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The use of coercion in psychiatric and mental health nursing is a major challenge, which can lead to negative consequences for nurses and patients, including rupture in the therapeutic relationship and risk of injury and trauma. The concept of coercion is complex to define and is used in different ways throughout the nursing literature. This concept is defined broadly, referring to both formal (seclusion, restraint, and forced hospitalization), informal (persuasion, threat, and inducement), and perceived coercion, without fully addressing its evolving conceptualizations and use in nursing practice. We conducted a concept analysis of coercion using Rodgers' evolutionary method to identify its antecedents, attributes, and associated consequences. We identified five main attributes of the concept: different forms of coercion; the contexts in which coercion is exercised; nurses' justification of its use; the ethical issues raised by the presence of coercion; and power dynamics. Our conceptual analysis shows the need for more nursing research in the field of coercion to achieve a better understanding of the power dynamics and ethical issues that arise in the presence of coercion.

Proposals for structural changes to the US Supreme Court have attracted attention in recent years amid a perceived “legitimacy crisis” afflicting the institution. This article first assesses whether the court is in fact facing a legitimacy crisis and then considers whether prominent reform proposals are likely to address the institutional weaknesses that reformers aim to resolve. The article concludes that key trends purportedly contributing to the crisis at the court are more ambiguous in their empirical foundations and normative implications than reformers often suggest. It also argues that prominent reform proposals—including term limits, age limits, lottery selection of justices, and explicit partisan balance requirements for court membership—are unlikely to resolve the institutional flaws that proponents perceive. It ends by suggesting a more modest (though novel) reform, which would allocate two lifetime appointments per presidential term and allow the size of the court to fluctuate within bounds.

The United States’ war in Afghanistan, in its broader Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), recently passed the nineteenth-year mark, easily surpassing Vietnam as its longest war. Domestic support for th...

Going through Research Ethics Boards (REB) and being held accountable to the highest ethical standards to conduct research with human subjects is commonplace. The goal of such a process helps ensure the selection and achievements not only of morally acceptable ends, but also of acceptable means to those ends when conducting research. Ultimately, REBs must pass judgment about the acceptability of harms and benefi ts to participants as they relate to research processes and outcomes. In this paper, we explore the implication of integrating “institutional reputation” as a category of analysis in the ethical review process. Informed by a recent Research Ethics Board (REB) review, we seek to engage with the readership in a constructive refl ection on the concept of institutional reputation as a source of confl icting interests in research ethics review process.

This policy brief highlights flaws in the current federal tax treatment of stock buybacks and proposes to address those flaws by equalizing the tax treatment of buybacks and dividends. (We explore the proposal in greater detail in Hemel & Polsky, Taxing Buybacks, 38 Yale J. on Reg. 246 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764112.) Stock buybacks allow foreign shareholders to avoid U.S. withholding tax on corporate cash distributions. Stock buybacks also allow U.S. taxable investors to reduce or eliminate shareholder-level tax on corporate cash distributions through a combination of deferral, loss harvesting, and stepped-up basis at death. Our proposal—based on an idea first suggested by Marvin Chirelstein a half century ago—would plug these gaps in the tax base by treating stock buybacks as imputed dividends. We explain the mechanics of the proposal and the principal design choices facing policymakers. We also estimate—conservatively—that the proposal would raise more than $500 billion over the 10-year budget window.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has led to acute supply shortages across the country as well as concerns over price increases amid surging demand. In the process, it has reawakened a debate about whether and how to regulate “price gouging.” Animating this controversy is a longstanding conflict between laissez-faire economics (which champions price fluctuations as a means to allocate scarce goods) and perceived norms of consumer fairness (which are thought to cut strongly against sharp price hikes amid shortages). This article provides a new, empirically grounded perspective on the price gouging debate that challenges several aspects of conventional wisdom. We report results from a survey experiment administered to a large, nationally representative sample during the height of the pandemic’s initial wave. We presented participants with a variety of vignettes involving price increases, eliciting their reactions along two dimensions: the degree of unfairness they perceived, and the legal response they favored. Overall, we find that participants are more tolerant of price increases than either the existing behavioral economics literature predicts or most state price gouging statutes countenance. But we also find that price fairness perceptions can be highly sensitive to context. For example, participants are much more tolerant of moderate price increases if they previously are asked to contemplate large price increases. Moreover, participants are substantially more willing to accept a price increase when it is accompanied by an apology and/or a public-minded rationale (such as supporting furloughed employees). We explore the implications of our findings for behavioral economics, pricing practices, and legal reform.

We present a new framework for analyzing defamation liability that serves both to clarify and complicate understandings of the law’s consequences for speakers, victims, and the marketplace of ideas. In addition to the familiar deterrence and chilling effects, we show how defamation liability can generate a “warming effect,” making statements more credible and potentially raising both the quality and quantity of speech. We also explain how a more plaintiff-friendly liability regime may exacerbate harms to defamation victims. We end by considering the possibility of “self-tailored” defamation law, with victims or speakers selecting the defamation liability regime that applies to them.

American foreign policy has lacked a coherent strategic framework since the Cold War ended. This lack of vision is confirmed by the regional chaos that continues to plague the Middle East fifteen years after a bid to assert American hegemony in the Middle East failed in Iraq. This study contests reductionist interpretations of global insecurity in favor of what can best be understood as an ideological framework for understanding modern insecurity. It thus provides an immanent critique of American security thinking while offering suggestions for a soluble link between the theory and practice of modern security in an age mired by geostrategic challenges to state and regional powers and fractured international institutions and alliances. A critical historical and political approach is taken to determine the preconditions for today’s security failures. Unencumbered by cold war constraints from the Soviet Union, the US took on numerous unilateral and multilateral interventions throughout the world in the nineties and, in so doing, not only created new enemies but also set the preconditions for how America would respond when transnational terrorism touched her shores on 9/11. Operating under what I term “reified realism,” whereby power is exercised in the breach, American security practices have tended to be counterproductive: producing further insecurity through the original act of securitization—or what I deem an “in/security matrix.” This dynamic relationship becomes apparent from the standpoint of the “war on terror” presidents’ practices. Be it the unilateral preemption of Bush’s neo-conservatives or the multilateral engagement of Obama’s neo-liberals, these foreign policy models are ultimately distinguished by the means they employ to arrive at shared ends. In each instance, however, a similar phenomenon drives American security practices in this epoch of terror. “Post strategic warfare,” as I determine it, whereby ethically spurious isolated tactics replace and masquerade as strategy to fight a transnational enemy, has intensified attempts to quell security failures. Short-term exigency, which is often readily associated with security, is challenged not only in terms of ethics but also in terms of strategic utility and long-term stability—the cornerstone of the realist enterprise since its inception. Recovering realism from its usurpation will, as I argue, go a long way in reorienting American security practices today while also anticipating future ones as well.

Funding: St Andrews’ Janet T Anderson Scholarship This article employs a qualitative, biographical approach, to explore the motivations and subjectivities behind migration of middle‐class Brazilians to London. It uses the concept of the geographical imagination to understand how migrants imagine not only their destinations and places of origin but also how their own identity is shaped by their imagined relationship to these places. The paper argues that for many middle‐class Brazilians, their motivation to migrate is couched in terms of “societal alienation”: a feeling of distance from the place of origin resulting from a lack of identification and trust in its institutions and the very culture of the place itself. This is in contrast to the more popularly understood concept of migrating due to “material alienation”: migrating to access a higher level of material consumption or to acquire financial capital to use “back home.” For those who migrate due to “societal alienation” what is “fetishised” is the cultural and less material aspects of the ‘quality of life’ of the migration destination, which become a kind of commodity in their own right. It argues that social class which often intersects with regional and racial divisions within Brazilian society, is a key marker of difference in these two types of imaginary. Postprint

Is it a requirement of justice to democratize private companies? This question has received renewed attention in the wake of the financial crisis, as part of a larger debate about the role of companies in society. In this article, we discuss three principled arguments for workplace democracy and show that these arguments fail to establish that all workplaces ought to be democratized. We do, however, argue that republican-minded workers must have a fair opportunity to work in a democratic company. Under current conditions, this means that a liberal order must actively promote workplace democracy.

Internationally proclaimed safe areas do not aim to end ongoing wars. Instead, their more limited goal is to create islands of temporary refuge where threatened civilians can find shelter. As intuitively compelling as the idea of safe areas may seem, however, it raises numerous practical and ethical questions. The articles in this special issue draw on history, moral philosophy and political science in order to assess whether safe areas are indeed an appropriate response to humanitarian crises.

The Supreme Court accords starkly different treatment to private expression and government speech for First Amendment purposes. While regulation of private speech generally must be viewpoint neutral, the government is subject to no such requirement when it engages in speech of its own. But the line between private expression and government speech is often fuzzy. To draw this distinction, the Supreme Court has placed increasing emphasis on whether members of the public reasonably perceive the relevant expression to be private or government speech. We think this turn toward public perception is a welcome development: government intervention in the marketplace of ideas is especially dangerous when it is nontransparent, so before allowing government officials to escape the viewpoint-neutrality requirement, courts should verify that the public actually perceives the speech in question to emanate from the government. But the Court has so far failed to develop a reliable method for determining how ordinary citizens distinguish between private and government messages, relying instead on armchair speculation. Meanwhile, scholars have not yet mustered any evidence as to when and why individuals understand messages to be private expression or government speech. To begin to fill this empirical void, we presented a variety of speech scenarios to a nationally representative sample of more than 1200 respondents and asked the respondents to assess whether the speech in question was the government’s. Some of the speculative claims made by the justices in recent government speech cases are borne out by our survey, but others prove less accurate. We further find that respondents are somewhat more likely to attribute messages to the government if they agree with those messages themselves; in this respect, lay people may be little different from judges, whose decisions in government speech cases sometimes seem to be influenced by ideology. We end by considering whether courts should consult survey evidence in resolving cases that involve government speech claims. An advantage of survey experiments is that they can be used to disentangle the effects of medium from the effects of message, reducing the risk that government speech doctrine will systematically favor some messages over others. To be sure, the use of survey evidence raises a number of implementation issues that require careful thought, but we ultimately conclude that an empirically informed government speech doctrine would protect First Amendment values more successfully than a doctrine dependent upon judicial guesswork.

In recent years, trademark scholars have come to recognize that the supply of words, sounds, and symbols available to designate new goods and services is an exhaustible resource. In certain sectors, the most common Eng-lish words and syllables and the most common U.S. surnames are almost all claimed as marks. Some firms have responded by resorting to ever-more-unusual brand names so as to avoid trademark disputes. Scholars have pro-posed solutions ranging from raising registration fees to narrowing the scope of trademark rights. In this Article, we frame trademark law’s governance of “linguistic space” as a balancing act between what we term proximity costs and distance costs. Proximity costs, the conventional focus of trademark doctrine, occur when different firms use marks that are close in linguistic space—think Zan-tac (for heartburn) versus Xanax (for anxiety). Distance costs arise when firms use marks that are difficult to remember because of their length or their far remove from the core of semantic signifiers familiar to most consumers—staying in the medicine cabinet, think Valsartan (for high blood pressure) or Namzaric (for memory loss). Although conceptually different, proximity costs and distance costs both create similar practical problems. Both make it more difficult for consumers to purchase and communicate about brands, and both make it harder for new entrants to establish and defend their market share. Our proximity-distance framing has conceptual payoffs for trademark law. We explain why responses to the crowding of linguistic space internal to trademark law cannot escape some tradeoff between proximity costs and dis-tance costs. Allowing mark holders to control a larger swath of linguistic space reduces proximity costs, but at the expense of pushing other firms to the periphery of linguistic space, increasing distance costs. Similarly, weak-ening trademark protection to allow more firms to locate their marks in the linguistic core reduces distance costs, but with some increase in proximity costs. Our framing thus shows how the policy problems of trademark law parallel the challenges of managing scarcity in real property. As we draw in-spiration from solutions to urban congestion and sprawl, we suggest how nontrademark interventions can lead to more efficient use of linguistic space, promoting product identification without raising proximity or distance costs. Our approach thus points to the possibility of using a plurality of legal and policy tools to address the proximity-distance dilemma at trademark law’s heart. And by relieving some of the pressure on trademark law to resolve the proximity-distance dilemma on its own, our approach frees trademark law to pursue a wider range of goals and to vindicate a broader variety of values.

The US has recently—and belatedly—come to recognize opioid addiction as a public health crisis. What has gone mostly unrecognized is the degree to which this crisis is intertwined with US intellectual property law and related elements of US innovation policy. Innovation institutions—the legal arrangements that structure incentives for production and allocation of knowledge goods—encouraged the development and commercialization of addictive painkillers, restricted access to opioid antidotes, and (perhaps most importantly) failed to facilitate investments in alternative, nonaddictive treatments for chronic pain. Although innovation policy does not bear all the blame for the opioid wave that has washed over communities across the country, innovation institutions are bound up in the ongoing epidemic to a degree that so far has gone underappreciated. This article examines the proliferation of opioid use and abuse through the lens of innovation policy, and it envisions ways in which innovation institutions could help to contain the crisis. Along the way, it seeks to derive broader lessons for innovation policy scholarship as well as recommendations for institutional reform. The opioid crisis challenges the conventional understanding of IP law as a trade-off between allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency; it highlights the potentially pernicious role of IP protection for addictive and habit-forming products; and it exposes deep flaws in the structure of federal subsidies for and regulation of prescription drugs. It also draws attention to the political and cultural factors that contribute to innovation policy failures. Ultimately, the opioid crisis underscores both the urgency and the limits of institutional change in the innovation policy domain.

Non-tax legal rules regulating the workplace, the financial sector, real property, and many other areas affect the ability of governments to collect revenues and provide public goods. Yet tax-collection considerations rarely enter into economic analyses of non-tax legal rules. Usually, tax-collection concerns are shunted aside to separate studies (and separate law-school courses) rather than being integrated into debates in non-tax spheres. This separation between non-tax legal rules and tax-collection considerations bears significant negative consequences for the ability of law and economics to generate descriptively accurate and normatively attractive accounts of important non-tax legal questions. This Article takes a step toward remedying that oversight. We present an analytic framework for understanding the interaction between non-tax legal rules and tax collection. This framework—which we call the Legal Envelope Theorem—demonstrates that legal rules should systematically deviate from simple notions of efficiency to take stock of tax effects. We then provide a series of examples applying the Legal Envelope Theorem, illustrating how the non-tax legal system ought to be (and, on occasion, actually is) designed with tax effects in mind. These examples range from parental-leave mandates to bank capital requirements to centuries-old property and contract rules regularly taught in introductory law-school courses. We illustrate how a framework that is attentive to tax-collection considerations can enhance the government’s capacity to redistribute resources and address wealth inequality.

The metaphor of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ has long pervaded discussions of free speech in and beyond the United States. For early scholars of law and economics, including Aaron Director and Ronald Coase, the similarities and differences between the metaphorical marketplace for ideas and literal markets for goods and services were subjects of much attention. More recently, however, while the law-and-economics movement has flourished, economic analysis of free speech has lagged. Although law and economics has branched out from its traditional emphasis on private law to topics such as criminal law, judicial behavior, and agency structure, free speech has faded from its focus. The leanness of the law-and-economics literature on free speech should not be understood to imply that economics has little to say on the topic. Perhaps most significantly, the ‘new information economics’ for which George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz won the Nobel prize in 2001 carries profound implications for free speech — implications noted by a handful of legal scholars but not exhaustively explored. The new information economics challenges the faith in free markets reflected in the writings and thinking of early law and economics scholars, and — though less directly — the faith in a free marketplace of ideas reflected in much of US First Amendment jurisprudence. It suggests that under certain circumstances, the regulation of speech not only can protect individuals and societies from speech-related harms but also can promote speech itself. This chapter provides an introduction to the economic analysis of free speech, with special attention to the new information economics perspective. Section 1 critically summarizes the small law-and-economics literature on free speech. Section 2 offers an overview of the new information economics. Section 3 applies insights from the new information economics to free speech subjects.

We present a new framework for analyzing defamation liability that serves both to clarify and complicate understandings of the law’s consequences for speakers, victims, and the marketplace of ideas. In addition to the familiar deterrence and chilling effects, we show how defamation liability can generate a “warming effect,” making statements more credible and potentially raising both the quality and quantity of speech. We also explain how a more plaintiff-friendly liability regime may exacerbate harms to defamation victims. We end by considering the possibility of “self-tailored” defamation law, with victims or speakers selecting the defamation liability regime that applies to them.

The objective of this brief report is to present an overview of the main benefits and key characteristics of an individualized physical activity program delivered by an assertive community treatment team in Ottawa, Canada. A mixed-method case study was conducted over a 9-month period. Findings revealed significant reductions in weight, BMI and waist circumference (p

The state was long seen as the only institution able to govern legitimately. The empirical limitations of statehood in many parts of the world, as well as the normative ambivalences inherent to statehood, however, have led to a renewed interest in the legitimacy of non-state governance. A prominent approach holds that non-state governance is legitimate if and to the extent that it contributes to normatively desirable outcomes, such as an increase in security. This chapter argues that this approach faces four problems that severely limited the scope of legitimate governance by non-state actors in areas of limited statehood. They concern the definition of goods, the inclusiveness of governance services, the accountability of non-state actors, and the reliable assignment of responsibilities. We contend that these problems highlight the need for public institutions and explore whether and how non-state actors can assume public roles under conditions of limited statehood.

The rapid growth of the Islamic State (IS) reminds us of the ongoing terrorist threat facing the individual, the state, and the international system. More than that, though, it illustrates the fail...

Mechanical restraints are most often used in circumstances where behaviours are believed to be a threat to the welfare and safety of others or the individual him or herself. However, the degree to which health care professionals justify the uses of mechanical restraints in relation to the perceived beneficial effects expressed by those who must experience them may very well prove to be quite different. The overarching purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the lived experience of mechanically restrained patients hospitalized in psychiatric settings (acute psychiatric care unit and psychiatric emergency unit) in order to explore gendered power relations in psychiatric care. While this chapter focuses specifically on the experience of women who have been restrained, it would seem that mechanical restraints operate in a system where authority is embedded in psychiatric practices and likely to affect all who are in contact with this setting.

What is the moral value of formal democratic decision-making? Egalitarian accounts of democracy provide a powerful answer to this question. They present formal democratic procedures as a way for a society of equals to arrive at collective decisions in a transparent and mutually acceptable manner. More specifically, such procedures ensure and publicly affirm that all members of a political community, in their capacity as autonomous actors, are treated as equals who are able and have a right to participate in collective decision-making. Recently, a number of authors have raised what I describe as the ‘no impact’ objection. This objection focuses on the egalitarian emphasis on autonomy to cast doubt on the moral value of formal democratic procedures. It holds that individual participation in formal democratic decision-making has no impact on the eventual result, and therefore cannot be understood as an exercise in autonomy. Consequently, the ‘no impact’ objection claims that the moral value of formal democracy cannot be explained with reference to an egalitarian ideal of ‘rule by the people’. In this article, I refute this objection by complementing an egalitarian account of democracy with an account of basic autonomy.

Europe was swept by a number of political revolutions between the latter parts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These revolutions, from the outset, provided fuel for reactionary forces ...

Frequency is defined in terms of number of occurrences of a given linguistic structure in a particular linguistic system or sub-system (as approximated by a suitable corpus). Frequency is assumed to be a possible determinant in usage-based models of language change, language acquisition and language processing. While the default assumption is that there is a non-trivial relation between frequency of occurrence thus defined and mental and structural representation, the frequency factor is being investigated with a view both to its explanatory potential and to its challenges in future research. The present paper is based on on-going research within the DFG funded research training group (GRK 1624) that carries out empirically rich and methodologically co-ordinated research on frequency effects in language, with an empirical focus on standard and non-standard varieties of European languages. In its integration of descriptive-linguistic and cognitivist approaches and its broad empirical corpus base, the on-going research opens up a new, constructively critical approach to usage-based modelling in linguistics. The two-pronged approach – extending the breadth of empirical coverage, while at the same time increasing the sophistication of the theoretical models – is a timely one.

This Article considers the distributional consequences of the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence over the past quarter century, focusing specifically on the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines. The first of these doctrines prevents Congress from compelling the states to administer federal programs; the second prevents Congress from achieving the same result through offers that for practical purposes the states cannot refuse; the third prohibits Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity outside a limited class of cases. These doctrines vest the states with valuable entitlements and allow the states to sell those entitlements back to Congress for a price. In this respect, the doctrines have an intergovernmental distributional effect, shifting wealth from the federal government to the states. The distributional consequences of the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines are not purely intergovernmental, however. The doctrines also have potential implications for the distribution of wealth across individuals and households. By forcing Congress to bear a larger share of the costs of federal programs, and by shifting some of the costs of liability-imposing statutes from the states to Congress, these doctrines allow the states to raise less revenue and compel Congress to raise more. For a number of historical as well as structural reasons, the federal tax system is dramatically more progressive than even the most progressive state tax systems, and so the reallocation of fiscal responsibility resulting from these federalism doctrines causes more revenue raising to occur via the more progressive system. The likely net effect is a shift in wealth from higher-income households (who bear a larger share of the federal tax burden) to lower- and middle-income households (who would have borne a larger share of the burden of state taxes). This conclusion comes with a number of caveats. The distributional consequences of the Supreme Court’s federalism doctrines may be moderated—or magnified—by differences in federal and state spending priorities. Moreover, the doctrines may affect the size of government as well as the allocation of fiscal responsibility across levels of government (though the net effect on government size is ambiguous). And the doctrines may have distributional consequences that are not only interpersonal, but also intergenerational. What seems clear from the analysis in this Article is that federalism doctrines affect the distribution of income and wealth in subtle and sometimes unexpected ways, and that a comprehensive understanding of wealth inequality in the United States requires careful attention to key features of our fiscal constitution.

Proposals for a universal basic income are generating interest across the globe, with pilot experiments underway or in the works in California, Canada, Finland, Italy, Kenya, and Uganda. Surprisingly, many of the most outspoken supporters of a universal basic income have been self-described libertarians — even though libertarians are generally considered to be antagonistic toward redistribution and a universal basic income is, at its core, a program of income redistribution. What explains such strong libertarian support for a policy that seems so contrary to libertarian ideals? This Article seeks to answer that question. We first show that a basic safety net is not only consistent with, but likely required by, several strands of libertarian thought. We then explain why libertarians committed to limited redistribution and limited government might support a system of unconditional cash transfers paid periodically. Delivering benefits in cash, rather than in-kind, furthers autonomy by recognizing that all citizens — even poor ones — are the best judges of their needs. Decoupling such transfers from a work requirement acknowledges that the state lacks the ability to distinguish between work-capable and work-incapable individuals. Providing payments periodically, rather than through a once-in-a-lifetime lump sum grant, ensures that all individuals can receive a minimum level of support over lifespans of variable lengths, while also allowing individuals to adjust payment flows through financial market transactions. Although our main objective is to assess the fit between libertarian theory and a universal basic income, we also address various design choices inherent in any basic income scheme: who should receive it?; how large should it be?; which programs might it replace?; and should it phase out as market income rises? Lastly, we consider the relationship between a basic income and the political economy of redistribution. We find that the case for a basic income as a libertarian “second-best” is surprisingly shaky: libertarians who oppose all redistribution but grudgingly accept a basic income as the least-worst form of redistribution should reconsider both aspects of their position. We conclude by drawing out lessons from our analysis for non-libertarians, regardless of whether they are supportive or skeptical of basic income arguments.

Institutional rules of courts often draw status distinctions among members, assigning certain statuses to different judges (e.g., “chief judge,” “presiding judge”) and allocating particular powers on the basis of status. We investigate the influence of intra-court and intra-panel status distinctions on judicial behavior in the U.S. federal courts of appeals. We exploit cross-case variation in judicial status and cross-circuit differences in institutional procedures that relate status to particular powers. Analyzing cases published between 1993 and 2007, we find that presiding-judge status reduces the probability that a judge dissents by 16 percent. We find evidence suggesting that this effect operates entirely through the presiding judge’s power to assign the panel opinion, and that it is not a product of strategic voting by presiding judges seeking to retain opinion-assignment authority by siding with the majority. These results illustrate the importance to voting patterns of institutional rules governing judicial status and intra-panel powers.

Congressional Republicans and Trump administration officials have said that they plan to repeal the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes (SALT) as part of a comprehensive tax reform package. This essay critically examines the major arguments for repealing the SALT deduction. Repealing the deduction and using the resulting revenues to reduce federal rates across the board would likely lead to greater tax-induced deadweight loss overall. Repealing the deduction also would distort decisions about the financing of education and health care, which together account for more than half of all state and local government spending. Repeal would further encourage a shift from nonbusiness to business taxes at the state and local level, and potentially would result in more borrowing by subnational governments in the short and medium term. It would have ambiguous effects on the progressivity of the overall tax system, and it would exacerbate existing differences in federal tax burdens across states. The essay concludes that the case against the SALT deduction fails on its own terms, and that the status quo of partial deductibility offers a number of underappreciated advantages vis-a-vis the alternative of full repeal.

The 2017 tax legislation brought sweeping changes to the rules for taxing individuals and business, the deductibility of state and local taxes, and the international tax regime. The complex legislation was drafted and passed through a rushed and secretive process intended to limit public comment on one of the most consequential pieces of domestic policy enacted in recent history. This Article is an effort to supply the analysis and deliberation that should have accompanied the bill’s consideration and passage and describes key problem areas in the new legislation. Many of the new changes fundamentally undermine the integrity of the tax code and allow well-advised taxpayers to game the new rules through strategic planning. These gaming opportunities are likely to worsen the bill’s distributional and budgetary costs beyond those expected in the official estimates. Other changes will encounter legal roadblocks, while drafting glitches could lead to uncertainty and haphazard increases or decreases in taxes. This Article also describes reform options for policymakers who will inevitably be tasked with enacting further changes to the tax law in order to undo the legislation’s harmful effects on the fiscal system.

ISIS’ march across the Middle East illuminates the degree to which security and sovereignty mutually inform one another. Where one is lacking, the other will be found to be equally wanting. This chapter explores how these categories link to one another by using 9/11, the Arab Spring, and ISIS to make its case. Failed attempts at state building after 9/11 as surely as the toppling of autocratic sovereign regimes by way of the Arab Spring culminated in a security vacuum that was filled by ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and beyond. Outmoded policies to counter ISIS have been complicated by the failure to appreciate the role sovereignty plays in effecting security.

The objective of this paper is to present the results obtained from a qualitative research study conducted in a forensic psychiatric setting and to explore the dual role associated with being both "agents of care and agents of social control." Following the narratives provided by nurses working in this field, the analysis that follows will problematize the rhetoric of therapy in forensic psychiatric nursing. In order to support the analysis, this article comprises four sections. The first section will briefly review the study's methodological considerations. Using a combination of Foucault and Goffman's work, the second section provides an empirical contextualization of correctional environments and their effects on nursing care. The third section explains the effects of having a contradictory mandate of care and custody from Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. Lastly, the fourth section provides a critique of disciplinary interventions in forensic psychiatric nursing, as it is explained by the participants.

The purpose of this article is to present the results of a study conducted in a Canadian medium-security forensic psychiatric facility. The primary objective of this qualitative research was to describe and comprehend how fear influences nurse-patient interactions in a forensic psychiatric setting. Eighteen semistructured interviews with nurses were used as the primary source of data for analysis. In brief, the results from this research indicate, as other researchers have demonstrated, that within this highly regimented context, nurses are socialized to incorporate representations of the patients as being potentially dangerous, and, as a result, distance themselves from idealistic conceptions of care. Moreover, the research results emphasize the implication of fear in nurse-patient interactions and particularly how fear reinforces nurses' need to create a safe environment in order to practice. A constant negotiation between space, "at risk" bodies and security takes place where nurses are forced to scrutinize their actions in order to avoid becoming victims of violence. In parallel, participants also described how being able to self-identify with patients enabled therapeutic interventions to take place. However, exposure to the patient's criminal history fostered negative reactions on the nurses' part, which impede nursing work.

The purpose of this paper is to engage with the reader in a theoretical reflection regarding the use of the seclusion room as a punitive nursing intervention (behaviour modification technique for instance). To set the stage, we explore the internal structure and functioning (culture) of the psychiatric institution – as total institution – from a Goffmanian perspective. Then, drawing on the work of the late French philosopher Michel Foucault, we introduce the concept of sovereign power and explore how various forms of punishment (as manifestations of power) came into play at different moments in history. Through an exploration of seclusion and its use in the psychiatric domain, we critically examine this practice when used as a behaviour modification technique. Finally, the use of seclusion is discussed in terms of the concept of sovereign power with the purpose of highlighting the political forces surrounding such a coercive practice in psychiatric nursing.

Roughly half of U.S. states allow labor unions and public-sector employers to establish “agency shop” arrangements that cover state and local government workplaces. These arrangements require employees to pay agency fees to cover their local union’s collective-bargaining costs, regardless of whether the employee joins the union. Agency shop supporters justify these arrangements as a means of preventing non-union members from free-riding off the union’s bargaining efforts, while opponents contend that agency shop arrangements violate the First Amendment rights of non-union members forced to pay the agency fee. Although the Supreme Court permitted agency fees over First Amendment objections in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977), the Court will reconsider that ruling in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association in early 2016. Many observers predict the Court may use Friedrichs as an opportunity to overrule Abood, with the consequence that public-sector unions will lose the ability to deter free-riding by nonmembers.We take no position on whether Abood will, or ought to, survive. Instead, we present a novel alternative mechanism to address the free-rider problem in public-sector workplaces — a mechanism that could be utilized even if Abood is overturned. We suggest that if a public-sector employer wants to make sure that a labor union is compensated for the cost of representing nonmembers, the employer can reimburse the union for those expenses directly. To offset the cost of this direct payment, the employer can reduce each employee’s salary by the employee’s pro rata share of the union’s bargaining expenses, while also freeing employees from the obligation to pay agency fees. This “direct payment alternative” would seem to accomplish the same objective as existing agency shop arrangements: it would prevent non-union members from reaping the benefits of union representation without sharing the costs. And while the wages of public-sector employees would be reduced by their pro rata share of their union’s bargaining costs, existing agency shop arrangements already reduce wages by that amount, because employees must pay their pro rata share in the form of union dues or agency fees.In fact, our direct payment alternative might leave public-sector employers and employees better off than existing agency shop arrangements. First, the direct payment alternative eases the First Amendment concerns raised in Friedrichs: a direct payment to the union would likely qualify as “government speech,” and would thus be subject to less stringent scrutiny under present First Amendment doctrine. Second, the direct payment alternative would bring with it favorable federal tax consequences for state and local government employees. An employee’s pro rata share of union bargaining expenses would not be included in gross pay for purposes of Social Security and Medicare taxes, and would not be included in adjusted gross income for purposes of personal federal income taxes. Most public-sector employees would fare better on an after-tax basis if their employers adopted the direct payment alternative instead of the agency shop arrangement.In this short essay, we compare and contrast the basic features of the agency shop and the direct payment alternative, considering the constitutional, economic, and political factors that might lead state and local governments and public-sector unions to choose one approach over the other. We present several hypotheses drawn from behavioral economics and political psychology — and, in particular, from the emerging literature on the “salience” of taxes and fees — that might explain why employers and unions have thus far opted for agency shops. We close by considering the practical consequences of a possible Supreme Court decision overruling Abood. We conclude that while Abood is not entirely irrelevant, the availability of the direct payment alternative suggests that the impact of overruling Abood may be muted.

Genre and Living World : On the cultural historical Symbolic Character of Genres and its historical Changes

In the introduction to Chapter 4, I argued that in order to be morally justified as a means to fulfill the requirements of the natural duty of justice an ITA must fulfill three conditions: c1: the establishment of an ITA is a response to a situation of extreme state failure, in which a state is systematically unable to protect its citizens’ security rights c2: the goal of an ITA is to create minimally just conditions. To this end, it protects the local population’s security rights and ensures the (re-)construction of minimally just institutions. Once this goal is reached, ultimate authority must be transferred to the local government c3: the ITA governs in a way that respects the local population’s human rights and basic principles of rule of law, that makes the ITA accountable to the local population, and that avoids humiliation

In the introduction to this book I asked whether ITAs can be morally justified, although they clearly constitute a form of foreign rule. I suggested to approach this question by relating it to the idea of a natural duty of justice and, hence, by asking whether ITAs can plausibly be conceived of as a means to fulfill the requirements of this duty.

At the beginning of the previous chapter I suggested that an ITA can be a means to fulfill the requirements of the natural duty of justice if it fulfills the following three conditions: c1: the establishment of an ITA is a response to a situation of extreme state failure, in which a state is systematically unable to protect its citizens’ security rights c2: the goal of an ITA is to create minimally just conditions. To this end, it protects the local population’s security rights and ensures the (re-)construction of minimally just institutions. Once this goal is reached, ultimate authority must be transferred to the local government c3: the ITA governs in a way that respects the local population’s human rights and basic principles of rule of law, that makes the ITA accountable to the local population, and that avoids humiliation

The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between mandatory HIV testing and the institutional management of inmates in U.S. prisons. Mandatory HIV testing has been largely overlooked by the nursing community even though it has important human rights and ethical implications. Drawing on the work of Goffman (1990) on the inner workings of total institutions, the present article critically examines the deployment of mandatory HIV testing in U.S. prisons. To set the stage, we define mandatory HIV testing and describe the methods of HIV testing currently used in U.S. prison settings. Then, we provide a brief overview of the concept of total institution and the mortification process. Finally, we expand on the relationship between mandatory HIV testing and much larger institutional objectives of total control, total structuring, total isolation, and separation of inmates from society (as summarized by Farrington, 1992). And lastly, we provide a brief discussion on the implications of mandatory HIV testing (as a method of HIV testing) from a nursing perspective.

Forensic psychiatric nurses work with individuals who may evoke feelings of empathy as well as feelings of disgust, repulsion, and fear. The main objective of this theoretical paper is to engage the readers in a theoretical reflection regarding the concepts of abjection and fear since they both apply to the experiences of caring for mentally ill individuals in forensic psychiatric settings. Our contention is with the potential impact of feelings such as disgust, repulsion, and fear on the therapeutic relationship and, more particularly, with the boundaries imposed on this relationship when these feelings are unrecognized by nurses. Acknowledging that patients may evoke feelings of disgust, repulsion, and fear is essential if nurses wish to understand the implications of these emotions in the therapeutic process. In forensic psychiatric settings, caring for so-called "monsters" in the face of abjection and fear is not an easy task to achieve given the lack of theoretical understanding regarding both concepts. Given the actual state of knowledge in forensic nursing, we argue that theoretical (conceptual) analyses, as well as ethical and political discussions, are paramount if we wish to understand the specificities of this complex field of nursing practice.

1. Preface (by Dufter, Andreas) 2. Introduction (by Dufter, Andreas) 3. Topicalization and focalization in French SI-clauses (by Aptekman, Jeanne) 4. Discourse functions of fronted foci in Italian and Spanish (by Brunetti, Lisa) 5. Clefting and discourse organization: Comparing Germanic and Romance (by Dufter, Andreas) 6. Cleft sentences from Old Portuguese to Modern Portuguese (by Kato, Mary Aizawa) 7. Fronting and verum focus in Spanish (by Leonetti, Manuel) 8. Additive focus particles in bilingual language acquisition (by Leray, Estelle) 9. Major constituent order, information packaging, and narrative structure in two Middle French texts (by Muller, Claude) 10. Grammatical and contextual restrictions on focal alternatives (by Onea, Edgar) 11. Verb placement in Old Portuguese (by Rinke, Esther) 12. Topic, focus, and background in Italian clauses (by Samek-Lodovici, Vieri) 13. Index

Udgivelsesdato: 2008-Sep The humanist school of thought, which finds resonance in many conceptual models and theories designed to guide nursing practice, needs to be understood in the context of the total institution, where the individual is subjected to a mortification of the self, and denied autonomy. This article will engage in a critical reflection on how humanism has influenced nursing theorists and the subsequent production of conceptual models and theories, especially as they relate to the field of forensic psychiatric nursing. Although humanism provides optimism for nurse-patient relations, this article explores the incapability of such a philosophy to acknowledge the power relationships between individuals and its inability to explain the day-to-day realities experienced in forensic nursing, where the possibility of interpersonal violence reshapes nursing care. The tidal model will be discussed in detail as an example of a recently developed humanistic nursing model. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that humanistic philosophy and its subsequent models of care are in discordance with the highly specialized field of forensic nursing.

Background Seclusion continues to be a widespread measure used in psychiatric settings. Furthermore, the humanitarian, ethical and legal issues associated with the use of seclusion make it one of the most controversial management strategies available. Despite these important issues, little nursing research has sought to gain an understanding of the nurses' decision-making process regarding the use of seclusion in psychiatric settings. Objective: The objective of this presentation is to outline the research results of a grounded theory study conducted in two major Canadian university affiliated psychiatric hospitals.

6114 Background: Cancer drug shortages increased considerably over the past 5 years, but quantitative analyses of the scope and effects are limited. We assessed the effects of drug shortages on outpatient medication use in a single New York City university hospital. Methods: We examined pharmacy records for drug shortages, defined by the ASHP as supply issues that affect “how the pharmacy prepares or dispenses a drug product or influences patient care when prescribers must use an alternative agent.” We examined outpatient records for all cancer patients treated with infusional antineoplastic and/or supportive medications from 4/2010-9/2010 and from 4/2011-9/2011, and performed subgroup analysis on Aug/Sept 2011, the peak of medication availability problems at our hospital. We compared proportions of patients treated with specific medications in 2010 and 2011 with Pearson’s chi-square test. Results: Twelve medications were in shortage during the study period in 2010 and 22 in 2011. Between 4/1/10 and 9/30/10, 335 cancer patients were treated, and 379 patients were treated between 4/1/11 and 9/30/11. Median patient age was 60 years. Cancer site of origin was comparable between years: breast (40%), GI (15%), lymphoma (10%), GU (8%), and lung (7%). Drugs considered in shortage were used for 170 (50.8%) patients in 2010 and 241 (63.6%) patients in 2011 (p=0.0005). Of 235 patients treated in Aug/Sept 2011, there were 23 (9.8%) documented therapy changes due to shortages, compared with 0 changes among 211 patients treated in Aug/Sept 2010 (p