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This article addresses the political effects which the multidirectional activity of both the state and civil society institutions have on the voluntary movement. The state seeks to provide support with the purpose of indoctrination, whereas the aim of public organizations is civic activism. The authors of this paper confirm the hypothesis about the direct political impact of these efforts using the evidence of an empirical study of voluntary movements that was conducted in 2019 in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug—Yugra. The authors conclude that just as state support provided to voluntary organizations does not incite the ‘pro-government’ discourse of their actions, so their ‘civil’ origin does not stir up oppositionist attitudes. Moreover, the state’s efforts to indoctrinate or block political socialization can trigger the opposite response, where volunteers start to act opportunistically and non-profit public organizations, designed to be the mainstay of civil society, can easily be transformed into agents of state policy.

This article refutes dominant views that define evangelical indigenous media as intrinsic tools for religious indoctrination. The case of the Colombian Misak community shows that evangelical radio stations can contribute to community building. However, the degree of the positive or negative contribution of evangelical media depends on the dominance of evangelical presence at indigenous localities. The rapid expansion of indigenized evangelical groups via the provision of social services has radicalized Evangelicals against views different from their own. As a result, these evangelical media are progressively leaving their role as promoters of positive social change to become tools for religious indoctrination.

In this book chapter the author discusses the interconnections between social media addiction, cult indoctrination, and the coronavirus pandemic, all in relation to the United States presidency of Donald Trump. The relationship of the Trump presidency to each of these three phenomena: social media addiction, cult indoctrination, and the coronavirus pandemic, is initially examined separately. Subsequently the author ties things together by exploring the interconnections of these three different phenomena with each other, in the context of the Trump presidency. The author concludes with his own belief about how we can avoid the most detrimental consequences of all these interconnections. However, the author believes that the current very real and understandable human phenomenon of pandemic caution fatigue has been tremendously amplified by President Trump’s use of cult indoctrination techniques in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic devastation.

During the last decade, there has been a distinct move away from the examination of the role of National Socialist indoctrination in the Wehrmacht. Few, if any, historians now doubt that the propag...

Dictators depend on a committed bureaucracy to implement their policy preferences. But how do they induce loyalty and effort within their civil service? The authors study indoctrination through forced military service as a cost-effective strategy for achieving this goal. Conscription allows the regime to expose recruits, including future civil servants, to intense “political training” in a controlled environment, which should improve system engagement. To test this hypothesis, the authors analyze archival data on over 370,000 cadres from the former German Democratic Republic. Exploiting the introduction of mandatory service in the gdr in 1962 for causal identification, they find a positive effect of conscription on bureaucrats’ system engagement. Additional analyses indicate that this effect likely did not result from deep norm internalization. Findings are more compatible with the idea that political training familiarized recruits with elite preferences, allowing them to behave strategically in accordance with the rules of the game.

Many philosophers argue that religious schools are guilty of indoctrinatory harm. I think they are right to be worried about that. But in this article, I will postulate that there are other harms for many individuals that are more severe outside the religious school. Accordingly the full scope of harm should be taken into account when evaluating the harm that some religious schools may do. Once we do that, I suggest, justice may require that we choose the lesser harm. To simplify matters, I focus my attention on the stigmatic harm done to Muslims, and the role that Islamic schools might be expected to play in mitigating that harm. If the full weight of stigmatic harm is factored into the ethical analysis concerning Islamic schools, then I suggest that there are sufficiently weighty pro tanto reasons for Muslim parents to prefer an Islamic school over the alternatives, notwithstanding the potential indoctrinatory harm.

This chapter analyses how the 1960s protest movement, from its infancy, had a libertarian as well as a radical manifestation. This radical democracy, strongly present in the student movement, practises direct action and civil disobedience, rejecting representative democracy, aiming to emancipate people by making them mature, through political education and radically horizontal relationships between teachers and students. Central to it is conflict with powers that be, and the ‘hidden curriculum’. Their opponents stick to a proportional, pluralistic, politics of dialogue. Both claim to be raising truly tolerant citizens. This polarization produces a culture war, involving the left-wing Den Uyl government’s education policies, ‘state pedagogy’ and supposedly indoctrinatory radical youth work. Around 1980, both conservatives and progressives criticize radical democracy for being paternalist itself.

We apply the models and tools of epidemiology and public health to propose a unified field theory showing the role of ideologies, indoctrination, and incitement, in genocide, genocidal terror, and terror by groups or individuals. We examine the effects of indoctrination and incitement as exposures and risks in relation to genocide and genocidal terror. Incitement has been recognized as a trigger to these outcomes but indoctrination is upstream to incitement. Population-wide exposure to indoctrination increases susceptibility to the effects of incitement. These relationships have been seen in all major genocides and genocidal terror in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries. There is some insight into the relationship between ideology, incitement, and genocidal acts of violence from the so-called localized genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, Syria, and most recently, among the Rohingya in Myanmar. There is a need to recognize the upstream role of ideologies of hate in order to determine the degree to which indoctrination posed, and continues to pose, a contributing factor. Epidemiologic models, such as the iceberg model of exposure and disease and the concept of “sick individuals” and “sick populations,” guide our understanding of the content and spread of indoctrination and incitement and can provide essential insights for prevention. The hateful indoctrination and ideologies behind genocidal violence must be countered and replaced by positive ideologies and role models that emphasize respect for life and human dignity for all.

The numerous killings of non-Muslims by Muslim jihadi groups in Kenya, have fuelled ethno-religious tensions manifested in hatred and anger against the entire Muslim community. Though anti-jihadi Muslims have rightly condemned the targeting of their non-Muslim countrymen by the jihadists, the Christian leaders have not been satisfied by their counterpart's internal self- criticism. There are suspicions from Christians, even when anti-jihadi Muslims disassociate themselves from the heinous criminal acts of the jihadists, that all Muslims are the same, and posing a threat to peace in the country. In this context, there has arisen two theories of why we do have jihadist Islam in Kenya, and, for that matter, in other parts of the world. The one argument is that it is due to the social and economic marginalisation and exclusion of Muslims from the dominant and governing hegemony of the mainly Christian-affiliated parties in the country. This causes discontent and dissatisfaction among Muslims, especially among the poor and underprivileged, with the result of their radicalisation, attraction and exposure to, the jihadi groups. The other argument, and this coming from the Christian side, is that Muslims are not the only ones economically marginalized in the country. For them, one of the main factors for the radicalisation of some Muslims and their joining of jihadi groups, is the indoctrination by charismatic Muslim leaders (imams). Foregrounding the potency of both these accounts for explaining why some Muslims join the jihadi movement, as well as why we have jihadi violence (especially against Christians in Kenya), this article addresses these two theories and attempts to point to a Muslim-Christian Public Discourses and Perceptions, on Religious Violence way forward. It shall also address the issue of public rhetoric emanating from Christian religious leaders, against Muslims.

Since the emergence of the national protests at Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in South Africa in 2015, both the public media and social media platforms were inundated with debates justifying the credibility and validity of the protests. It appears that the public and social media had succeeded in swaying public opinion in favour of the protests, as much media attention was focused on portraying the protests in the same manner as those of June 1976, namely that these were students fighting for equality in education, similar to those of 1976. However, since the protests hit their peak in 2015, and even through 2016, what have we learnt about the crisis in higher education that the protests have created? First, is there a crisis? Second, do the protests reflect the reality of the state of education in South Africa, namely, that institutions no longer seek to educate, but to indoctrinate? These are the key questions addressed in this article.

In the postwar period, after 1999 in Kosovo, not only Kosovo citizens are those who claim that the Islamic religion in Kosovo does not seem to be at the same level of faith as it has been preached for centuries.What is happening in Kosovo is something special when is known that the vast majority of Kosovo's population belong to two major religions - Muslim and Catholic religion. After not a very short period of time the state bodies, including the Islamic community, have proven that in the Republic of Kosovo there are ideologies which until after 1999 in Kosovo were not mentioned that have ever been present.The question arises why and from when have these ideologies began to appear in Kosovo that are endangering the stability of security at the same time they are making parallelism to Islamic faith in the Republic of Kosovo.So what happened to Kosovo's kosovo how occurred that the impact of some destructive ideologies and especially the takfir ideology to emerge and to try that coexistence and religious tolerance be put into question, precisely in the period of state building.

Since the 1960s, organ procurement policies have relied on the boundary of death-advertised as though it were a factual, value-free, and unobjectionable event-to foster organ donation while minimizing controversy. Death determination, however, involves both discoveries of facts and events and decisions about their meaning (whether the facts and events are relevant to establish a vital status), the latter being subjected to legitimate disagreements requiring deliberation. By revisiting the historical origin of the dead donor rule, including some events that took place in France prior to the report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, I want to recall that those who first promoted the DDR did not take into account any scientific rationale to support the new proposed criteria to determine death. Rather, through a process of factual re-semantization, they authorized themselves to decide about the meaning of death in order to implicitly prioritize the interests of organ recipients over those of dying people.

In recent years the concept of indoctrination has almost become synonymous with Islam. Madrasas are described as incubators for violent extremism and as jihadist factories. They are perceived as places where Muslims are indoctrinated in an ideology of intolerance, violence and hatred against the West. The concept of indoctrination is and will be increasingly used, given the current climate of religious resurgence, religious conflicts and inter-religiously motivated terrorism. Thus, indoctrination will continue to occupy a prominent place both in media coverage and in simple everyday conversations. Therefore, we have an intellectual and moral obligation to critically examine and understand this term as precisely as possible, so we can use it accurately in relation to education and Islamic culture and in order to be able to better analyze its consequences.

Attempts at modifying public opinions, attitudes, and beliefs range from advertising and schooling to "brainwashing." Their effectiveness is highly controversial. In this paper, we use survey data on anti-Semitic beliefs and attitudes in a representative sample of Germans surveyed in 1996 and 2006 to show that Nazi indoctrination--with its singular focus on fostering racial hatred--was highly effective. Between 1933 and 1945, young Germans were exposed to anti-Semitic ideology in schools, in the (extracurricular) Hitler Youth, and through radio, print, and film. As a result, Germans who grew up under the Nazi regime are much more anti-Semitic than those born before or after that period: the share of committed anti-Semites, who answer a host of questions about attitudes toward Jews in an extreme fashion, is 2-3 times higher than in the population as a whole. Results also hold for average beliefs, and not just the share of extremists; average views of Jews are much more negative among those born in the 1920s and 1930s. Nazi indoctrination was most effective where it could tap into preexisting prejudices; those born in districts that supported anti-Semitic parties before 1914 show the greatest increases in anti-Jewish attitudes. These findings demonstrate the extent to which beliefs can be modified through policy intervention. We also identify parameters amplifying the effectiveness of such measures, such as preexisting prejudices.

Temi psihološke uloge medija u procesima indoktrinacije političkih i korporativnih ideologija u zapadnim društvima pristupljeno je iz više perspektiva. Rad pruža pregled kritičke teorije medija, koja razmatra kako postmoderna propaganda pogoduje nastajanju fenomena ‘javnosti’ i institucije ‘PR-a’. Utvrđeno je da imperativ konzumerizma, koji inzistira na negaciji individualiteta, reproducira tipove osobnosti. Stoga je pojedinac modernog doba depersonalizirana individua koja je za konstrukciju svoje zbilje ovisna o medijima, političarima i oglašivačima te relativno novijim akterima – influencerima. Razmatra se kako kolektivni entiteti, sačinjeni od heterogenih pluralističkih institucija, mogu postati jezgra socijalnog ‘pathosa’. Rad nastoji dekonstruirati neke aspekte odnosa privrede, politike i medija te načina na koji se propagandnom retorikom utječe na psihu pojedinca i zajednica., Multiple perspectives are applied in approaching the subject of psychological role the media plays in the processes of indoctrination of political and corporate ideologies in western socie ties. This paper provides a review of critical theory on the media, examining the way in which postmodern propaganda contributes to the formation of ‘the public’ and the institution of public relations. It is found that consumerist imperative, insisting on the negation of individuality, reproduces certain types of personalities, thus a modern day individual appears to be deper sonalised and highly depended upon media, politicians, advertisers and relatively recent agents – influencers – for the construction of their reality. The paper examines how collective enti ties, made up from heterogeneous pluralist institutions, can become the core of social ‘pathos’. Paper attempts to deconstruct some aspects of the existing relationships between the economy, politics and media, and investigate the way in which propagandistic rhetoric can influence the psyche of individuals and communities.

In the spring of 1945, the Allied Ministers of Education in London set up a Commission to investigate the re-education of teachers and pupils in the territories formerly occupied by Nazi Germany. The Commission proposed to implement ‘appropriate teaching methods’, based on the scientific results of psycho-technique, in Europe’s national education systems, as well as to introduce ‘counter propaganda’ in schools, such as educational films or radio that had the task of ‘facilitating the national feeling’ again.1 For Belgium, the Commission launched plans to de-Nazify Belgian education and introduce counter propaganda, in particular in the German-speaking territories of Belgium that had been annexed by Germany during the war. The aim of the Allied education reform plan for Belgium was to foster ‘faith in the reasonableness and good will of human beings, love of freedom, deep and abiding respect for individuality, [and] a generally humane and tolerant attitude’.2

Lautsi II underscores that one cannot yet speak of a steady trend to reduce (de facto) the margin of appreciation of states in relation to the place of religion in public education.

In the provocatively titled Indoctrination U., David Horowitz argues that radical members of college faculties have “intruded a political agenda into the academic curriculum,” engaging in propaganda rather than scholarship and indoctrinating students rather than teaching them (Horowitz 2007, xi). Although allegations of liberal bias in academia are nothing new, the issue has gained increased attention as the result of efforts by Horowitz and the Center for the Study of the Popular Culture (CSPC) to promote the Academic Bill of Rights for American colleges and universities.

David Brandenberger, Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination, and Terror under Stalin, 1927–1941 . New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2012. Pp. xii + 357. £40.00 (hardback...

(1997). The ideological indoctrination of Japanese prisoners of war in the Stalinist camps of the Soviet Union (1945–1956) The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 86-103.

The boundaries between academic freedom and political indoctrination have eroded in recent years, and influential figures and institutions have resisted efforts to reinforce it. This can be seen in the most recent pronouncements of the American Association of University Professors and in the academic work of influential scholars like Matthew Finkin and Robert Post. The trend is also well illustrated by the decision late last year of the Pennsylvania State University Senate Committee on Faculty Affairs to amend that university’s academic freedom policy to delete language that provided: “It is not the function of a faculty member in a democracy to indoctrinate his/her students with ready-made conclusions on controversial subjects.” The conflation of political indoctrination with academic discourse appears repeatedly in various academic controversies, especially on topics relating to Israel and the Middle East. This development is deeply problematic for several reasons. This conference paper argues that the erosion of the boundaries between academic freedom and political indoctrination entails significant risks for the doctrine and that a firmly circumscribed but vigorous conception of academic freedom can avoid these risks. Specifically, this paper argues that political indoctrination cannot be considered academic because it exhibits five characteristics that are inconsistent with the academic function: non-educativeness, controversy, extraneousness, imbalance and bias. Moreover, recent efforts to redefine these five concepts in narrow terms are inconsistent with the basic values that academic freedom is intended to support. Finally, this paper apply these concepts to the William Robinson case, demonstrating that only a robust conception of these five strands can properly illuminate the issues at stake in that case.

The role of the army as an agency of nationalization is often highlighted as essential to the process of nation-building. By its very nature, the army of the modern state has become an institution devoted to fostering the feeling of national unity among the masses. Daily life in the armed forces requires soldiers to expand local attachments and to consent to, if not accept, the ideology of the state. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century systematic conscription provided European states with the possibility of teaching the language of the dominant culture and indoctrinating a vast part of the population in patriotic values. With its rituals, ceremonies and regimental schools, the army grew to be a ‘school of the fatherland’ in which all social classes were integrated and national allegiance was forged.

The war against the Soviet Union was described by the leaders of the Third Reich as a ‘Weltanschauungskrieg’, that is, a war of ideologies. In seeking the causes for the barbarisation of German troops on the Eastern Front it is therefore essential to examine the role played by political indoctrination among the combat elements of the army during the war. To what extent did National Socialist ideology motivate the individual soldier both in fighting the Red Army and in carrying out acts of brutality against POWs, partisans and civilians? Was there an essential difference between the war in the East and other fronts or other wars? In short, was this also an ideological, almost religious war from the point of view of the individuals at the front, and can this be seen as one of the major factors contributing to its ferocity and brutality?

Governments use public education and public ownership of the media to control the information that their citizens receive. More totalitarian governments as well as those with larger wealth transfers make greater investments in publicly controlled information. This finding is borne out from cross‐sectional time‐series evidence acros countries and is confirmed when the recent fall of communism is specifically examined. My results reject the standard publicagood view linking education and democracy, and I find evidence that public educational expenditures vary in similar ways to government ownership of television stations. Country‐level data on the organization of families as well as data on South African public schools are also examined.

On a previous occasion, I have argued that during the two decades preceding the First World War, the French Radical Party, under electoral pressure from the separate and then united Socialist parties of Jaurès and Guesde, began to look for a doctrine around which they could rally to defend their recently acquired hold on power against both the individualists to their right and the collectivists on their left. It was the six-month duration of Léon Bourgeois' purely Radical government of 1895–6 and hisLettres sur le Mouvement Socialof 1895, republished in 1896 as a book and entitledSolidarité, that marked the beginning of thebelle époqueof Radical-socialism and of the Third Republic. It was argued that during the next two decades, Bourgeois' doctrine of Solidarism became for platform, and to a lesser extent, practical political purposes, the official social philosophy of the régime, probably reaching its apotheosis at the time of the Paris World Exhibition of 1900. This pre-eminent position in the doctrinal firmament of France was not achieved without an intensive campaign through a variety of mainly educational pressure groups – to be anticipated in a lay “République des professeurs.” It is the principal channels and people through which this indoctrination was propagated that will be our concern in the pages that follow. However, the activities of the “Universités Populaires”, which were closely allied to the movements discussed here, have been passed over because they have formed the subject-matter of a separate study.

Changes in the educational system in North Korea during the last twenty years reflect an educational policy aimed at shifting institutional arrangements and instructional content to keep a balance between general and technical education. Ideologically committed to implementing the principles of polytechnical education expounded by Marx, Engels and Lenin, the North Korean Communists attempted to introduce into their educational institutions the principle and practice of "learning with labor." The execution of polytechnical education, however, was influenced more by the social realities of postwar North Korean society than by the ideology it was to follow. During the years of the Three-Year and Five-Year Economic Plans (1953-56 and 1957-60), which were carried out in the midst of a labor shortage, the precarious balance between learning and labor was often tripped in favor of labor. The pedagogical problem of balancing general and technical education in accordance with the educational ideology maintained by the North Korean Communists persisted until nearly the end of 1966, when the P'yongyang leaders introduced their fourth major educational reform in the hope of bringing schools closer to the socialist society and learning closer to laboring for the socialist fatherland. Although the leaders claimed that the 1966 reform would expand the scope of technical education in their educational institutions, in reality it was an attempt to reduce the content of technical education, which had received undue emphasis in the past, thus allowing more time for subject matter in the area of general education.

The formal education program in East Germany, like that of the Nazi Third Reich, is buttressed by extraclass activities. Calculated to develop allegiance and loyalty to Marxism, and also to provide a full day for the sometimes at-loose-ends adolescent student, these group activities are beginning in many areas to supplant the work of the home and church. It will be the purpose of this article to indicate the major areas in which such expansion takes place.

Soviet indoctrination is undertaken to create communistic morality as defined by the Soviet Communist Party. Youth indoctrination is critical. Attitudes instilled at an early age are practiced more naturally than ones imposed in adulthood. The generally consistent line, influenced by various cultural and ideological factors, is one of militaristic patriotism. Effects of such a long-term theme are difficult to reverse quickly. Indeed, the growth of Soviet global strength combines uncomfortably with such indoctrination. Any future modification of Party dominance may prove to be of less moment than the Party's legacy. However, human demands and weaknesses frustrate indoctrination program goals.

The emergence of neo-liberalism as a hegemonic ideological doctrine followed both the awkwardness of social democracy and the demise of communism, during the 1970s and 1990s. The main objective of neo-liberalism was to achieve socioeconomic development and political stability; using its unique instruments of liberalization, deregulation and privatization policies. To achieve these objectives, ideological indoctrination was the entire agenda of neoliberalism. Those who are baptized by this ideology, orchestrated neoliberalism as alpha and omega as well as the holy water needed to cure all human beings from socioeconomic and political disaster. Unfortunately, it became a cause of catastrophe instead of panacea since its advent time. From 1990 to 2000, neoliberalism recorded its first socioeconomic and political crises and failed at it; thus, other alternatives have emerged. After 2010 western’s climax crises, neo-liberalism shifted to a new dogma of neo-populism. Consequently, this paper explores the concept and ideological hegemony of neoliberalism and how neo-populism became a reaction of neoliberalism. The study examines the ideological paradox and its crises and demonstrates how it became an end and new beginnings. Key words: Neoliberalism, neopopulism, world-crises, end-of-history, new-alternatives, Fukuyama.

We in the United States live in an ethically pluralistic society. Why should that pose a problem for the teaching of ethics? One major worry stems from the fact that moral convictions issue in actions. They also govern social and legal institutions and practices, and influence the formation of public policy. If moral beliefs were confined merely to what people think, they would not impinge on the lives of society’s members in quite the same way. But it is precisely because cooperative or competitive activities are regulated by moral convictions that ethical pluralism gives rise to opposition to the teaching of ethics.

The purpose of the study is to identify the essence of the historical process of Japanese army capture in a changing world. Research Methods. The choice of research strategies contributing to the disclosure of the goal determined the application of a systematic and integrated approach, as well as comparative and historical-chronological methods, due to the active development of military-political processes at the final stage of World War II. The use of these research methods contributed to obtaining their own theoretically significant results. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the formulation and development of an actual topic that did not receive adequate attention in the scientific dimension. The idea is consists in the fact that the process of capturing the Japanese army by Soviet troops, besides labor utilization, had a political education of soldiers mass as its political goal. The set political goals actually marked the transition to a confrontation between the USSR and the USA in the Far Eastern theatre of military operation. Results. The end of World War II and the capture of the Japanese army by Soviet troops for their subsequent labor use on the territory of the USSR witnessed the emergence of a new global process, which later became known as the Cold War. The Soviet Union showed a flexible reaction to the prospect of a military confrontation with the United States in the face of a nuclear threat. The stay of the Japanese army prisoners on the territory of the USSR as a labor force was used for ideologically process the soldiers mass and preparation an active asset for the Communist Party of Japan. Ultimately, the goal of political indoctrination can be the control putting over domestic and foreign policies of Japan and US full prevention of control over Japan. Keywords: World War II, USSR, USA, Japan, Japanese prisoners of war, political indoctrination, Kwantung army.

The Book of Lord Shang, which is commonly identified as a major work of the so-called Legalist school, is also an important—and much neglected—treatise in the history of Chinese military thought. Beyond specific recommendations concerning both defensive and offensive warfare, the book presents a coherent vision of the state that should restructure its socioeconomic and cultural policies so as to turn every man into a valiant soldier. The book epitomizes the ideology of “total war,” in which the differences between civilian and military affairs are blurred. The society is profoundly militarized; the army, in turn, is profoundly bureaucratized. My paper explores military thought of the Book of Lord Shang, focusing on its views of mobilization, of indoctrination of the soldiers, of military discipline, of rules of military engagement, and of military command. I furthermore deal with the question of why the book’s military ideology was all but neglected after the end of the Han dynasty.

In an era where terrorism has become modernized and globalized, the international community and the French authorities remain cautious about an invisible, yet very present army, that of the "fighters in becoming ", whose indoctrination is privileged by the Islamic State: the minors. In these times of crisis, what legal apprehension can be brought to caregivers confronted with radicalised minor patients or undergoing radicalisation? Several limitations can be pointed out on this subject in the international response. Despite this, it is possible to give some guidance to caregivers confronted with situations of radicalized minors, or undergoing radicalisation, facing the dangers they represent for themselves and for society.

T HE JAPANESE STUDENT is at once the hope and the concern of post-war Japan. It is from his class that the nation must eventually draw its leadership in the political, economic and moral reconstruction of the country. But it is also his generation that has been subjected to an ideological indoctrination beside which Hitler's education for death is at best a crude imitation. The contrast between the two systems reveals the hemispheric gulf which separates Prussian from Japanese mentality. The Nazi soldier has been taught primarily the material aspects of power. The modern samurai of Japan, while not ignoring material strength in the form of twentieth-century weapons, has made spiritual training the most vital part of his indoctrination. Neither system has produced the superman. In the case of the Japanese warrior, however, most of his education has emphasized ritual and dogma at the expense of independent reasoning, with the result that he finds it virtually impossible to escape by any rational process from the convictions to which his training has bound him. On the battlefield this makes the Japanese soldier the more formidable foe. When forced into a hopeless situation, as at Attu, New Guinea or Tarawa, the Japanese have fought virtually to the last man. The German has also proved himself a brave, tough fighter, but in Russia, Tunisia and Italy, when driven into a corner, German forces have surrendered in droves. The Japanese system, however, has produced one serious weakness. Lacking reason and initiative, adverse circumstances have often thrown the Japanese soldier into abject confusion where he takes his own life rather than sell it at the highest possible price. But far more often he fights to the bitter end and exacts the maximum toll. It takes more than ordinary military training to produce the Japanese soldier we know today. His fanatical courage and fortitude are the