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Since President Clinton and Vice President Gore released the report of the National Performance Review--better known as the Gore Report (or the "Reinventing Government" report)--in September of 1993, most of the public, and congressional, discussion has centered on just one aspect of the proposal: the promise to cut 252,000 jobs from the government payroll (later raised by Congress to 273,000). In addition, Mr. Gore has been able to get some publicity for a few vignettes of improved governmental performance, such as reduction in the number of steps required to process veterans' claims and the redesign of fish ladders on the Columbia River. But virtually nothing has been said about what is potentially by far the most important and constructive recommendation in the report's entire 124 pages--presumably because in and of itself it is undramatic and carries little human-interest appeal. That is the recommendation buried on page 89, which reads: "Every federal department and agency will designate a chief operating officer." The chief operating officer (or COO) will, among other things, be responsible "for applying quality principles in transforming the agencies' day-to-day management cultures, for improving performance to achieve agency goals, for reengineering administrative processes, for implementing other National Performance Review recommendations," and--inserted almost as an afterthought--"for ensuring that the President's and agency head's priorities are implemented." Add up all those responsibilities and it becomes clear that, at long last, every federal department and agency is intended to have a manager, in the full and modern meaning of that word, as it is understood in business and industry and city government and every other kind of organization. And one need only read the horror stories sprinkled throughout the report, as well as those that appear regularly in the newspapers, to know that overstaffing, red tape, excessive centralization, procedural rigidity, insensitivity to public and clientele convenience, horrendous case backlogs, obsolete computer systems, and so on, are palpable evidence that the government has never established over the years a tradition and a structure that would ensure consistent attention by competent managers to the day-to-day operations of its departments and agencies. Why the lack of attention? Because direction of the government's operations is, with some notable exceptions, placed in the hands of political appointees. Managerial background, competence, and interest usually rank low among the criteria applied in staffing the top political positions in any administration. Political appointees normally get their jobs for a variety of other reasons--because they stand for the right policy positions and will be articulate in promoting them, because they have records of loyal service to the president or his party, because they represent demographic or interest groups important within the party, because they served well in the presidential campaign, and so on. Some of these appointees sometimes turn out to be highly competent managers, but that is likely to be the consequence not of design but of lucky accident. Often the political appointees placed in charge of multi-million- and even multi-billion-dollar operations have never managed anything of significant size in their entire careers. Some are lawyers, who at most may have managed middle-sized law firms. Some are academics, who may not even have had the managerial responsibilities of a deanship. Some are former members of Congress, or aides to members, who have never run an organization larger than their personal office staffs, plus perhaps a subcommittee or committee staff. Appointees from those backgrounds tend to be more accustomed to doing their own work than to delegating, organizing, and supervising the work of others. "Transforming" a "management culture" is likely to be not only quite outside their experience but also, initially at least, beyond their comprehension. …

tant. The governmental process is not like a see-saw where as one end goes up the other must automatically go down. It is, rather, like a gasoline engine which operates most efficiently when all of its cylinders are functioning. It is not necessary to strip the President of power to increase the power of Congress, but the time has come for Congress to exercise some of the powers which it has always formally possessed but which have been permitted to atrophy. In this process, public administration can offer new insights into legislative structures and their environment. The Executive Branch is by no means the only location of formal organizations which may have common features. In addition, if we consider administration to be a process as well as an academic discipline-that is, as a body of knowledge and techniques for the effective management of any enterprise-then it is needed in legislatures just as in other organizations. Sundquist is correct in his view that "the important thing is that the country begin talking seriously about what should be done about the presidency." An obvious conclusion, in this author's mind, is that public administrators ought to end their long love affair with the Executive Branch and seek to apply the principles and precepts of public administration to the study of legislative institutions. But how to maintain the strength and direction provided by the President while guarding against the excesses which led to the great political crisis of the age remains a major challenge confronting professional public administrators and every citizen of the United States.