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Matrimonial regime is the synthesis of all the rights and obligations of spouses pecuniary valence, having its origins in the institution of marriage, leaving outside their regulatory and other economic issues that may arise property relationships between spouses, as: maintenance obligation, Liberties rights of inheritance. matrimonial regime, considering that it is the synthesis of all the rights and obligations of spouses pecuniary valence, having its origins in the institution of marriage, leaving outside their regulatory and other economic issues that may arise property relationships between spouses, such as: the obligation maintenance, Liberties, rights of Inheritance. Under company law, spouses are not forbidden to own a company, whether it one partnerships, or that they have an association with unlimited in a limited partnership or limited by shares or a company is limited or become shareholders in a joint stock company. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Educational assortative mating and economic inequality are likely to be endogenously determined, but very little research exists on their empirical association. Using census data and log-linear and log-multiplicative methods, I compare the patterns of educational assortative mating in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, and explore the association between marital sorting and earnings inequality across countries. The analysis finds substantial variation in the strength of specific barriers to educational intermarriage between countries, and a close association between these barriers and the earnings gaps across educational categories within countries. This finding suggests an isomorphism between assortative mating and economic inequality. Furthermore, educational marital sorting is remarkably symmetric across gender in spite of the different resources that men and women bring to the union. This study highlights the limitations of using single aggregate measures of spousal educational resemblance (such as the correlation coefficient between spouses' schooling) to capture variation in assortative mating and its relationship with socioeconomic inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use data from the earlier and later cohorts of the NLSY to estimate the effect of marriage and childbearing on wages. Our estimates imply that marriage lowers female wages 2-4 percent in the year of marriage. Marriage also lowers the wage growth of men and women by about two and four percentage points, respectively. A first birth lowers female wages 2-3 percent, but has no effect on wage growth. Male wages are unaffected by childbearing. These findings suggest that early marriage and childbearing can lead to substantial decreases in lifetime earnings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies in the 1980s and 1990s revealed that financial arrangements in marriage tended to disadvantage women, especially those with young children. However, much of that research focused upon relatively well-established married (or remarried) couples, and we have little insight into the choices that today's newly-weds are making, or what influences their choices. To address this gap in our understanding, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with forty-two heterosexual couples on the brink of their first marriage. We explored their monetary practices and the way that they thought about money in the relationship. The results of a grounded theory analysis showed that six couples were pooling all or most of their money, fifteen were using a partial-pooling system, twenty were using an independent management system (with separate accounts), and one couple had an arrangement where all the money was controlled and managed by one partner. A key factor was perceived ownership of money, and this influenced the extent to which finances were being merged and treated as a collective resource. Other factors included the couple's current living arrangements and beliefs about the importance of sharing and independence within the relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uses a logit technique to estimate couples' joint probabilities of various combinations of labor-market behaviors. Conditional probabilities of the labor force status of spouses; Evidence of substitutability in spouses' work hours.

The article focuses on the economics of marital instability in Great Britain. It is stated that divorce has been domination in the country during the 1970s, compared to most countries in Western Europe and the U.S. Accordingly, the upward trend in marital instability has caused a debate trend in causes and consequences. In relation, the economic theory of marital instability, data sources and regression specifications are discussed. Moreover, empirical results are presented, and the findings are elaborated.

Uses a choice-based model to estimate the effects of a broad set of economic factors, including AFDC benefit levels, husband's earnings, and a woman's wage rate, on the probability of marital dissolution. Effect of AFDC income on welfare receipt by a divorced woman; Effect of rising wages for women on marital stability.

In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can model couples. We analyze two cases: a symmetrical one with only one type of men and one type of women; and one with several types of women and men. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]