Search

During the 2008–09 financial crisis, the U.S. government arranged bailouts of major banks to prevent a suspension of bank deposits, where banks cease paying checks and refuse depositors’ requests to withdraw funds. Although these bailouts likely helped firms and households continue to make payments, they have been debated due to potential moral hazard concerns as well as the high cost to taxpayers. Assessing the costs and benefits of preventing deposit suspensions is difficult, as nationwide bank suspensions have not occurred since the Great Depression. To circumvent this challenge, Qian Chen, Christoffer Koch, Gary Richardson, and Padma Sharma study the effects of more recent deposit suspensions at the state level (Nebraska in 1983, Ohio and Maryland in 1985, and Rhode Island in 1991). They find that the suspension in Rhode Island, which occurred during a recession, lowered employment, gross state product, and per capital personal income. Their results suggest that interventions that prevent large deposit suspensions during recessions, such as those undertaken after 2008, are likely worth the costs. Effective interventions not only help avoid economic losses during recessions, but also prevent losses to output and employment several years into the future.

Banking-system shutdowns during contractions scar economies. Four times in the last forty years, governors suspended payments from state-insured depository institutions. Suspensions of payments in Nebraska (1983), Ohio (1985), and Maryland (1985), which were short and occurred during expansions, had little measurable impact on macroeconomic aggregates. Rhode Island’s payments crisis (1991), which was prolonged and occurred during a recession, lengthened and deepened the downturn. Unemployment increased. Output declined, possibly permanently relative to what might have been. We document these effects using a novel Bayesian method for synthetic control that characterizes the principal types of uncertainty in this form of analysis. Our findings suggest policies that ensure banks continue to process payments during contractions – including the bailouts of financial institutions in 2008 and the unprecedented support of the financial system during the COVID crisis – have substantial value.

We develop a Social Distancing Index (SDI) based on a range of mobility metrics from Safegraph geolocation data, and validate the index with mobility data from Google and Unacast. We construct SDIs at the county, MSA, state and nationwide level, and link these measures to indicators of economic activity. According to our measures, the bulk of social distancing occurred during the week of March 15 and simultaneously across the U.S. At the national peak of social distancing in early April, localities that engaged in 10% more social distancing than average saw an additional 0.6% of their populations claiming unemployment insurance, an additional 2.8 pp reduction in small businesses employment, an additional 2.6 pp increase in small business closures, and an additional 3.2 pp reduction in new-business applications. A gradual and broad-based reduction in social distancing started in the third week of April.

Banking-system shutdowns during contractions scar economies. Four times in the last forty years, governors suspended payments from state-insured depository institutions. Suspensions of payments in Nebraska (1983), Ohio (1985), and Maryland (1985), which were short and occurred during expansions, had little measurable impact on macroeconomic aggregates. Rhode Island’s payments crisis (1991), which was prolonged and occurred during a recession, lengthened and deepened the downturn. Unemployment increased. Output declined, possibly permanently relative to what might have been. We document these effects using a novel Bayesian method for synthetic control that characterizes the principal types of uncertainty in this form of analysis. Our findings suggest policies that ensurebanks continue to process payments during contractions – including the bailouts of financial institutions in 2008 and the unprecedented support of the financial system during the COVID crisis – have substantial value.

Denmark’s cultural and linguistic homogeneity is reflected in its highly proportional electoral system and governing institutions that are designed for consensual power sharing. Governments are formed according to the principle of negative parliamentarism which does not require a majority of parliament supporting a government, as long as there is not a majority opposing it. As a result of this system, Denmark has the highest occurrence of minority governments in the world. The main political divide in Denmark has traditionally been redistribution, often labelled the economic dimension of politics. Recently, however, the country has seen a trend felt throughout Europe according to which immigration has played an increasingly important role in political competition. Hence party competition in Denmark is increasingly two dimensional as the dimension of new politics has evolved.

Shocks emanating from and propagating through the banking system have recently gained interest in the macroeconomics literature, yet they are not a feature unique to the 2008/09 financial crisis. Banking disintermediation shocks occured frequently during the Great Inflation era due to fixed deposit rate ceilings. I estimate the effect of deposit rate ceilings inscribed in Regulation Q on the transmission of federal funds rate changes to bank level credit growth using a historic bank level data set spanning half a century from 1959 to 2013 with about two million observations. Measures of the degree of bindingness of Regulation Q suggest that individual banks’ lending growth was smaller the more binding the legally fixed rate ceiling. Interaction terms with monetary policy suggest that the policy impact on bank level credit growth was non-linear at the ceiling “kink” and significantly larger when rate ceilings were in place. At the bank level, short-term interest rates exceeding the legally fixed deposit rate ceilings identify bank loan supply shifts that disappeared with deposit rate deregulation and thus weakened the credit channel of monetary transmission since the early 1980s.

We present new evidence on how heterogeneity in banks interacts with monetary policy changes to impact bank lending, at both the bank and U.S. state levels. We use a new policy measure identified from narratives on FOMC intentions and real-time economic forecasts. This policy measure eliminates some of the movements in the actual federal funds rate that are endogenous to expected economic conditions. We find much stronger dynamic effects, and greater heterogeneity, in U.S. bank lending responses to the new monetary policy measure compared to the standard measure based on realized federal funds rate changes. Our findings suggest that studies using realized monetary policy changes confound monetary policy’s effects with those of changes in expected macrofundamentals. In fact, estimates from identified monetary policy changes lead to a reversal of U.S. states’ ranking by credit’s sensitivity to policy. We also extend Romer and Romer (2004)’s identification scheme, and expand the time and balance sheet coverage of the U.S. banking sample.

With short-term policy interest rates constrained by their effective zero lower bound (ZLB), monetary policy relied on communicating the future path of policy conditional on incoming macroeconomic data. Motivated by this, we exploit intra-day prices to investigate how updates on the state of the U.S. economy affect interest rates and exchange rates before and after the ZLB. We find that releases reflecting the dual mandate of the Fed rose in importance and – as an ex-post acknowledgement of the sources of the Great Recession – additional housing market indicators and GDP revisions, that hitherto left markets unaffected, became market movers.

A substantial body of work has highlighted the distinctive personality trait levels of elected officials, but very little is known about the personality of those who actually implement the political will of these officials, namely, bureaucrats. We sent surveys to all Danish municipal politicians and high-level bureaucrats for whom contact information could be obtained (92% of total). With response rates of 53% and 40% for politicians and bureaucrats, respectively, our sample of political elites across the two groups represents the best-powered study of political elites to date. Responses to our 30-item Big Five survey (the BFI-2-S; Soto and John, 2017a; Vedel et al., 2020) highlighted substantial similarity among various categories of political elites. For example, differences between bureaucrats and elected officials were small on average, and less than half that observed in a recent study comparing Danish elected officials with a representative population sample (Nørgaard & Klemmensen, 2018). Comparisons between bureaucrats of different rank partially aligned with results on executive personality (Ones & Dilchert, 2009). Potential implications for effective political functioning and for meeting the needs of those with personalities diverging from those of political elites are briefly discussed.