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Globalization and automation have contributed to deindustrialization and the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs, yielding important electoral implications across advanced democracies. Coupling insights from economic voting and social identity theory, we consider how different groups in society may construe manufacturing job losses in contrasting ways. We argue that deindustrialization threatens dominant group status, leading some white voters in affected localities to favor candidates they believe will address economic distress and defend racial hierarchy. Examining three US presidential elections, we find white voters were more likely to vote for Republican challengers where manufacturing layoffs were high, whereas Black voters in hard-hit localities were more likely to vote for Democrats. In survey data, white respondents, in contrast to people of color, associated local manufacturing job losses with obstacles to individual upward mobility and with broader American economic decline. Group-based identities help explain divergent political reactions to common economic shocks.

In the Kaldorian tradition, manufacturing is the main engine of growth. Deindustrialization is a concern for economists and policymakers. This study analyses deindustrialization occurring in the 28...

There is a growing empirical evidence of premature deindustrialization in developing countries wherein the share of manufacturing in GDP and employment declined at a much lower level of per capita income as compared to the trend observed in developed countries. This study examined the manufacturing performance of India, which has been persistent with industrialization as its catch-up strategy. While the study finds no evidence of deindustrialization in the conventional sense, it presents compelling evidence in terms of wage share in value added and wage rate. Therefore, the study argues that a realistic analysis of deindustrialization should consider the quality of employment, wage share and wage rate along with employment share and GDP share. The study attributes deindustrialization in India as an outcome of its strategy to build international competitiveness based on price/wage cost advantage and the failure to build a vibrant learning, innovation and competence building system. Resumo Existe crescente evidência empírica de desindustrialização prematura nos países em desenvolvimento, onde a participação do emprego industrial no PIB diminuiu em um nível muito mais baixo de renda per capita em comparação com os países desenvolvidos. Este estudo examinou o desempenho da indústria da Índia, que tem persistido com a industrialização como estratégia de catch-up. Embora o estudo não encontre evidências de desindustrialização no sentido convencional, ele apresenta evidências convincentes em termos da qualidade do emprego gerado e da sua participação no PIB. Portanto, o estudo argumenta que uma análise realista da desindustrialização deve considerar a qualidade do emprego, a participação e a taxa dos salários, juntamente com a parcela do emprego e do PIB. O estudo atribui a desindustrialização na Índia como resultado da estratégia de ganhar competitividade internacional via vantagens de preço / custo de salário e o fracasso em construir um sistema vibrante de aprendizagem, inovação e construção de competências.

This article presents an intergenerational study of 28 skilled working-class men’s life stories of negotiating social mobility in the wake of deindustrialization. This contributes to emerging qualitative research that aims to build a framework that understands the personal tensions social mobility creates for individuals. In this study, the tensions that men experienced were not exclusively the consequence of ‘habitus clivè’ (Friedman, 2016), i.e. men feeling a dislocation from their working-class backgrounds as they climbed the occupational ladder. Men’s tensions also arose from internalising the generational pressure to improve their occupational position. Pressed by these competing tensions, men developed a ‘getting-on outlook’ over their careers, which meant that each generation pursued upward social mobility while also seeking to have the integrity of their working lives authenticated by their parents. To build on habitus, Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame’s (1997) description of the ‘dual tension’ is advanced as a means to frame the conflict between belonging and individuality that social mobility provoked. This article suggests this ‘dual tension’ could be reduced by families in a process named ‘authentication’. ‘Authentication’ reflects intergenerational dialogues and practices developed by the younger generations to have their achieved status recognised as in keeping with their family background.

The paper provides new evidence on policy options to deal with the impact of deindustrialization, as defined in terms of a drop in manufacturing employment, for a panel of 20 early OECD countries on annual data from 1990 to 2014. We explore how key economic indicators, among them per capita GDP growth and various unemployment rates, have responded to deindustrialization. Our main contribution is to explore the role of economic flexibility and some key labor market interventions in shaping the impact of deindustrialization on these indicators. We find that lowering the cost to start a new business is a particularly useful policy to combat rising unemployment and losses in GDP growth in this context. But we also show that economic flexibility alone is not sufficient to achieve good macroeconomic outcomes. Job market training in conjunction with flexibility appears to be the preferred policy choice.

The dominant narrative of U.S. deindustrialization opens with the Northeast as the definitive starting point for industry followed by a direct linear relocation to the South and then the Global South. In this framework, deindustrialization appears to have a logic, a rational pathway following cheaper and compliant labor. When Puerto Rican needleworkers become visible in the history of the textile and garment industry, however, their colonial migrations complicate deindustrialization, and its linear logic collapses. From the perspective of these colonial women, industrialization of Puerto Rico began at the turn of the twentieth century - the same time factories and mills increased in the South. Thousands of women also migrated to the Northeast mainland, especially from the 1950s to the 1970s, when many white workers were mourning the loss of textile and garment jobs. Puerto Rican women moved to the old factories of the Northeast, which had become outposts for large transnational corporations that did not relocate their manufacturing in a direct geographic path but rather spread their processes over any arrangement that offered the best cost-benefit analysis. For Puerto Rican women, employment in the plants of the Northeast during the 1960s and 1970s offered hope rather than despair, and many took pride in meeting their quotas and providing wages for their families. In the 1980s, when the Reagan administration initiated major reforms to financial policies and the practices of leveraged buyouts made closing old plants a better return on investment, Puerto Rican women mourned the loss of jobs in an industry many experts had already declared ‘dead.’ Fragmentation of the archives between Puerto Rican studies and U.S. labor history have allowed for a simplistic narrative of deindustrialization and an erasure of the losses and disappointments of women who left Puerto Rico for the promise of higher wages in the postwar Northeast mainland. When the oral histories and documents related to the migrations of Puerto Rican needleworkers become visible in the larger history of the ‘American working class’, we see deindustrialization as sprawling and contingent rather than as linear and naturalized. Puerto Rican studies scholars have written about needleworkers as part of their field with particular attention to gender as it relates to notions of motherhood, but this article sets the women as American workers into the losses of the textile and garment industry without eliding their specificity as migrating and racialized colonial labor. In addition, the women expressed grief that went beyond losing a specific job - many of these workers lost their place in the U.S. workforce and the promise of financial stability as they became associated with racialized poverty and welfare debates.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 revolutionized politics in the American South. These changes also had economic consequences, generating gains for white as well as Black southerners. Contrary to the widespread belief that the region turned Republican in direct response to the Civil Rights Revolution, expanded voting rights led to twenty-five years of competitive two-party politics, featuring strong biracial coalitions in the Democratic Party. These coalitions remained competitive in most states until the Republican Revolution of the 1990s. This abrupt rightward shift had many causes, but critical for southern voters were the trade liberalization measures of 1994, specifically NAFTA and the phase-out of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement which had protected the textiles and apparel industries for decades. The consequences of Republican state regimes have been severe, including intensified racial polarization, loss of support for public schools and higher education, and harsh policies toward low-income populations.

The effect of premature deindustrialization on the distribution of gains from growth has thus far been understudied. Using census data from eleven countries spanning five decades and shift...

The steady rise of income inequality in the United States coincides with trade union decline and structural changes to the economy, but prior studies do not consider whether these phenomena interact in ways that magnify inequality. Drawing on institutional and market accounts of inequality, the author develops the argument that trade union decline, occurring within the context of deindustrialization and the offshoring of routinemanufacturing jobs, creates more profound distributional effects than these factors would create in isolation. This argument is tested (net of other important determinants of income inequality) using time-series regression models and national-level data from 1947 to 2015. Results support the proposed interaction effects, suggesting that a thorough understanding of inequality and social stratification must consider not only institutions and markets, but how they interact. The results also suggest that inequality is driven by financialization, public sector retrenchment, and unemployment, but not necessarily by technological change.

Deindustrialization was one of the most disruptive social transformations of the twentieth century. Why did democratic capitalist regimes permit and survive this process, while state social...

Despite frequent associations, deindustrialization features rarely in studies of organized crime, and organized crime is at best a spectral presence in studies of deindustrialization. By developing an original application of Linkon's concept of the "half-life," we present an empirical case for the symbiotic relationship between former sites of industry and the emergence of criminal markets. Based on a detailed case-study in the west of Scotland, an area long associated with both industry and crime, the paper interrogates the environmental, social, and cultural after-effects of deindustrialization at a community level. Drawing on 55 interviews with residents and service-providers in Tunbrooke, an urban community where an enduring criminal market grew in the ruins of industry, the paper elaborates the complex landscapes of identity, vulnerability, and harm that are embedded in the symbiosis of crime and deindustrialization. Building on recent scholarship, the paper argues that organized crime in Tunbrooke is best understood as an instance of "residual culture" grafted onto a fragmented, volatile criminal marketplace where the stable props of territorial identity are unsettled. The analysis allows for an extension of both the study of deindustrialization and organized crime, appreciating the "enduring legacies" of closure on young people, communal identity, and social relations in the twenty-first century.

The main objective of this article is to provide a brief reflection on the process of deindustrialization in the largest economy in Latin America, Brazil, and also to present some proposals for economic policies to deal with it. The article deals with deindustrialization and its relation with the abundance of natural resources. After having identified the main arguments concerning the deindustrialization, we present the case of Brazil, a country where the deindustrialization process and its relation to the abundance of natural resources is the subject of economic policy debate.

This article argues for a view of “actually existing neoliberalism,” identifying points of continuity from midcentury social democracy and showing how American neoliberalism developed unevenly across a preexisting landscape. It does so with a case study of labor market transformation in Pittsburgh, showing a causal relationship between the New Deal state’s institutional structures and the rise of low-wage employment in health care in the 1970s and 1980s. The low-wage service economy did not only come after the high-wage industrial economy: it grew out of it, sped by the decline of steel manufacturing and shaped within the distinctive matrix of the postwar public-private welfare. In establishing this historical process, the article also suggests that social history can play a useful conceptual role linking Foucauldian and Marxist accounts of neoliberalism, by showing concretely the role of the production of subjectivity and the governance of population in the establishment of the neoliberal economic regime. Pointing to a homology between the structural role of incarceration in neoliberalism and that of health care, the article suggests the term “biopolitical Keynesianism” for understanding this conceptual synthesis, which uncovers new contradictions within neoliberalism.

An examination of the manufacturing output of Britain and the U.S. (the two advanced industrial countries most associated with neoliberalism and "the Anglo-Saxon model") over time shows striking parallelism but also striking differences. In particular an examination of United Nations' statistics on the matter indicates a significant divergence after 1990, with British manufacturing stagnating in per capita terms, and America's continuing to expand. This paper examines that data, and explains the differences in terms of the U.S. enjoying successes in a small number of sectors (computer and electronic products, petroleum and coal products, chemicals and aerospace-defense goods), and suggests that to the extent that the U.S. has outdone Britain here, it is a matter of the government support that created its historic strength in the relevant sectors, notably computers and aerospace-defense; the country's continued high levels of defense spending; and the fossil fuel resources exploited in the shale boom (of which not just the oil and gas-oriented sectors, but chemicals especially and other parts of the industrial base have been beneficiaries); which have in at least some measure offset the broader trend of decline in the sector.

The article adds to the debate around the ‘premature deindustrialization’ of developing countries by analyzing the contribution of services to aggregate productivity and output growth within a Kaldorian framework. We revisit Kaldor´s Growth Laws (KGL) and empirically test them for a number of economic activities, including four service branches, across twenty-nine developing economies in Asia, Latin-America and Sub-Saharan Africa over three decades (1975-2005). Panel data estimations are complemented by a shift-share decomposition of labour productivity growth. We find support to the Kaldorian argument for both manufacturing and business services contribution to aggregate productivity growth. Conversely, other services slow down aggregate productivity and output growth. We suggest qualifying and repositioning the debate on premature deindustrialization within a broader reflection on the opportunities for development linked to structural change. We claim that these opportunities might include not only manufacturing sectors but also business services.

Deindustrialization is a complex and multifaceted series of processes and transitions, reflecting the equally complicated web of social relationships and interdependencies that constitute(d) an industrial society. Contemporary scholars have looked beyond just the economic impact of industrial loss, to the cultural, temporal and spatial legacies and impacts wrought by the mass closures of the 1980s, as well as the continuing presence of an industrial identity in struggles over representation and regeneration. However, deindustrialization has a history that precedes the volatility and culmination of that period, and has impacted upon a more geographically diverse range of former industrial locations than are commonly represented. The narratives that surround some sites are complicated by their displacement in time, place and discourse; they lack the political capital of an ‘industrial’ identity through this disassociation. In this article I aim to go beyond what we might consider the industrial ‘heartlands’ of the UK to a place that has felt the impact of deindustrialization, but which falls outside of the usual representations of the UK’s industrial past. I explore how the industrial identity and memory of a place can be naturalized and selectively re-worked for the needs of the hour, the very meaning of ‘industrial’ altered in the process. I argue that for sites unable to access or utilize the imagery of modern, heavy industry for community or promotional aims, deindustrialization becomes a process of re-writing an historic identity – one that sheds new light on industrial loss in diverse situations, and at an ever-increasing distance from closure.

This paper provides new and deeper evidence on the extent and the main characteristics of the deindustrialization process in the EU27 over the period 1995‒2011. This evidence is linked to the debate on the “manufacturing imperative” and the need for a renewed approach to industrial policy in the European Union. To investigate the issue, we adopt a subsystem approach, based on input‒output tables from the World Input‒Output Database, and decompose subsystems according to three different technological taxonomies. The analysis shows that the deindustrialization process affecting the EU27 is not homogeneous. Great differences exist between the EU15 and the other EU countries and among the technological classes of manufacturing. This evidence confirms and better delimits the effects of the hierarchical reorganization of the EU’s industrial structure and of the processes of intra-European offshoring described in the literature. The general result is that the horizontal industrial policies, and in particular the horizontal innovation policies promoted since the early 1990s, appear to have failed to achieve the objective of strengthening the influence of high-technology production on economic growth across the European economies.

This chapter outlines the contours of contemporary structural change and economic development along the following lines: in all developing regions agriculture shares of GDP and employment have fallen substantially—albeit they still persist at high levels among the poorest countries; regional manufacturing shares are consistent with deindustrialization or stagnant industrialization in employment shares and value-added; and, service shares of GDP and employment are on an upward trend in general, with the exception of East Asian economic growth, which has been driven by an inter-sectoral movement toward manufacturing. There is also a trend toward greater capital intensity of growth. Further, while in East Asia there have been substantial changes in the composition of exports, this is not the case in all regions.

This article examines conceptions of social justice and economic fairness with regard to employment. It does so through an analysis of the management of deindustrialization in the Scottish coalfields between the 1940s and 1980s. Emphasis is placed on the historical roots and social and political constitutions of labor market practices. The analysis is grounded within Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation; industrial relations within coal mining are conceived through an ongoing conflict between commodifying, liberalizing market forces and a “counter-movement” of worker and community resistance and state regulation, which works to embed markets within social and political priorities. E. P. Thompson’s moral economy provides the basis for an understanding of the formulation of communal expectations and employment practices that acted to mitigate the disruption caused by pit closures. The analysis grounds the historical roots of the moral economy within Poalnyi’s counter-movement and illuminates the operation of specific practices of a Thompsonian character within the nationalized industry, which maintained individual and collective employment stability. This is constructed utilizing interviews with former mineworkers and members of mining families. These are supplemented by archival sources that include the minutes of Colliery Consultative Committee meetings, which took place before pit closures. They reveal the moral economy was fundamentally centered on the control of resources, collieries, and the employment they provided rather than simply elements of financial compensation for those suffering from labor market instability. Resultantly procedure centering on collective consultation was fundamental in legitimating colliery closures.

Industrial cluster initiatives are established to drive the social, economic growth and development of nation States. Cluster system is also a source of employment creation in order to alleviate joblessness and poverty in society. It is believed that through cluster initiatives, the industrialization attainment of countries will be actualized. When this is done, poverty, family instability, high divorce rate, youth restiveness, insurgency, kidnapping, robbery, etc will be curtailed. As countries were trying to grow their local economies through the creation of industrial clusters, globalization ideology was imposed on peripheral nations by the core countries of Europe and America including Asia that had skewed globalization implications to their own economic advantage. The World Bank and other powerful financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ensured that conditions of international trade are processed along with the terms of this ideology for the benefits of the developed economies. The study adopted the qualitative method of data collection using the case study method of data collection and the collected data are analyzed through content analysis. At the end of the study, policy-oriented recommendations are proffered to stem the drift from manufacturing industries to event centers in Lagos state.

This paper uses the historical experience of U.S. states to examine the reasons why energy intensity has declined in some places more than in others. In aggregate, U.S. energy per dollar of GDP declined 34 percent between 1997 and 2018, but across states the decline varied from 9 percent in Iowa to 52 percent in Washington State. I show that none of this variation is explained by either deindustrialization or the changing composition of states’ industrial sectors. Although some U.S. state policies are significantly correlated with these changes, they are not correlated in a way that explains the changing overall state energy intensities. Energy intensity declines do not appear to be a result of leakage to other states or countries and have not been associated with slower economic growth.

Economic recovery is longer in service-providing economies than in goods-producing economies. Services cannot be produced and inventoried ahead of demand; goods can. We are the first to document this macroeconomic repercussion of the sectoral shift away from the secondary sector toward the tertiary sector, that is, of deindustrialization and the rise of services. We distinguish between nontradable services and all other sectors, using U.S. state-level employment data for post-1960 recessions. Concerns over the endogeneity of services are addressed in two ways: by using 3-year pre-recession averages of sector shares, and separately by invoking instrumental variables. Our results are robust to alternative specifications. The increase in service production and deindustrialization in the United States over the last half-century lengthens the trough-to-peak employment recovery from recessions by about 40%. (JEL E24, E32, L80, N12)

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to determine why premature deindustrialization is occurring in many developing countries. Design/methodology/approach A theoretical structure for explaining premature deindustrialization is utilized. Then the comparative experiences of a number of developing countries are used to illustrate the operation of the theory. Findings The results indicate that increasing inequality among a number of developing countries has reduced the domestic market for labor intensive manufactured goods, resulting in stagnation in manufacturing. Also, the increasing inequality in developed countries has reduced international demand for labor intensive manufacturing. Thus developing countries have fewer opportunities to export labor intensive manufacturing. Research limitations/implications Data on inequality is limited and it is very difficult to determine causality. However, intuition indicates that causality is most likely bi-directional. Practical implications Strategies of economic development must concern themselves with the effects that increasing inequality will likely have on the development of labor intensive manufacturing. Social implications Social programs that bolster the purchasing power of poor families are likely to be important (social safety net). Broad-based agricultural growth will provide a basis for labor intensive manufacturing. Originality/value The originality stems from the linking of deindustrialization with rising inequality.

Background The health gap between the top and the bottom of the income distribution is widening rapidly in the USA, but the lifespan of America’s poor depends substantially on where they live. We ask whether two major developments in American society, deindustrialization and incarceration, can explain variation among states in life expectancy of those in the lowest income quartile. Methods Life expectancy estimates at age 40 of those in the bottom income quartile were used to fit panel data models examining the relationship with deindustrialization and incarceration between 2001 and 2014 for all US states. Results A one standard deviation (s.d.) increase in deindustrialization (mean = 11.2, s.d. = 3.5) reduces life expectancy for the poor by 0.255 years [95% confidence interval (CI): 0.090–0.419] and each additional prisoner per 1000 residents (mean = 4.0, s.d. = 1.5) is associated with a loss of 0.468 years (95% CI: 0.213–0.723). Our predictors explain over 20% of the state-level variation in life expectancy among the poor and virtually the entire increase in the life expectancy gap between the top and the bottom income quartiles since the turn of the century. Conclusions In the USA between 2001 and 2014, deindustrialization and incarceration subtracted roughly 2.5 years from the lifespan of the poor, pointing to their role as major health determinants. Future research must remain conscious of the upstream determinants and the political economy of public health. If public policy responses to growing health inequalities are to be effective, they must consider strengthening industrial policy and ending hyper-incarceration.

A recent literature documents that manufacturing employment growth in developing countries has been sluggish over the past decades, and that deindustrialization has often set in at historically low levels of income. However, there is little evidence on which kind of jobs are disappearing prematurely, and some debate on whether the phenomenon is structural or transitory. In this article, I use a new data set on manufacturing employment by occupation to document four stylized facts about `premature deindustrialization’: first, it is mostly unskilled jobs that have disappeared, and also the wage premium of workers with little formal education in manufacturing relative to other industries has declined. Second, the disappearing jobs have been among the most formal–both relative to other industries, and to the manufacturing average. Third, premature deindustrialization has been driven by occupations which are intensive in tasks that are vulnerable to an increasing adoption of ICT. Fourth, the phenomenon pertains most clearly to middle income countries, as low income countries have been spared from premature job losses. Overall, the employment patterns are consistent with a pervasive shift of the `automation frontier' separating tasks that are automated from those which are not, and suggest a structural decrease in the ability of manufacturing to employ unskilled labor productively.

This study puts forward a model of a multisector economy and embeds it in a novel theoretical framework to address the relationship between commodity revenues and manufacturing output with a special focus on the role of the agricultural sector. The three-sector model lays the groundwork for analyzing policy choices in more complex sectoral settings. Based on the theoretical analysis, the study identifies the weight of the individual economic sectors in the public revenue generation as a determinant of the magnitude of rent seeking epitomized in the crowding out effect of investments in manufacturing. We find that enclave agriculture contributes to the deindustrialization pressure in the face of natural resource windfalls. The central finding of the multisector analysis is the conclusion that not diversification per se but rather a diversification with the substantial domestic factor or market orientation has the capability to limit the magnitude of deindustrialization. For the empirical validation of the theoretical findings, the study employs fixed effects, fully modified OLS, dynamic common correlated effects estimators and dynamic fixed effects estimators for the dataset of 113 developing and transition economies for 1963&ndash, 2014 period. The estimations reveal that natural resource revenues correspond with a higher level of the manufacturing sector output. In the economies with a low level of economic diversification, commodity bonanza leads however to the shrinkage of the manufacturing. In the commodity revenue dependent settings, nevertheless, agricultural sector exports have a negative impact on the performance of the manufacturing sector. These findings are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model.

Scholars have argued that deindustrialization has had different effects on the occupational structure of South African cities. Some have argued for a polarisation of the occupational structure, where the decline of the manufacturing sector is argued to result in a loss of middle-income jobs. This is accompanied by large growth of employment in high-income and low-income jobs, resulting in an occupational structure bereft of middle-income jobs and polarised between classes of high-income and low-income workers. Others have argued for a professionalizing pattern defined by the predominant growth of employment in highly-skilled, high-income managerial, professional, associate professional and technical jobs. In contrast to the growth of highly-skilled jobs is the stagnation or decline in growth of all other occupational groups, and rising unemployment. These changes in the occupational structure have also been argued to have specific consequences for persisting racial inequality. This study tests the aforementioned theories of occupational change by looking at the metropolitan municipality of eThekwini, which houses the city of Durban. It demonstrates that deindustrialisation in eThekwini is undergoing a pattern of middle-income, semi-skilled growth that does not support the polarisation or professionalization hypotheses. It also produces evidence that does not support the argument that deindustrialisation results in an occupational structure polarised between a class of mostly white, highly-paid managers and professionals and a class of mostly black (black Africans, coloureds and Indians) low-paid service workers as the eThekwini middle-class is undergoing substantial de-racialisation. However, it argues that inter-racial inequality still persists due to the uneven high-representation of whites in high-income jobs, opposed to the class of low-income workers and unemployed which are almost entirely dominated by black Africans. Alongside this is a pattern of deepening intra-racial inequality between the growing black African middle class, and the class of black Africans which dominate the unemployed.

This chapter analyzes the way Chile confronted the period of stagnation after the Asian crisis. It considers two dimensions. The first one is the role of the business associations to pressure the government to, as a way to reinvigorate growth, liberalize the financial market and initiate a new wave of signing trade agreements with the big markets. The second one includes both the United States’ interests in, through negotiating trade agreements, reducing the policy space in the region, and the beginning of the commodity boom. The outcome of the interaction of these dimensions in Chile’s strategy is both a deep deindustrialization and a reduction in the policy space for the state.

The article deals with problems of the reindustrialization of the market economy. The author argues the need to change the organizational forms of industrial production, strengthen state support for processing enterprises using natural rent, that arises in extractive industry in order to increase the production of investment in the machine-building and industrial complex.

From being the second most industrialized country in Sub-Saharan Africa at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s economy has declined rapidly to a point where the country ranks among the poorest economic performers in the region. The three pillars which had underpinned the country’s vibrant economy, namely, agriculture, mining and manufacturing, have suffered greatly from poor government policy choices, resulting in the near collapse of each of the sectors and massive unemployment. As a result, an estimated 90% of the Zimbabwean population was unemployed at 2015 and was forced to eke out a living in the informal sector, mostly through vending of second-hand clothes and other basic items. With regard to the manufacturing sector specifically, the sector had all but collapsed by 2015, as companies either folded or relocated to escape the country’s harsh economic climate. This article traces the decline of the Zimbabwean manufacturing sector from 1990 to 2015 and seeks to explain the factors contributing to this decline.

Contains fulltext : 159035pub.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) This study examines trends in labour force participation of older men (55–64 years) in the Netherlands between 1992 and 2009 using Dutch Labour Force Survey data. In this period, the share of early retirees and disability recipients steadily decreased, while labour force participation of Dutch older men increased. The authors characterize these developments both theoretically and empirically in terms of policy reforms, normative change and deindustrialization. More specifically, institutional early retirement arrangements were abolished due to the rising costs associated with the ageing of the Dutch population. Older men, therefore, became more likely to be employed, unemployed or disabled compared to early retired between 1992 and 2009. The authors also find that deindustrialization increases the chances of employment for older men with a university degree. Moreover, a shrinking industry sector is particularly harmful for the lowest educated older men, as their likelihood to be in unemployment increases compared to early retirement. 23 p.

A long-held view among macroeconomists in the UK and USA is that sustained currency over valuation, often the result of financial-sector dominance, weakens domestic macroeconomic performance, and results in premature deindustrialization. Similar concerns have been expressed about persistent, policy-induced recessions. According to balance of payments constrained growth (BPCG) theory, meanwhile, the BPCG rate in a multi-sector economy varies directly with the share of manufacturing in total output. This chapter develops a simple model that combines these observations to show how a temporary but persistent shock to the nominal exchange rate and/or domestic demand can both affect the actual rate of growth in the short run (by moving it away from the long-run equilibrium BPCG rate) and alter the BPCG rate itself (by lowering the income elasticity of demand for exports as a result of induced premature deindustrialization). The result is a time-varying balance of payments constrained growth (TV-BPCG) rate. Because actual growth and the TV-BPCG rate vary directly, the latter is also characterized as quasi path dependent.

Puerto Rico recently became the largest bankruptcy case in the history of the U.S. municipal bond market. This debt crisis has not been the subject of significant scrutiny in the economic literature, though many researchers focus on case studies, such as Greece and Argentina, to analyze a country’s indebtedness. The underlying economic factors that influence unsustainable debt in upper middle-income countries are generally understudied. We attempted to contribute to filling these gaps in the related literature. Using econometric analysis, we found that Puerto Rico’s government indebtedness is, to a large extent, connected to a sharp decrease in manufacturing employment (i.e. deindustrialization) suffered by this economy, and weak evidence that it was caused by an excessive government payroll or overgenerous federal programs. In light of our empirical results, we discussed how the consequences of deindustrialization ultimately led to increase government borrowing.

How might “transmedia” approaches—or working across media—fit into histories of textual and visual innovation within anthropology, and what might they contribute to the discipline in the current moment? I explore this question through the Exit Zero Project, which includes a book, documentary film, and planned interactive website that examine the impact of deindustrialization on Southeast Chicago and the relationship between industrial job loss and expanding class inequalities in the United States. While the book and film take an “autoethnographic” approach, the website is based on collaboration with a local museum. I argue that transmedia ethnography both provokes new research questions and supports a growing interest in public anthropology by offering diverse spaces for engagement with subjects and audiences.

Summary This paper examines the evolution of Chinese rural industry since the rural reform in the late 1970s and revisits the debate on the role of ownership. Based on a case study of W county in southern Jiangsu province as well as drawing on national data, the author shows that the community-based market dynamic had been a key factor in the expansion of rural enterprises and that its weakening in recent years has led to the closing of village enterprises and deindustrialization of the countryside. Large-scale land expropriation, sponsored by local government, is the principal factor responsible for the change.

Northeastern Pennsylvania has undergone long-term deindustrialization, and the region has one of the highest unemployment rates in the nation. In the late 1990s, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provided major tax breaks to corporations, and many companies moved their fulfillment centers to the region. Latinos, mostly of Dominican descent, have migrated to the area to fill these low-skilled positions. As a result, Hazleton’s Latino population has risen from 4 percent in 2000 to 37 percent in 2010, and by 2020 it will be a majority minority community. Fearing undocumented workers, the City of Hazleton passed anti-immigration laws, which have helped fuel anti-immigration sentiment across the United States. The memory of Lattimer and recognition of the undocumented status of the victims have been employed to protest this type of legislation.

This article explores the cultural politics of nostalgia for industry in the context of deindustrialization. It analyses interviews with female factory workers who lost their jobs when the French domestic appliance company, Moulinex, went bust in 2001, and it situates these in the context of the meanings ascribed to these factory closures (and deindustrialization more generally) by professionals, politicians and the media. The article suggests that the nostalgia of ex-Moulinex workers can be read as a critique of managerial change and a response to dominant representations which served to naturalize the neo-liberal economy and disqualify the voices of industrial workers by consigning them to the past.

The aim of this research is to examine whether and to what extent the process of financialization has an impact on the process of deindustrialization in the European Union, employing a fixed-effect panel regression model. In this paper exogenous explanatory variable that indicates the level of financialization is presented by the value added of the finance sector as a percentage of total value added, and by the employment in the finance sector as a percentage of total employment. In a process of deindustrialization, the industrial activity is usually replaced by service activities. However, situations where the service sector has not been able to absorb the additional supply of labour and to produce additional values that would compensate the reduction in the industrial sector, could have led to higher unemployment and lower economic growth. In this paper, deindustrialization is measured by the value added of industry sector as a percentage of total value added, and by the employment in industry as a percentage of total employment. Using latest panel data from EUROSTAT and ILO for the period from 1995 to 2015 author detects the significant and negative impacts of the process of financialization on value added of industry sector, as well as on the employment in the industry sector. This supports the conclusion that the process of deindustrialization of the EU countries can be characterized as a financializationled process.

The financialization of the Brazilian economy is often criticized as being responsible of the slowdown of capital accumulation in this country. Indeed, very high interest rates are maintained in order to finance the public debt, and this fosters capitalists to get more Treasury bonds rather than to invest in the productive area. Nevertheless, the evolution of the profit rate in this area also explains the particular relation existing between capitalists, finance and productive investment, as Marx showed it more than a century ago. A financeirização da economia brasileira é frequentemente criticada como sendo responsável pela desaceleração da acumulação de capital no país. Na verdade, muito altas taxas de juros são mantidas a fim de financiar a dívida pública, o que fomenta capitalistas para conseguir mais títulos do Tesouro em vez de investir na área produtiva. No entanto, a evolução da taxa de lucro nesta área também explica a relação especial existente entre os capitalistas, finanças e investimento produtivo, como mostrou Marx mais de um século atrás.

This paper discusses determining factors behind Indonesia’s deindustrialization in the post-New Order era. Over time, manufacturing sector shows decreasing contribution to Indonesia’s GDP, while industrial transformation stagnates with limited high-technology exports. Using Linda Weiss’ (1998) Governed Interdependence and Christopher Dent’s (2003) Adaptive Partnership theories, this paper offers political-economy arguments to explain the phenomenon. Internationally speaking, while it is true that neoliberal globalization imposes some restrictions, it is too much to claim the death of industrial policy. Rather, it is the limitation of domestic institutions that is best explained Indonesia’s case. Using automotive, rattan and copper industries as case studies, the argument consists of two parts. First, in post-New Order Indonesia there is insufficient coordination between state and capital (both foreign and domestic). Second, the state in Indonesia lacks sufficient administrative capacity. The paper recommends Indonesia to invest in domestic institution as a means to reindustrialize.

A long-held view among macroeconomists in the UK and US is that sustained currency over valuation – often the result of financial-sector dominance – weakens domestic macroeconomic performance and results in premature deindustrialization. Similar concerns have been expressed about persistent, policy-induced recessions. According to balance-of payments-constrained growth (BPCG) theory, meanwhile, the BPCG rate in a multi-sector economy varies directly with the share of manufacturing in total output. This chapter develops a simple model that combines these observations to show how a temporary but persistent shock to the nominal exchange rate and/or domestic demand can both affect the actual rate of growth in the short run (by moving it away from the long-run equilibrium BPCG rate), and alter the BPCG rate itself (by lowering the income elasticity of demand for exports as a result of induced premature deindustrialization). The result is a time-varying balance-of payments constrained growth (TV-BPCG) rate. Because actual growth and the TV-BPCG rate vary directly, the latter is also characterized as quasi path dependent.