1. On the Three-Person Game Baccara Banque
- Author
-
Stewart N. Ethier and Jiyeon Lee
- Subjects
Statistics and Probability ,Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory ,independent cooperative equilibrium ,Parameterized complexity ,sampling with replacement ,jel:C ,lcsh:Technology ,Nash equilibrium ,correlated cooperative equilibrium ,lcsh:Social Sciences ,symbols.namesake ,Economics ,Cooperative equilibrium ,ddc:330 ,jel:C7 ,jel:C70 ,jel:C71 ,lcsh:T ,Applied Mathematics ,baccara banque ,jel:C72 ,jel:C73 ,three-person game ,Simple random sample ,lcsh:H ,baccara à deux tableaux ,symbols ,Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty ,Mathematical economics - Abstract
Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium . However, this solution exists only for certain \(\theta\). A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium , always exists. Under a ''with replacement'' assumption as well as a simplifying assumption concerning the information available to one of the players, we derive each of the three solutions for all \(\theta\).
- Published
- 2015