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This study is aimed to: (a) analyze changes in the economic structure of Java and Bali from 2010 to 2019, (b), understand to what extent the level of specialization of economic sectors in the Java and Bali Region that utilizes the base or the leading sector, and (c) understand on economic sectors that are growing progressively and have high competitiveness in the Java and Bali Regions. This study uses the LQ method and shift share analysis. Results show that the economy of Java-Bali from 2010 to 2019 did not experience much shift in the economic structure. In general, sectors that became the source of growth in 2010 in each province in Java-Bali remained the base sector/sources of growth in 2019. The shift share analysis shows that the Manufacturing sector in most provinces in Java-Bali is in quadrant III, which means that it grows slowly and its commodities lack of competitiveness. Meanwhile, the Communication and Information sector is mostly in quadrant II, which means this sector is growing progressively but lacks of competitiveness. Likewise with the Transportation and Warehousing sector, in most provinces this sector is able to grow progressively, but this sector lacks good competitiveness (quadrant II). On the other hand, the Service sectors in most provinces have grown progressively and have good competitiveness (quadrant I). The implication of this finding is the presence of symptoms of premature deindustrialization in Java-Bali, since the Services sector is growing faster, more progressive with a contribution to GDRP exceeds the Manufacturing sector, whereas the Manufacturing sector is not mature yet. Premature deindustrialization in Java-Bali has the potential to reduce job creation in the manufacturing sector and increase the risk of unemployment. Although the Service sector is growing progressively and competitively; However, if we look at the labor productivity, it appears that the labor productivity of the Service sector is much smaller than the labor productivity of the Manufacturing sector

As the commodity chains supporting the fashion industry have become ever more global and complex, so the work of constructing and maintaining the reputations of fashion cities such as London has also needed to evolve. Museums have played a key role in this process through their dissemination of discursive narratives about the places, spaces, and people that constitute London’s symbolic fashion capital. Taking the Victoria and Albert Museum as a primary case study, this paper explores how changes to the networks and processes of the fashion city in the decades following the Second World War were connected to the growth of fashion within the museum. Looking at two key exhibitions: Britain Can Make It (1946) and Fashion: An Anthology (1971), it traces how the museum responded to processes of deindustrialization and cultural change by bringing the city’s commercial fashion cultures into the museum space, resulting in the museum becoming an important site for the fashion city. Finally, it asks whether the legacy of this process has resulted in increasingly narrow and homogenous fashion exhibitions that have the potential to harm London’s fashionable reputation by excluding many of the diverse networks and places that make the city’s fashion culture unique.

Manufacturing has long been the center of industrialization strategies for poor developing countries This article first investigates the effects of labor supply constraints on industrialization, which may have been caused by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Then, it examines how manufacturing automation could affect industrialized developing economies based on the premise that manufacturers may accelerate production automation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic The model predicts declines in developing economies' manufacturing competitiveness and a heterogeneous pattern of recovery from the COVID-19 recession In comparison, developing economies with large manufacturing bases would recover relatively quickly, whereas those with weaker manufacturing bases would suffer from a long-term decline and manufacturing contraction trends (undesirable deindustrialization) Manufacturing automation can enhance economic welfare, causing a contraction in the unproductive nontradable good (service) sector However, with low labor mobility, the welfare effect is ambiguous, thereby widening the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor © 2021 Institute of Developing Economies

The rise of crack cocaine in the late 1980s propelled the war on drugs. The experience of Canton, Ohio, shows how the response to crack solidified mass incarceration. A declining industrial city of 84,000 people in northeast Ohio with deep-seated racial divides, it was overwhelmed by aggressive, enterprising crack dealers from outside the city. In response, politicians and residents united behind the strategy of incessant arrests and drastic prison sentences. The law-enforcement offensive worsened conditions while pursuing African Americans at blatantly disproportionate rates, but few people engaged in reframing the drug problem. Instead, a punitive citizenry positioned punishment as the principal remedy. The emergency foreclosed on more comprehensive assessments of the city’s tribulations, while the criminal justice system emerged as the paramount institution.

This paper presents a model of inflation in developing economies and uses it to evaluate macroeconomic policy in those countries. We see cross-sectoral interactions between demand and supply side forces as central and show that the standard macroeconomic policy recommendations of inflation targeting and balanced budgets (i) increase volatility by amplifying external shocks and (ii) can lead to premature deindustrialization. The analysis applies to economies with marked underemployment, a central feature of developing and emerging countries. The recent Brazilian experience is used to illustrate the argument.

This paper examines the construction of a factory occupation’s ‘usable past’. It analyses how the political culture of the multinational ‘branch plant’ has combined with the optics of class and nation that predominate in accounts of Scottish deindustrialization. During 2017, the Caterpillar Workers Legacy Group commemorated the occupation of Caterpillar’s tractor plant in Uddingston, Lanarkshire, thirty years earlier. The occupation endured for 103 days, becoming a labour-movement cause célèbre. Commemoration included workforce reunions, museum exhibitions, drama performances and an anniversary debate in the Scottish Parliament. Legacy Group members archived the occupation ‘from below’, including by recording oral testimonies. The occupation was rooted in a tradition of ‘rank-and-filist’ factory trade unionism and sustained by a left-wing activist infrastructure which shaped the dispute’s contemporary framing and historical legacy. A culture of radical labourism that rejected managerial authority and profit-making as the factory’s basis for operation enthused the occupation’s defence of the right to work. These actions now form the basis for embedding a political and cultural ‘working-class presence’ long after Caterpillar departed from Uddingston. The (co-) production of labour-movement heritages is a complex process, shaped by enduring activist repertoires as well as dominant public memories.

Globalization and automation have contributed to deindustrialization and the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs, yielding important electoral implications across advanced democracies. Coupling insights from economic voting and social identity theory, we consider how different groups in society may construe manufacturing job losses in contrasting ways. We argue that deindustrialization threatens dominant group status, leading some white voters in affected localities to favor candidates they believe will address economic distress and defend racial hierarchy. Examining three US presidential elections, we find white voters were more likely to vote for Republican challengers where manufacturing layoffs were high, whereas Black voters in hard-hit localities were more likely to vote for Democrats. In survey data, white respondents, in contrast to people of color, associated local manufacturing job losses with obstacles to individual upward mobility and with broader American economic decline. Group-based identities help explain divergent political reactions to common economic shocks.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the efficiency of cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union, in general and expediency of Ukraine’s joining the Free Trade Area, in particular, as well as to prove the expediency of European integration processes, in general. The article deals with the history of the development of Ukraine’s integration into the European Economic Community. The main expectations, risks and results of measures aimed at integrating the Ukrainian economy into the European one are considered. Two main viewpoints on the results of the European integration are revealed. The first one is that the European integration is a blessing in all respects, it has no obvious and significant risks and should bring economic and social prosperity to Ukraine, promote Ukraine’s transition to the European social standards, due to economic growth caused by expanding target markets for Ukrainian products (giving access to the capacious European market), guarantee rapid growth of direct foreign investment in the Ukrainian economy, the improvement of the export-import balance, the creation of new jobs, the intensification of innovation processes and an increase in tax revenues to the budgets at all levels, the revamping of Ukrainian industry and the entire economy. The second viewpoint is quite opposite to the first one. It says that the European integration will cause deindustrialization, accompanied by a massive reduction of jobs; emigration of a significant and most capable part of the population; and as a consequence, acute shortage of labor resources, catastrophic increase in social tension and Ukraine’s transformation into Europe’s raw material appendage. Research carried out in the field of investment activity confirms the collapse of direct foreign investment in the Ukrainian economy during the period of the EU integration. Currently, foreign investors, at best, take a wait-and-see attitude, waiting to see the direction in which Ukraine’s political, economic and social development will go. The state of the trade-economic balance with the EU has deteriorated noticeably, as well as the state of the labor market and innovation activity. The research carried out clearly confirms the validity of the second viewpoint. Further studies of integration processes should be aimed at a significant modification of the goals and directions of Ukraine’s European integration, and should help Ukrainians to find a way out of the socio-economic crisis and rank high in the global division of labor. Keywords: economic crisis, enterprise, European integration, export, import, industry, investment. JEL Classification С13, А10 Formulas: 0; fig.: 1; tabl.: 5; bibl.: 24.

In December 1977, a tiny group of U.S. glove makers—most of whom were African American and Latina women—launched a petition before the U.S. International Trade Commission calling for protection from rising imports. Their target was China. Represented by the Work Glove Manufacturers Association, their petition called for quotas on a particular kind of glove entering the United States from China: cotton work gloves. This was a watershed moment. For the first time since the Communist Party came to power in 1949, U.S. workers singled out Chinese goods in pursuit of import relief. Because they were such a small group taking on a country as large as China, their supporters championed the cause as one of David versus Goliath. Yet the case has been forgotten, partly because the glove workers lost. Here I uncover their story, bringing the history of 1970s deindustrialization in the United States into conversation with U.S.-China rapprochement, one of the most significant political transformations of the Cold War. The case, and indeed the loss itself, reveals the tensions between the interests of U.S. workers, corporations, and diplomats. Yet the case does not provide a simple narrative of U.S. workers’ interests being suppressed by diplomats and policymakers nurturing globalized trade ties. Instead, it also underscored the conflicting interests within the U.S. labor movement at a time when manufacturing companies were moving their production jobs to East Asia.

[...]there was something missing in this focus on the nation state and the yet-to-be-attained economic independence is reflected in the large levels of poverty that bite at the continent. In this new model of modern Pan-Africanism, public resources must be managed for the benefit of all, leadership must frontload ethics and values, and the state must be a facilitator, enabler, and provider of the necessities for decent and dignified living. By adding value to Africa's agricultural sector, increased agricultural investment will likely lead to a stronger manufacturing industry, boosting industrialization.4 Such investments will increase quality crop and animal husbandry yields while promoting more value addition activities, including food processing and production in sectors incidental to agriculture, such as transportation and agricultural inputs. The share of manufacturing in Africa's combined GDP is currently at about 10 percent.5 While fears exist about premature deindustrialization in Africa, there are opportunities across a range of sectors that can build on the demands of COVID-19 on African leaders, who are increasingly in favor strengthening domestic production.6 These actions can build on the corrective measures to dismantle heavy intra-African trade barriers.

Advanced welfare countries have faced a mix of policy constraints regarding employment growth, income equality, and budget discipline in managing the challenges of deindustrialization, often dubbed as the trilemma of the service economy. Yet, puzzlingly enough, there are some welfare countries that could choose policy options outside of these policy constraints in their responses to deindustrialization. This article argues that the source of this derestricting capacity can be found in the size of electoral district and the level of development in dynamic service sectors. Using the Service Economy Trilemma Index (STI), the author propounds that the expansion of dynamic services in the economy has differential effects on the combined performance in employment, income equality, and budget discipline conditional on the district magnitude. The findings of this article show that countries with large electoral districts and well-developed dynamic service sectors are better able to derestrict policy constraints in the age of deindustrialization.

Processes of industrial decline have often generated nostalgia phenomena in the affected communities based on the more or less idealised memory of a past time of prosperity that disappeared as the chimneys went out (‘smokestack nostalgia’, this has been called sometimes). In an earlier time, the development of industries and mining had resulted in the configuration of well-defined social structures and socio-political frameworks. Class identity, collective action, labour disputes and trade union organisations provided the basis on which to build communities that revolved around work. Deindustrialisation undermines both the material and symbolic bases of those cities and regions that have known an industrial boom and exposes them to great uncertainty about their future. The elaboration of a collective memory capable of adapting to a radically transformed context constitutes a research field full of possibilities, despite its complexity. The references can be adapted to new post-industrial scenarios only with considerable difficulty, but at the same time they provide sources of pride and identity and response schemes to adversities. In the following lines, we will concentrate on a specific case: that of Asturias, a mining and industrial region with a prominent role played by the labour movement that has suffered a prolonged decline in its economic bases but has largely managed to preserve social cohesion. The traumatic nature of these changes invites us to explore the way in which collective perceptions manifest themselves and also the role that memory (and oblivion) can play in the reactions of young people subjected to very different challenges from those of their elders.

This article is an attempt to comprehend deindustrialisation and the impact of plant downsizing and closures in Scotland since the 1970s through listening to the voices of workers and reflecting on their ways of telling, whilst making some observations on how an oral history methodology can add to our understanding. It draws upon a rich bounty of oral history projects and collections undertaken in Scotland over recent decades. The lush description and often intense articulated emotion help us as academic “outsidersˮ to better understand how lives were profoundly affected by plant closures, getting us beyond statistical body counts and overly sentimentalised and nostalgic representations of industrial work to more nuanced understandings of the meanings and impacts of job loss. In recalling their lived experience of plant run-downs and closures, narrators are informing and interpreting; projecting a sense of self in the process and drawing meaning from their working lives. My argument here is that we need to listen attentively and learn from those who bore witness and try to make sense of these diverse, different and sometimes contradictory stories. We should take cognisance of silences and transgressing voices as well as dominant, hegemonic narratives if we are to deepen the conversation and understand the complex but profound impacts that deindustrialisation had on traditional working-class communities in Scotland, as well as elsewhere.

Leseprobe ----- Abstract The Latrobe Valley, Australia, is a resource community in transition. The post-carbon future has yet to be realised, and the immediate future is one of economic uncertainty. A state and national economy was built upon energy production from brown coal (or lignite) since the early 1920s, but the realities of changing international and national markets and economies for coal-fired electricity are seeing its value diminish. The consequences of mining and power generation, of course, were left to be experienced by the residents of the Valley. The 2017 closure of Hazelwood Power Station and the Morwell or Hazelwood open-cut mine (as it has been called since the 2014 mine fire) proved to be the Valley’s tipping point for a future without brown coal generation. This article uses the case study of the Latrobe Valley to explore government and corporate renderings of the transition, and the closure of Hazelwood Power Station in particular. We introduce the concept of “extractive meaningˮ to understand and theorise the way that narratives are evoked by government and coal-related corporations that use the structures of collective memory and oral history, but that appear to be more akin to practices that seek to codify, confine, and strip popular and local experience of its meaning. Regional memory and oral history are blanketed under a powerful set of discourses. In this exploratory analysis, we contend that in this version of regional restructuring neo-liberalism is given full rein, history and heritage are in flux with strong Government and corporate direction to assist current policy priorities, even whilst dissonant elements of a vernacular interpretation of regional changes are still discernible. ----- Bibliographie: Holm, Antoinette/Eklund, Erik: A Post-Carbon Future? Narratives of Change and Identity in the Latrobe Valley, Australia, BIOS – Zeitschrift fur Biographieforschung, Oral History und Lebensverlaufsanalysen, 2-2018, S. 67-79. https://doi.org/10.3224/bios.v31i2.06

Assiste-se ao desenvolvimento em rede da economia em âmbito urbano-regional, e uma importante questão reside em como as cidades vêm enfrentando o esvaziamento e a desfuncionalidade econômica, fruto de processos de desindustrialização ou de uma nova localização industrial periurbana, e de como tais fenômenos são compreendidos pelo planejamento e enfrentados por planos e Projetos Urbanos. Sistemas em rede articulam atividades em âmbito urbano-regional, procurando a complementaridade da indústria tradicional e de novas formas de economia, economia criativa e atividades 4.0 (TIC), suprindo tanto as capitais como as áreas ou regiões metropolitanas. Ao mesmo tempo em que se busca uma compensação para a desconcentração industrial nos centros urbanos, e que periferias e bordas acolhem polígonos e tecidos industriais, pela proximidade aos principais eixos de escoamento e vantagens logísticas, desequilíbrios e desigualdades socioterritoriais são gerados em escala regional e local, na medida em que a economia encontra modos de reprodução e localização envolvendo populações e especificidades sociofuncionais. Discute-se a concepção de planos e Projetos Urbanos, sobretudo dos parques tecnológicos urbanos, a fim de alcançar novas expressões da economia e atração de empresas de TIC em centros urbanos com áreas em deterioração, a exemplo dos projetos para Zorrozaurre (Bilbao, Espanha) e Parque dos Patrícios (Buenos Aires, Argentina). Os resultados evidenciam as relações de planos e Projetos Urbanos com áreas periurbanas e regiões metropolitanas, o papel desses projetos para a economia urbano-regional em rede, seus principais ganhos e descompassos, e desafios à atividade planejadora para atender às carências socioterritoriais em áreas em transformação.

This paper evaluates the productive structure of the State of Espírito Santo using the methodology of economic complexity. Since the falls in 2015 and 2016, the recovery of the Brazilian economy has been disappointing. This fact is correlated with the process of early deindustrialization of the Brazilian economy. In the State of Espírito Santo, whose economic development model is fifty years old, the methodology of economic complexity points out that it will be necessary to rethink public policies for regional development. This paper proposes a gradualist strategy for public policies in Espírito Santo, based on the international literature on the development process.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 revolutionized politics in the American South. These changes also had economic consequences, generating gains for white as well as Black southerners. Contrary to the widespread belief that the region turned Republican in direct response to the Civil Rights Revolution, expanded voting rights led to twenty-five years of competitive two-party politics, featuring strong biracial coalitions in the Democratic Party. These coalitions remained competitive in most states until the Republican Revolution of the 1990s. This abrupt rightward shift had many causes, but critical for southern voters were the trade liberalization measures of 1994, specifically NAFTA and the phase-out of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement which had protected the textiles and apparel industries for decades. The consequences of Republican state regimes have been severe, including intensified racial polarization, loss of support for public schools and higher education, and harsh policies toward low-income populations.

The paper provides new evidence on policy options to deal with the impact of deindustrialization, as defined in terms of a drop in manufacturing employment, for a panel of 20 early OECD countries on annual data from 1990 to 2014. We explore how key economic indicators, among them per capita GDP growth and various unemployment rates, have responded to deindustrialization. Our main contribution is to explore the role of economic flexibility and some key labor market interventions in shaping the impact of deindustrialization on these indicators. We find that lowering the cost to start a new business is a particularly useful policy to combat rising unemployment and losses in GDP growth in this context. But we also show that economic flexibility alone is not sufficient to achieve good macroeconomic outcomes. Job market training in conjunction with flexibility appears to be the preferred policy choice.

The transition from a traditional, constant returns technology to modern, increasing returns methods of production in manufacturing not only widens the scale of production but more crucially, it enhances product quality. Such a quality improvement consists mainly in a much higher level of transportability. The fact that products become “lighter” and easier to carry opens foreign markets to manufacturers thereby supporting larger scales of production. We model this situation through a one-stage game where firms distributed across two countries select technologies and fob mill prices. Contrasting with the Big Push approach, such a game is never a coordination game. In addition to cases where all firms adopt either modern or traditional technologies, the standard outcome is an asymmetric situation, where the modern firms in a country eliminate traditional units in the other country. Starting from a situation where all productive activity is traditional, deindustrialization can be viewed as a situation where firms in a country switch to more modern technologies while industrial units in the other country are unable to participate in this movement. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, thousands of workers across the world have revived bankrupt businesses without—and often against—the involvement of their previous owners. This kind of labor struggle is usually referred to as workers “recovering an enterprise.” Cases of recovery have been reported both in the United States and in European countries, from Spain and France to Greece and Italy. This article looks at the Italian phenomenon by analyzing a case study that shows how a complex history with capital, experiences of labor conflict and cooperation, and the creation of civil alliances are all key to workers' contemporary solidarity.

This article explicates the harms associated with deindustrialization in Teesside in the North East of England in the context of neoliberalism. Drawing on in-depth qualitative interviews (n = 25), the article explores how ongoing industrial collapse, typified by Sahaviriya Steel Industries’ (SSI) closure in 2015, has generated various harms. First, the article examines industrialism’s socioeconomic security and stability. It then explores the negative impact of SSI’s closure in 2015, including a sense of loss and unemployment. Next, it demonstrates how the absence of economic stability produces harmful outcomes, namely insecurity, mental health problems and bleak visions of the future. The article concludes by casting industrial ruination as an impediment to human flourishing; the normal functioning of capitalism represents a “negative motivation to harm” that prevents the stability and security necessary for individual and collective flourishing.

This review paper provides a new narrative by combing through the experiences of structural transformation among developing countries and discussing the roles of government and market in different contexts. Country performance has been influenced by the prevailing development thinking: the structuralism in the 1950s–1970s, which stresses an active government's role to overcome market failures for industrialization, and the neoliberalism in the 1980s–present, which advocates for eliminating government failures to build up a well‐functioning market. We find that almost all countries failing by following structuralism in their industrialization and neoliberalism in their transition to a market economy, and the few countries successful in catching up have a few characteristics that go against the prevailing structuralism and neoliberalism. The new structural economics, generated from the experiences of successful East Asian economies and proposing active facilitating roles of government in a market economy to remove market failures, will gain traction and take root.

This study attempts to explore the determinants of interprovincial income inequality in Indonesia from 2005 to 2013 by using a bi-dimensional inequality decomposition method. It tries, particularly, to analyze how economic tertiarization and concurrent output deindustrialization have affected interprovincial inequality. The bi-dimensional inequality decomposition method decomposes interprovincial inequality as measured by the squared population-weighted coefficient of variation in two dimensions, namely, by regional groups and industrial sectors. While deindustrialization has lowered the relative importance of manufacturing in determining overall interprovincial inequality, manufacturing activities are still very unevenly distributed among regions and provinces. The government needs to implement policies that are conducive to the balanced development of non-oil and gas manufacturing industries based on regional comparative advantages and disadvantages, where further development of economic infrastructures and human resources, particularly outside Java-Bali, is essential. Meanwhile, economic tertiarization has raised the importance of service activities in determining overall interprovincial inequality, particularly inequality within Java-Bali. The tertiary sector accounts for more than half of total GDP in Java-Bali, and many service activities, such as IC, banking, business services and private services, are concentrated in Jakarta and neighboring districts. Particularly, with the advancement of IC technologies, the IC sector has been expanding rapidly. Together with banking, business services and private services, further development of the IC sector is likely to increase interprovincial inequality in Java-Bali unless policies that could facilitate geographical dispersion of these service activities are implemented.

Rajan claims that rising inequality led to financial crises through credit booms in the U.S. Kumhof and Ranciere provide a theoretical formulation for this hypothesis. However, their assertions are...

The era of mass incarceration has had a profound impact on rural areas, such as the Central Appalachian region in the United States. Since 1989, twenty-nine new prisons have been built in the region (Perdue and Sanchagrin 2016). The justifications put forth for prison-building have focused predominantly on economic development and job creation, as deindustrialization continues to affect residents. Research has found that prison-building as a means for economic development in rural areas is a myth, however—one that obscures the real reason for carceral expansion. This article explores the nature of prison-building and the resulting exploitation of individuals working in these carceral institutions in Central Appalachia. We argue that prison-building is a mechanism of economic and social control within the region, and we focus our analysis on the poor working conditions, impoverished pay, and the general toxicity of the land on which these prisons are situated. Our article is not, however, a call for improved working conditions in the prisons. Instead, we weave together literature on the exploitation of carceral officers, the community, and the incarcerated to explore avenues of abolitionist solidarity between all people harmed by the carceral state.

Deindustrialized cities often struggle with developing a new economic base and place-based identity while also honouring the memory of the industrial past. In this process, local governments have used cultural branding and iconic architecture to present their city as a tourist destination and attractive location for capital investment. Such regeneration strategies have been critiqued as elite projects, divorced from a local sense of place and the everyday realities of residents experiencing ‘industrial ruination’. Yet, this need not always be the case. Focusing on one example of iconic architecture – the spectacular remaking of the railway station of Heerlen, a Dutch former coal-mining town – this article argues that middle-class memories of industrial Heerlen informed both the genesis of this project and its polarized reception by residents. The article demonstrates the linkages between historical and contemporary class divisions, resulting in a complex politics of memory at play within regeneration strategies.

This paper examines the proliferation of the Chicago metropolitan region’s post-recession regional economic development initiatives, and a consequent shift towards manufacturing-centric development...

There is a growing empirical evidence of premature deindustrialization in developing countries wherein the share of manufacturing in GDP and employment declined at a much lower level of per capita income as compared to the trend observed in developed countries. This study examined the manufacturing performance of India, which has been persistent with industrialization as its catch-up strategy. While the study finds no evidence of deindustrialization in the conventional sense, it presents compelling evidence in terms of wage share in value added and wage rate. Therefore, the study argues that a realistic analysis of deindustrialization should consider the quality of employment, wage share and wage rate along with employment share and GDP share. The study attributes deindustrialization in India as an outcome of its strategy to build international competitiveness based on price/wage cost advantage and the failure to build a vibrant learning, innovation and competence building system. Resumo Existe crescente evidência empírica de desindustrialização prematura nos países em desenvolvimento, onde a participação do emprego industrial no PIB diminuiu em um nível muito mais baixo de renda per capita em comparação com os países desenvolvidos. Este estudo examinou o desempenho da indústria da Índia, que tem persistido com a industrialização como estratégia de catch-up. Embora o estudo não encontre evidências de desindustrialização no sentido convencional, ele apresenta evidências convincentes em termos da qualidade do emprego gerado e da sua participação no PIB. Portanto, o estudo argumenta que uma análise realista da desindustrialização deve considerar a qualidade do emprego, a participação e a taxa dos salários, juntamente com a parcela do emprego e do PIB. O estudo atribui a desindustrialização na Índia como resultado da estratégia de ganhar competitividade internacional via vantagens de preço / custo de salário e o fracasso em construir um sistema vibrante de aprendizagem, inovação e construção de competências.

In explaining the outcome of the 2016 EU referendum in the United Kingdom, can theories emphasizing the importance of economic factors be reconciled with the fact that many people appeared to vote against their economic self-interest? This article approaches this puzzle through case study research that draws on fieldwork and a process of reciprocal knowledge exchange with local communities in five local authorities in England and Wales. It argues that the Leave vote can be attributed partly to political discontent associated with trajectories of relative economic decline and deindustrialization. Building on the growing literature about the role of narratives and discourses in navigating uncertainty, it contends that these localized economic experiences, interpreted through local-level narratives, paved the way for local-level discourses of resilience and nationwide optimistic messaging about the economic impacts of Brexit to resonate. Local and national-level discourses discounting the potential economic costs of leaving the European Union played a crucial role in giving precise, somewhat paradoxical, political content to the sense of discontent. The article contributes to the growing focus on place and community in understanding political behavior and invites further research on local discourses linking macro-level trajectories and micro-level voting decisions.

Over the last few years, authoritarian populist parties and politicians have emerged in many different and varying parts of the world. Trump in the United States. Orban in Hungary. Duterte in the Philippines. Most if not all of these leaders have come to power by utilizing a form of populism, namely, by claiming to represent the will of the people and dividing the general populace into antagonistic and sympathetic camps. This trend in authoritarian populism is notable in two respects. First, it encompasses a wide swath of the world’s large and powerful countries, many of which are democracies. Second, the trend has broad support in each country’s respective populace. For example, in the United States, Trump was chosen by large portions of the American electorate. Many scholars agree that this global turn to authoritarian populism is a result of the failures of globalization. When promises of increased economic growth failed to materialize, globalization has instead resulted in deindustrialization, accelerating inequality and dramatic economic restructuring, political unrest, and a rise in nationalism. These trends were intensified during and after the 2008 financial crisis, making many populations worldwide dissatisfied with the world order. The electoral successes of authoritarian populist parties beg the question if authoritarian populism and its leaders can ever result in truly progressive policies and if populism can be democratic at its core? This chapter will analyze three case studies of the authoritarian populist parties’ successes and investigate the extent to which progressive policies have emerged from these party’s leadership and whether populism fits within a democratic model of governance.

Why have white, less educated voters left the Democratic Party over the past few decades? Scholars have proposed ethnocentrism, social issues and deindustrialization as potential answers. We highlight the role played by the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In event-study analysis, we demonstrate that counties whose 1990 employment depended on industries vulnerable to NAFTA suffered large and persistent employment losses relative to other counties. These losses begin in the mid-1990s and are only modestly offset by transfer programs. While exposed counties historically voted Democratic, in the mid-1990s they turn away from the party of the president (Bill Clinton) who ushered in the agreement and by 2000 vote majority Republican in House elections. Employing a variety of micro-data sources, including 1992-1994 respondent-level panel data, we show that protectionist views predict movement toward the GOP in the years that NAFTA is debated and implemented. This shift among protectionist respondents is larger for whites (especially men and those without a college degree) and those with conservative social views, suggesting an interactive effect whereby racial identity and social-issue positions mediate reactions to economic policies.

The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted our ability to undertake oral history research as it is traditionally understood, where interviewer and interviewee are in dialogue with each other in a shared physical setting. Reflecting on experiences conducting twenty-seven remote interviews with former British mineworkers, this article explores how meaningful interviews can be produced with certain groups via video conferencing software and over the telephone. While some of the observational benefits of in-person interviewing were lost, there were gains in terms of the comfort of interviewees and interviewer alike. The reciprocity of video conferencing software went some way to disrupt the power dynamics of oral history interviews. Likewise, interviewees seemed more self-reflexive and willing to discuss sensitive topics when talking via online video-conferencing platforms than over the telephone, or inperson. My experience demands that we rethink orthodox methodological advice concerning best practice. The remote oral history interview can allow access to groups who are hard to reach, and offers a means through which vulnerable interviewees can regain some sense of identity and agency in a time of social dislocation.

This article presents an intergenerational study of 28 skilled working-class men’s life stories of negotiating social mobility in the wake of deindustrialization. This contributes to emerging qualitative research that aims to build a framework that understands the personal tensions social mobility creates for individuals. In this study, the tensions that men experienced were not exclusively the consequence of ‘habitus clivè’ (Friedman, 2016), i.e. men feeling a dislocation from their working-class backgrounds as they climbed the occupational ladder. Men’s tensions also arose from internalising the generational pressure to improve their occupational position. Pressed by these competing tensions, men developed a ‘getting-on outlook’ over their careers, which meant that each generation pursued upward social mobility while also seeking to have the integrity of their working lives authenticated by their parents. To build on habitus, Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame’s (1997) description of the ‘dual tension’ is advanced as a means to frame the conflict between belonging and individuality that social mobility provoked. This article suggests this ‘dual tension’ could be reduced by families in a process named ‘authentication’. ‘Authentication’ reflects intergenerational dialogues and practices developed by the younger generations to have their achieved status recognised as in keeping with their family background.

The dominant narrative of U.S. deindustrialization opens with the Northeast as the definitive starting point for industry followed by a direct linear relocation to the South and then the Global South. In this framework, deindustrialization appears to have a logic, a rational pathway following cheaper and compliant labor. When Puerto Rican needleworkers become visible in the history of the textile and garment industry, however, their colonial migrations complicate deindustrialization, and its linear logic collapses. From the perspective of these colonial women, industrialization of Puerto Rico began at the turn of the twentieth century - the same time factories and mills increased in the South. Thousands of women also migrated to the Northeast mainland, especially from the 1950s to the 1970s, when many white workers were mourning the loss of textile and garment jobs. Puerto Rican women moved to the old factories of the Northeast, which had become outposts for large transnational corporations that did not relocate their manufacturing in a direct geographic path but rather spread their processes over any arrangement that offered the best cost-benefit analysis. For Puerto Rican women, employment in the plants of the Northeast during the 1960s and 1970s offered hope rather than despair, and many took pride in meeting their quotas and providing wages for their families. In the 1980s, when the Reagan administration initiated major reforms to financial policies and the practices of leveraged buyouts made closing old plants a better return on investment, Puerto Rican women mourned the loss of jobs in an industry many experts had already declared ‘dead.’ Fragmentation of the archives between Puerto Rican studies and U.S. labor history have allowed for a simplistic narrative of deindustrialization and an erasure of the losses and disappointments of women who left Puerto Rico for the promise of higher wages in the postwar Northeast mainland. When the oral histories and documents related to the migrations of Puerto Rican needleworkers become visible in the larger history of the ‘American working class’, we see deindustrialization as sprawling and contingent rather than as linear and naturalized. Puerto Rican studies scholars have written about needleworkers as part of their field with particular attention to gender as it relates to notions of motherhood, but this article sets the women as American workers into the losses of the textile and garment industry without eliding their specificity as migrating and racialized colonial labor. In addition, the women expressed grief that went beyond losing a specific job - many of these workers lost their place in the U.S. workforce and the promise of financial stability as they became associated with racialized poverty and welfare debates.

Artificial intelligence (AI) provides many opportunities for social and economic empowerment in developing countries. However, when one thinks of Africa, robotics does not spring immediately to mind as the most relevant application of AI, considering that the continent typically has high unemployment and fast-growing populations. Nevertheless, some countries in Africa have embraced robotics on the basis that it has an important role to play in their economic development. In this article, we explore this role and the ways in which Africa can best exploit the opportunities afforded by intelligent automation and robotics. It also highlights strategies to offset the threats posed by global factors, such as premature deindustrialization.

In this article I explore the making of a gendered working-class identity among a sample of male nickel miners in Sudbury, Ontario, Canada. Through 26 oral history interviews conducted between January 2015 and July 2018 with current and retired miners (ages 26 to 74), I analyze how the industrial relations framework and social relations of the postwar period shaped – and continue to shape – a masculinized working-class identity. I then examine the ways in which economic restructuring and the partial deindustrialization of Sudbury’s mines have affected workers’ ideas about gender and class. I argue that, amid growing precarious employment in both the mining industry and the regional economy more broadly, the male workers in this study continue to gender their class identities, which limits attempts to build working-class solidarity in a labor market now largely characterized by feminized service sector employment.

Adam Smith finalised his magnum opus An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations between 1773 (Boston Tea Party) and 1776 (Declaration of Independence), and in its final paragraph Britain should “endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances”. The Wealth of Nations was “aimed to influence British MPs [Members of Parliament] to support a peaceful resolution to the American colonies’ War of Independence”, A. Smith “urged legislators to awaken from the “golden dream” of empire and avoid “a long, expensive and ruinous war”“, and “rejection of the protectionist Corn Laws in favour of opening up to the world economy marked the start of an era of globalization which contributed to Britain’s prosperity”, as Yueh (2019, p. 16f) puts it. Over the years, industrialization brought about by the Industrial Revolution has been challenged by deindustrialization, globalization by deglobalization. So with the “Brexit issue” at stake, what has been the “Brexitologic of Competitiveness”? In an earlier relevant series of analyses published by Čiderová et al. between 2012-2014 our focus was on the Global Competitiveness Index (alias the GCI by the World Economic Forum) in a spectrum of territorial and temporal perspectives related to the European Union. Now, in this follow-up comparative study zooming out to globalization and zooming in to competitiveness, our focus is streamlined to the “openended Brexit issue” on the background of updates of the GCI (alias GCI 4.0) and the KOF Globalisation Index (the latter by ETH Zürich).

The article is focused on the evolution of geopolitical arrangements that had initially materialized in the concluding quarter of the twentieth century and had given birth to the contemporary world politics paradigm including the growing role of Russia. The present author maintains that the very process of History is objective (i.e. independent of political establishment’s likes and dislikes) and continuous. This point is argued by appeal to various academic sources, among them the works of Russian and foreign historians, economists, philosophers, political scientists and futurologists. The dismemberment of the U.S.S.R. and collapse of bipolar world suspended, for a short while only, the developments at the sunset of the twentieth century. “Truncated” globalization resulted in “reactive” accumulation of controversies both between the North Atlantic “supercivilization” and the “rest” and within societies that emerged victorious after the cold war. The new vulnerabilities consisted of: deindustrialization as a sideeffect of globalization, “orientalization” of western societies as part and parcel of massive migration inflows from the South, political and economic decline encouraged by disappearance of powerful “counter­centre” embodied by the Soviet Union, waning of economically active population under existent demographic trends throughout the West, etc. Instrumental of cold war revision have also been: emergence of radical antiWest megaprojects like the “Islamic State”, gaining strength by the erstwhile “new in fluentials” as well as revival of Russia as an omnipotent world power. Nowadays, Pax Americana has become inefficient to be substituted by a new and workable global consensus on universal collective security system that meets the basic requirements of contemporary multipolar world.

For many years, the working class has been an object of interest for Russian sociology. In Soviet sociology, a lot of research has been devoted to workers and industrial sociology. The point of attention of sociologists moved towards the study of labor relations and the protest movement in enterprises in the 1990s. Then the workers stopped being in the center of attention of sociology, but now interest in the working class is returning. This article is a form of analytical reflection on the research agenda for the study of workers by Russian sociologists. The analysis is based on publications on the research of Russian workers in the leading Russian sociological journals. Workers are considered as a social and professional group that is in a status crisis as an archaic social class that lost in the course of market reforms and represents an obstacle to modernization. Russian authors point to the return of the significant role of industrial workers against the background of a focus on the technological breakthrough of the Russian economy. An analysis of publications also shows that in recent years, researchers have found it difficult to access enterprises to study workers in their work environment, which affects the understanding of the situation of industrial workers in Russia. Workers have become a popular and convenient object of study as a statistical artifact present in sociological data bases, but sometimes this data speaks little of the real situation of the industrial working class. The article emphasizes the growing interest of Russian sociologists to workers and new approaches to their study, including the biographical method and the included observation.

In the seemingly routine and the everyday, lie layers of cultural and social symbolism. So it is with dirt. This article examines the social and cultural roles of dirt within socialization practices in working-class industrial and ex-industrial communities. Drawn from oral history accounts with 46 former and current engineering apprentices, the discussion demonstrates dirt as a concept and a practicality, and how the idea of 'getting dirty' provided a cultural imagery used to renegotiate moral boundaries that devalue working class, masculine experiences and identities. Building on from the work of Skeggs (1997, 2004, 2011), it demonstrates the lived experience of value within the industrial workplace past and present. Through dirt, the role of cultural artefacts and iconography within working-class experience and workplace training is explored. Additionally, the role of a cultural icon like dirt in the intergenerational dialogues of workplace communities is given new attention. In doing so the article argues that while after decades of underinvestment in apprenticeships as a model for training in the UK, a recent resurgence in interest can go some way in overcoming the long-term effects of the loss of large-scale industrial work. However, the cultures of work attached to the apprenticeships of the past are, within deindustrialization, much more complicated to develop or recreate.

The effect of premature deindustrialization on the distribution of gains from growth has thus far been understudied. Using census data from eleven countries spanning five decades and shift...

Based on a bibliographic selection of recent edition, this is a reflection on some of the most problematic aspects of violence: criminality, offenses, and insecurity in the Countries of the North Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras), the present analysis intends to contribute with elements that will help develop a better understanding and comprehension of its evolution and intensification which only came once these countries concluded their democratization processes, which apparently facilitated economic growth in the region. The methodology used in the process was analytic and qualitative, with a strong focus on the contributions made by Dammert and Arias (2007), Figueroa (2013), Devia, Ortega y Nino (2016), Andrade (2015) Jimenez (2016), Caceres (2017) and data extracted from reports issued by PNUD (2009; 2015), OIT (2016), and official institutions from each Country. Among the main or most important elements we considered a) the peace process as a synonim of democratization, and among the main economic aspects: b) Deindustrialization and its repercussions on the variables of employment and sub employment, income and wage, poverty and inequality, and its impact on the c) increase of homicides and delinquency (-thievery of goods and belongings and private property). The article concludes that neither politic democratization nor economic growth have brought security to the population, on the contrary, they’ve had a negative impact on society in general, triggering the high homicide and robbery rates that characterize the Countries in the North Triangle.

The recent history of western Massachusetts was shaped by a set of processes familiar in post-Columbian North America, including colonization, revolutionary repositioning in the Atlantic and world system, industrialization and deindustrialization, struggles for racial emancipation and gender and sexual equality, and the emergence of cultural reproduction to supplement, and increasingly to replace, the loss of industrial work. The particular political, economic, social, ideological, and ecological contexts of western Massachusetts are presented to provide background for the finer-grained studies in the articles that follow.

A partir de una investigación sobre las transformaciones sociales y productivas en las periferias urbanas en proceso de desindustrialización, el objeto de este artículo es tratar de construir una categoría de análisis que permita pensar y comprender la subjetividad propia de las clases populares que habitan en los márgenes del estatuto salarial tradicional. La subjetividad precaria define las nuevas formas de subjetividad producidas por los nuevos sistemas organizativos de la producción y por los nuevos dispositivos de gestión del empleo y del desempleo en aras a implantar formas de obtención de rentabilidad a partir de la intensificación del trabajo y los bajos costes laborales.