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The Russian and Chinese revolutions, long celebrated by their claqueurs as trailblazing events leading to what Karl Marx asserted would be the inevitable worldwide victory of socialism, were linked...

This forum includes six commentaries on Lorenz M. Lüthi's book The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, published by Princeton University Press in 2008. Drawing on recently declassified documents and memoirs from numerous countries, Lüthi explains how and why the close alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China fell apart in a remarkably short time, dissolving into fierce mutual enmity. Amassing a wealth of evidence, Lüthi stresses the role of ideology in the split, lending support to the arguments put forth nearly five decades ago by analysts like Donald Zagoria in his pioneering book on the Sino-Soviet rift. Six leading experts on Chinese foreign policy and Sino-Soviet relations discuss the strengths of Lüthi's book but also raise questions about some interpretations and omissions. The forum includes Lüthi's reply to the commentaries.

This volume reviews the goals, operation, and history of American antidumping laws coupled with a strategy for using those laws to promote U.S. trade policy and economic objectives in the post-Uruguay Round GATT talks.

DURING THE 1977 Christmas season, a best selling item in Plains, Georgia, was a cup and saucer set made in Taiwan depicting President Carter and scenes from his home town.' This neatly symbolized the continuing hold that the issue of Taiwan had on the president during a year that saw little if any movement towards the goal of normalizing Sino-American relations. The illusion, fostered by the inauguration of a new administration, that long intractable problems might suddenly become manageable, did not long survive in the area of China policy. Rather, as the administration established its priorities in foreign affairs, China policy slid toward the bottom of the list of issues requiring urgent attention. The high point of the year was a low-key and apparently inconclusive trip to Peking by Secretary of State Vance in late August. As Chinese leaders reiterated their conditions for normalization, Washington apparently believed that it could temporize a while longer before making any difficult decisions. Two things became clearer during the year. One was that more than ever before, China policy had to be considered in the context of America's global posture. The second was that there is no longer a domestic consensus on American policy toward China. Whatever position the administration takes will incur political costs. Thus, what some observers see as an unfortunate policy of drift might more charitably be viewed as prudence in the face of very difficult choices.

The foreign policy of China, a nation which proudly proclaims itself to be a developing socialist country belonging to the Third World, continues to be defined largely by what it perceives as the imperatives of its relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States. The end of the Cultural Revolution which coincided with the beginnings of Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy and a border-war crisis in Sino-Soviet relations introduced a new fluidity into Chinese foreign policy. But the resulting Sino-American rapprochement coupled with continuing SinoSoviet stalemate is just one of the possible forms of a complex pattern of competition and cooperation among these powers which is likely to persist for some time. Until recently, China has been a country with predominantly regional interests, but now her foreign policy is acquiring a global dimension through her growing foreign trade, her augmented strategic capacity, and her support for the transformation of the international economic and political systems. This development naturally enhances the intrinsic importance of studying Chinese foreign policy, but just as surely increases the uncertainty of any analysis because of the widening range of factors which need to be considered.

On July 28, 1986, in his first major pronouncement on Soviet Asian policy since coming to office sixteen months earlier, Soviet Communist Party General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made a broad-ranging series of proposals aimed at improving Soviet relations with its Asian neighbors. Reaffirming the USSR’s status as an Asian-Pacific nation, Gorbachev stated his support for China’s current modernization program and called upon Chinese leaders to build on the advances in Soviet-Chinese relations achieved over the past few years.1 In a September 2 interview with CBS Television, China’s preeminent leader Deng Xiaoping responded to Gorbachev’s initiative by saying that he would be willing to visit Moscow provided the USSR ceased helping Vietnam in its occupation of Cambodia.2 What do these top-level declarations indicate about the state of Sino-Soviet relations?