I would like to thank Merje Kuus and Garth Myers for suchthoughtful and generous responses to my paper. Their comments,inverydifferentways,bothdrawouttheimplicitchallengerunningthrough my paper, which is the attempt to overcome the domi-nance of western ways of thinking in political geography withoutsliding towards a kind of relativism where everything is of equalimportance (see also Agnew, 2007).Kuus suggests that I see marginality and subalterity as equiva-lent, leading to her argument that marginalityis not a trait but a relationship to power. Our efforts to grasp itsoperation, whether in Denmark, Tanzania or the US, cannot be astraightforwardmatteroflabellingsomeplacesassubalternandothers as hegemonic.Kuus argues that potentially all countries are subaltern in thecurrent system; they just don’t know it yet. Recent debates aroundthe difficulties of states ensuring that multinational corporationspay tax is illustrative of this point: it has recently been discoveredthat tax avoidance by one UK-based companycost Zambia fourteentimes the amount it received in aid from Britain (Boffey, 2013). Butit has also been argued that the tax owed by companies like Star-bucks, Google and Vodaphone to the UK government would elim-inate the need for austerity cuts (Milne, 2012). Argued like thisthen, each state is in a subaltern position relative to systemic po-wer; each matters equally.However, I do not want to entirely equate marginality andsubalterity e they are broadly comparable, as Kuus notes, but notquite the same. While I do want to see both primarily as being in arelationship to power, there is no doubt that, at times, certainplaces are labelled as subaltern, that this representation has con-sequences, but also that it is a location with a certain strategicpolitical agency. Nyerere played up the subalterity of Tanzania,insisting on the importance of unity with other people placedoutside of hegemonic power. And, this is where Tanzania is notjustanother example of a marginal state. Nyerere had a vision thatmade it more significant than the country’s position in otherranked measures might suggest. Post-colonial Tanzania was tryingto do something different, setting a new path not just forTanzanians but to challenge a system where certain states wouldcome todominance. Nyerere’s vision of going beyond societies thatwere defined by religion, colour and ethnicity led to the countrybecoming a beacon of hope for many. But this was a leadership ofmoral authority, not one based around conventional geopolitical oreconomic power.Thus, as I noted in my paper, post-colonial Tanzania sought topush a different world order. Nyerere did not seek to compete withhegemonic powerof any kind, as he explained in an interviewwiththe Kenyan paper, the Daily Nation, in 1968:The big Communist states are as likely to indulge in attempts toinfiltrate societies as the big capitalist states. The major differ-ence which I see at the moment is that the eastern powers arenot yet used to controlling Africans . They don’t assume theyhave the right to ‘give us advice’ in the same wayas some of thelargewesternpowers do.The real truthis thatcapitalismis bynature expansionist. Communism is on the other hand evan-gelical . and Africa has some experience of the things that canfollow evangelism. (quoted in Pratt, 1976: 250).Nyerere sought to create linkages with a variety of lower-orderpowers; politically through pan-Africanism and non-alignment butalso in terms of economic assistance, by going to those Europeanpowers (Norway, Sweden, Denmark.), which, he believed, werenot used to assuming dominance (from this Tanzanianperspective,Denmark did matter). Thus, I do think the Tanzanian case is of in-terest in and of itself. It is not just one marginal state amongstmany, because of what it stood for, and what it attempted to dowithin and beyond its own boundaries.Nyerere’ssubalterngeopoliticswasprojectedthroughanumberof scales. Myers has suggested (in his response to my paper and,more forcefully, in Myers and Muhajir 2013) that the true subalterngeopolitics in Tanzania are expressed in Swahili. Indeed, Nyerereused Swahili to narrate the Tanganyikan, then Tanzanian, nation,and perhaps one day hoped for this to be a language that wouldunite East Africa and beyond. The concepts that Myers explains,alongside the more familiar ujamaa, umoja and uhuru (family-ness,unity and freedom), capture Nyerere’s conceptualisation of adistinctively African form of self-reliant socialism in a way thatthese English translations do not. However, while it is clear that, asMyers explained so convincingly, Nyerere was an exceptionalSwahili orator, this was a performance made in particular spaces,when he was promoting a vision of a country united beyond the