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The evolution of multicellular life requires cooperation among cells, which can be undermined by intra-group selection for selfishness. Theory predicts that selection to avoid non-cooperators limits social interactions among non-relatives, yet previous evolution experiments suggest that intra-group conflict is an outcome, rather than a driver, of incipient multicellular life cycles. Here we report the evolution of multicellularity via two distinct mechanisms of group formation in the unicellular budding yeast Kluyveromyces lactis. Cells remain permanently attached following mitosis, giving rise to clonal clusters (staying together); clusters then reversibly assemble into social groups (coming together). Coming together amplifies the benefits of multicellularity and allows social clusters to collectively outperform solitary clusters. However, cooperation among non-relatives also permits fast-growing unicellular lineages to ‘free-ride' during selection for increased size. Cooperation and competition for the benefits of multicellularity promote the stable coexistence of unicellular and multicellular genotypes, underscoring the importance of social and ecological context during the transition to multicellularity., Multicellularity can arise by cells aggregating or remaining connected after cell division. Here, Driscoll and Travisano show that both mechanisms operate in experimentally evolved strains of the yeast Kluyveromyces lactis, with transient aggregation facilitating the coexistence of unicellular and multicellular genotypes.

Cooperation is fundamental to the survival of many bacterial species. Previous studies have shown that spatial structure can both promote and suppress cooperation. Most environments where bacteria are found are periodically disturbed, which can affect the spatial structure of the population. Despite the important role that spatial disturbances play in maintaining ecological relationships, it remains unclear as to how periodic spatial disturbances affect bacteria dependent on cooperation for survival. Here, we use bacteria engineered with a strong Allee effect to investigate how the frequency of periodic spatial disturbances affects cooperation. We show that at intermediate frequencies of spatial disturbance, the ability of the bacterial population to cooperate is perturbed. A mathematical model demonstrates that periodic spatial disturbance leads to a tradeoff between accessing an autoinducer and accessing nutrients, which determines the ability of the bacteria to cooperate. Based on this relationship, we alter the ability of the bacteria to access an autoinducer. We show that increased access to an autoinducer can enhance cooperation, but can also reduce ecological resistance, defined as the ability of a population to resist changes due to disturbance. Our results may have implications in maintaining stability of microbial communities and in the treatment of infectious diseases.

In recent years, sociobiology has been extended to microorganisms. Viewed through this lens, the microbial world is replete with cooperative behaviors. However, little attention has been paid to alternate hypotheses, making many studies self-confirming. Somewhat apart is a recent analysis of pyoverdin production-a paradigmatic public good and social trait-by Pseudomonas, which has revealed discord between predictions arising from sociobiology and the biology of microbes. This led the authors, Zhang and Rainey (Z&R), to question the generality of the conclusion that pyoverdin is a social trait, and to question the fit between the sociobiology framework and microbiology. This has unsettled Kummerli and Ross-Gillespie (K&R), who in a recent "Technical Comment" assert that arguments presented by Z&R are flawed, their experiments technically mistaken, and their understanding of social evolution theory naive. We demonstrate these claims to be without substance and show the conclusions of K&R to be based on a lack of understanding of redox chemistry and on misinterpretation of data. We also point to evidence of cherry-picking and raise the possibility of confirmation bias. Finally, we emphasize that the sociobiology framework applied to microbes is a hypothesis that requires rigorous and careful appraisal.

The question of how altruism can evolve despite its local disadvantage to selfishness has produced a wealth of theoretical and empirical research capturing the attention of scientists across disciplines for decades. One feature that has remained consistent through this outpouring of knowledge has been that researchers have looked to the altruists themselves for mechanisms by which altruism can curtail selfishness. An alternative perspective may be that just as altruists want to limit selfishness in the population, so may the selfish individuals themselves. These alternative perspectives have been most evident in the fairly recent development of enforcement strategies. Punishment can effectively limit selfishness in the population, but it is not free. Thus, when punishment evolves among altruists, the double costs of exploitation from cheaters and punishment make the evolution of punishment problematic. Here we show that punishment can more readily invade selfish populations when associated with selfishness, whereas altruistic punishers cannot. Thereafter, the establishment of altruism because of enforcement by selfish punishers provides the ideal invasion conditions for altruistic punishment, effectively creating a transition of punishment from selfishness to altruistic. Thus, from chaotic beginnings, a little hypocrisy may go a long way in the evolution and maintenance of altruism.

Organisms from prokaryotes to plants and animals make costly investments in diffusible beneficial external products. While the costs of producing such products are born only by the producer, the benefits may be distributed more widely. How are external goods-producing populations stabilized against invasion by nonproducing variants that receive the benefits without paying the cost? This question parallels the classic question of altruism, but because external goods production need not be altruistic per se, a broader range of conditions may lead to the maintenance of these traits. We start from the physics of diffusion to develop an expression for the conditions that favor the production of diffusible external goods. Important variables in determining the evolutionary outcome include the diffusion coefficient of the good, the distance between individuals, and the uptake rate of the external good. These variables join the coefficient of relatedness and the cost/benefit ratio in an expanded form of Hamilton's rule that includes both selfish and altruistic paths to the evolution of external goods strategies. This expanded framework can be applied to any external goods trait, and is a useful heuristic even when it is difficult to quantify the fitness consequences of producing the good.