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Drawing on the neo-republican theory of non-domination and a qualitative case study conducted in three Dutch municipalities, this article explores the extent to which external rules are able to prevent arbitrary power in relationships between welfare officers and work supervisors, on the one hand, and welfare recipients participating in mandatory work programmes, on the other hand. It concludes that external rules were insufficiently implemented in the three municipalities in question. In addition, it found that rules cease to be capable of constraining arbitrary power where institutional contexts themselves are unpredictable and insecure. Under these conditions, welfare recipients may seek to avoid risks and act in accordance with the preferences (or their expectation of the preferences) of the welfare officer or work supervisor by playing the role of the ‘good recipient’ instead of relying on available rules of a protective nature or rules that enable them to have a say in their participation in mandatory work programmes.

The Belgian Constitution holds an obligation for governmental schools to organise RE in the recognised religions and in non-confessional ethics for all children of school age. While neither the Flemish nor the French Community legislator can thus abandon RE altogether, both legislators have recently taken initiatives, moving beyond the opt-out system, towards an opt-in system and a partial withdrawal of RE in governmental schools. After a brief description of the Belgian RE system and its historical roots, we scrutinise these evolutions. Although the Constitution does offer some room for manoeuvring, not everything goes: ending the possibility for students in governmental schools to opt for RE in any of the recognised religions or in non-denominational ethics altogether would, for instance, not be allowed. This is different from the perspective of human rights instruments such as the ECtHR, which permits, but does not require governmental schools to organise moral or religious education. Following the margin of appreciation doctrine of the ECtHR, the ECHR does not pose strict limits on governmental possibilities. It remains, however, to be seen whether the Flemish and French Community will manage to stay in line with the stricter regime of the Belgian Constitution.

In this paper, we adopt an experimentalist approach to determining the content of international human rights for assessing national mandatory work programmes for recipients of social assistance (MWPs). This approach implies going back and forth between law and experience in order to determine the better way to secure human rights in an ever-changing environment. After having identified six criteria for evaluating MWPs in the soft case-law of international bodies, we confront this emerging international human rights framework with an empirical study on MWP practices in the Netherlands. This confrontation reveals that specific aspects of the capability for voice of working welfare recipients are absent in the human rights framework and that the framework is not gender-neutral. Including these aspects, we construct an experimentalist human-rights-based instrument that is suitable for evaluating national MWPs.

In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) the right of States to control migration is firmly established despite strong indications that the effects of migration control are not racially neutral. In this article we attempt to understand how it is possible that the doctrine of sovereign migration control is not considered to breach the prohibition of racial discrimination. We argue that the ECtHR’s approach to migration and racial discrimination fits a pattern in the historical development of migration law whereby the right to travel, and the power of States to restrict this right, have been consistently defined in such a way as to protect the interests of the predominantly white population of today's global North. Hence, the ease with which the racialised impact of migration control is accepted as normal and compatible with the prohibition of racial discrimination is consistent with migration law's long history as part of colonial and postcolonial relations.

Equality is a fundamental principle, also in youth justice. Nevertheless, children from ethnic minorities, children with disabilities and children from low socioeconomic backgrounds are vastly overrepresented in youth detention populations across the globe. This article combines interdisciplinary theoretical perspectives and empirical findings from interviews with practitioners from two English youth courts to explore the meaning, perceptions and implications of the principle of equality in the specific context of the youth court. Ultimately, this article presents the first contours of a conceptual model of equality in the youth court, which aims to inform policy, practice and future research.

With the Modernisation of the Code of Criminal Procedure, certain digital investigation powers will for the first time be given a specific statutory basis, such as the search of data carriers, open-source investigation and network searches. Nevertheless, considering the high degree of intrusiveness of such techniques, particularly with the right to privacy, it remains important to take note of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which continues to set minimum safeguards for the interference with private life. In this paper, we therefore conduct a brief overview of recent ECtHR case law concerning five types of digital investigation powers. We then consider the implications of this case law for the regulation of such powers in the draft Code of Criminal Procedure and for the Modernisation process more broadly.

This article presents the findings of an in-depth comparative study of remand decision-making in youth courts in England & Wales and the Netherlands. Informed by qualitative empirical research, this article explores differences and similarities in remand decision-making and in the functions of remand in the administration of youth justice. A key finding is that in Dutch youth justice a paternalistic and interventionist perception of the ‘welfare principle’ seems to be an important informal driver of the (relatively) high youth remand rates, whereas in the English youth justice system the ‘welfare principle’ seems to function rather as a protective mechanism against an overzealous use of youth remand. Ultimately, the article explores how different legal traditions and ‘proximal processes’ might explain and shape cross-national differences in the use of remand for youth and identifies several areas for further inquiry that can potentially advance our broader international comparative understanding of youth remand practices.

In the past decade or so, vulnerability has become a fairly prominent concept in human rights law. It has evolved from being an underlying notion to an explicit concept. This column takes stock of vulnerability's relationship to, and possible influence on human rights law, assessing the concept's potential and pitfalls. It focuses on the not altogether unrelated issues of migrants’ social rights and on the role of human rights in environmental protection. The discussion commences with a reflection on the potential of vulnerability to re-interrogate those aspects of the human rights paradigm that relate to environmental protection. The next section focuses on the potential of vulnerability to enhance migrants’ social rights within human rights law. Subsequently, it focuses on the pitfalls and the difficulties of the vulnerability concept. It concludes by offering an outlook for the future of the concept.

In September 2012, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld a judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal that the eviction from basic shelter of a mother and her minor children, who did not have legal residence in the Netherlands, was unlawful. This ruling was instigated by a radically new interpretation of the European Social Charter’s personal scope and caused a major shift in Dutch policy.This article provides a case study into the legal reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. It argues that, instead of relying on legal doctrinal reasoning for justifying the outcome, both courts referred to factors that the general public relies on to assess people’s deservingness of welfare. This finding raises fundamental questions about the relationship between human rights law and deservingness; and calls, therefore, for further research into the relevance of deservingness criteria in judicial discourse.

While studies have drawn attention to the operationalization, and implementation challenges associated with the ECOWAS free movement protocol, our understanding of how different categories of migrants experience the protocol is far more limited. Drawing on data from interviews conducted with 23 ECOWAS migrants living or travelling to Ghana, immigration officials and a trade union representative, this paper examines the diversity of experiences of ECOWAS migrants in relation to the free movement protocol. The findings suggest that the experiences of ECOWAS nationals in areas such as awareness and knowledge of provisions in the protocol, border crossing, processes of acquiring residence and work permits and renewing permits, and rights of establishment differ remarkably by dimensions of social difference. The gender, social class and nationality of migrants are fundamental and shape the experiences of ECOWAS migrants in divergent ways. These findings have important implication for policies seeking to promote free movement in West Africa.

Over the past few decades, child sexual abuse (‘CSA’) has become recognized as a serious and major problem in modern societies. Consequently, a common denominator in modern government policy is that CSA must be criminalized and pro-actively enforced. However, if national authorities are to be able to enforce, knowledge about the abuse is essential. Yet the disclosing of information to the authorities is hampered by the hidden nature of the offence. According to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Lanzarote) and EU Directive 2011/93 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, Member States should ‘encourage any person’ who knows about or suspects CSA to report this to the relevant authorities. To encourage such disclosure, several European governments have introduced mandatory reporting systems imposing a (non-criminal) duty on designated professionals to report information about or suspicions of CSA to the competent authorities.This article examines whether introducing a criminal duty to report CSA could be recommendable for the European Union or the Council of Europe in order to improve Member States’ knowledge of CSA and thus protect children more effectively against this type of violence. Using the outcomes of our recent study into the possibilities and impossibilities of extending the present Dutch criminal duty (aangifteplicht) to report rape, we argue that a criminal duty to report CSA is not recommendable as a means to encourage CSA disclosure by third parties.

How to determine whether mobile Union citizens have a right to social assistance? Research has shown how Western European Member States have made efforts to restrict Union citizens’ access to their welfare systems over the past decade, whereby lawful residence has increasingly become the linchpin for entitlement. Member States have responded strikingly differently, however, to the complex administrative puzzle of dealing with open borders, the ability to verify lawful residence and the right to social assistance over time. This article makes an analytical and empirical contribution to existing literature by asking how Member States adjust their welfare/migration administrations to fit the Union’s free movement regime and what implications this has for Union citizens. Based upon comparative case studies into the administration of social assistance rights in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, the article develops a typology of three different models of administering Union citizens’ access to the welfare state: the form, signal and delegation models. Demonstrating how bureaucratic design impacts the stratification of social rights in the Member States in different ways, the article concludes that studying alternative administrative models offers important insights into the functioning of territorial welfare states in open border regimes.

The deployment of pervasive information and communication technologies (ICTs) within smart city initiatives transforms cities into extraordinary apparatuses of data capture. ICTs such as smart cameras, sound sensors and lighting technology are trying to infer and affect persons’ interests, preferences, emotional states, and behaviour. It should be no surprise then that contemporary legal and policy debates on privacy in smart cities are dominated by a debate focused on data and, therefore, on data protection law. In other words, data protection law is the go-to legal framework to regulate data processing activities within smart cities and similar initiatives. While this may seem obvious, a number of important hurdles might prevent data protection law to be (successfully) applied to such initiatives. In this contribution, we examine one such hurdle: whether the data processed in the context of smart cities actually qualifies as personal data, thus falling within the scope of data protection law. This question is explored not only through a theoretical discussion but also by taking an illustrative example of a smart city-type initiative – the Stratumseind 2.0 project and its living lab in the Netherlands (the Stratumseind Living Lab; SLL). Our analysis shows that the requirement of ‘identifiability’ might be difficult to satisfy in the SLL and similar initiatives. This is so for two main reasons. First, a large amount of the data at stake do not qualify as personal data, at least at first blush. Most of it relates to the environment, such as, data about the weather, air quality, sound and crowding levels, rather than to identified or even likely identifiable individuals. This is connected to the second reason, according to which, the aim of many smart city initiatives (including the SLL) is not to identify and target specific individuals but to manage or nudge them as a multiplicity – a combination of the environment, persons and all of their interactions. This is done by trying to affect the ‘atmosphere’ on the street. We thus argue that a novel type of profiling operations is at stake; rather than relying on individual or group profiling, the SLL and similar initiatives rely upon what we have called ‘atmospheric profiling’. We conclude that it remains highly uncertain, whether smart city initiatives like the SLL actually process personal data. Yet, they still pose risks for a wide variety of rights and freedoms, which data protection law is meant to protect, and a need for regulation remains.

This special issue investigates citizenship and belonging in mixed-status families, i.e. families consisting of both citizens and non-citizens. We critique the standard perception of citizenship as ‘hard on the outside and soft on the inside’. For citizens with non-citizen family members, the exclusionary nature of citizenship is very much ‘inside’, in the very heart of their families. We deploy the concept of ‘performing intimate citizenship’ to understand how citizens deal with migration regulations that hinder them from living with their families. Often this is a first, shocking confrontation with state intervention into their private lives. Protesting such interventions–in court, in collective mobilisation, in letters to the authorities–involves making claims both about who belongs and about what ‘proper’ family is. Thus, citizens and their non-citizen family members ‘perform intimate citizenship’: they express what citizenship is and should be, by mobilising intersecting conceptions of intimacy and of belonging.

Academic literature has studied the legal consciousness of common citizens: the way ordinary people think and talk about law in their everyday lives. Building on this literature, we explore how Dutch female citizens with a migrant partner experience the impact of migration law on their everyday lives. We questioned how legal consciousness is linked to intimate citizenship, thus demonstrating how ‘private’ matters such as intimate relationships, marriage, and family have a profound impact on citizenship. Based on two sets of interviews, conducted in 2000 and 2016, we were able to determine how these women, despite being citizens formally, experienced the profound impact of increasingly restrictive family reunification policies. Contrary to our expectations, female sponsors continued to express considerable support for restrictive migration law. In performing intimate citizenship, they claimed an exception from the strict application of the rules for their particular family situation, rather than radical change.

Irregular migrants in Europe are increasingly subjected to state coercion, surveillance and spatial restrictions, such as containment, dispersal and forced transfers. Lawyers usually evaluate such practices in the light of human rights law, which only provides limited protection. For this reason, I propose an alternative normative framework to evaluate and assess coercive state practices towards irregular migrants: the concept of freedom as non-domination. In this article, I conceptualize non-domination from a rule of law perspective. To this end, I start from Lovett’s procedural account of arbitrariness; and complement this with Benton’s focus on unaccountable power and Palombella’s argument for ‘duality of law’. In the second part of this article, I apply this normative framework to coercive practices in shelters for irregular migrants in the Netherlands. This allows me to demonstrate the practical relevance and consequences of the theory. It discloses how the protection of freedom as non-domination, conceptualized from a rule of law perspective, sets more demanding criteria for the (courts of) law than the protection of human rights. At the same time, it does not require non-interference or elaborate positive obligations from the state. For irregular migrants, who do not have the right to reside in the territory, but who are entirely under the control of state power, non-domination as conceptualized in this paper provides, in my view, a necessary framework of review that ensures a kind of protection that is currently lacking.

Claims by many experts on the connection between corruption and human rights, and especially the realization that corruption undermines the enjoyment of human rights, have led practitioners to advocate a human rights-based approach to corruption. However, it comes at a time where the global human rights movement is under assault, this contribution addresses the emerging localization discourse in human rights. Researchers and campaigners are adapting the international human rights system to local institutions and meanings in a process of “vernacularization”. This is by taking the needs of the community and the language that makes sense locally as the entry point of human rights advocacy. The question that arises is what role can the local understanding of human rights play? This contribution suggests answers to this question by using the African concept of ubuntu (humanness) to reinforce measures against corruption.

National authorities are often reluctant to arrange for a forensic medical examination or to grant important weight to forensic medical reports in asylum cases. They do not (fully) accept that a forensic medical report may change their initial assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s asylum account. They may argue that a physician cannot establish the context (date, location, perpetrator) in which the alleged ill-treatment has taken place or the cause of a specific scar or medical problem of the applicant. Moreover, they may contend that the physician concerned did not have the expertise to write a forensic medical report. This article examines how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Committee against Torture (CAT) have included forensic medical reports in their assessment of asylum cases and how they have dealt with the ‘context’, ‘causality’ and ‘expertise’ argument. It shows that these bodies do not accept that national authorities refrain from arranging a forensic medical examination or attach no or limited weight to a forensic medical report submitted by the applicant, just because the applicant has made inconsistent, incoherent or vague statements. They also do not accept general references to the ‘context’, ‘causality’ and ‘expertise’ argument. However, they have accepted these arguments in some individual cases, often without clear reasoning. The article concludes that the ECtHR and CAT could provide more guidance to national authorities concerning the role of forensic medical reports in asylum cases by explicitly weighing the seriousness of the credibility issues against the forensic medical report and by paying attention to the requirements for forensic medical reports laid down in the Istanbul Protocol.

Rituals are customarily muted into predictable and boring routines aimed to stabilise social orders and limit conflict. As a result, their magic lure recedes into the background, and the unexpected, disruptive and disordered elements are downplayed. Our collaborative contribution counters this move by foregrounding rituals of world politics as social practices with notable disordering effects. The collective discussion recovers the disruptive work of a range of rituals designed to sustain the sovereign exercise of violence and war. We do so through engaging a series of ‘world pictures' (Mitchell 2007). We show the worlding enacted in rituals such as colonial treaty-making, state commemoration, military/service dog training, cyber-security podcasts,algorithmically generated maps, the visit of Prince Harry to a joint NATO exercise and border ceremonies in India, respectively. We do so highlighting rituals’ immanent potential for disruption of existing orders, the fissures, failures and unforeseen repercussions. Reappraising the disordering role of ritual practices sheds light on the place of rituals in rearticulating the boundaries of the political. It emphasises the role of rituals in generating dissensus and re-divisions of the sensible rather than in imposing a consensus by policing the boundaries of the political, as Rancière might phrase it. Our images are essential to the account. They help disinterring the fundamentals and ambiguities of the current worldings of security, capturing the affective atmosphere of rituals.

This article considers how empirical legal studies (ELS) and doctrinal legal research (DLR) interact. Rather than seeing them as competitors that are methodologically independent and static, it suggests that they are interdependent activities, which may each be changed by interaction with theother, and that this change brings both opportunities and threats. For ELS, the article argues that DLR should properly be understood as part of its theoretical framework, yet in practice little attention is given to doctrine in empirical work.Paying more attention to DLR and legal frames generally would help ELS meet the common criticism that it is undertheorised and excessively policy oriented. On the other hand, an embrace of legal thinking, particularly of critical legal thinking, might lead to loss of status for ELS in policy circles and mainstream social science. For DLR, ELS offers a chance for it to escape the threat of insular sterility and irrelevance and to participate in a founded commentary on the world. The risk, however, is that in tailoring legal analysis to what can be empirically researched legal scholars become less analytically ambitious and more safe, and their traditionally important role as a source of socially relevant critique is weakened. Inevitably, in offering different ways of moving to normative conclusions about the law, ELS and DLR pose challenges to each other, and meeting those challenges will require sometimes uncomfortable self-reflection.

Millions of human biological samples are stored worldwide for medical research or treatment purposes. These biospecimens are of enormous potential value to law enforcement as DNA profiles can be obtained from these samples. However, forensic use of such biospecimens raises a number of ethical questions. This article aims to explore ethical issues of using human bodily material in medical biobanks for crime investigation and prosecution purposes. Concerns about confidentiality, trust, autonomy and justice will be discussed. We explore how to balance these concerns against the importance of crime solving. Relevant case examples of forensic use of medical biobanks show that requests by law enforcement to access biobanks are handled in disparate ways. We identify some core ethical issues and conclude that further research on these issues is needed to provide ethical guidance.

In most legal orders, human germline modification is either prohibited or severely restricted. A recurring thought in these legal frameworks is that heritable genome editing would result in practices that are at odds with principles of human rights, such as dignity, justice, and equality. However, now that CRISPR is bringing heritable genome editing within human reach, the question has risen as to whether these human rights bans still make sense. The call is growing louder to lift the ban on heritable genome editing for therapeutic purposes as soon as the technology is safe for introduction in the clinic. This article critically examines these recent proposals from a human rights perspective. First, it examines the question as to how realistic the proposed distinction between the therapeutic and the nontherapeutic uses of human germline modification is in the CRISPR era. Second, it argues that these proposals rely on a one-dimensional understanding of the meaning of human rights for this issue. Finally, it suggests that this one-dimensional understanding paves the way for a regime of self-regulation by the scientific community that leaves little room for public debate on the question as to whether or how human germline modification fits in the long-term aspirations of society.

This article assesses the role that institutional concern for the possibility of interracial marriages played in the Italian Fascist party's internal debate regarding the legal status of Libyans in the second half of the 1930s. Following the end of the 'pacification' of the Libyan resistance in 1932, Governor Italo Balbo pushed for the region's demographic colonization and the legal inclusion of the colonial territory and its population within the metropole. In contrast, Fascist Party officials in Rome endorsed starker racial segregation in the colonies based on the racist ideology that permeated the regime after the declaration of the empire in 1936. The legal inclusion of Libyans within the metropolitan body politic touched upon the regime's most sensitive theme: the need to avoid any promiscuity that could interfere with the racial consciousness of Fascist Italy. This article analyses this dispute through the lens of interracial marriage and concubinage regulations, framing it into the definition of a normative standard of Italian whiteness through the racialization of the colonial Other.

These things also require their material forms, their easily recognizable visible symbols, their homes. . . . [With the Peace Palace,] international justice between nations has moved into a splendid home. The proud building is standing now, visible, and tangible: Temple, symbol and workplace. At least the spirit of peace is no longer homeless.1.

Free movement is intended to bring Europeans together. This article suggests it may have the opposite effect: it may drive them apart. The mechanism involved is sorting. This happens when people are free to choose where to live, and choose a community which matches their preferences. This match can come about in different ways, but the result of them all is that people of particular preferences are clustered together, leading to society being structured as a series of adjacent mono-cultures. It is not a large step to suggest that this arrangement is likely to cause alienation between the communities. The fact of sorting means that they have less in common than they did before. For Europe, if sorting happens, this would imply that polarization between states would increase and the governability of the EU would be threatened. Free movement may be less a mechanism of integration than one of disintegration.

Ongoing discussions about autonomous weapons typically share concerns of losing control and the potentially destabilizing consequences for global security. To the extent that there is any consensus among states, academics, NGOs and other commentators involved in diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, it is grounded in the idea that all weapons should be subject to meaningful human control. This intuitively appealing concept immediately gained traction, although at a familiar legal-political cost: nobody knows what the concept actually means in practice. Although global discourses on policy and governance are typically infused with ambiguity, abstract concepts are of little use if they ignore the operational context that confronts the military in their application. This article places this intuitively appealing concept in context, and thus examines it in operational practice. Paying attention to this military practice is important as it demonstrates that meaningful human control is not the only, or the best, approach through which to characterize the human role and govern the challenges raised by autonomous weapons.

In 2017, the Dutch alternative dispute resolution (ADR) initiative e-Court handled 20,000 debt collection claims via an online arbitration procedure, and this number was expected to double in 2018. In September of that same year, the Chairman for the Council of the Judiciary, Frits Bakker, argued on the Day for the Judiciary that in the future most lawsuits can be handled automatically and that a robot judge could work fast, efficiently and cheaply. However, in January 2018, Frits Bakker seemed to have changed his mind and criticized e-Court for its lack of impartiality, lack of transparency, unlawfully denying people the right to a state Court, and for being a ‘robot judge’. Ultimately, all criticism boiled down to one issue: that the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not sufficiently protected in e-Court’s procedure. This accusation led to a huge media outcry, and as a result Courts were no longer willing to grant an exequatur to e-Court’s arbitral awards until the Supreme Court had given its approval. This forced e-Court to temporarily halt its services. Questions such as ‘is arbitration desirable in the case of bulk debt collection procedures?’ and ‘are arbitration agreements in standard terms of consumer contracts desirable?’ are relevant and important, but inherently political. In this article, we argue that the conclusion of the judiciary and media that e-Court’s procedure is in breach of the right to a fair trial is not substantiated by convincing legal arguments. Our aim is not to evaluate whether online arbitration is the best solution to the debt collection claim congestion of Courts in the Netherlands, but instead to assess e-Court’s procedure in the light of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The conclusion is that e-Court’s procedure sufficiently guarantees the right to a fair trial and thus that the criticism expressed was of a political rather than legal nature.

This paper aims to contribute to The History of the Family by researching the historical relationship between family and state, and the roles that the concepts of 'race' and 'mixture' played. To this end, it analyzes the regulation of Chinese–Dutch marriages in the interwar period and Second World War in the Netherlands. It argues that the ways in which these interracial marriages were regulated were informed by colonial discourses on the Chinese as racialized others. This resulted in a systematic pattern of exclusion of Chinese migrants in the Netherlands, in which they were registered, fingerprinted, counted and deported. Part of these discourses focused on Chinese 'interracial' marriages with Dutch white women. This resulted in the 'regulation of mixture' in which state officials aimed to prevent such marriages, through migration law, document requirements and premarital counseling. During the war, these marriages were considered a 'racial shame' and relationships were broken up by arresting Chinese husbands before marriage. More research is needed to learn more about the extent of these practices and to know whether they were applied to racialized groups other than Chinese.

The European Court of Human Rights increasingly deals with migrants’ complaints about destitution in their host state under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment). This case law has been criticized for not being consistent and/or for not providing migrants with enough protection. Based on a systematic case law search, in this article, I analyse Article 3 case law on migrants’ destitution from a new perspective: the concept of freedom as non-domination, as developed in (neo) republican theory. It will argue that, seen through this lens, many tendencies in the Court’s case law can be explained and constructed as consistent, and it is submitted that in this way the Court does provide migrants with important protection against unfreedom. Nevertheless, I also argue in the article that the case law could be improved in a number of ways in order to provide more effective and robust protection against domination.

Currently, the Council of the European Union is negotiating the European Commission’s recent proposal on cross-border mobility. This paper provides an overall assessment based on the proposal’s central pillars: freedom of establishment and protection of the interests of creditors, shareholders, and employees. The proposed directive meets a real necessity for regulation on a European level and pursues an ambitious agenda. While the general approach is excellent, there is room for improvement on some issues of importance.

As the Indian economy is slowly opening up after the COVID-19 lockdown, it seems like a number of states are overriding even the most basic human rights of their workers in the name of labour reforms.These moves have been criticised in a number of national and international spheres, as along with the Constitution of India, they are inconsistent with various international instruments. Under these circumstances, this article provides a comprehensive view of the changes that have been made and why they are inhumane and derogatory towards the worker communities, and suggests possible ways forward to remedy the atrocious situation. © Policy Press 2021

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol generated about 4.3 billion Assigned Amount Units (aaus) and about 180 million Certified Emission Reductions (cers) for carry-over by Annex i states and potential use as ‘overachievements’ or offsets to discount emissions under ndcs. The second commitment period may generate additional carry-over units, and there is an estimated ‘dormant’ amount of about 4.6 billion cers that could be issued from ongoing cdm projects. To rely on these units risks upsetting the process of trust-building necessary to increase ambition under the Paris Agreement. This article questions the legality of carry-overs but finds that a textual interpretation of the current legal framework under both treaties leaves the matter unresolved. With a more refined legal interpretation, based on the principles of environmental integrity and sound accounting under the Paris Agreement, the article re-evaluates aaus and cers under the Agreement, by relying on insights from a social theory of value and the critical studies literature on the political economy of carbon markets. The conclusion is that aaus cannot be used under the ndc accounting framework, as their formal value of 1 Mt CO2 eq. under the Kyoto Protocol is considerably diminished under the Agreement. As for cers, their value depends on different social realities related to their issuance. States or the cma should adopt transparent criteria to select the cers that are worth transitioning pursuant to the Article 6.4 mechanism. The same conceptual framework of value-attribution can also inform the design and operation of the Article 6 mechanisms and their units in order to attain higher environmental integrity and sound accounting for ndcs.

This article discusses the politics of the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM) – a contemporary social movement operating across a number of Arab and western countries. Unlike analysis on the Arab Uprisings which focused on the national dimension of youth activism, we explore how the PYM politics fosters and upholds an explicitly transnational anti-colonial and intersectional solidarity framework, which foregrounds a radical critique of conventional notions of self-determination based on state-framed human rights discourses and international law paradigms. The struggle becomes instead framed as an issue of justice, freedom and liberation from interlocking forms and hierarchies of oppression.\ud \ud KEYWORDS: Palestine, transnational social movements, intersectionality, human rights, anti-colonialism

National education policies often emerge from the global arena. These global policy norms hold the promise that reforms will produce similar education and development outcomes in different contexts. However, research on how and why global education reforms are practised ‘on the ground’ and with what effects is still scant. In this paper, we investigate how two global education agendas, namely Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Competency-Based Education (CBE), are enacted and re-contextualised in Uganda and Mexico. By drawing on data obtained from extensive field research in both countries, we explore how these global policies were translated into practice within their situated, professional, material and external contexts. Our research shows that in both cases the enactment of global policies differed widely from universal agendas. We, therefore, argue that global education norms in education can also reproduce existing inequalities or even lead to new forms of inequalities at the local level.

When Member States restrict free movement on public health grounds they must show that their measures have a sound scientific basis. However, during the pandemic Member States have imposed a wide variety of restrictions, at the border, and internally. While Member State governments have invariably had local scientific advice, the variety of their measures suggests that their actions have also been driven, to some extent, by public opinion, contrary to what EU law generally allows. This situation could be seen as a defeat for EU law as traditionally conceived, and the triumph of local preferences over scientific standards. Perhaps we learn that in a crisis, local desires for symbolic security and closure trump both law and science. Alternatively, it can be argued that the Court of Justice's emphasis on exclusively objective justifications for measures is unrealistic and over-strict. The pandemic responses show that (i) science is often neither clear nor determinative, and (ii) policy is invariably a mix of science and values, even in apparently technical fields. In either case, the absence of legal challenges to Member State actions leaves free movement in an uncertain state. Have we entered a new phase, where national fears are a more legitimate justification for restricting movement, or will the pandemic be treated as so exceptional as to be beyond law, and thus not a precedent?

Even though the Netherlands was one of the founding fathers of the CoE, the impact of CoE conventions and soft law on Dutch administrative law and the development of the principles of good administration is rather patchy and uneven. This ‘Dutch paradox’ can be explained by the much more significant and direct impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on both substantive and procedural national administrative law. At least partly, this impact can be explained by the existence of a coherent body of ECtHR case law that is relevant to almost all areas of administrative law and that can be readily and easily applied on the national level. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that it might be useful for Dutch authorities to keep an eye on other CoE instruments that may be relevant for the development of general administrative law, especially because the ECHR provides for minimum protection only.

In the concluding chapter, Bart van Klink and Ingeborg van der Geest integrate the insights obtained by the different chapters from the perspective of possible responses to populism. Analysing these insights from the perspective of logos, ethos and pathos, they discuss how the various contributions to this volume offer potential clues for responding to populist discourse. Specifically, the question will be raised how - both on the level of form and content - citizens could or should respond to the challenges populism poses to current notions of reasonable debate and liberal democracy.

In this chapter, the editors Henrike Jansen, Bart van Klink and Ingeborg van der Geest provide an overview of conceptions of populism, explanations of this phenomenon and various types of research that have been conducted in order to come to gripes with it.

The evidentiary value of forensic medical reports in asylum procedures is highly contested, mainly for two reasons. First, a physician usually cannot establish when, where, why and by whom the applicant has been ill-treated. Moreover, a physician can almost never establish with complete certainty which treatment caused a scar or physical or psychological problem. Nevertheless, both the ECtHR and the Committee against Torture (CAT) have recognised the importance of forensic medical reports as evidence in asylum cases in their judgments and decisions. However, they rarely explicitly address fundamental questions relating to the duty to arrange for a medical examination and the evidentiary value of forensic medical reports. This article examines where the Court of Justice of the European Union may step in to provide more guidance regarding these issues to the Member States of the European Union, by interpreting Article 18 of the recast Procedures Directive.

Condominium is a special and relatively new type of property right emerged in the last century to be a remedy for the management problems in multi-unit buildings. There are many types of condominium regimes, as described in EUI (2005), UNECE (2005) and van der Merwe (2016). The common elements include: (a) Individual right to an apartment, (b) co-ownership (joint ownership) of the common property or the whole property, and (c) membership of an incorporated or unincorporated owners' association (van der Merwe, 2015, p. 5). The ownership shares in the common property are here referred to as co-ownership shares; yet, alternative terms include ownership fraction, condominium share, participation quota, share value, and unit entitlement. Generally, these shares will determine the proportional contribution to the common expenses and the share of common profits, as well as the voting power of each condominium unit owner in the administration of the condominium. The most common approaches to the determination of the co-ownership shares are based on equality, relative size or relative value of each condominium unit, or a combination of such (van der Merwe, 1994, p. 57–58). The literature presents detailed descriptions and comparative analysis related to condominium systems in different jurisdictions (e.g. van der Merwe, 2015; 2016; Paulsson, 2007; EUI, 2005; UNECE, 2005); however, the procedural aspects related to the allotment of co-ownership shares still need to be further investigated. This article aims to describe condominium systems in the Netherlands, Sweden and Turkey, and compare legal provisions and procedures related to the allotment of co-ownership shares in these jurisdictions. The main purpose is to clarify the methodologies behind the determination of the co-ownership shares in national systems to bring new insights to countries, which are trying to revise their national provisions.

While European politicians and policy makers have attempted to limit migration in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, international air traffic on European airports has almost doubled between 2002 and 2017. This contribution argues that, despite this significant increase of international mobility, clear borders separate the mobile from the immobile. Among the most significant instruments to limit access to the international air traffic market is the pre-boarding check, executed by (private) airline companies, which have effectively become an extension of state sovereignty. Moreover, visa criteria play a vital role in providing access to international air traffic. In practice, the ‘liberalization’ of air traffic tends to separate the mobile from the immobile on wealth-based and racial criteria, defended in reference to a theoretically free (but in practice strongly regulated) market. Image: Eric Fischl: A Visit To / A Visit From / Te Island (1983). © 2020. Digital image Whitney Museum of American Art / Licensed by Scala

Summary The Seventeen Statutes is one of the oldest classical texts of Old Frisian Law. In its late fifteenth century edition, as part of the Frisian Land Law, it was provided with Latin glosses. Analysis of these glosses, which were scarcely investigated until now, enables us to pronounce with more certainty upon the date of both the Frisian Land Law, as a compilation, and its Gloss. Moreover, the glosses to the Seventeen Statutes reflect a considerable increase of ecclesiastical competence, point to certain principles of Romano-canonical procedure and use Roman law texts when applying provisions of indigenous law. This all may indicate a stronger presence of learned law in late medieval Friesland than previously assumed.

This article outlines two points of criticism related to Christopher Marshall’s discussion of a relational justice of care. First, addressing the needs of the parties involved in a criminal justice case finds its appropriate place in the post-trial stage. In the pre-trial and trial stages, protecting the legal rights and equal treatment of suspects should take priority over caring for suspects. Secondly, if the outcome of the restorative encounter in the pre-trial stages has a bearing on the verdict of the judge, the encounter may risk to lose its authenticity. The offender may have reason to believe that a socially appropriate performance will be rewarded with less punishment.

In April 2019, an unusual group of artists and international legal academics gathered on an elegant square in The Hague to visit the former American Embassy. This brutalist icon, designed in the 1950s by Marcel Breuer, was recently abandoned by its original inhabitants. The ongoing transition of the building from highly secured embassy to public cultural centre makes for a moment to reflect on the meanings this space inspires. In this special section, we posit the building as a prism through which we probe the connections between art, architecture and international law. In line with the tradition of (re)invention embodied by Breuer’s design, the section breathes experimentation. The contributions are eclectic, unconventional and rough round the edges. The section is structured as a route through the building with no particular order or hierarchy. The ‘façade’ functions as a somewhat natural starting point, thereafter, the reader is invited to choose her own route. All spaces that can be visited are actual spaces in the building and echo the source of inspiration of the contributor. We invite you to join us on our journey and to explore the special issue as you would explore and make sense of an abandoned building where traces of international law abound.

This article discusses the concept of misrecognition to analyse international legal ordering in the practice of colonial treatymaking. As critical interventions to the debate on recognition have made clear, recognition is about exclusion as much as it is about inclusion. The most obvious example is the nineteenth-century applications of the standard of civilisation, where the European Family of Nations introduced the criterion of ‘civilisation’, which excluded non-European entities as sovereigns and legitimised their colonisation. But at the same time colonial treaties included the ‘savage rulers’ as signatory powers, and thus legal persons within the international legal order that at once excluded them. This contribution to the Special Issue discusses these treatymaking practices as a practice of misrecognition; not because it misrecognises some natural, essential, or true identity of the indigenous entities, but as a misrecognition of the international order’s own conditions of possibility through practices that simultaneously constitute that order and undermine its constitutive conditions. A rereading of Hegel’s famous master–slave metaphor through the concept of misrecognition sheds light on the reversals and contradictions of the colonial legal enterprise and reveals the aporia of the contemporary international legal order by showing the void at its heart.

The consequences of a prolonged non-accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights following Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the European Union may very well affect the longer-term effectiveness and viability of the Convention system. This contribution gives a succinct analysis of the institutional link between the Convention system and the EU legal order, and of the more recent interaction between the two systems, arguing that both were on what seemed to be a collision course until recently. The author stresses the continued need for an institutionalised arrangement between both regional courts working in the same geographic area interpreting similar human rights standards.

Since the end of the Cold War, migration law and policy of the global North has been characterised by externalisation, privatisation and securitisation. These developments have been conceptualised as denying access to migrants and as politics of non-entrée. This article proposes to broaden the analysis, and to analyse unwanted migration as merely one form of international human mobility by relying on the concept of the global mobility infrastructure. The global mobility infrastructure consists of the physical structures, services and laws that enable some people to move across the globe with high speed, low risk, and at low cost. People who have no access to it travel slowly, with high risk and at high cost. Within the global mobility infrastructure, travellers benefit from advanced forms of international law. For the excluded, international law reflects and embodies their exclusion before, during and after their travel to the global North. Exclusion is based on nationality, race, class and gender. The notion of the global mobility infrastructure allows for questioning the way in which international law reproduces these forms of stratification.

Recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) marks a striking shift towards a more restrictive interpretation of EU citizens’ rights. The Court’s turnaround is not only highly relevant for practical debates about ‘Social Europe’ or ‘welfare migration’, but also enlightening from a more general, theoretical viewpoint. Several recent studies on the ECJ have argued that the Court is largely constrained by member state governments’ threats of legislative override and non-compliance. We show that an additional mechanism is necessary to explain the Court’s turnaround on citizenship. While the ECJ extended EU citizens’ rights even against strong opposition by member state governments, its recent shift reflects changes in the broader political context, i.e. the politicisation of free movement in the European Union (EU). The article theorizes Court responsiveness to politicisation and demonstrates empirically, how the Court’s jurisprudence corresponds with changing public debates about EU citizenship. Recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) marks a striking shift towards a more restrictive interpretation of EU citizens’ rights. The Court's turnaround is not only highly relevant for practical debates about ‘Social Europe’ or ‘welfare migration’, but also enlightening from a more general, theoretical viewpoint. Several recent studies on the ECJ have argued that the Court is largely constrained by member state governments’ threats of legislative override and non-compliance. We show that an additional mechanism is necessary to explain the Court's turnaround on citizenship. While the ECJ extended EU citizens’ rights even against strong opposition by member state governments, its recent shift reflects changes in the broader political context, i.e., the politicization of free movement in the European Union (EU). The article theorises Court responsiveness to politicization and demonstrates empirically, how the Court's jurisprudence corresponds with changing public debates about EU citizenship.

As the use of the Internet and online platforms grows, the scale of collecting and processing personal data and turnovers have increased correspondingly.1At the same time, public awareness about the Internet turning into a genuine profiling and advertisement machine, as well as a powerful surveillance instrument, grows. More people today are concerned about the ways in which public and private actors store and use private information. Many individuals note that they lose sight of the consequences once they give consent to the collection of their sometimes most intimate personal data. The Snowden revelations and the recent Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal have only reinforced this public awareness.Objections against these data processing practices cannot be explained as breaches of data protection or privacy regulation alone. In this Article, it is argued that recently passed regulations fail to solve the unease of data subjects as other, more fundamental values are at stake here. A different or complementary ethical and legal framework is needed to interpret this generally felt unease vis-à-vis current data practices and secondly to confront future developments on the data market. The concept of human dignity may be a helpful perspective in this respect. In the context of data processing, human dignity is generally interpreted in a quite specific manner, such as contributing to the empowerment and self-determination of autonomous individuals. It can be argued, however, that human dignity—in the context of the commodification and commoditization of online personal data—should be seen in a different, quite opposite, light. In sum, future regulation of privacy and data protection attention should shift towards more constraining dimensions of human dignity.

The individualisation of punishment is a key element in liberal narratives about international law and international relations. This narrative has become an integral part of positive international law, especially the regimes governing the use of force and the prosecution of an international crimes. Rather than punishing states or entire societies, liberals claim, punishment has become restricted to those who incurred individual guilt. To liberals, the individualisation of punishment is part of a larger process of enlightenment and civilisation that has helped to fence atavisms like revenge. We do not question the emergence of an ever more sophisticated system of individual punishment in international law. However, we argue that punitivity has been more difficult to fully channel towards individuals and away from collectives than claimed. To be sure, punitive language has by and large been banned from the laws of armed conflict. We argue, however, that the absence of a punitive vocabulary does not equal the absence of punitivity. In contrast, current state practices of using armed force are still imbued with punitivity, however silenced in the current legal framework and thus pushed underground. Realising the presence of a punitive undercurrent, we argue, adds to a more comprehensive understanding of contemporary state practices.