1. OPTIMAL STOPPING GAMES FOR MARKOV PROCESSES.
- Author
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Ekström, Erik and Peskir, Goran
- Subjects
STRUCTURAL optimization ,NASH equilibrium ,METHOD of steepest descent (Numerical analysis) ,MARKOV processes ,MARTINGALES (Mathematics) ,OPTIMAL stopping (Mathematical statistics) ,STOCHASTIC processes ,CONTINUOUS functions ,SEQUENTIAL analysis - Abstract
Let X = (X
t )t≥0 be a strong Markov process, and let G¹, G², and G³ be continuous functions satisfying G¹ ≤ G² ≤ G² and Ex supt ∣Gi (Xt )∣ < ∞ for i = 1, 2, 3. Consider the optimal stopping game where the sup-player chooses a stopping time τ to maximize, and the inf-player chooses a stopping time s to minimize, the expected payoff Mx (τ,σ) = Ex [G1 (Xτ ) I(τ < σ) + G2 (Xσ) I(σ< σ) + G3 (Xτ ) I(τ = σ)], where X0 = x under Px . Define the upper value and the lower value of the game by V *(x) = infσ supτ Mx (τ, σ) and V*(x) = supτ infσ Mx (τ, σ), respectively, where the horizon T (the upper bound for τ and σ above) may be either finite or infinite (it is assumed that G1 (XT ) = G2 (XT ) if T is finite and lim inft→∞ G2 (Xt ) ≤ lim supt→∞ G1 (Xt ) if T is infinite). If X is right-continuous, then the Stackelberg equilibrium holds, in the sense that V *(x) = V*(x) for all x with V := V * = V* defining a measurable function. If X is right-continuous and left-continuous over stopping times (quasi-left-continuous), then the Nash equilibrium holds, in the sense that there exist stopping times τ* and σ* such that Mx (τ, σ*) ≤ Mx (τ*, σ*) ≤ Mx (τ*, s) for all stopping times τ and s, implying also that V (x) = Mx (τ*, σ*) for all x. Further properties of the value function V and the optimal stopping times τ* and σ* are exhibited in the proof. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2008
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