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Comparative analysts argue that democracies spend less on military policies than authoritarian states, a claim that was applied to Brazilian electoral democracy by Hunter (1997). In fact, Brazil behaves as an outlier and military spending has continued to increase since 1995. Our explanation for this behavior relies on the idea of internal political governability risks faced by Brazilian presidents.They are continually threatened by leftist groups that have fragile commitments to liberal democracies and they rely on the military to strategically protect them.

The literature on democratic consolidation has devoted considerable attention to civil-military relations at the elite level and such matters as the preservation of military coup attempts and the reduction of military autonomy. In general, however, there is insufficient attention in the literature to the issue of the demo cratic control of everyday forms of state coercion. By "everyday forms of state coercion" I mean routine policing, intelligence work, and military operations that do not involve the seizure of the executive or the shutting down of other branches of government. Over time, changes in practice in these realms have the potential for the "hollowing out" of the democratic regimes from within, through the gradual expansion of the budgets, functions, and autonomy of the coercive institutions that engage in them.

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

This article aims to demonstrate how the Brazilian Superior Military Court of today (just as under the former military regime) continues to primarily defend what it considers the most important assets under its tutelage: hierarchy, discipline, and military duty. The Court has hybrid characteristics, displaying traits both from the authoritarian regime as well as from Brazil's current fledgling democracy. It is no coincidence that the Court has maintained its structure, functioning, and recruitment criteria virtually unaltered. The article contends that this institutional hybridism can only be overcome when effective democratic civilian oversight of the military is achieved. Dans cet article, on cherche à montrer que, comme pendant les années du régime militaire, le Tribunal Militaire Supérieur continue à défendre, avant tout, les intérêts constitutionnels de l'Armée ayant rapport aux biens placés sous sa tutelle qui leur semblent importants: hiérarchie, discipline et devoir militaire. Le Tribunal Militaire Supérieur est un tribunal à caractères hybrides, présentant des traits issus non seulement du régime autoritaire mais aussi de la fragile démocratie brésilienne. Ce n'est pas un hasard si la Cour en a conservé pratiquement inchangés la structure, le fonctionnement et les critères de recrutement de ses membres. On suggère que le dépassement de cet hybridisme institutionnel n'aura lieu que si, effectivement, on réussit à établir un contrôle civil démocratique sur les militaires.