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In terms of design and key objectives, this volume entails a triadic syllogism. Continental thinking constitutes its source material, and first of all I offer a concise exposition of the way in which Hegel, Marx, Engels, Bachelard, Lacan and Heidegger allow us to come to terms with technoscience. As indicated, notwithstanding multiple differences and interventions, I see their oeuvres as building on a common ground. I also acknowledge the second moment (the negation), however, consisting of claims (brought forward by various authors) that this corpus of literature, or parts of it, are invalid or outdated, for instance because the future belongs to neo-liberalism (as Francis Fukuyama argued), or because continental thinking is flawed by Eurocentric and androcentric biases. Rather than countering or criticising this type of criticism directly and extensively (which would result in more or less “theoretical” debates), I have adopted a more “cataphatic” course. By outlining its basic logic (its methodology) and by extrapolating it to a number of case studies, my aim is to demonstrate the viability, urgency and contemporary relevance of a continental approach (“via positiva”).

The article refutes the widespread view that Dostoevsky's Christian beliefs were strictly Orthodox. It is proved that Dostoevsky's religious and philosophical searches' central tendency is the criticism of historical, ecclesiastical Christianity as a false, distorted form of the teaching of Jesus Christ and the desire to restore this teaching in its original purity. Modern researchers of the history of early Christianity find more and more arguments in favor of the fact that the actual teaching of Jesus Christ is contained in that religious movement, which the church called the Gnostic heresy. The exact philosophical expression of the teaching of Christ was received in the later works of J.G. Fichte, whose ideas had a strong influence on the Russian writer. Like Fichte, Dostoevsky understands Christ as the first person who showed the possibility of revealing God in himself and gaining divine omnipotence and eternal life directly in earthly reality. In this sense, every person can become like Christ. Dostoevsky's main characters walk the path of Christ and show how difficult this path is. The article shows that Dostoevsky used in his work not only the philosophical version of true (Gnostic) Christianity developed by German philosophy (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), but also the key motives of the Gnostic myth, primarily the idea that our world, filled with evil and suffering, is created not by the supreme, good God-Father, but by the evil Demiurge, the Devil (in this sense, it is hell).

It is often claimed that Hegel's philosophy cannot accept that something would remain beyond the grasp of conceptual language, and that his thought therefore systematically represses the possibility that something cannot be said. By analysing Hegel's account of the ineffable in the ‘Sense-Certainty’ chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, this article argues that Hegel does not repress, but firmly confronts the problem of what cannot be said. With the help of Giorgio Agamben's linguistic interpretation, it is shown that Hegel's conception of the ineffable must be understood from the perspective of his dialectical understanding of language. What appears to be ineffable is only the constitutive result of the dialectical negation that conceptual discourse enacts. Consequently, the ineffable in Hegel's thought cannot be said to remain external to and independent from conceptual language.

Sophocles’ Antigone has been studied intensely for more than two thousand years, but it was especially Hegel’s allegorical use of this tragedy in several of his works (first and foremost the Phenomenology of Spirit) that added yet another fascinating facet to its possible reading: the birth of the legal order and therewith a constitutional system from the conflict between two normative orders. In this contribution, I interpret the dialectic structure of Antigone in a manner in which each normative position – both Antigone’s and Creon’s – are equally justified and thereby antithetic in the ethical world of the Greek polis. It is therefore only by transcending this tragic conflict between the human and the divine orders that we can transform necessary externalities (‘fate’) into a process of a legal status which eventually allows individuals to become the authors of the law itself and thus to guarantee their freedom. I denote this reading of Hegel’s Antigone as ‘symmetrical’, since it accepts both positions – Antigone’s divine law and Creon’s human law – as equal and makes freedom and justice only possible through the law. This means that an ‘asymmetrical’ reading, giving prevalence to either position (for instance, found in Goethe or Habermas) and localizing freedom and justice beyond the law, can never effectively result in a legal status that would allow individual persons to become legal persons.My principal argument consequently is that only a symmetrical view of this normative conflict can justifiably be regarded as making a constitutional order possible in the first place. It is feasible only in a dynamic-genealogical fashion (ie, by constantly generating this order through conflict and the transcending of this conflict through mutual recognition) that concurrently also respects individuals as particular individuals, not just as formal equals among equals, by allowing them to realize their personalities and to find themselves through the arts, science, and philosophy. This is more than a merely formal or negative constitution which recognizes every person as equal and free, but disregards their particularities; this is a material and positive constitution that can guarantee both equality and self-actualization. Such a constitutional order guarantees an identity of universal laws and individuality, and accordingly offers individuals a solution to the conflicting ethical orders of the ancient polis in which they would otherwise remain trapped.

Beginning with Margaret Somers and Christopher Roberts’ review of the sociology of human rights and Bryan Turner and Malcolm Waters’ debate therein, the author presents some of the questions which have been so far been the focus of this sociological sub-discipline. This review raises the question of ‘rights’ as a subject of study, and the normative consequences therein. From here, the author introduces recognition theory as a potential participant in these discussions around human rights. The author traces recognition theory from its Hegelian origins to the work of Axel Honneth, and the critiques of Nancy Fraser, Frantz Fanon, and Glen Sean Coulthard. Despite Fanon and Coulthard’s critical accounts, they reinforce the value of recognition within any sociology of human rights. Lastly, the author briefly engages with Alasdair MacIntyre as both a dialogical participant, and a means towards dialogue in the first place between recognition theory and human rights. Concluding, the author argues that the normative and descriptive nature of recognition theory offers a useful tool to aid in sociological theorizations of human nature and rights, while addressing some of the problems raised by early theorists of the sub-discipline and preventing siloing of the sub-discipline within a universalist or particularist vein.

This article looks at several sections of Minima Moralia where Adorno talks explicitly about the need for genuine thinking and what that might consist in. First, I argue that Hegel and Nietzsche ar...

Hegel’s doctrine in the XXI century remains relevant for the Russian politico-legal science due to the deep development of the categorical apparatus and methodological tools for expressing the value nature of law and state. Hegel's doctrine of the subject of law, especially presented in his early works, is one of the little-studied, but at the same time very significant part of his scientific work, the appeal to which should contribute to the further development of the modern system of legal categories. Purpose: to carry out a comparative analysis of the various versions of the Hegelian doctrine of the personality as a subject of law and its genesis, taking into account the peculiarities of natural law and theological pproaches. Methods: the authors use logical, historical-genetic, historical-comparative, systemic method of cognition, as well as the methodology of theoretical and legal comparative studies. Results: in the late philosophical system, Hegel develops the doctrine of the dual nature of the personality as a subject of law: as a specific subject, a person mediates his relationship with other subjects through a single objective thing (qualitative characteristics of the subject), as an abstract subject, a person bases his relations with them on recognition as equal subjects of freedom (quantitative characteristics of the subject). The way to resolve this conflict is through morality. During various periods of his scientific work, Hegel considers the genesis of the personality as a subject of law from a natural law and theological point of view, including the idea of God, while dentifying new substantive aspects of the concept of the subject of law, related to the the historical development of the state and the formation of the rule-of-law state.

Following the presence of Hegel’s philosophy in Iran from the nineteenth century to the present, this study discusses various interpretations and appropriations of Hegelian philosophy by Iranian ac...

This article discusses the value changes in the time of generations over the years of Kazakhstan’s independence. It was considered that in the first years of independence, Kazakh society, as a result of the creation of a value vacuum in people’s behaviour, was disoriented in the spiritual and material spheres. The issue of spiritual obscenity was also addressed. At the same time, the influence of an atheistic society on a person’s worldview, the factor of polyreligiosity of one nation, the inability of the Kazakh people to occupy the cultural space as a state of the forming nation, living with one-day interests, was recorded. It was shown that the time of generations is associated with the political freedom of citizens and that this freedom is a guarantee of the security of the state. The article presents the views of philosophers such Hegel, Marx, Foucault, Zh.Abdildin, G.Yessim, B.Kolbayev, Sinan Uzbek, Sh.Aitmatov. In the novelof Sh. Aitmatov “Cassandra’s Brand” in the study of universal values were given thoughts such as evil in non-religious society, struggle against it, conscience, and shame.Key words: time of generations, multi-religiosity of one nation, disorientation in spiritual values, alienation, being for oneself, futurology, doubts.

The article examines the paradoxical nature of G.W.F. Hegel’s biography and philosophical ideology. The essence of paradoxicality is substantiated by several factors – biographical, historical-philosophical, hermeneutical, and concrete-historical. The purpose of the work is to identify insufficiently known aspects of the personality and philosophical ideology of the thinker. Methodologically, the study is constructed using dialectical and historical-logical methods. The results of the study are to reveal the voluminous inconsistency of Hegel’s biography and thought; to clarify both the positive and negative aspects of his philosophical ideology. The author shows a number of paradoxes of Hegel’s philosophy: first, the understanding of development as a ‘hard’ war against itself and inattention to the multifactorial and non-linear nature of many processes; secondly, focusing on a logical idea belittles or denies the value of everything else, including living and human beings; thirdly, the desire to raise a person to ‘the highest’ position and at the same time enslave him as a universal creature and a state citizen; fourth, Hegel’s essentialism is frankly anti-existential and merciless to everything private and subjective; fifth, Hegel’s seemingly flawless scientific system suffers from inattention to the complexity and unpredictability of reality; sixth, the Lutheran religiosity of the philosopher turns out to be almost anti-Christian – with the non-recognition of the Most Holy Trinity, without the desire to become a ‘servant’ of another, etc.; seventh, Hegel’s decency and philistine ‘kindness’ are radically different from his pejorative attitude towards the female sex, other peoples, races, and civilizations. Colonialism is justified. Hence, it was quite natural for the German Nazis to turn to Hegel’s ideas. Eighth, the great dialectic has too much belittled the reality of static things, unambiguity and invariance. The novelty of the research lies in the recognition of the true causes and tasks of the thinker’s life and work; in the explanation of his main values, including his understanding of Christianity; in the clarification of the Hegel-German and Hegel-citizen positions. The conclusions of the study are related to the antithetical comparison of the ideology and philosophy of Hegel and Hesse, Hegel and Shestov. The author highlights anti-existential and racial-nationalist motives of the philosopher’s work.

Dostoevsky's characters are often portrayed as unhappy people suffering from the deepest personal crisis or going through total life disorder, chaos in thoughts, failure of plans and desires. In fact, such troublesome state of affairs becomes natural to them. They go on emerging in it, feeling constantly unsatisfied with what they are (and usually they are nothings, non-entities), alienated from everything and everyone. Western philosophical tradition sees some not-too-dark version of such state as a dramatic norm of human existence and beginnings — from Heraclites' fate-challenging War and Parmenides' naught-coming-to-being to Plato's Eros longing for what he is and has not and Hegelian Ungluckliche Bewustsein meaning that consciousness in the form of Self is only a sketch that has yet to define and fill itself with true substance. But Russian literary-philosophical discourse (Dostoevsky's being the significant representative of it) regards this situation as catastrophic, and the idea of creature-in-need-of-its-own-being absurd, threatening and finally demonic. Those lost and darkly brooding Selves, if according to it, produce with their unrest a whirl of destructive energy, essentially leading all the world around them to moral devastation, cultural nihilism and murderous revolts. Dostoevsky defies dialectics; there is only Life (real, true, present, godly) and deadly, lying, unshaped Evil confronting and marring it, with no processional in-betweens and mathematically neutral balance. The failed man penetrating the body of Life is indeed an agent of Evil, and his personal failure is the first sign of a more dreadful ruination to come from the dark side of existence, exactly through him.

Hegel's integration of the concept of Life in the Logic has long been disputed and rejected by many scholars. The most common objection was that it seemed counterintuitive to integrate an empirical phenomenon such as Life into a Logic that, in fact, ought to present an immanent development of pure concepts. Hegel was often accused of bringing empirical considerations into his Logic in order to develop his logical account of Life. Consequently, there has been a great discussion about the question as to whether a Logic is an appropriate place for this concept—a discussion that did not occur with respect to other categories in Hegel's Logic. Now, in contemporary literature on Hegel, there is a surge of genuine interest in Hegel's logical account of Life, accompanied by the insight that the concept of Life plays an important and indispensable role in Hegel's philosophy. However, what this role is precisely is a controversial issue.

There are two dominant contradictory approaches towards understanding the nature of language: one, the epistemological approach; two, the ontological approach. The epistemological approach understands language as a mere tool and denies the close relationship between a word and the actual thing for which that word stands. The ontological approach, on the other hand, understands language as the disclosure of world experience and professes a close relationship between a word and the thing it signifies. However, this approach opposes the epistemological approach towards the understanding of language. In this article, we propose that Hegel, in his Phenomenology of Spirit, depicts an interesting relationship between language and spirit which points towards the consistency between the two contradictory approaches towards the nature of language. For Hegel, language not only plays a role in spirit’s pursuit of self-knowledge which signifies the epistemological approach, but also in spirit’s existence which signifies the ontological approach. Thus, in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the epistemological approach and the ontological approach towards the nature of language coexist. In this article, by turning to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and through an analysis of the relationship between language and spirit, we not only attempt to seek some resolution to the epistemology-ontology contradiction, but we also reveal the homogeneity of language and spirit, which we take as the true nature of language in Hegel’s philosophy.

Hermann Cohen's Logic of Pure Knowledge and G. W. F. Hegel's Science of Logic each use in their way the means of thought of negation and contradiction to unfold the philosophical dynamic: a fragile interplay between self-endangerment and self-preservation of thought. Here, the proximity and difference of the two authors are extended. The proximity lies in methodological negativism. The difference is in the significance of the principle of continuity. According to Cohen and Hegel as well, thinking proceeds exclusively, as Kant called it, synthetically. The exclusion of contradiction, limited to analytical judgments, has only marginal significance. But the commonality does not eliminate the differences. As Hegel puts it, contradiction is a principle of mediation and finally results in "self-dissolution"; it carries within itself a direction of logical "reconciliation." Per Cohen, contradiction is a principle of "annihilation" (annihilatio) of approaches to a determination that threatens any form of "identity." The turn Hegel put in contradiction itself, regarding in it a unity of positivity and negativity, has no direct counterpart in Cohen. Nevertheless, for him, too, the "judgment of contradiction" becomes the active basis of all cognitive thought. By exercising a contradiction-destroying "activity," the judgment of contradiction "protects," indeed "generates," the real possibility of cognition. The annihilation of the non-identical sets free the fundamental "judgment of origin" with which cognition finds its beginning. The principle of continuity taken over from Leibniz corresponds to it. Just this principle has now again no direct correspondence with Hegel.

This essay proposes that the interpretations of Hegelian philosophy advanced by Gillian Rose and Robert Pippin may be relevant to the theorisation of genocide. This argument is presented via a disc...

En la actualidad la crisis de la racionalidad occidental y la crisis del modo de producción capitalistas ha planteado nuevos problemas como la crisis ecológica, la crisis política y en general la crisis social y moral en la sociedad moderna. Ante este estado de cosas es necesario retomar, replantear la crítica que hace Marx al modo de producción capitalista. En este trabajo analizaremos dos categorías que son relevantes para la comprención de la obra más importante de Marx: el Kapital. Estas dos categorías son el concepto de ‘racionalidad’ y el concepto de ‘crítica’. En la primera parte analizamos los tres posicionamientos de la razón frente a la objetividad. En esta parte, sostenemos que Marx asume el tercer posicionamiento de la razón frente a la objetividad que es el modo de proceder de la razón en el sentido de Hegel. En este sentido hay una continuidad y no una ruptura con respecto a la propuesta epistemológica de Hegel. En la segunda parte de la investigación, se muestra cómo Marx desarrolla y articula las categorías económicas de el Capital asumiendo el modo de proceder de la razón dialéctica en el sentido hegeliano. En la tercera parte, muestro la crítica en un sentido positivo respecto a Hegel dirigida a la crítica que hace Marx a la economía política clásica en su punto de partida y en relación al modo en como articula sus categorías económicas. Finalmente, en la útima parte muestro la ruptura que tiene Marx respecto a Hegel sosteniendo que los efectos negativos de la codicia impiden alcanzar al Estado ‘racional’.

If early Caribbean philosophy is characterized by its pan-African flourishes, what is less well known is its flirtations with existentialism. Although C.L.R. James’s 1965 Heideggerian reading of Wi...

La obra maestra desconocida de Balzac se ha convertido en una obra que anticipa la fragmentación y la disolución de la forma en el arte moderno. Desde una perspectiva comparada entre la literatura y el arte, se analizan algunos conceptos relacionados con la estética de lo inacabado, lo efímero, lo subjetivo y la percepción de la muerte del ideal de la belleza del arte clásico como características de un arte que en la obra de Balzac se esboza a partir de la literatura. Estos conceptos son revisados a partir de los escritos sobre el arte de Baudelaire y de Delacroix donde existen coincidencias en la nueva perspectiva de la obra pictórica alejada de los cánones de la teoría clásica. Se retoma el concepto de la disolución de la forma de Hegel para señalar algunos aspectos que se alcanzan a ver en la obra descrita de Balzac. Las relaciones entre literatura y pintura son dispares e imposibles, lo que plantea los límites de la representación. Balzac presenta una obra llena de significados, lo que ha permitido un sinfín de interpretaciones. Más allá de intentar encontrar una definición se considera el carácter inmaterial e inacabado de la obra pictórica descrita, ya que Balzac propone, en realidad, una poética de la reflexión sobre los alcances de la pintura y de la literatura.

Peter Fitzpatrick’s intellectual relationship with Jean-Luc Nancy centred on the related problems of myth and community. In this article, I will explicate the ‘restlessness of the negative’ that Nancy describes in Hegel, in order to further develop Fitzpatrick’s notion of ‘law as resistance’. Set against the backdrop of myth and community, law can be understood as a community’s fragmentary attempt to explicate its essence. Modern law becomes an artefact of the negative twisting through a community’s attempts to construct itself through a Nancian ontology of ‘being singular plural’. In this manner, one might understand Fitzpatrick’s claim that there is ‘always more to be done’ as affirming the necessity of some extra-formal legality—that is, the political—that must be opened through the resistance wrought by negativity.

G. W. F. Hegel sees Oedipus as an epitome of the philosophical quest for self-knowledge. In Hegel's readings of Oedipus, the latter becomes a distant reflection of the modern and mature Hegelian self, who consciously takes on this quest. Yet unlike Oedipus, whose search for the truth about his past is characterized by both metaphorical and literal blindness, the modern self knows itself, precisely because it understands its past and can thus appropriate and situate itself in relation to the present. For Hegel, self-understanding entails grasping the proper relationship between past and present, which in turn necessitates acknowledging his own relationship to Oedipus. This essay examines Henrik Ibsen's turn to the Hegelian engagement with the past (Oedipus being one crucial moment in the Hegelian story of the history of self-consciousness), by focusing on one of the most enigmatic scenes in his 1866 drama, Peer Gynt, where the Norwegian protagonist is cast as Oedipus. The scene examines the drama's own past—through an engagement with a dramatic ancestor—and focuses on the influence of the past on fashioning modern European identity. Moreover, it offers a critique of how the past is utilized in the creation and consolidation of that identity. With this, Ibsen offers an implicit critique of Hegel's understanding of Oedipus, and his encounter with the Sphinx in particular. Revisiting Oedipus through its modern reception, Ibsen questions the act by which the past is revealed as such and is put to work in the service of a particular present.

In the present article we concentrate on developing what we consider the essential passages of Hegel’s political philosophy in the Philosophy of Right. Firstly, as an introductory note to the content, we analyze briefly the aims pursued by his project, both contextually and in itself. This obliges us to distinguish between the existent and the real. Secondly, we proceed to expose the concept of will, which transits from an abstract moment (the subjective will) to the concrete moment (the will in itself and for itself, which is identical to the Idea). Thirdly, we continue studying the morality by focusing on Hegel’s immanent critique of Kant, stating the idea of the autonomy of moral being on Sittlichkeit. Fourthly, the ethical Idea keeps giving itself content in the family, in civil society and in the State. Our interest focused on the last two, although family has its exiguous place in the article. The emphasis on civil society and the State lies in the moments when individuality experiences its selfish and, subsequently, universal ends. Finally, we reflect on our contemporaneity and the demands that the concept of ethicity has in a new context, namely, the differentiation of commodities that becomes the differentiation of capital. By means of the concept of differentiation of capital expounded by Pablo Levin, our intellection of capitalism is enriched. Thus, we understand that the specificity of this universal system is domination through ideology. Indeed, we use the concepts of alienation, fear of freedom and oppression developed by Paulo Freire to explain the selfish, abstract, and unreflective manifestations of the present. This task, far from distancing us from Hegel’s concept, invites us to take it up again to distinguish its limits as well as its potentiality.

Unpublished text from the beginning of the Hegel period in Jena, The German Constitution (1799-1802) analyzed the long process of degradation that the German Empire suffered at the turn of the 19th century and related it to the appearance of a “bourgeois spirit” (Burgergeist), that is, from an autonomous sphere of interests that was constituted fundamentally under the sign of commerce. We will first try to find some threads of continuity between these elements and the concept of “civil society” in the Philosophy of Right (1820), and then we will enter our fundamental question, the “problem that plagues modern societies”: the social production of poverty and of an inorganic social fringe that acts, even, against the State, the Rabble (Pobel), trying to understand it as an immanent contradiction of civil society, how Hegel tries to solve it and the historical implications of these solutions.

A bicentenária filosofia do direito de Hegel ainda contém importantes contribuições para o debate jusfilosófico contemporâneo. Essas contribuições surgem, por exemplo, ao se traçar contraposições ao juspositivismo, uma das principais correntes contemporâneas da filosofia do direito, especialmente no que diz respeito à figura de Kelsen. Enquanto o juspositivismo advoga por uma visão objetiva sobre o direito, o mais próximo possível de uma ciência, elegendo a norma como seu objeto e afastando o direito de demais esferas da vida social, especialmente a moral e a política, Hegel propõe uma visão sistemática, onde o direito é, ao lado da moralidade e da eticidade, parte do espírito objetivo, de todo o universo prático racional. A partir dessa compreensão, Hegel é capaz de explicar o direito positivo como resultado de uma evolução conceitual que pretende a universalização do direito abstrato, o qual, por sua vez, tem início na personalidade enquanto expressão mais básica da liberdade, sendo sua efetivação a categoria da propriedade. Essa universalização apenas pode ser atingida na esfera das relações éticas, quando o direito se torna positivo. Mesmo assim, Hegel ressalta que o direito positivo nem sempre é condizente com o direito racional, pois o direito positivo em determinado contexto não necessariamente corresponde à evolução da autoconsciência da liberdade. Tendo em vista a sistemática conceitual por detrás do direito, Hegel consegue superar algumas das dificuldades que o juspositivismo possui no que diz respeito à crítica de normas que claramente ferem a liberdade humana.

A pesar de haber sido formulada de la manera más completa hace casi dos siglos, la teoría hegeliana de la pena sigue siendo convincente por entender la justicia en términos de reconocimiento y no en una clave vengativa o correctiva. El problema ante el que nos encontramos se puede resumir en el sintagma de “justificación de la pena”. Lo más radicalmente novedoso en la filosofía de Hegel es que la pena, tal y como se muestra en el parágrafo 100 de los Principios de Filosofía del Derecho, es considerada como “un derecho” del delincuente. Así, la pena impuesta a la persona que decide delinquir no resultaría ser nada más que un reconocimiento a su racionalidad. Esto es así puesto que, a ojos de Hegel, de no tratarse de un ser racional, sería incoherente castigarle. Encontramos entonces una relación directa entre el castigo y una determinada concepción de la racionalidad que, como es conocido, para Hegel está relacionada con la libertad y su desarrollo en la historia. Esta concepción tiene sus dificultades, a las cuales trataremos de aproximarnos: ¿cómo puede ser algo simultáneamente un derecho y un castigo para la misma persona? En la primera parte de este artículo dibujaremos la teoría de la pena de Hegel como una que no debe ni reformar al individuo ni vengar el daño. Esto nos permite pensar la justicia en términos que dejan atrás tanto la venganza como la corrección. Una lectura de Hegel nos llevaría hoy a adoptar una perspectiva de un gran compromiso moral, que no patologice al criminal sólo por ser criminal, y que, a un mismo tiempo, no criminalice eternamente al culpable. Estamos insertos en un marco complejo de relaciones sociales donde es imposible no actuar mal a ojos de alguien. No por ello nos debemos quedar en la inacción, pues, ¿de qué serviría la autonomía para pensar la moral, si no la tenemos para actuar conforme a ella? Legislación y moral no se pueden entender completamente si prescindimos de uno de los dos términos. Por ello, en la segunda parte del trabajo se tratará de analizar este problema en clave ética, subrayando la crítica de Hegel al formalismo kantiano y al alma bella.

What is a damaged life? What kind of theoretical and metaphysical problems are challenged by Adorno’s moral philosophy? In this paper we argue that the reflections delivered by Adorno after the catastrophe of the Second World War must be read from the scope of a systematic use of reason present in modern enlightenment philosophy as well as in modern market society. We claim the traditional concepts of moral autonomy and ethical life (Sittlichkeit) are both guided by the exchange principle developed by bourgeois society. We focus in the systematic architecture of Hegel’s social philosophy with a view to identify an antimony shared with bourgeois society: the boundless expansion of the market and rational knowledge. The role of the synthetic concept of infinity is discussed in an ideological sense, stressing labor’s division consequences. Finally, we set forth a discussion about the limits of Adorno’s theoretical criticism, especially on his use of dialectical categories and the ways in which they can be integrated in the core of a Critical theory.

This article explores the understanding of aesthetics in the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy. It does so in relation to Hegel’s claim about art’s dissolution or passing at the end of the classical, Greek age, as the world entered the modern, Christian age. For the two French thinkers, their relation to Hegel (and to a large extent aesthetics generally) turns on the claim that art was, but is not. The article looks first at Nancy’s discussion of the young girl carrying fruit, a figure used by Hegel to depict this scene in the history of spirit, then moves on to a rarely-read but significant article by Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘The Unpresentable’, before some final thoughts.

The article discusses the Hegelian opposition between institutions of Police and Corporation, leading to the objective spirit formed in the notion of the State. Juxtaposing both of Hegel's institutions against the usage of these notions proposed by Jacques Rancière (Police) and Alain Badiou (State of the Situation) opens a critical dividing line. We emphasize the inadequate handling of economic factors inherent in both notions, consequently obfuscating the economic conditioning of the political dimension in the social body. Moreover, we supplement both of the institutions with an economic-counterpart notion; to Police we add “Private Property” and to Corporation “State of Technology”. Further, we apply Badiou's handling of Hegel's dialectics as the dialectics of “constitutive scission”. The dialectical play of private property and state of technology is distinguished in the dialectics of algebra of places and topology of localizations. The resulting intersection is shown to be the place of torsion–corresponding to the place of the Subject–an interval, where we confront an uttered “wrong”, an interruption in the smooth counting of parts in a social body. This torsion is an immanent backside operation of the economic structure as far as it is a necessary factor in the upsurge of political subjectivity.

The aim of this short essay is to sketch an introductory account of the concept of life in German Idealism and to argue that it is both a philosophically robust concept and a productive lens throug...

Embora para o pensamento dialético posterior e de matriz hegeliana o desenvolvimento técnico tenha sido considerado central para a compreensão da dinâmica da sociedade como um todo, esse não parece ter sido o caso para o próprio Hegel. Certamente subtematizada, a questão da técnica não esteve todavia ausente de seu pensamento. O artigo investiga duas abordagens do assunto feitas pelo filósofo, em sua obra de juventude e de maturidade, levando cada uma delas a lançar luz sobre a outra.

The relations between George Herbert Mead’s pragmatism and Wilhelm Dilthey’s hermeneutics have been examined in recent years in a new light: based on the former’s close contact with the latter during the course of his studies in Germany in the 1880s–90s. These relations seem to vanish afterward, with Mead’s return to the United States. Yet the common interests they share in the formation of a new social science keeps their respective developments in parallel; from psychology to history, they both share common interests in the reformulation of the concepts of Geist or Mind of the Hegelian legacy, through an interest in meaning and symbols as keys to the interpretation of the social world. Although there are important differences in their evaluation of the definition of the scientific enterprise that keeps natural sciences and Geisteswissenschaften apart for Dilthey, but are rather seen in their continuity for Mead, there are numerous points of intersection in their views. This article seeks to highlight those similarities, without neglecting the differences between Mead and Dilthey, in order to bring hermeneutics and pragmatism closer in their capacity to shed light on each other, and on the requirements of sociological analysis in contemporary society to be widened and deepened by adding the psychological and historical dimensions to its perspective.

The article examines the period from the end of the 17th century to the beginning of the 19th century, when on the basis of deep philosophical concepts, a new vision of the development of statehood and human values raised. At this time, a certain re-thinking of the management and communication ideas of Antiquity and the Renaissance took place, which outlined the main promising trends in the statehood evolution, which to one degree or another were embodied in practice in the 19th and 20th centuries. A systematic approach and a comparative analysis of the causes and consequences of those years achievements for the present and the immediate future of the 21st century served as the methodological basis for a comprehensive review of the studies of that period. The scientific novelty of this study is the demonstration of the theoretical heritage complexity of the Enlightenment for the general history of management and communication ideas. The article presents an analysis of the views and concepts of the late 17th – early 18th century thinkers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who defend the right to freedom of communication and liberalization of relationships in the system: “person – society – state”, associated with their own understanding of the government role. French enlighteners François Voltaire, Denis Diderot, Jean d'Alembert, Etienne Condillac were much smaller theorists in management and communication issues, but their successful epistolary and encyclopedic communication practice, starting from the third decade of the XVIII century significantly increased the self-awareness of the masses. The influence of their ideas on the possibility of progressive development of social relations, on improving the national states manageability and on how of a new type scientists were able not only to popularize knowledge, but also to practically make it an object of public communication is shown. In this context, the author considers the importance of political and legal communication problems in the vision of Charles Louis Montesquieu and analyzes the republican governance ideas by Jean-Jacques Rousseau as an outstanding figure of the Enlightenment, who attached great importance to the forms and methods of forming of the state governance structures. At the end of the historical period under consideration, a comparative historical analysis of the most significant statements of such thinkers as Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is presented. These founders of the scientific discourse around the problems of power and state, war and peace, the effectiveness of government and communication in relations with the people laid the enduring foundations of the theoretical argumentation of two opposing views on the cardinal problem of our time – the possibility or impossibility of achieving mutually acceptable foundations of a new world order peacefully, excluding all types of hybrid wars. The general picture of the scientific and technological achievements of this period, influencing the level of understanding of the management and communication functions of the state of that time, is given in comparison with the present.

The Chinese view of time and history cannot be defined as either “cyclicality” or “linearity” in the sense of St. Augustine and Hegel. Like the Indo-Hellenic cyclicality, it regards the cyclical movements as universal in both Heaven and human. Nevertheless, it contains neither the conception of Great Year or Mahayuga, nor that of repeated destruction and reconstruction of humankind. It holds that the cyclical movements do not recur as “uniform rotation,” but appear as a chain composed of countless links each of which possesses individuality. It is not the chain itself, but each of its links that cyclically develop. Meanwhile, it agrees with the Judeo-Christian tradition that there is no repetition and reversibility for historical figures and events. However, it does not believe that history has an absolute beginning and end, demonstrating itself as a One-Grand Cycle from human alienation from God to their reconciliation with Him.

Problem setting. The thesis that modern war is a "war of consciousness" inevitably leads science to the problems of methodology in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness. This study shows that both the authors and the followers of the concept of modern continental wars in general reproduce a thoroughly forgotten (and in the history of philosophy has been overcome for two hundred years) its interpretation as tabula rasa - a blank slate that necessarily distorts the understanding of the real state of affairs. At the same time, the methodology developed by German classical philosophy, which culminated in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit", reveals the true essence of both modern and historical forms of national consciousness. All this makes it possible to remove some of the tension created in the social sphere by the very formulation of the thesis about the consistent nature of modern wars. Article’s main body. In the article the authors consider modern problems of methodology in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness. It is emphasized that the very nature of consciousness is determined by the fact that it itself in its knowledge it considers true. On the basis of a thorough analysis of scientific achievements in the field of phenomenology, the authors state that the position on modern war without opponents is filled with contradictory, inconsistent grounds. The same myth of political technologists is the statement about the nature of national self-consciousness as tabula rasa. Conclusions. Historically, it is possible to trace the "steps" of the development of such units of national self-consciousness, while in modern times their existence is possible either in the form of "fragments" or in the form of "repetitions" of these steps. The phenomenon of international law is intensifying everywhere, and the phenomena of bipatrism, feminism, LGBT, etc. are following it - this is the verdict of World History, which can be reborn only in the form of philosophy. And our contemporary is right, saying that "the world exists to enter the book" [22, p. 370].

At the beginning of his book Body, Community, Language, World, Jan Patocka claims that the human body has never been considered worthy of reflection throughout the entire (Western) philosophical tradition. Human corporeity has been largely excluded from philosophical reflections since the times of Plato’s conception of the human as a being divided between a mortal body and an immortal soul. Yet there is one thinker who had, as early as the nineteenth century, described the history of philosophy, from Plato to Hegel, as a history of the loss of human corporeity. This philosopher was Ludwig Feuerbach. While Patocka follows the path of phenomenological anthropology, Feuerbach tries to return the sense of corporeity to the human being through the rehabilitation of sensuous perceptions and emotions. Despite their different approaches to the problem, Patocka and Feuerbach both agree with the notion that intersubjectivity, based on the corporeity of two autonomous subjects, stands outside of any cognitive pattern. They both persist in their efforts to bring the human body back into philosophy as a relevant source of experience because they both understand that the human body remains a universal symbol across all cultures and societies.

The paper deals with two Ukrainian translations of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" – a complete one by Peter Tarashchuk, and a partial one by Ivan Ivashchenko (which covers only the "Introduction"). Both have undergone a contrastive critical examination to appreciate how adequately they reflect the original. (Some critical comments also apply to the accompanying article by the second translator.) A number of translations of the work into other languages were also taken into account (the English and Russian ones, considered as commonly understandable to the Ukrainian public, are cited quite often), occasionally some errors were noted in them. In general, it is quite natural to find errors in the translations of such an extremely difficult work as Hegel's "Phenomenology", but the same cannot be said of the two Ukrainian translations under scrutiny. The errors found in both of them are too numerous and often too flagrant (due to the space restrictions, little attention was given to the minor flaws), some passages of these texts constitute just a meaningless set of words. This means that the quality of the translations is not at all satisfactory. Both translators showed neither proper competence (particularly in German) nor proper diligence and responsibility. Therefore it is quite natural that their translation attempts turned out to be a total failure. Publications of such texts also points to some serious organizational problems in the translation of philosophical works in Ukraine. Thus, an adequate Ukrainian translation of this book of the Philosopher is yet to appear in the future. Further thoughts on the subject are to be exposed in an upcoming article in which translations of other Hegel's works will be discussed.

The article represents the explication of some Hegel’s ideas with coherence to Holderlin’s phi- losophical reflections, all of which are dealing with the problem of making more significant the philosophy for the social life especially in the period of the national self-statement and radical cultural transformations on the crossing of the XVIII-th and XIX-th centuries. The communi- cation between Hegel and Holderlin shows the different ways of making philosophy more avail- able for lower classes of population. Holderlin’s considering on this problem was to make philo- sophical thinking more sensuous through its transforming into a new rational religion. Hegel perceived solving of this problem in education and teaching without reducing standards of phi- losophy as a science. The university philosophy with its abstract concepts and systems was crit- icized by Holderlin and accepted by Hegel, because his aim was to activate the social and ori- entation functions of philosophical ideas. The popular philosophy with its metaphorical lan- guage was regarded by him as preparing for fundamental philosophical studies. The role of the philosophical lyric in the evolution of German Idealism is analyzed with its impulses for the renewal of philosophical thinking. Hegel shows some risks of symbiosis of the lyric and philo- sophy such as losing its freedom and turning into a new mythology with eclipse of reason. Hegel emphasizes the role of the grammar of philosophical thinking: its concepts and categories. The dia- lectical potential of concepts is illustrated on their cunning possibility what might be regarded as opening of closed systems. The adaptation possibilities of this theoretical and practical experience to the Ukrainian social and cultural contexts are regarded. Hegel’s interpretation of the dialec- tical interconnection existing between the philosophical creativity and the philosophical educa- tion for the foundation of the philosophical inquiring culture are actual today as well his demand to search for the truth. The causes for explaining Hegel’s intuitions about the concept’s and reason’s cunning are stating in their validity for developing strategies and practices of the spiritual renewal of the Ukrainian society.

A partir de textos clásicos de la filosofía política se problematiza las formas de habitar/ocupar el Estado por parte de los agentes técnicos encargados de la intervención social. Conceptualmente el Estado es colocado tanto del lado de lo bueno como de lo malo de las cosas, de ahí que se vincule la intervención social dirigida tanto a la integración social como a la subordinación. Una vez conscientes de esta discusión cabe la pregunta sobre cuánta confianza le pueden tener al Estado y a la función que les demanda cumplir y qué razones tienen para una “buena” práctica. El eje de la argumentación se apoya en el sugerente libro de Abad y Cantarelli (2010) Habitar el Estado como puntapié para contraponer a Hobbes y Hegel, y sus argumentos a favor del Estado, con la mirada marxista del Estado como esfera de dominación y las posibilidades de superarlo.

O presente estudo visa buscar uma base filosófica hegeliana, explorada na obra Fenomenologia do Espírito, quanto à consciência-de-si e sua gênese, a fim de contextualizar uma estruturação que conceba a consciência não erigida em bases solipsistas, mas sim como um construto social, apreendendo a estrutura da alteridade em seu núcleo mais íntimo, num embate entre forças antagônicas que clamam para si reconhecimento, na forma da alegoria Senhor-Escravo. A partir dessa base, procuro exemplificar empiricamente como se instaura tal dinâmica, para em seguida abordar a esquizofrenia, em especial sob a perspectiva do autor Bin Kimura, que compreende a clínica esquizofrênica de forma muito semelhante, com base em tal embate de forças, que se processaria de forma não integrativa. Tento, então, iluminar a clínica esquizofrênica deste autor à luz de uma chave de leitura próxima ao pensamento hegeliano, traçando possíveis pontos de convergência e divergência quanto as suas perspectivas.

Este trabajo se centra en el concepto de humanismo de la libertad de Carlos Astrada, entendido como eje principal de articulación de los pensamientos de Marx y Heidegger. Esa articulación es presentada en principio a partir de la copertenencia de ambos filósofos al campo de las filosofías de la praxis. Sin embargo, si prestamos mayor atención al modo concreto en que Astrada comprende y expone lo más propio de cada uno de esos pensamientos, notaremos que esa confluencia no remite simple ni fundamentalmente a la filosofía de la praxis, sino a una tarea aún pendiente en la que se anudan la historia de la filosofía y la filosofía de la historia: la salida definitiva del sistema cerrado del idealismo y de la filosofía de Hegel.

This article focuses on the issue of the Other/Alien within the conceptual and aesthetic paradigm of modernism. In the context of modernistic ideas, the author analyses the philosophy of dialogue and phenomenological views on the Other as represented in the intellectual heritage of the twentieth century. Taking into consideration these ideas, the author discusses three mainstream aspects of the Other/Alien in Russian modernist literature: 1) mythological tradition, which provokes the image of the enemy through the image of the Other; 2) Romantic tradition of the double (doppelganger), and 3) philosophical / phenomenological notion of the body, which views personality as “me/Self” and “my body”. Conceptual analysis of these aspects is provided with reference to poetic texts by Alexander Blok, Innokenty Annensky, and Osip Mandelstam. The author stresses the conventionality of such a division, on the one hand, and the influence of the analysed aspects of the Other/Alien onto the conceptual system of Postmodernism. Modernism in European culture, in contrast to other historical periods, is characterised primarily by the fact that many of its ideas and concepts were only proclaimed, but not presented in the form of complete theoretical concepts/systems. In this sense, modernism turned out to be open to the future, which allows us to call it an “uncompleted project” (Jürgen Habermas). Previous eras offered solutions to important existential problems in the form of complete philosophical systems (Immanuel Kant or Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel), ideas or concepts (Kant’s concept of “eternal peace” and a moral imperative, Hegel’s idea of state and law). Modernism, influenced by the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, destroyed the systematic nature of thinking, doubted traditional morality, and offered paradoxical solutions to many problems in the form of conceptual questions, which are discussed to this day. One of these uncompleted modernist projects was the concept of the Other/Alien, discussions about which have been going on for over a century., В статье рассмотрена проблема другого / чужого в идейно-эстетической парадигме модернизма. В контексте модернистских идей проанализирована философия диалога и феноменологические проекты Другого в гуманитарном мышлении ХХ в. На этом фоне предложены интерпретации трех магистральных аспектов другого / чужого в модернизме: 1) мифологическая традиция, которая через образ Другого провоцирует образ врага; 2) романтическая традиция двойничества; 3) философская / феноменологическая традиция телесности, в контексте которой личность рассматривается как Я и «мое тело». Анализ идейного смысла этих аспектов предложен на примере поэтических произведений Александра Блока, Иннокентия Анненского и Осипа Мандельштама. В статье также подчеркнута, с одной стороны, условность такого разделения рассматриваемой проблемы на три аспекта, а с другой стороны — влияние анализируемых аспектов другого / чужого на культуру постмодернизма. Модернизм в европейской культуре в отличие от других культурно-исторических эпох характеризуется прежде всего тем, что многие его идеи и концепты были только провозглашены, но не представлены в виде законченных теоретических концепций / систем. В этом смысле модернизм оказался открытым для будущего, что позволяет назвать его «незавершенным проектом» (Ю. Хабермас). Предыдущие эпохи предлагали решения важных экзистенциальных проблем в виде законченных философских систем (И. Кант или Г. В. Ф. Гегель), идей или концептов (идея «вечного мира» и моральный императив у И. Канта, идея государства и права у Г. В. Ф. Гегеля). Модернизм под влиянием философии Ф. Ницше разрушал системность мышления, сомневался в традиционной морали и предложил парадоксальные решения многих проблем в виде вопросов-концептов, о которых мы размышляем и дискутируем до сегодняшнего дня. Одним из таких незавершенных модернистских проектов была концепция другого / чужого, вокруг которой уже более ста лет продолжаются дискуссии.

This article offers a close reading of Katharine Bradley and Edith Cooper’s lyric III in Long Ago, a Sapphic volume of verse published in 1889 under the collaborative nom de plume of Michael Field. This collection articulates a dramatic inquiry into the tragedy of unrequited love in a long cycle of lyrics whose third piece most effectively encapsulates the kernel of what the Fields reconstruct as Sappho’s ambivalent eroticism. The outcome of this reconstruction, as analysed in light of lyric III, is a consistent Hegelian view of desire that subsumes a complex system of tropes, myths, paradoxes and imaginative strategies under an overarching ideology of desire as a radical experience of appropriation, violence and self-destruction.

El presente escrito se apoya en la crítica que realiza Marx a Hegel para elucidar cuáles son las determinaciones del modo de producción capitalista que permiten a este último desarrollar las formas generales del método dialéctico. Afirmamos que, dado que el capital goza de un movimiento automático, a Hegel se le presenta que la conciencia, que realiza dicho movimiento, se pone en marcha a sí misma. Pese a esto, siguiendo a Marx, sostenemos que Hegel explica la estructura básica del método dialéctico, el afirmarse mediante la propia negación de toda forma real.

As “Children of the Century”, Delacroix and Heine cultivate a common Bonapartism – which is patriotic in the one and anti-teutomaniac in the other. Delacroix’ “Liberty Leading the People” and its commentary by Heine in the first article he sent to Germany from Paris open up to an elitist aesthetic. There is a close bond between Delacroix’ sensual approach of the art of painting and Heine’s “pantheistic” sensibility, influenced by Saint-Simonian ideas, which the poet associated with the Berlin Hegelianism of the 1820s. At the centre is the idea of the essential equality of freedom and reason, which materialises in History.

This is perhaps the real strength of the book: the authors' insistence on Lenin being, as Immanuel Wallerstein once said of Karl Marx, a comrade in the struggle who knew as much as he knew As the First World War broke out, Lenin spent his days in the library reading Hegel [Extracted from the article] Copyright of Journal of Holy Land & Palestine Studies is the property of Edinburgh University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use This abstract may be abridged No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract (Copyright applies to all Abstracts )