment predictors. Discrete-time survival analyses revealed that, for all 5 emotions under study, the higher the importance of the emotion-eliciting situation and the higher the intensity of the emotion at onset, the longer the emotional experience lasts. Moreover, a reappearance, either physically or merely mentally, of the eliciting stimulus during the emotional episode extended the duration of the emotional experience as well. These findings display interesting links with predictions within N. H. Frijda's theory of emotion, with the phenomenon of reinstatement (as studied within the domain of learning psychology), and with the literature on rumination.

A case is made for the use of hierarchical models in the analysis of generalization gradients. Hierarchical models overcome several restrictions that are imposed by repeated measures analysis-of-variance (rANOVA), the default statistical method in current generalization research. More specifically, hierarchical models allow to include continuous independent variables and overcomes problematic assumptions such as sphericity. We focus on how generalization research can benefit from this added flexibility. In a simulation study we demonstrate the dominance of hierarchical models over rANOVA. In addition, we show the lack of efficiency of the Mauchly's sphericity test in sample sizes typical for generalization research, and confirm how violations of sphericity increase the probability of type I errors. A worked example of a hierarchical model is provided, with a specific emphasis on the interpretation of parameters relevant for generalization research. ispartof: Frontiers in Psychology vol:6 pages:1-10 ispartof: location:Switzerland status: published

The aim of this study is to describe variability in the shape and amplitude of intensity profiles of anger episodes and how it relates to duration, and to investigate whether this variability can be predicted on the basis of appraisals and emotion regulation strategies used. Participants were asked to report on a wide range of recollected anger episodes. By means of K-spectral centroid clustering, two prototypical shapes of anger intensity profiles were identified: early- and late-blooming episodes. Early-blooming episodes are relatively short and reach their peak immediately. These profiles are associated with low-importance events and adaptive regulation. Late-blooming episodes last longer and reach their peak (relatively) late in the episode. These profiles are related to high-importance events and maladaptive regulation. For both early- and late-blooming profiles, overall amplitude is positively associated with event importance and the use of maladaptive regulation strategies and negatively with the use of adaptive ones. peerreview_statement: The publishing and review policy for this title is described in its Aims & Scope. aims_and_scope_url: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=pcem20 ispartof: Cognition & Emotion vol:29 issue:1 pages:168-177 ispartof: location:England status: published

Previous research has shown the relation between social sharing and emotional processing to be notoriously complex. In the present study, we unraveled this complexity by, for the first time, taking 3 key aspects of this relation into account simultaneously: the nature of the emotion, the timing of possible sharing effects, and the multicomponential character of emotions. Using the day reconstruction method, we first identified an intense anger or sadness target episode for each participant. In a second phase, participants repeatedly reported their sharing behavior and intensity of different emotion components over 5 days. Growth curve analyses revealed that sharing anger leads to several immediate and delayed beneficial effects, whereas sharing sadness leads to limited positive effects that emerge later on. This implies that all 3 aspects under study, as well as their interplay, are of critical importance in the relation between sharing and emotional processing.

Intensity and duration are two central characteristics of an emotional response. Appraisals and regulation strategies are among the most important determinants of these emotion features. However, as intensity and duration are only moderately correlated, appraisals and regulation strategies may be differently related to these characteristics. A systematic empirical study comparing predictors of emotion intensity and duration is missing. The goal of the present study is to fill this gap. Participants were asked to recall recently experienced episodes of anger, fear, disgust, guilt, sadness, and shame. Subsequently, they were asked to answer a number of questions regarding (a) the intensity and duration of these emotions, (b) their appraisal of the emotion-eliciting event, and (c) their use of a wide range of regulation strategies. Emotion intensity was found to be mainly predicted by appraisals whereas emotion duration was equally well predicted by appraisals and regulation strategies.

People often socially share their emotions to regulate them. Two-mode theory of social sharing states that cognitive sharing will contribute to emotional recovery, whereas socio-affective sharing will only temporarily alleviate emotional distress. Previous studies supporting this theory, measured emotional recovery in terms of residual emotional intensity. Until now, another important time-dynamic aspect of emotions, emotion duration, has been largely ignored. In two experience sampling studies we addressed this gap. In Study 1, participants reported on the duration of anger, fear, and sadness episodes; additionally time-varying information on the occurrence and mode of sharing was collected. This study revealed that sharing led to a shortening in emotion duration, in particular when it was socio-affective in nature. In Study 2 we investigated whether this result could be interpreted in terms of our measure of duration primarily reflecting emotional relief rather than recovery. In this study, the same method as in Study 1 was used; additionally, residual emotional intensity was measured three days after emotion onset. Study 2 largely replicated the findings from Study 1. Furthermore, duration appeared to be empirically distinct from residual intensity. Finally, no relation between sharing and residual intensity was found, even when considering the sharing mode.

Research has shown that cognitive control processes play a central role in emotion regulation. While most research has examined whether individual differences in such processes are related to the use of these strategies, a crucial next step involves examining whether such differences influence their impact on people's feelings, especially in normal daily life. The present study examined whether impairments in cognitive control (measured using an affective interference resolution task) moderate the impact of using rumination and reappraisal on affective experiences in everyday life (assessed using experience sampling methods). Multilevel analyses revealed that difficulties removing previously relevant negative information from working memory were associated with a larger increase in negative affect following rumination, and smaller increase and decrease in positive and negative affect, respectively, following reappraisal. These findings show that impaired interference resolution for negative information aggravates the deleterious effects of rumination and curbs the benefits of reappraisal in daily life. ispartof: Cognition & Emotion vol:27 issue:3 pages:492-501 ispartof: location:England status: published