1. Forensic brain-reading and mental privacy in European human rights law
- Author
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Ligthart, Sjors, Douglas, Thomas, Bublitz, Christoph, Kooijmans, Tijs, Meynen, Gerben, Forensische psychiatrie / psychologie, UCALL / Aansprakelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid, Moral and Political Philosophy, CLUE+, Department of Criminal Law, Forensische psychiatrie / psychologie, UCALL / Aansprakelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid, and Psychiatry
- Subjects
SDG 16 - Peace ,media_common.quotation_subject ,Fundamental rights ,Context (language use) ,0603 philosophy, ethics and religion ,03 medical and health sciences ,Mental privacy ,0302 clinical medicine ,Crime prevention ,Human rights ,media_common ,Recidivism ,Health Policy ,Jurisprudence ,SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions ,Brain-reading ,06 humanities and the arts ,16. Peace & justice ,Justice and Strong Institutions ,Criminal justice ,Psychiatry and Mental health ,Philosophy ,Neurology ,Law ,060301 applied ethics ,Neuroethics ,Psychology ,030217 neurology & neurosurgery - Abstract
A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes.
- Published
- 2020