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An official misrepresentation of the law occurs when an official, acting as an agent of the state, represents what is legal or not in an erroneous or misleading way. Should reliance on such misrepresentations excuse one from criminal responsibility? American courts presently recognize two official misrepresentation defenses: Entrapment by Estoppel and Public Authority. However, there is disagreement about what constitutes these defenses and what their limits are. Part of the confusion surrounds why these defenses are justified at all, especially given the general principle ignorantia juris non excusat. We propose an answer to this justification question: these defenses are justified because official misrepresentations preclude knowledge of the illegality of the acts in question. It is not simply that someone on the receiving end did not know; they could not know. We develop this account, linking it to due process and fairness, and then use it to clarify Entrapment by Estoppel and Public Authority and argue both should be subject to important restrictions.

In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) 121 SA (CC) the Constitutional Court had to consider the difficult question whether an agreement to negotiate compensation at a later date for an employee who had invented something for his employer was enforceable, where in the absence of later agreement the issue would be referred to the Chief Executive Officer of the employer for final determination. Although the court answered this in the affirmative, the more pressing issue for present purposes was whether the representative of the employer who had negotiated the agreement with the employee had the necessary actual or apparent authority to conclude the agreement. In dealing with the matter of authority, the apex court took an unconventional approach to ‘ostensible’ or ‘apparent’ authority: Whereas the basis of such authority has traditionally been seen as the doctrine of estoppel, the court held that the expressions ‘apparent authority’ and ‘ostensible authority’ have no bearing on estoppel as such, but rather refer to a form of actual authority arising from a representation of authority by the principal in respect of the agent. This article examines the court’s approach in that regard and concludes that, although the decision attracts criticism from a conceptual viewpoint, there is merit in such an approach if it is adapted and defined purely in terms of the reliance theory.

“What remedy is available to creditors seeking to exercise diligence over corporeal moveable property in the possession of their debtors, but the ownership of which lies with another? The presumption of ownership from possession offers some relief to creditors faced with an action for vindication by the true owner of the goods. But the presumption can be overcome. However, reputed ownership seeks to permit creditors to proceed with diligence when the moveables have been fraudulently, carelessly or unnecessarily left in the possession of the relevant debtor. This article will explain that the true owner is personally barred from recovering the goods, as a result of such “fraudulent” or careless conduct. Lengthy academic discussion of the doctrine in Scotland is scarce. To analyse its legal basis, reference is made to South Africa and England, which recognise the reputed ownership context as part of the general law of estoppel. This article will also explain that despite its mostly historical significance, reputed ownership still survives in the current law, within the statutory framework of the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002.”

Traditional Covenant Law theory has characteristics emphasizing the importance of legal certainty and predictability. The main function of one of the contracts is to provide certainty about the binding of an agreement between the parties so that the principles of good faith in the civil law system and promissory estoppel in the common law legal system. which in this article the author will discuss PT ADEN's contractual agreement with PT Well Harvest Winning Refinery Alumina in the catering contract for employees of PT Well Harvest Winning Alumina Refinery which discusses whether the agreement made between the customer and the catering party has qualified the validity of the agreement and the issues contained in the valid agreement.Keywords: Treaty Law Theory, Civil Law, Agreement.

This article focuses on an Australian piece of legislation and interesting case law, as well as how the Federal Court of Australia has applied Australia’s Corporations Act 2001, to characterise a person as a de facto director – that is, as a professed director whose appointment as such was defective. In this regard, the decisions of that Court will, as envisaged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, constitute persuasive authority. The Australian decision to be discussed in this article is significant in that the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not contain substantively similar provisions to those of Australia’s Corporations Act 2001. For example, section 66(7) of the Companies Act 2008, contains the phrase “entitled to serve” as a director. This article explains the legal implications relevant to that expression, including whether it imposes a statutory condition precedent. This article also considers the validity of decisions taken by a person who is not “entitled to serve” as a director.

This article argues that, as tutors, we are bound not only by the rules of contract law (i.e. to avoid breaching the terms of that which was agreed to) but also by our duty of care, and the principles of human rights law that protect the right to education. We must strive to avoid negligent acts and any potentially harmful practices or policies. Looking to recent litigation, we are bound also to provide useful, meaningful guidance on how learners might best achieve - and subsequently evidence - high levels of intellectual attainment and wider ‘learning gains.’ The concepts of fairness and equitable treatment are key, especially where Universities have agreed to widen access, and improve opportunities. With the protection of vulnerable learners increasingly leaning towards the provisions - and promises - of human rights law, a sort of estoppel-led ‘trusteeship’ (over shared knowledge and learning processes) can perhaps also be inferred.

The paper is devoted to the study of the legal construction of the prohibition of conflicting behavior. The author conducted a comparative study of the legal structures of venire contra factum proprium and estoppel. It is concluded that the indicated legal phenomena differ by their legal nature, although they have a common goal — to protect the rights and interests of the weak party. The paper indicates that the prohibition of conflicting behavior should consider a rule aimed at protecting a bona fide party by refusing to satisfy claims (material aspect) and (or) refusing to satisfy a procedural motion (procedural aspect) if the actions of the party that filed the claim, are aimed at refuting their own pre-trial behavior (material aspect) and (or) behavior in the framework of the trial (procedural aspect). The author highlights elements of the venire contra factum proprium rule, which form the subject of proof when referring to this doctrine, in particular: 1) the contradiction of secondary behavior to the original behavior; 2) the presence of dishonesty in the actions or intentions of a person acting in contradiction; 3) causing or intention to cause damage to the opposite side.

Inadmissibility of controversial conduct (venire contra factum proprium) is a continental functional analog of common law estoppel. It is a special “pitfall” under the rubric for the application of the bona fide requirement when inadmissibility of conduct is derived from its controversial character in regard to previous conduct. The article exposes a lack of necessity in the prohibition under the regimes of early private law codifications of the Modern Age (France, Austria) which is why one may observe its prevalence primarily in Germany after the enactment of German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code). The author thinks of its prevalence as a result of a drastic change in understanding the legal relationship induced by the restoration of corporate thinking in a renewed form as opposed to individualistic thinking associated with Roman law and the first draft of Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. For the courts, the inadmissibility of controversial conduct became a convenient means to justify the restatement of rules formally binding for parties in cases where, as a result of the application of formal rules, the connection between the conduct of a party to a legal relationship and its negative outcome, which under said formal rules, totally fall into the other party’s burden. Due to this, the concept of a legal relationship, previously built as mere correlation of a subjective right to liability, is complicated by an element of burden — some of which would be imposed on the entitled party. This revealed the formal side of inadmissibility of controversial conduct, which made it possible to correct what shall be treated in terms of new thinking as a gap of regulation formed by individualistic thinking. In material terms, the inadmissibility of controversial conduct is limited in literature to cases when the previous conduct of a certain person has caused legitimate expectations from the counterparty and the current conduct contradicts these expectations. The author refutes this reduction since from the outset, the founding idea of the rule was to preserve the interrelation between conduct and adverse consequences lost in the formal application of the law. The contradiction of conduct, hence, shall be seen in using a formal legal position to prevent the adverse outcome of one’s own conduct. However, development of this court practice revealed another function of the rule, much more important in the author’s opinion, namely, the acceleration of civil communication governed by private law.

The doctrine of legitimate expectations (hereinafter LE) is one of the key features of judicial review both in common law and continental traditions. Paul Craig has summarized three ways in which L...

In recent years, the investment-arbitration and anti-corruption regimes have been in tension. Investment tribunals have jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes between investors and host states under international treaties that provide substantive protections for private investments. But these tribunals will typically decline to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute if the host state asserts that corruption tainted the investment. When tribunals close their doors to ag-grieved investors, tribunals increase the risks for investors and thus raise the cost of international investment. At the same time, the decision to decline jurisdiction creates a perverse incentive for host states to turn a blind eye to corruption. Together, these distorted incentives hinder developmental goals and undermine the fight against corruption. To correct these problems, this Note proposes a framework to guide arbitral tribunals when faced with a corruption-tainted dispute. Specifically, this Note argues that when both parties participate in corruption, arbitral tribunals should invoke equitable estoppel to accept jurisdiction over the dispute. When considering the corruption claims, investment tribunals should use a contributory-fault approach that evaluates each party’s role in the corrupt act to determine the final award. This framework not only helps align the investment-arbitration and anticorruption regimes but also advances developmental objectives.

The "estoppel" concept and the issues of applying the "estoppel" rule in international law and Russian civil law are considered in this paper. Procedural legislation novels stipulated in the Concept of the Unified Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, approved by the Committee on Civil, Criminal, Arbitration and Procedural Legislation of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on December 8, 2014, are noted here. The authors propose amendments to the civil procedural legislation, which will allow to apply the "estoppel" rule in civil proceedings. Particularly the authors propose to supplement Article 12 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation with part 3, including in it the obligation of the party to act in good faith in the exercise and protection of their rights and obligations. The authors indicate what exactly should be understood as unfair behaviour in this context.

Russian Abstract: В статье рассматривается проблема ограничения права сторон на обжалование судебного решения в результате применения института истопл (estoppel). Сложилась практика, когда неприменение апелляционным судом «принципа» estoppel приводит к отмене судебных актов в кассационной инстанции. В этой связи предлагается проанализировать доктринальное обоснование, содержание и цель применения разных видов истопл в сравнительно-правовой перспективе. Раскрывается содержание постановления Президиума ВАС РФ от 22.03.2011 No 13903/10 как судебного акта, которым суд обосновал применение расширенной доктрины estoppel per rem judicatem (res judicata), а не частноправового истопл. По итогам обосновывается ошибочность представлений о том, что истпол должен служить цели формирования последовательного процессуального поведения сторон, а также оправданность применения формального вида истопл в отношении предъявления множественных исков, основанных на одном материальном правоотношении. English Abstract: The denial of the citizen’s right of access to the court guaranteed by the law, through unprincipled judicial discretion, is justifiably seen as a true vice of a judicial system. The current position of the Russian Supreme Court as to the existence of a broad principle of estoppel and coherence in litigants’ acts as its underlying ratio raises a few doubts. Moreover, the court uses the broad concept of estoppel, undefined in the civil procedure law, to reverse the decisions of lower courts. Thus, the rights of litigants are fully dependent on the judicial discretion as to the existence of estoppel in any particular case. This discretion is wholly unpredictable for there is neither legislation nor judicial dictum of the Russian Supreme Court on the elements needed to establish and prove an estoppel claim. Meanwhile, those are of paramount importance in the estoppel authentic legal systems. What is more important is that the fallacious understanding of the true kind of the estoppel employed by the Russian Supreme Commercial Court in 2011 has made it possible to plead and use estoppel as a source of limiting procedural rights of litigants, which contradicts the original idea of estoppel as an instrument establishing either representations or promises. Thus, the aim of the article is to reveal those discrepancies in the current use of the estoppel instrument which result in denying the litigant’s right to justice.

This Article considers whether federal student loan borrowers can bring successful legal challenges if Congress retroactively repeals the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (“PSLF”) program. It addresses whether borrowers at litigation could rely on analogies to the promissory estoppel doctrine or assert equitable estoppel claims to challenge the repeal. In doing so, the Article explores the intersection of estoppel and government contract law with sovereign immunity theories in a way that has never been done before. This topic has been given very little attention in prior literature, so I aim to present its legal issues in a clear way while paying tribute to its nuance. The Article addresses the hurdles of sovereign immunity and the Sovereign Acts Doctrine, which the borrowers would encounter at litigation. It concludes that, despite likely overcoming these hurdles, in many cases, the plaintiff-borrowers’ government contract law claims would likely still fail to win on their merits. The Article similarly contends that most if not all equitable estoppel claims would likely fail before a court. The Article then offers an alternative proposal to Congress, which would avoid the issues that would arise at litigation, while solving the problems associated with the program and protecting the most vulnerable members of society negatively impacted by a repeal.

On 11 September 2020, the DG Agriculture at the European Commission published contents of a unilateral Application No. PGI/IN/02425 for the registration of the term “Basmati” as a Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) in relation to aromatic rice products. The aforesaid application has been filed by India, through its Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA). Pakistan (as a stakeholder country itself), along with its Rice Exporters Association have lodged their oppositions against the aforesaid application before the DG Agriculture of the European Commission. In its Application No. PGI/IN/02425, India/APEDA chose to move ahead unilaterally to apply for the PGI of Basmati, and failed to mention the geographical areas of Pakistan that should also be covered in the same since Basmati is a trans-border PGI. It is the humble view of the authors that India’s/APEDA’s Application No. PGI/IN/02425 is hit by the principle of estoppel; is in breach of European Commission’s ‘Guide to applicants: How to compile the single document’; and is in breach of Articles 5(2)(a), 5(2)(b), and 7(1)(a) of Regulation No. 1151/2012. For convenient reading, the body of this article has been arranged into six parts. The first part serves as an introduction. The second part highlights past instances where the European Commission has recognized trans-border PGIs that originate from two countries. The third part identifies the legal issues that can arise in a dispute for trans-border geographical indication. The fourth part focuses on historical origin and reputation of Basmati as a trans-border PGI under Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No. 1151/2012. The fifth part provides an overview as to the link with the geographical area for Basmati as a trans-border PGI under Article 5(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No. 1151/2012. The sixth part serves as the conclusion to this article.

Who is bound by a forum selection clause? At first glance, the answer to this question may seem obvious. It is black-letter law that a person cannot be bound to an agreement without her consent. In recent years, however, courts have not followed this rule with respect to forum selection clauses. Instead, they routinely enforce these clauses against individuals who never signed the contract containing the clause. Courts justify this practice on the grounds that it promotes litigation efficiency by bringing all of the litigants together in the chosen forum. There are, however, problems with enforcing forum selection clauses against non-signatories. First, there is the unfairness of binding a litigant to a contract without her consent. Second, there is the danger that relying on a forum selection clause to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory may be inconsistent with due process. This Article critiques the rules that determine whether a non-signatory is bound by a forum selection clause. It first documents the emergence of a new doctrine — the closely-related-and-foreseeable test — that the courts have created to facilitate this practice. It then argues that the test serves as a portal to a parallel due process universe in which casual contacts and breezy assertions of foreseeability can connect a defendant to a forum selection clause in a way that would be, at best, highly scrutinized were they construed as potential minimum contacts with the forum. In a world of ever-tightening personal jurisdiction standards, courts have created a bubble of nearly unlimited jurisdiction for parties in close proximity to forum selection clauses. To address this problem, the Article proposes reforms that would provide more robust protections to non-signatory defendants and, as importantly, impose a degree of order on an increasingly fractured due process landscape.

Good faith is described as 'the foundation of all law, or a fundamental principle of law'. O'Connor suggests that good faith derived from 'the necessity for a minimum of human cooperation and tolerance if group living is to emerge and survive'. Although good faith has origins in the earliest human societies, O'Connor suggests that the Roman concept of bonafides (associated with trustworthiness, conscientiousness and honourable conduct) represents its most direct ancestor. By about 1450 it was applied in both civil and common law systems, and was 'reflected in specific rules incorporating or referring to good conscience, fairness, equitable dealing and reasonableness'.4 As early as 1659, good faith was mentioned in Treaty between France and Spain, signed to end the Franco-Spanish War that had begun in 1635. Before that, in 1625, Grotius had referred to the Aristotelian parameter that if good faith has been taken away, “all intercourse among men ceases to exist”. Grotius also referred to Cicero‟s famous observation according to which “in good faith what you meant, not what you said, is to be considered”. The civil law regimes tend to require that contracts be formed and performed in good faith. If parties act in bad faith, this leads to mistrust, making contracting more complex and expensive. A rule of good faith increases contracting parties' confidence that contractual obligations will be performed. The principle of good faith is less established and less uniform in common law systems. At one extreme is the United Kingdom, which has no general doctrine of good faith. However, equity developed many doctrines to promote specific notions of good faith, including the concepts of undue influence and promissory estoppel. Good faith is also recognised in relation to particular classes of contracts, for example, contracts of insurance. At the other extreme is the United States, “where every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement”.

The common law doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, prevents parties from re-litigating an issue in subsequent lawsuits if a prior judgment already conclusively decided the issue. Issue preclusion traditionally required strict mutuality of parties; the first and second lawsuits had to involve the exact same litigants. Although the majority of jurisdictions now allow nonmutual issue preclusion, Georgia continues to require "identity of parties." Despite recently reaffirming this requirement, the Georgia Supreme Court has not thoroughly analyzed the merits of the rule. This paper examines the history and evolution of issue preclusion and the mutuality element, distinguishes offensive and defensive assertions of issue preclusion, reviews the current application of nonmutual preclusion in federal courts, compares Georgia mutuality law to the case law of other states, considers the policy arguments favoring and disfavoring strict mutuality, and explores why the Georgia Supreme Court has not addressed the nationwide trend towards allowing nonmutual issue preclusion. The paper argues for changing Georgia law to allow nonmutual defense issue preclusion in civil litigation and advises practitioners on practical avenues for achieving that goal.

Doctrinally, both consent and estoppel seem to lack a conceptual core. If consent is the exercise of a normative power predicated on our autonomy interests, then sometimes what we call “consent” is not really consent. And if estoppel is about barring/stopping/hindering one’s ability to make a claim, but not about changing the underlying rights and duties themselves, then sometimes what courts deem to be estoppel is not really estoppel. Instead, consent has alternative normative groundings, and estoppel seems to be employed as the term by which courts can simply reach what they deem to be the fair or equitable result. This paper aims to make sense of these categories, venturing into both consent and estoppel, but focusing more on the far more undertheorized estoppel. As it surveys these doctrines at work in criminal law, tort law, property, and IP, it points to the sorts of changes in normative relations that appear to be at work and what might ground them. Ultimately, some of our practices make far more sense than others, although our nomenclature makes little sense at all. Apparent consent is not consent at all. And estoppel masks distinctions between “forfeiture by insincere act” (a forced shift in rights and duties), other cases that should be deemed exercises of normative powers, other instances that should be seen as tort-like for creating liabilities, and thinner losses of the ability to complain/assert one’s rights. Even this final forfeiture of mere assertability proves questionable because when it does not camouflage a more significant estoppel, it ultimately produces a result that may be disproportionate to A’s behavior and B’s reliance. Ultimately, I hope to show that our concepts are conflating radically different sorts of relations and that these labels prevent us from scrutinizing our practices as carefully as we should.

Economic analysis of contract law is a highly influential theoretical approach to contract law. At the same time, feminist analysis of contract law offers an important critical approach to the field. However, feminist economics, a prominent alternative approach to mainstream neo-classical economics drawing from both economic theory and feminist theory, has only been applied scarcely and sporadically to contract law. This Article seeks to bridge this gap, and to apply the key features of feminist economics to an analysis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This Article uses promissory estoppel as an example with which to demonstrate a feminist economic analysis of contract law.

This article questions the received orthodoxy from England and Wales that unincorporated treaties are ineffective (or not self-executing) on the domestic plane, and that municipal courts are incompetent to adjudicate the rights and liabilities arising from them. Anomalous gaps in protection have arisen from the application of this orthodoxy in the human rights context in Hong Kong. A close analysis, however, shows the orthodox positions in both Hong Kong and England and Wales to have been overstated, and there is room and good constitutional reason for an estoppel to be imposed against the executive in human rights cases, resulting, effectively, in the direct application of unincorporated human rights norms.

The point of discussion of this paper is to have a detailed overview of the doctrine of “Double Jeopardy'' under the “Code of Criminal Procedure 1898”. This paper will begin by discussing what Double Jeopardy is, then it will discuss the legal provisions on Double Jeopardy applicable in Pakistan. It will explain the basis of section 403 CrPC. The critical review of this doctrine will be given in this paper at hand. This paper will briefly discuss the conditions necessary for the applicability of the doctrine of double jeopardy. Furthermore, it will be discussed what the law under CrPC explicitly states and how it is implemented by the judiciary. In addition to that this paper will also discuss exceptions to the doctrine of double jeopardy. It precisely states how the concept of public interest overrides the doctrine of estoppel. Relevant case laws have been cited.

This Article puts forth the following working hypothesis by which it is asserted that on the basis of comparing certain interpretations of Article V-2b of the New York Convention with the notion of estoppel, such interpretations may be tantamount to a violation of international law. The method implemented to demonstrate the working hypothesis is hermeneutical-analytical and several examples of treaties in force or declarations made by the States are laid out to show how estoppel may be or is actually impaired. This Article is divided into two parts: the first one lays out certain preliminary clarifications from the doctrine and jurisprudential viewpoint and the second one examines the issue of States declarations and estoppel in the light of a recent ruling in Colombia. On the basis of the Article findings, it is concluded that States may be and need to be flexible as to trade and investment policies, but would need to be rigid as to the observance of juridical principles and values.

This article argues that the idea of conscience can play a useful, albeit limited and highly general, explanatory role in private law, if we have regard to two distinctive contexts in which it is used. First, it tells us something about how equitable obligations arise and reminds us that they directly enforce moral duties. Second, it conveys the message that the courts are reluctant to impose primary liabilities which restrict the exercise of legal rights absent a past or prospective breach of moral duty by the defendant. Without further explanation, the indiscriminate invocation of conscience in both contexts can lead to confusion and uncertainty, but if the distinction between obligation and liability is observed, the explanatory force of conscience in relation to each becomes clearer, and it plays a valuable role in bolstering the authority of private law.

Intimidation of arbitrators in investment law is a rarely approached but significant threat to the legitimacy of the arbitral process. The article discusses the legal basis in the relevant treaties and conventions, as well as general principles of law, in regulating the behaviour and maintaining the impartiality and independence of arbitrators. With consideration of the distinct sources of intimidation, the article pursues the complicated reality of fairly approaching intimidation that comes from different actors, in particular from one of the parties. Respecting that dismissal of a compromised arbitrator may be in line with the desires of the actor and that the arbitrators typically take the decision on whether to dismiss, alternative methods for ensuring a fair trial and due process are assessed. The article concludes by looking with a critical eye at the current structure of the system and the possibility of unknown intimidations.

The issues of the status of good faith of participants in civil proceedings as an independent principle are investigated, taking into account the degree of its legal regulation and the existence of a legislative prohibition to abuse civil procedural rights. An outline is given of the state of development of the problem in the scientific literature, as well as legislative regulation in procedural legislation.It has been argued that the modernization of civil procedural law in some way influenced the modification of a competitive model of civil justice, based on its tasks - fair, impartial and timely consideration and resolution of civil cases with the aim of effective protection of violated, unrecognized or challenged rights, freedoms or interests of individuals, rights and the interests of legal entities, the interests of the state. This factor has led to a rethinking of the principles of civil justice as a cornerstone of the legal regulation of civil procedural legal relations, Considering that in the competitive model of civil justice, the implementation of the procedural rights and procedural obligations by participants in civil proceedings is essential in the presence of the provision contained in part 1 article 44 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, which provides that participants in the trial and their representatives should use procedural rights in good faith and abuse of procedural rights is prohibited.The author proves that the analysis of procedural legislation and scientific literature on the outlined problem gives grounds to assert that in the system of principles of civil justice the principle of good faith of participants in civil justice has independent status, structural content and defines: 1) the prohibition of abuse of procedural rights; 2) the requirement of honest performance of procedural duties; 3) the prohibition of contradictory behavior of the parties, or the rule of procedural estoppel; 4) the prohibition of other illegal impediments to the administration of justice (for example, the prohibition of misleading the court, the prohibition of the use of lost procedural powers, etc.).

This article deals with the issues relating to the synallagmatic link of obligations from the contract on Russian law, as well as the institutions through which the goals of the synallagma are achieved in English law. The doctrine of the synallagmatic link of obligations from the contract in its entirety, which is usual for continental civilian, is not developed in common law. At the same time, the ideas of this doctrine are realized through other institutions. In particular, the genetic aspect of the synallagma in common law is expressed by the necessity of having a reciprocal grant (consideration). The weakening of the genetic level of synallagma in common law is due to the historically established tortuous archetype of the contract. This weakening manifests itself in numerous implicit conditions, often only legal fictions, and the promissory estoppel doctrine is capable of completely eliminating the requirement of a genetic synallagma. The idea of the functional level of a synallagmatic link in the common law is realized through the theory of interdependence. At the same time, the taxonomy of the conditions differs significantly from the domestic one. Thus, the condition is divided into events for which neither side took on a contingent condition, and conditions that are an event for which one party assumed responsibility (promissory condition). That is, the criterion of differentiation is the acceptance of responsibility, and not the fact, on whose will the events depend. Depending on the condition for which no party has taken responsibility, only the contract as a whole can be put, which allows preserving the functional link of obligations. Attenuation of this level of synallagma is possible through the mechanism of independent promises if the parties directly provide this condition in the contract.

The subject of identification of customary international law (CIL) has been under consideration by the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) since 2012, evoking responses from States and scholars. The ILC has finalized in its second and final reading a set of 16 conclusions.I discuss these conclusions in the light of the well-established doctrine on the formation of CIL. I disucss the “two elements” approach – general practice and its acceptance as law – and offer guidance on capturing the moment of creation of CIL, focusing on relevant factors, in particular the temporal factor. I emphasise the role power, persuasion, consensus, common interests or commonly shared community policies play in the formation of CIL, while noting various forms of practice including the United Nations General Assembly resolutions as important indicators for this purpose. I find many of the conclusions adopted by the Commission well balanced and in consonance with the well-established principles governing the formation of customary international law. Mention may be made in this connection of the conclusion that the practice of international organizations in certain cases also constitutes relevant practice, even as it is clear that it is State practice that predominantly figures in the evolution of “general practice”. It is, however, felt that the principle of persistent objector and that the concept of “specially affected States” has no real basis in practice and are otherwise best accommodated by other well-known principles of international law, such as acquiescence or estoppel or historic rights.

The definition of consideration in Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act 1872 substantially anticipated the far-reaching reforms to the orthodox doctrine of consideration that were proposed by the English Law Revision Committee (1937). These included making enforceable, through the doctrine of promissory estoppel, promises without consideration in the traditional sense that were meant to and did induce reliance; making enforceable a promise to perform a pre-existing duty; and making binding a promise to keep an offer open. The pivots of the definition in Section 2(d) were: a ‘subjective’ conception of consideration on which value was to be measured by the desire of the contractors alone, as opposed to an external standard; a concomitant purging of the traditional requirements of benefit and detriment; and the recognition of induced reliance as a form of consideration. The definition was designed to mark the vanishing point of consideration without having to formally abolish it. This design, however, went awry as courts and scholars in India projected the orthodox English model of consideration, replete with benefit and detriment, and external standards of value, upon this provision. Consequently, an ingenious piece of draftsmanship came to be eclipsed by orthodoxy.

In MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd the Court of Appeal held that when an ongoing contract is varied so that one party's obligation to pay money is reduced, the variation is binding as long as the other party receives a practical benefit. In doing so, the Court of Appeal effectively confined the rule in Foakes v Beer to one-off payments. This raises serious questions about the continued survival of Foakes v Beer. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal ensured that Foakes v Beer would not be killed off via equity by moving away from the suggestion in Collier v P & M J Wright (Holdings) Ltd that an agreed part-payment of a debt by a debtor will always raise an estoppel preventing the creditor from demanding the remainder of the debt.

This case note comments on a recent English Court of Appeal judgment departing from the pre-existing duty rule in contract law found in Foakes v Beer and extending the concept of practical benefit as good consideration to this situation. The note addresses the questions of precedent, the nature of the purported benefit in pre-existing duty situations, its relationship with the vitiating factor of economic duress and the future of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The note argues that the Court of Appeal’s method of sidestepping recent Court of Appeal decisions upholding Foakes v Beer is open to question, that the Court of Appeal failed to consider the relationship between practical benefit and economic duress and that the future of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is in doubt.

I will offer an extended illustration of the demystification link here and will focus on promissory estoppel, a doctrine that receives sustained attention in the typical US Contracts class and has been the focus of a great deal of scholarship, critical and otherwise, for decades. Following this introduction, the essay proceeds in two parts. In Part II, I introduce promissory estoppel the way I do in my classes, contrasting mainstream, legal realist, and critical ‘stories’ about the history and role of the doctrine in American contract law. I warn my students – as I am warning readers here – that the contrasting accounts are to some extent caricatures, for surely no self-respecting legal academic would actually admit to being ‘mainstream,’ and I gather from what I read in the casebooks as well as from discussions with others teaching the course that most of us bring insights from a mix of realist, critical, and other schools of thought to our classroom work. But the point of proceeding in this fashion is to attempt to highlight the contributions of the critical tradition to pedagogy as well as legal theory, and in Part III I’ll bring those contributions to bear on a critical study of the Local 1330 case, a storied challenge to the closing of a pair of aging steel plants in the industrial Midwest nearly four decades ago.

Russian Abstract: В статье обсуждается позиция российских судов по поводу юридического эффекта неисполнения обещания завещать. Рассматриваются подходы, выработанные английской судебной практикой. Для российских читателей. English Abstract: Author discuss approaches of the russian courts to the legal effect of the promise to bequest from the position of positive rules of inheritance by will or in intestacy. As authoritative backgrounds and examples the paper includes the most recent english precedents. For russians readers.

This article examines the problem of the law governing the validity of the arbitration agreement. The cases ofSulaméricain the English Court of Appeal and ofFirstLinkin the High Court of Singapore demonstrate that leading arbitration jurisdictions around the world can come to diametrically opposite results. In particular, there are currently diverging views as to whether the law applicable to the arbitration agreement should be the law chosen by the parties to govern their substantive legal relationship or the law of the seat of the arbitration. The issue is unlikely to be settled soon at international level. However, without embracing extreme approaches that purport to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement without reference to any national legal system, a more ‘transnational’ approach should be encouraged. This may emerge, based on three structured principles which would be desirable for international convergence, namely the non-discrimination principle, the estoppel principle and the validation principle. These principles can be developed without conflicting with the conventional conflicts-of-laws approach which was adopted by the English Court of Appeal inSulamérica.

Within the regulatory space that exists at the intersection of UK company law and environmental regulation, the business community has generated its own environmental governance initiatives to address growing anxiety about companies’ externalised risk. Yet, there is currently nothing in law to prevent companies from frequently acting inconsistently with these voluntary unilateral assurances, which has led to widespread concern that environmental values are treated as merely instrumental to the dominant idea of achieving economic benefits for the company. This article examines a specific case for the legal facilitation of binding obligations owed to the environment, which require a company to make good on its previous commitments about environmental responsibility. It seeks to demonstrate that this is possible through the common law doctrine of estoppel, which can be opened up to prevent a company from acting inconsistently with its previous statements or actions about the governance of environmental risk.

WISHART v Credit and Mercantile Plc [2015] EWCA Civ 655 is an unusual priorities case. At its heart is an informal business partnership between two close friends: S and W. Together, the pair undertook a series of property developments. In all their ventures, S took the lead on financial matters. With the approaching sale of a particularly lucrative development, S and W considered how to spend their gains. W indicated that he would like to purchase a residential property for himself and his family, and entrusted the arrangements for the acquisition to S. W removed himself entirely from the process, failing even to look at the contract of sale. As such, he did not realise that S had inserted himself as the purchaser of the property. Upon sale, W and his family moved into the property, oblivious to the subterfuge. S then secured a loan of £500,000 on the property by way of a legal mortgage in favour of C&M. The sum was promptly gambled away, and S, now declared bankrupt, disappeared. C&M obtained possession of the property and sold it for £1.1 million, using just under £700,000 of the proceeds to recoup their loan and expenses. It was at this point that W re-entered the narrative, appearing before the court to argue that, by virtue of an overriding interest, he was entitled to the proceeds of the sale over C&M.

Contents: Introduction to the Research Handbook on Territorial Disputes in International Law Marcelo G. Kohen and Mamadou Hebie 1. Territorial conflicts and their international legal framework Marcelo G. Kohen and Mamadou Hebie Part I The establishment of title of sovereignty over a territory 2. The acquisition of original titles of territorial sovereignty in the law and practice of European colonial expansion Mamadou Hebie 3. The acquisition of derivative titles of territorial sovereignty in the law and practice of European colonial expansion Mamadou Hebie 4. Titles and Effectivites in Territorial Disputes Marcelo G. Kohen 5. State conduct in territorial disputes beyond effectivites: Recognition, acquiescence, renunciation and estoppel Kate Parlett 6. Boundaries Giuseppe Nesi Part II The impact of fundamental principles of international law 7. Territorial disputes and the use of force Pierre Klein and Vaios Koutroulis 8. Territorial settlements in peace treaties Seokwoo Lee 9. The human factor in territorial disputes Mariano J. Aznar 10. Territorial disputes in the context of secessionist conflicts Theodore Christakis and Aristoteles Constantinides Part III Technical rules in territorial disputes settlement 11. Time factor and territorial disputes Giovanni Distefano 12. Evidence in territorial disputes Katherine Del Mar Conclusion Marcelo G. Kohen and Mamadou Hebie Bibliography Index

Consideration in the modification of contracts is a different matter. Williams v Roffey represents a determined attempt to free contractual modifications from the shackles of the doctrine of consideration. The abolition of consideration in contractual modification situations has long been mooted. In Williams v Roffey building contractors promised carpenter sub-contractors additional payment if they completed their work on a row of flats and did not abandon the job on account of the inadequate price they were being paid for it. J. Adams and R. Brown-sword observed that the implications of Williams v Roffey for the rule in Foakes v Beer would surely have to be considered, and an opportunity to do so arose in the case of Re Selectmove Ltd. The part payment of debt rule is based on the decision of the House of Lords in Foakes v Beer. Promissory estoppel was the avowed solution in Collier v Wright, a part payment of debt case.

In the matter between Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd 2013 NSWSC 235 (25 Mar 2013) the Supreme Court of New South Wales had to decide on the legal difficulty arising from unpaid dividends. The Court was required to decide whether a shareholder has a right to a predetermined annual dividend. The principles applied by the Supreme Court entailed estoppel (common law), minority oppression (company law) and contractual law principles. Although the principles of estoppel were relevant, these fall outside the ambit of this article concerning unpaid dividends. The Supreme Court cited approximately 40 cases and considered 5000 pages of documentary evidence pertaining to the contractual right to a predetermined dividend. Although the latter seems applicable and relevant to the South African corporate law environment, South African case law does not support it. Besides a contractual right, this article also investigates the Oxford Legal Group case in establishing at least an implied right (based on the doctrine of proper purpose) to claim an undeclared dividend or unauthorised dividend that is contrary to the board of directors discretion not to authorise any dividends. Both these cases argue when and why a court should interfere in company resolutions in striking a better balance between a right to a dividend and a company's discretionary power not to recommend or declare a dividend.Keywords:Dividend, distribution, damages, proper purpose, implied right, declare a dividend, shares, profits for dividends.

One of the pillars of Roman law is contained in the maxim res judicata pro veritate accipitur, that is, a thing adjudicated is received as the truth. This maxim of Roman law is based upon two other maxims of Roman law, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, that is, it concerns the State that there be an end to law suits, and, nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, that is, no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause. Doctrine of res judicata simply put states that, ‘If a person though defeated at law sue again he should be answered, “You were defeated formerly”’. The recognised basis of the rule of res judicata is different from that of technical estoppel. Estoppel rests on equitable principles and res judicata rests on maxims which are taken from Roman law.

A trend discernible post 1965 within the judgments of the Supreme Court is the control of discretionary powers of the government. In a society ruled via the "rule of law" it is essential that the person's rights must not be dependent on the whims of an official, a risk likely to arise if the government enjoys untrammelled discretion or strength. However, there is no signal of abatement of the outstanding discretionary powers of the management. One of the safeguards given to the individual in opposition to the substantial powers of the state are procedural. The Supreme Court has been exercising an energetic and a commendable role in evolving these safe-guards. 3 instances, P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India , Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd . and State of Assam v. Bharat Kala Bhandar , represent the high water-mark of this improvement. These cases display that our Supreme Court is pretty lively in responding to the demand made upon it. It is quite vigilant in shielding individual liberty without, at the same time, unduly hampering the project of the authorities in organising a welfare state.