Search

This paper presents a systematic review of organised crime data collection and analysis methods. It did this by reviewing all papers published in Trends in Organized Crime and Global Crime between 2004 and 2018 (N = 463). The review identified a number of key weaknesses. First, organised crime research is dominated by secondary data analysis of open-access documents, and documents are seldom subjected to the same principles guiding primary data collection methods. Second, data analysis lacked balance with a distinct lack of inferential statistical analysis. Third, there was a significant absence of victim or offender voices with an overreliance on data from state bodies and the media. The paper concludes that organised crime, as field of research, appears unbalanced by reliance upon a small number of methods and sources. Rebalancing the field requires more organised crime researchers to speak to offenders and victims, employ greater use of statistical analysis and tighten our methodologies.

Understanding terrorist innovation has emerged as a critical research question. Terrorist innovation challenges status quo assumptions about the nature of terrorist threats and emphasises a need for counterterrorism policy and practice to attempt to not simply react to changes in terrorist tactics and strategies but also to try to anticipate them. This study focused on a detailed examination of the 1972 Munich Olympics attack and draws on the wide range of open source accounts available, including from terrorists directly involved but also from among the authorities and victims. Using an analytical framework proposed by Rasmussen and Hafez (Terrorist innovations in weapons of mass effect: preconditions, causes and predictive indicators, The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, DC, 2010), several key drivers are identified and described, both internal to the group and external to its environment. The study concludes that the innovation shown by Black September was predictable and that Munich represented a profound security failure as much as it did successful terrorist innovation.

Our understanding of how people become involved in terrorism and violent extremism has transformed since the turn of the century. That transformation occurred at the same time that ‘radicalisation’ took over as the dominant framework for considering questions around terrorist psychology, motivation and recruitment. Today, radicalisation is typically seen to refer to a complex and dynamic process which results in individuals coming to embrace a violent ideology in support of a political or religious cause. The concept of radicalisation has become an almost universal element in contemporary efforts to understand and combat terrorism. This chapter outlines the rise and development of theoretical models and research on radicalisation. It highlights some of the major research breakthroughs but also focuses on where very significant gaps remain in our understanding. The chapter cautions that we need to be careful in terms of how we think about the broader role of radicalisation. A subtle – and dangerously unquestioned - assumption has spread that ‘radicalisation’ as a phenomenon is the major root cause of terrorism. When different radicalisation models are used to design or justify a variety of counter-terrorism policies and programmes, care is needed to look beyond the headline banner of radicalisation and pay attention to the factors identified within those models as key drivers.

Our understanding of the risk assessment of terrorist and extremist prisoners is in its infancy, yet this is clearly a critical issue. How can one tell if a prisoner is still dangerous or not? What are valid measures to assess risk and what type of evidence is worth examining? In considering risk assessment of terrorists and extremists in prison settings there are a range of essential issues to consider. Crucially, not all terrorist and extremist prisoners are the same and factors which apply clearly to one individual will not apply equally strongly to others. As a result, effective risk assessment processes need to be nuanced. This chapter highlights the range of issues which are likely to be of most use when considering risk assessment in the context of a terrorist prisoner, and also identifies what sources of information can provide the necessary insight to inform this assessment.

Starting from Mao's well‐known metaphor of ‘water and fish’, this article examines the nature of power as it applies to terrorist groups. Terrorists are under constant pressure actively to increase their influence and control over their constituent communities. Our understandings of how terrorist groups can do this has generally suffered from being too limited and overly simplistic. Focusing on Northern Ireland, this article explores how terrorist groups can first identify and then access various sources of power which can be used to strengthen the group's position and authority. The article argues that there are identifiable strategies which can be exploited by current and future terrorists in virtually any setting. It is in the interest of those combating terrorism to study these principles closely if they wish to limit the power and durability of terrorist opponents.

Paramilitary vigilantism has been a feature of conflict in Northern Ireland since the earliest days of the Troubles. In that time, the vigilante campaigns have left over 115 people dead and more than 4,000 injured. Yet despite this toll, remarkably little research has been carried out on the subject. Now, in the sixth year since the 1994 ceasefires, paramilitary vigilantism has gradually emerged as one of the most critical issues in the Northern Ireland peace process. This article focuses on the impact the vigilantism has on its victims and on the wider communities. In doing so, it also addresses why the governments have hesitated to take strong action against the activity. The article attempts a multi‐layered analysis of the impact of an emotive, controversial and increasingly critical subject.

The revival of loyalist terrorism has been one of the most important developments in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. This article examines the recent fund‐raising activities of the two main loyalist paramilitary groups, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The article focuses particularly on the financial importance of extortion and blackmail to the groups in the 1990s. It also explores how the loyalist paramilitaries have responded, as organizations, to the constant need for funds, a need that has continued unabated since both groups implemented cease‐fires in 1994. The paper concludes that because of internal arrangements, the loyalist groups are consistently risking the spread of corruption among their most senior members.

Using an encounter from Alice In Wonderland as a metaphor, this article examines the long-running attempt to apply a psychopathology label to terrorists. The disorders of greatest interest to researchers (antisocial, narcissistic and paranoid personality disorders), are described in order to highlight their attraction for theorists. A review of evidence follows. The critique finds that the findings supporting the pathology model are rare and generally of poor quality. In contrast, the evidence suggesting terrorist normality is both more plentiful and of better quality. However, in response to a failure to find any major psychopathology, a trend has emerged which asserts that terrorists possess many of the traits of pathological personalities but do not possess the actual clinical disorders. This development has effectively tainted terrorists with a pathology aura, without offering any way to easily test or refute the accusations.

Case studies of terrorist groups from before 1900 are rare and only a handful have been fully detailed in the terrorism literature. This article describes one such group, the shishi, a radical samurai movement which waged a terrorist campaign in Japan just prior to the Meiji Restoration. Placed in context, the origin, structure and methods of this group are described. Also examined is the profound impact the movement had on Japanese society. It is argued that the study of older terrorist groups warrants greater interest and that a scientific understanding of terrorism depends on the incorporation of such early examples.

Terrorism is best understood as a form of warfare. Considerable division exists among researchers on the issue of defining terrorism. A minority propose that terrorism is a form of warfare, possibly identical to guerrilla warfare. However, the majority disagree with this position, instead viewing terrorism as a distinct and separate phenomenon. This divergence has been fuelled by the distinctive questions of morality which cloak any consideration of terrorism. The impact of this special morality dimension to the problem is examined, with the focus being directed to biases arising from the moral standpoint which has been adopted by most. It is argued that many of the so‐called distinctions between terrorism and warfare are illusionary. The article concludes that while there are solutions to the current conceptual deadlock these are unlikely to be realised in the near future.

1. Towards an Understanding of Terrorism and the Olympics Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey, Andrew Silke 2. Terrorism, the Olympics and Sport: Recent Events and Concerns for the Future Anthony Richards 3. Al Qaeda and the London Olympics Afzal Ashraf 4. Understanding Terrorist Target Selection Andrew Silke 5. Securing the Transport System Steve Swain 6. Surveillance and the Olympic Spectacle Pete Fussey 7. Strategic Security Planning and the Resilient Design of Olympic Sites Jon Coaffee 8. Governing the Games in an Age of Uncertainty: the Olympics and Organisational Responses to Risk Will Jennings 9. The Role of the Private Security Industry David Evans 10. The Challenge of Inter-Agency Coordination Keith Weston 11. The European Union & the Promotion of Major Event Security Within the EU Area Frank Gregory 12. Critical Reflections on Securing the Olympics: Conclusions and Ways Forward Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey, Andrew Silke Appendix: Terrorist Threats to the Olympics, 1972-2016 Pete Fussey

This animated short film is a toad's perspective of the dangers involved in being a wanted species. Young Baz has gone missing and his good mate Dazza gives an insight into what may have happened to the little fella. Cane-Toad was made in a Brisbane "share house" by independent animators Dave Clayton and Andrew Silke. Copyright held by creator.

President Obama is showing astute caution in refusing to release the photos of Osama bin Laden's corpse, says Andrew Silke