Search

The article examines recent court decisions in South Africa regarding merger control and competition law interpretation. Two mergers were blocked due to concerns about potential price increases, even though they would not have impacted competition before the mergers. The Constitutional Court and the Competition Tribunal both determined that price increases alone can constitute a significant reduction or prevention of competition. The article raises questions about the rationale behind these decisions and their potential consequences. It discusses specific cases involving a private hospital merger and a merger involving an industrial chemical used in gold mining. The article also analyzes the Sasol/Draslovka merger and its impact on the pricing of liquid NaCN. The Tribunal concluded that the price increase resulting from the merger could be considered a substantial reduction or prevention of competition, but the article challenges this conclusion and its implications for future mergers. [Extracted from the article]

Purpose: There is widespread belief that intermediaries in African agri-food value chains have disproportionate market power. In this paper, the authors examine this belief by uncovering the purchasing and selling prices, costs and profit margins by farmers, intermediaries and retailers in the matooke (cooking banana) value chain in Uganda, and by analysing the prevailing value chain and market structures, seasonal entry and exit dynamics and the trading relationships in the chain. Design/methodology/approach: Data for this study were collected along the trading routes from the main matooke producing districts in South-West Uganda (Kabarole, Bunyangabo, Bushenyi, Isingiro and Mbarara) to the main urban markets around the capital Kampala. A structured survey was administered with 383 producers, 172 collectors and wholesalers and 71 retailers. In addition, key informant interviews and focus group discussions were held. Findings: The authors find that price mark-ups by intermediaries (selling prices minus purchasing prices) vary with the type of intermediary, season and location but generally reflect the costs of moving matooke down the value chain to the urban consumer. The authors do not find evidence for disproportionate market power among the intermediaries in the chain. Intermediaries enter and exit the market in peak and off-peak season, such that profits are kept in check. This seasonality does imply a small shift in market power in favour of farmers in off-peak season and in favour of intermediaries in the peak season. Research limitations/implications: The investigation concentrated on an important and relatively homogenous staple crop along its main trade route. More remote areas, where there is less of an abundance of matooke, might still be characterised by local monopsonies where intermediaries have more market power due to high search and transport costs. Similarly, (local) monopsonies might exist for products for which there is a smaller market (segment), for products with a stronger seasonal variation in supply and for more perishable products. Originality/value: While there is an important literature on the role of intermediaries in African agri-food value chains, the evidence on intermediary market power is scant. Beliefs on intermediary market power are largely based on anecdotal evidence from farmers or inferred from observed prices or market structures. The paper contributes in addressing this important knowledge gap by studying the matooke value chain in Uganda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government aims to balance employment stabilization and emissions reduction when it initiates an emissions trading scheme (ETS) to control carbon emissions. However, the policymakers should not neglect the role of imperfectly competitive market structure and market power from incumbent firms. In view of this, classical framework of Berman and Bui's (2001) is extended in this paper to clarify the theoretical mechanism of employment effect of the ETS considering firm-level market power. In addition, based on the firm-level panel data from 2008 to 2019 of China, the employment effect of each pilot ETS is measured with the method of difference-in-difference-in-differences. Then a moderating effect model is established to verify the role of firm-level market power on the heterogeneous employment effect among the pilot ETSs. Moreover, the employment effect is further decomposed to evaluate the influential mechanism from the perspective of firms' strategic behavior. It is found that there is negative employment effect of China's ETS policy, due to the significant moderating role of firm-level market power. This decrease in labor demand is mainly dominated by a negative output effect rather than a positive substitution effect because strategic allowance sellers with stronger market power tend to hire fewer employees to reduce carbon emissions by controlling production scale. However, the heterogeneity of policy effects resulted by market structure is also identified in different pilot regions. Employment dividend has been found in Beijing and Tianjin where strategic allowance buyers manipulate the carbon market and hire more employees to consolidate their market power. Therefore, policymakers should improve the design of the ETS to overcome the adverse employment effect duo to the region-specific market structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a real‐option model to study the effect of input supplier's market power on a firm's capital structure, and identify the Nash equilibrium outcome (firm's investment and financing policies and its supplier's pricing policy). When its supplier has market power, the firm will reduce leverage ratio and delay investment. This can help explain why observed leverage ratios are lower than in traditional capital‐structure models (without supplier market power). Firm value can be increased by the vertical acquisition of the supplier, which would also result in a higher leverage ratio. This helps explain the observed increase in leverage ratios after acquisitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More people are listening to more recorded music than any other time in history. While record labels have largely rebounded from the lean 'Napster years' of the early 2000s, remuneration for artists remain low. This article moves beyond an investigation of label-artist contracts – largely blamed for low recording royalties – and considers the broader array of consequences brought by the institutional structure of the streaming economy. Three factors explain dynamics within the music economy: music as a non-rival, non-excludable good; digital service providers (DSPs) as interchangeable market substitutes; and the concentration of Major Label market power due to their discretion to grant or withhold catalog access to DSPs. The ultimate consequence of this market structure is to depress prices in the music economy; value that can be captured largely rests with rights holders. With the DSPs as nearly perfect substitutes, the music industry is constrained in its ability to increase its revenues. Due to market power asymmetries, the burden of this contracted market size is borne by musicians, and to a lesser extent, by DSPs. To illustrate the problematic dynamics of the music streaming economy, music is compared to another non-rival, non-excludable good with a divergent market structure and outcomes: video streaming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Promoting the widespread access and integration of new energy generation into existing power markets is a key strategy for China to achieve peak carbon and carbon neutrality. A joint regulatory mechanism composed of government regulators, power generation enterprises, and third-party testing organizations has become an effective way to ensure the stable operation of the power market and safeguard the economic interest of all parties. In order to analyze the key factors affecting the mechanism and improve the regulatory efficiency, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model, explores the motivations of the participants under different strategy choices, and establishes a set of indicator systems for evaluating producers. The evolutionary game model is numerically simulated using the unified dynamics method, and the evolutionary stable strategy analysis is used to reveal how the key parameters affect the outcome of the game and its dynamic process, so as to find out the potential driving factors affecting the strategy choices. The results of the study show that in the early stage of market development, it is crucial to improve the profitability of firms, and the government needs to impose strict penalties and high incentives. As the market gradually matures and becomes more transparent, the government can gradually reduce the level of penalties. At the same time, ensuring accountability mechanisms from higher authorities to the government is key to ensure the effectiveness of regulation. This study provides an important theoretical basis and policy recommendations for constructing a new regulatory structure for the electricity market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a theory of how market power affects wage inequality. We ask how goods and labor market power jointly determine the level of wages, the skill premium, and wage inequality. We then use detailed microdata from the U.S. Census Bureau between 1997 and 2016 to estimate the parameters of labor supply, technology, and the market structure. We find that a less competitive market structure lowers the average wage of high‐skilled workers by 11.3%, and of low‐skilled workers by 12.2%, contributes 8.1% to the rise in the skill premium, and accounts for 54.8% of the increase in between‐establishment wage variance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of Brazilian listed companies, our study investigates the directional cause–effect relationship between market structure, ESG performance, and firm efficiency under a Stochastic Structural Relationship Programming (SSRP) model. Our empirical evidence is threefold. First, our findings indicate that firms with better environmental performance are more efficient, whereas lower ESG performance and poorer corporate governance practices are associated with a higher level of efficiency. Second, our study suggests that market structure measures (i.e., competition, concentration, and market power) have heterogeneous impacts on various ESG indexes. Specifically, higher market competition is associated with a lower concentration, better ESG performance and environmental performance, but worse corporate governance performance, although market power can only enhance the environmental and governance performance of firms. Third, the market structure proxies employed in this study are significantly attributed to firm efficiency. Our findings provide practical implications for various stakeholders and suggest avenues for future studies that can build on our evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We adopt a novel variation of the traditional structure‐conduct‐performance modelling approach, looking at between, rather than within, industries to study the impact of changes in the bank market structure on the corporate performance of financial technology (fintech) firms using firm‐level data. We use two samples, one with 231 fintech firms and one with 231 non‐fintech firms across 24 industrialized countries over the 10‐year period from 2008 to 2017. We find that changes in bank market power have a positive impact on the performance of fintech companies suggesting that such firms complement rather than compete with banks. On the other hand, within the non‐fintech sector, we find that changes in bank market power have no impact on non‐fintech firms. Our results are robust to several tests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its heart, competition represents an important driver of productivity growth that has slowed in European countries since the financial crisis. This study examines the non-linear relationship between productivity growth and market power, using data on Central European manufacturing firms, from 2009 to 2017. The results show concave relationships between both variables, and that firms in competitive industries respond more sensitively to market power. This study contributes to the literature by applying not only the standard firm-level measure of Lerner indexes, but also by calculating them from production functions and checking robustness with country-industry-level concentration measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering that upstream monopoly will lead to an exponential increase in the loss of social welfare, this paper investigates the impact of intermediate goods tariff concession on the welfare loss of manufacturing enterprises from the perspective of input trade liberalization and effective market power. It has been discovered that input trade liberalization significantly reduces the welfare loss of manufacturing enterprises. Due to the game condition in which oligopolies check each other and small businesses "gain from fishing", the inhibitory impact increases as market share decreases. The mechanism test demonstrates that input trade liberalization boosts the effect of technical competition and minimizes welfare loss through promoting market development degree and reducing factor distortion. In addition, this paper also finds that the effect of input trade liberalization on high monopolistic power enterprises is obviously stronger than that of low monopolistic power enterprises. Furthermore, the impact on non-high-tech industries and capital-intensive enterprises is significant, while that on high-tech industries and labor-intensive industries is not. Therefore, the welfare loss should be investigated from the dual perspective of market structure and marker power. Competitiveness has an important effect, while trade liberalization of intermediate inputs has a pivotal effect on promoting market development and improving resource allocation efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade market power serves as a significant indicator of pricing power within the trade market. This paper aims to examine the market structure of global forage trade from 1997 to 2020 and assess the market power of forage exporters in major importing countries, namely Japan, China, and South Korea, by utilizing an extended G-K model based on the theory of residual elasticity of demand. The findings of this analysis provide several key insights. Firstly, it is revealed that the United States and Australia hold a monopoly on forage trade, while China has emerged as the most pivotal market for worldwide forage trade. Notably, China's growing demand for forage imports is profoundly influencing the global forage trade landscape. Secondly, the extent and effectiveness of exporting countries' market power in forage-importing nations, such as China, varies considerably. Lastly, the market power of forage-exporting countries is determined by various factors, including the demand for forage in importing nations, export monopoly, import structure, demand elasticity, and the level of marketization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on whether Islamic banks (IBs), given their unique attributes and business model, outperform their conventional counterparts in the context of a dual banking system has been ignited, with no conclusive evidence yet reached. This study conducts a comparative empirical analysis of performance between IBs and conventional banks (CBs) in the dual banking system of Malaysia. It investigates whether banks’ performance in Malaysia has been driven by market structure or efficiency. It also investigates whether bank managers have been demotivated and settled for a quiet life due to market power or have been aggressive due to the search for efficiency and market share. Further, it investigates how concentration within one sector influences its counterpart’s performance. Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques are employed. The findings revealed that Efficient Structure (FS) and Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypotheses are rejected for all categories. The Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) is accepted for CBs, implying persistency of profits and validity of the Relative Market Power (RMP) hypothesis; however, it is rejected for IBs, implying IBs’ pursuit of market power. Islamic banking sector structure showed no influence on the performance of both IBs and CBs, while CBs negatively influenced the performance of both types of banks and the sector at large. Policy markets can capitalise on the findings, regulators, and banks’ managers to promote performance, efficiency, and set merger policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the degree of market power in the Syrian banking sector over the period 2005–2016 where research on competitive conditions does not exist. The degree of competitiveness is assessed based on the revenue elasticity to input prices approach and is related to a set of market indicators. To test whether the Syrian crisis has altered the competitive conditions over the years of the sample, I divide the full sample into two subsamples, namely the pre‐crisis years (2005–2012) and the crisis years (2013–2016). The results suggest that banks in Syria earn their interest and total revenue under conditions of monopoly. I find that the trend of market structure—characterized by a monopoly—in the pre‐crisis years continues over crisis years. My findings provide robust evidence that a collusive behaviour among banks is in operation in the banking sector of Syria. The difficult penetration into/exit from the market has led to the existence of a profit‐curb mechanism for the Syrian banks, hence, an upward shift in the marginal cost curve will be associated with a reduction in revenue as a result of the optimal condition for these banks which act as monopolists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to debates within the financialization literature by examining the rise of monopolies in the US' rental housing market. Drawing on a dataset of multifamily real estate transactions taken from the poorest census tracts in the US (so-called Opportunity Zones), we develop an antitrust framework and methodology for measuring market structure in housing using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. After detailing the geography of these market dynamics, we assess the specific strategies firms use to acquire market power and extract monopoly rents. This analysis reveals three critical aspects of real estate investors' anticompetitive conduct: integration between housing subsectors, acquisition strategies that rapidly scale up ownership, and corporate forms that promote cooperation. The framework developed in this article and subsequent findings offer three directions policymakers, regulators, and activists can take to reform antitrust law and better ensure affordable housing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a novel approach to optimizing the structure of the electricity market by mitigating market power through the use of forward contracts. The IEEE 30 node test system is used as a case study for the paper, which employs nodal pricing and a Cournot model with recursive optimization. The findings show that forward contracts can reduce market power and lead to a more competitive market structure with fewer participants. The study emphasizes the importance of successor companies having a well-balanced mix of generation technology. Six players with a different generational mix are optimal in the constrained nodal pricing scenario, while five players with slightly different mixes are optimal in the Cournot case study. These findings have important implications for policymakers and industry stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of efficient electricity markets. Market power can be reduced by using forward contracts and establishing an appropriate number of market participants, resulting in more efficient and sustainable electricity markets. Overall, this study provides useful insights for improving electricity market structures and increasing competition in the electricity sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Journal of Applied Economics is the property of Singidunum University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We assess how firms' incentives to operate and invest in energy storage depend on the market structure. For this purpose, we characterize equilibrium market outcomes allowing for market power in storage and/or production, as well as for vertical integration between storage and production. Market power reduces overall efficiency through two channels: It induces an inefficient use of the storage facilities, and it distorts investment incentives. The worst outcome for consumers and total welfare occurs under vertical integration. The results are key to understanding how to regulate energy storage, an issue which is critical for the deployment of renewable energies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this study is to examine the impact of Audit Market Concentration and Audit Firm Market Power on Audit Fees in nonfinancial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2017 and 2020. The sample of 194 companies was chosen through purposive sampling. The independent variable, Audit Market Concentration, was measured using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), and Audit Firm Market Power was measured using the absolute smallest difference in the market share value of an Audit Firm and its closest competitors. The market share was calculated using Audit Fee proxies that were summed based on the IDX Industrial Classification (IDX-IC). Our findings reveal that the market structure in Indonesia is a tight oligopoly, and the audit market conditions in the country are highly concentrated. Our results suggest that Audit Market Concentration has no effect on Audit Fees, while Audit Firm Market Power has a positive influence on Audit Fees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Companies such as Google and Facebook are not merely conglomerates of Internet-based services which just so happen to process personal data. They should instead be conceptualized as ‘data ecosystems’ and treated as such. Data ecosystems are companies which collect and monetize personal data through a network of widely diverging internet-based services, for the overarching purpose of targeted advertising. Contrasted with traditional conglomerates, a data ecosystem is unique since all of its different branches are interconnected through a single shared resource: personal data. Consequently, this ecosystem structure grants strong sources of market power. Network effects of personal data, throughout the entire ecosystem, lead to services being constantly updated and personalized with increasing accuracy, while simultaneously enhancing the monetization strategy of targeted advertising. Meanwhile, data ecosystems’ reach across the Internet means that consumers cannot realistically choose not to participate, nor find suitable competitors for each service. Finally, data ecosystems have strong incentives to expand into additional markets: conglomerate mergers are an essential strategy to reinforce their sources of market power. Data ecosystems enjoy a unique form of market power which has been seriously underestimated in the past. A new approach that fully appreciates their unique structure and market power is therefore required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some markets, there has been a spike in digitization. There may be changes in the market structure as a result of this, as well as an increase in the market strength of some huge digital enterprises. In light of this, the role of abuse control in digital markets is projected to grow in importance in the coming years. At the national and union levels, efforts are now being made to tighten abuse control on internet platforms. This thesis examines a number of topics relating to internet platform competition and market power, such as the criteria for determining market power of digital platforms and the method to follow in circumstances where the market tends to "tip" permanently in favor of a platform. Another question is whether the principles of Art. 102 TFEU appear sufficient in terms of market power in digital platforms. Central to this is the consideration that a special platform regulation, where dominant platform companies will be subject to additional obligations and stricter monitoring beyond Art. 102 TFEU could be a useful addition to the existing merger regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the gradual retirement of the first batch of new energy vehicles in recent years, determining the optimal recycling mode has become an urgent concern. Considering the closed-loop supply chain, the government subsidy system, and different market power structures, this paper studies new energy vehicle recycling decisions and supply chain contract coordination. The results show that given an increase in government subsidies, the profit of the dominant agent in the closed-loop supply chain will be higher than that of the follower, and an increase in wholesale and recovery prices may lead to an increase in sales prices. In addition, the effect of government subsidies on battery recovery is better in cases of vehicle manufacturer dominance than in those of battery manufacturer dominance. Finally, when a battery manufacturer is in the dominant position, a revenue sharing contract can incentivize supply chain coordination; when a vehicle manufacturer is in the dominant position, a two-part tariff contract can realize coordination in the supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Computer Engineering & Applications is the property of Beijing Journal of Computer Engineering & Applications Journal Co Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose: The study aims to analyze the changes in banking market structure and their impact on the bank efficiency. Design/methodology/approach: This study uses a one-stage stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to compare the impact of the market structure and the GFC on the economic efficiency of the major banks in both countries. Findings: A significant negative impact of the GFC is observed on bank efficiency. Overall, Canadian banks posted better efficiency scores than their American counterparts. Additionally, cost-efficient banks are found to be more resilient to crises and more profit-efficient in the post-GFC period. The authors found that market power had a positive impact on the cost and profit efficiency of banks. Higher levels of equity, market power and concentration helped banks be more cost-efficient. Research limitations/implications: Only large banks are selected for study although it represents the majority stake of both banking sectors. Practical implications: Banking regulators should include more measures to assess the banking market structure and performance. Originality/value: As per the best knowledge of the authors, it is the first study to assess the change in banking market structure and efficiency of the US and Canadian banking sectors in the post-GFC period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries cautiously observe their banking sector stability by virtue of its vital repercussions. Different researchers used different measures/proxies to investigate stability and its relevance to market structure and power, and mixed evidence was presented. In a dual banking system, the influence of the market structure and power on stability is overlapped given the operation of two different types of banks side by side. This paper uses advanced Z-score (time-varying Z-score and adjusted Z-score) to extend evidence and disentangle the stability linkage between the banking sector, Islamic and conventional banking markets. Quarterly data of 41 commercial banks operating in the Malaysian dual banking sector for the period 2011q4-2020q2 are obtained from FitchConnect database. The study applies the Corrected Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDVC) estimator in the investigation given its superior performance over other commonly used techniques. Diverse important results and conclusions are observed and drawn as in which manner structure and power within the banking sector at large, Islamic and conventional banking markets influence stability of each other, and to which extent the Islamic market is distinguishable and free from the influence of conventional market features. Policy makers and researchers need to be mindful of the used stability proxy and its dynamism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Policy & Internet is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

An implicit tax is a reduction in the pre-tax rate of return driven by tax preferences on an investment. The extant research demonstrates existence of implicit taxes at corporate level, but prior studies have drawbacks in tax preferences measure. This study takes the unique advantage of Chinese corporate tax rate preference setting to address research method problems. By employing the propensity score matching and multivariate regression analysis, we demonstrate the existence of implicit taxes in Chinese listed firms and the market structure impedes the realisation of implicit taxes. The market power and market concentration reduce the negative effect of tax preferences on the firm's pre-tax rate of return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilizing a rich export restriction database that covers 527 agricultural products at the six‐digit Harmonized System (HS) code level in 168 countries from 2005 to 2015, this article investigates the political and economic determinants of countries' export restriction decisions. Empirical analysis shows that a one standard deviation increase in a commodity's market power increases the probability of an export restriction on that commodity by 5.5%, and a one standard deviation increase in a country's number of Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) partners decreases the probability of an export restriction by 6.0%. There is also evidence that higher market power of the downstream sector, which purchases inputs from the upstream sector, leads to a higher probability of export restrictions in the upstream sector. Macroeconomic variables, including urbanization rate, agricultural land per capita, and weather variables, are also important determinants of export restrictions. This article highlights the potential role of RTAs and competitive market structure in both the sector of interest and its downstream sector in disciplining export restrictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores possible impact of the SSM's launch on the market power of banks in the large euro area economies. We employ the Lerner index and the Boone estimator, non‐structural measures that capture different aspects of competition. Using the results of the Lerner index, we find evidence of the significant decrease in market power for the ECB supervised entities in Austria, France, Germany and Spain. In a similar vein, the Boone indicator points towards an increase in competition among significant supervised entities of Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The evidence on changes for the total banking sector are mixed, whereas no significant effect is found for the banks remaining under national supervision. We do not find any support for significant increases in the market power of banks in Italy or Spain, suggesting that large increases in concentration do not necessarily result in anticompetitive conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a market structure with three mobile providers, two of which are vertically integrated with nationwide coverage. The third provider (an entrant) invests in partial coverage and needs to rent access from one of its rivals. Competition between the vertically integrated providers in the access market may drive them to offer an access price structure that benefits the entrant. For a given level of the access price, the entrant benefits from an access price structure that reduces its need to invest. If asymmetric regulation is imposed whereby only one of the vertically integrated firms (the incumbent) face restrictions on which access price structure it can offer, the access price could be higher than in an unregulated economy. This provides a cautionary tale for competition authorities as well as sector-specific regulators, both of which typically only impose restrictions on the incumbent. The paper is motivated by the Norwegian mobile market, where the competition authorities imposed a fine of 78 million euros on Telenor (the dominant incumbent) for allegations of the abuse of market power by changing the access price structure and thereby hampering an entrant's investment incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the game models under different market structures, the impacts of different competition modes on upstream manufacturers ' innovation investment decision-making in horizontal and vertical dimensions were discussed. The results showed that the horizontal market competition intensity has a negative effect on upstream manufacturers ' innovation investment willingness, while the vertical market power has a positive effect on upstream manufacturers' innovation investment willingness. However, compared with the benchmark situation without competition pressure, both horizontal and vertical competition will reduce manufacturers ' motivation to invest in research and development innovation, and the double competition pressure from the horizontal and vertical dimensions will aggravate this inhibition. Finally, through numerical analysis, the correctness of the obtained results is verified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agricultural and food industry exports are one of the strategies for export development and sustainable economic growth in developing countries. Since Iran has been among the top ten countries in the export of tomatoes and tomato paste in recent years, the purpose of this article was to compare the global market structure of these two products as two links in the tomato supply chain and calculate the revealed comparative advantage of their exports in the world and the target countries. According to the results, the global market structure of both products in the period 2010-2018, despite the high share of the top four market powers, has been an open oligopoly for most of the years, which indicates a small share of the most competitors and high competition between them. However, due to the large share and stability of market leadership, it is unlikely that small countries will be able to capture the share of large countries. Therefore, it is suggested that Iran, with an average share of 1.61 percent in the tomato market and 5.30 percent in the paste market, prioritize a number of markets in which it has more competitiveness for market penetration, market development, and branding. On average, exports of tomatoes and tomato paste to Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan have had the greatest comparative advantage for Iran. It is proposed to prioritize competition, market development, and branding in a number of markets in which it has competitiveness and stability based on the revealed comparative advantage index, including Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. It is worth mentioning that due to the higher comparative advantage of tomato paste compared to tomato, its higher added value, more branding, and storage and transportation capabilities, it is recommended, with the development of investment in food processing industries and the completion of supply chain and marketing. Development of the export market of tomato paste should be a priority of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the complexity of the pricing system for the production of low-carbon and nonlow-carbon products in a market composed of duopoly manufacturers under the cap-and-trade policies. Through nonlinear system theory and numerical derivation and simulation, it considers the influence of different market power structures, carbon trading prices, consumer environmental awareness, and other factors on price decisions, carbon emission decisions, profits, and system stability. The influence of price adjustment parameters and unit product carbon emission decision adjustment parameters on the complexity of the pricing system under different market power structures is analyzed. And, it was found that compared with the variable feedback chaos control method, the parameter adjustment chaos control method is more effective in controlling the pricing system in this paper. Our research provides management implications for market competition and operational decision-making for low-carbon and nonlow-carbon products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper analyzes the effect of the banking market (concentration and competition) on financial development. Design/methodology/approach: In order to estimate the effects of banking concentration and competition on financial development, we conducted an empirical analysis using the System Generalized Method of Moments (S-GMM) through a dynamic panel data model. Findings: The main results suggest that concentration and competition affect financial development. In particular, an increase in bank concentration may inhibit the country's financial development, due to the lack of competition. Our results do not confirm the controversy between concentration and competition, suggesting that concerning financial development, concentration is the reverse of competition. Practical implications: The results of this study add a new perspective on banking market power: a financial system concentrated or uncompetitive constrains financial development. Originality/value: The literature that combines the investigation of the effects of banking market structure (concentration) and banking market conduct (competition) on financial development is scarce. Although a concentrated banking sector can reduce competition through barriers to new entrants (which could expand financial services offer), it is also true that a concentrated banking sector can be competitive. In order to avoid the controversy, our paper chooses to look into a comprehensive approach considering independent measures of bank concentration and bank competition, which together refer to the banking framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of regulatory policies on bank risk‐taking and market structure. Since our model is matched to U.S. data, we propose a market structure where big banks with market power interact with small, competitive fringe banks as well as non‐bank lenders. Banks face idiosyncratic funding shocks in addition to aggregate shocks which affect the fraction of performing loans in their portfolio. A nontrivial bank size distribution arises out of endogenous entry and exit, as well as banks' buffer stock of capital. We show that the model predictions are consistent with untargeted business cycle properties, the bank lending channel, and empirical studies of the role of concentration on financial stability. We find that regulatory policies can have an important impact on banking market structure, which, along with selection effects, can generate changes in allocative efficiency and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is robust evidence in the experimental economics literature showing that monopoly power is affected by trading institutions. In this paper, we study whether trading institutions themselves can shape agents' market behavior through the formation of anchors. We recreate experimentally five different double‐auction market structures (perfect competition, perfect competition with quotas, cartel on price, cartel on price with quotas, and monopoly) in a within‐subject design, varying the order of markets implementation. We investigate whether monopoly power endures the formation of price anchors emerged in previously implemented market structures. Results from our classroom experiments suggest that double‐auction trading institutions succeed in preventing monopolists from exploiting their market power. Furthermore, the formation of price anchors in previously implemented markets negatively impacts on monopolists' power in later market structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's economy has been transitioning from a phase of rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development that is called "new normal," and China's construction industry plays a pillar part in China's economy. Nevertheless, the industry is large but not strong. This labour-intensive industry suffers from low concentration and fierce competition. Based on the organizational theory, which shows how market structure contributes to the growth of industry, this study aims to explore the impact of market concentration and market power on firm's turnover and profit. Using statistical analysis and panel data of 37 China's construction companies from 2009 to 2018, this study proposes and calculates the market concentration (CR) and the market power (MP) of China's companies. Then the augmented Cobb–Douglas production function and OLS regression are used to explore the growth factors of China's construction industry. The results show that the market concentration increases both the turnover and profit of construction firms. However, market power increases the profit of construction firms while decreases the turnover. In addition, the companies that are China's non-state-owned have overseas income or are civil engineering and construction have more advantages in the growth of the construction industry in "quality". This study provides a reference to understand the structures of the construction industries and the structural effect on the growth of different types of firms and could be replicated in other countries with the similar situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The internet revolution profoundly altered economic relations, with the developing of new technologies and commercial practices. This article scrutinizes how markets involved in this reality can facilitate anti-competitive behavior. It posits that the structure of these markets can enable new manifestations of anti-competitive practices, challenging traditional premises of competition law. The methodology, regarding the procedure, consists of the literature review of competition and the Google Shopping case study, decided by the Brazilian Economic Defense Council (CADE), in 2019. While technically approaching the characteristics of these markets - such as zero price, multiple sides and attention -, one can visualize the way in which the abuse of a dominant position can be revealed in digital markets, through the handling of big data and the consequent consolidation of economic power. When exploring the different views of the case study, even with divergent views of the decision makers, it is pointed out the need to rethink concepts in the analysis of anti-competitive behavior in digital markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the progressive development of satellite image data products, their pricing strategies become more and more important for enterprises to earn profits. The objective of this study is to explore several game pricing methods with risk aversion for pricing of data products in neutrosophic environments. First, to reflect the uncertainty of problem parameters, the idea of neutrosophic variables is adopted. With the aid of neutrosophic variables, the truth, indeterminacy and falsity degrees of players can be intuitively and conveniently obtained. Subsequently, considering the risk aversion of decision makers, the optimistic value theory is introduced into neutrosophic variables for calculating the optimistic value of player's profits. Then, different pricing models are constructed under the Bertrand and Stackelberg game scenarios, respectively. After deriving the corresponding equilibrium equations, some numerical instances are provided to testify the feasibility of our methods. Furthermore, the influences of dissimilar market power structures are examined. Finally, the effects of seven problem parameters and players' confidence levels on pricing results are investigated through sensitivity analyses. The results show that the proposed methods are practicable and can offer guidance for the pricing decision of data products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modular production requires new service provision under the trend of servitization. This paper is to explore the issue of module-based service associated with three different power structurers in a two-echelon supply chain that consists of a module supplier and a manufacturer. The manufacturer considers to delegate its upstream module supplier to provide services for downstream consumers. We divide the market into two types: the price-sensitive market and the service-level sensitive market. Different power structures and market types have a great impact on the service levels, prices and the profitability of each member in the supply chain. When the manufacturer (the supplier) acts as the leader in the supply chain, the module supplier should provide the highest (lowest)-level service and the manufacturer will charge the highest (lowest) price for the bundled product and service. The module supplier can benefit from the service-delegation relationship while the manufacturer will be hurt. There is an opportunity for the module supplier to offer the service, especially when the module supplier is in a dominated position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Middle East North Africa (MENA) region is witnessing a wave of bank consolidations, with many mega-mergers taking place in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. These will result in creating large banks, reducing the number of market players and increasing market concentration; which is already high. A further increase in concentration may raise concerns about the resulting dominance of large banks and the consequences on their pricing behaviour. The interrelationships between market structure and pricing behaviour is summarised by the popular model of industrial economics called the structure–conduct–performance (SCP) model. Consequently, we test the prevalence of this model in a sample of 15 MENA banking sectors to detect the possible existence of an impact running particularly from the structure of banking markets to the pricing behaviour (power) of banks in order to predict a possible emergence of oligopolistic behaviour following bank consolidations. Using a two-stage least squares model, we found a positive and significant impact of market concentration on bank pricing, suggesting that an further increase in MENA banking markets' concentration may boost banks pricing power and persuade them to increase their returns at the expense of their customers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adding renewable energy sources (RES) to an electricity market has an ambiguous effect on wholesale prices. The merit order effect (MoE) has a downward pressure on prices while, with market power, higher inframarginal rents will tend to increase prices. We quantify the interaction of the two effects in the Ontario electricity market. We identify the market power effect by simulating transfers of RES capacity from the fringe to larger firms: these transfers increase prices by up to 24%. We then add RES capacity and allocate it to players with varying levels of market power. Following a net expansion of RES capacity of 5% relative to total capacity, prices decrease by 30% when new capacity is assigned to the fringe, but only by 7% when assigned to the largest firm. Our findings show that the MoE is largely mitigated by market power, hence the importance of the market structure in the design of uniform incentives for RES adoption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As one of the main strategic port governance tools, port integration has been witnessed worldwide to facilitate regional port development. To examine whether the "interest balance" pattern observed in Chinese coastal region is also followed by the inland ports, this paper extends the work of Chen et al. (2020) by focusing on the implementations of port integration in the six inland provinces along the Yangtze River. A two-step methodological approach is adopted, including a descriptive analysis and an explanatory analysis. The findings suggest that a diversified implementation of port integration indeed exists on the Yangtze River and that inland ports follow the "interest balance" pattern. Specifically, institutional flexibility enables tailored implementations, which are characterized by diversity. The market structure and power distribution are recognized as the determinants that lead to the specific trajectories of port integration implementations. Notably, we also find that the geographical distance and the outside-in development model of inland ports can also affect inland port integration. This finding further enriches the "interest balance" pattern. Based on these findings, several general policy implications are proposed for inland port integration in different contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The up-to-date terminological definition of transformation processes in the global energy market has been investigated. The researchers have been summarized the methodological framework of studying the global energy market on the basis of model approach by application of provisions of the theory of branch markets ("Structure-Conduct-Performance-Regulation" model, SCPR), the theory of transformation of social and economic systems, the concept of sustainable development, which contributed to market-determined, componential, organizational and innovational and technological features of transformation. The key parameters of transformation processes in the global energy market as a result of changing social values in the paradigm of sustainable development, the necessary preconditions, drivers and incentives, techniques, the main directions of transformation have been identified. The experts have been identified the main stakeholders who honestly promote or hinder the transformations, as well as incentives for transformation by national and international regulators and the emergence of new business models and ecosystems. Methodological approaches to the application of the basic SCP model with its adaptation to study the transformation of the global energy market in areas, dynamics, impact, response and socially significant effects have been fixed. The global trends of energy market transformation towards liberalization on the basis of demonopolization, competitive market patterns, state and institutional tools have been studied. The irreversibility of transformations of the global energy market has been proved, their sources and key factors have been determined (demonopolization, reduction of entry/exit barriers, decentralization, liberalization, corporate integration, diversification, and greening). The structural transformations of the energy market through the prism of changes in the structure of energy consumption, the level of market concentration, international mergers and acquisitions have been analyzed. The influence of qualitative and quantitative changes in the market structure on the transformation of stakeholder behavior (change of pricing models, growth of segmentation, reduction of market power of natural monopolies, growth of global intra-industry competition, and stimulation of implementing innovations) has been substantiated. The term of "regulation" in the adapted model of SCPR in the context of measures of influence, stimulation, motivation, optimization has been determined. The focus is made on the importance of developing and implementing the ecological paradigm of the global transformation of the energy sector as a basis for sustainable development in the fourth energy transition using the cutting-edge technologies and models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial inclusion (FI) is increasingly becoming a global policy priority because it enables access to financial services, such as savings, payments, risk management, and credit, to households and firms with a wide range of needs. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet been undertaken on measures of FI and the nexus between FI and bank market structure in Africa. We used panel data from 17 African countries from 2004 to 2018 to measure FI and examine its nexus with bank market structure in these countries. We employed two-stage unsupervised machine learning to index FI: its dimensions in the first stage and overall FI in the second stage. Then, we employed an endogenous panel threshold model to examine bank market power and asset concentration impacts on FI. We found that bank market power enhances availability and accessibility dimensions but reduces the usage dimension. The impact of a higher regime market power on usage is worse than that of a lower regime market power. Asset concentration impacts on overall FI, availability, and usage are more pronounced under a lower regime concentration. The results imply that bank asset concentration and market power beyond thresholds are not desirable for promoting FI. The results also imply that scrutinizing potential sensitivity of the results to FI dimensions is vital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The detrimental impact of dominant corporations active in health-harming commodity industries is well recognised. However, to date, existing analyses of the ways in which corporations influence health have paid limited attention to corporate market power. Accordingly, the public health implications of concentrated market structures, the use of anti-competitive market strategies, and the ways in which market power mediates the allocation and distribution of resources via market systems, remain relatively unexplored. To address this gap, this paper aimed to identify and explore key literature that could inform a comprehensive framework to examine corporate market power from a public health perspective. The ultra-processed food (UPF) industry was used to provide illustrative examples.Methods: A scoping review of a diverse range of literature, including Industrial Organization, welfare economics, global political economy and antitrust policy, was conducted to identify important concepts and metrics that could be drawn upon within the field of public health to understand and explore market power. The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model, a guiding principle of antitrust policy and the regulation of market power, was used as an organising framework.Results: We described each of the components of the traditional SCP model and how they have historically been used to assess market power through examining the interrelations between the structure of industries and markets, the conduct of dominant firms, and the overall ability of markets and firms to efficiently allocate and distribute the scarce resources.Conclusion: We argue that the SCP model is well-placed to broaden public health research into the ways in which corporations influence health. In addition, the development of a comprehensive framework based on the key findings of this paper could help the public health community to better engage with a set of policy and regulatory tools that have the potential to curb the concentration of corporate power for the betterment of population health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many markets feature an economic structure in which value is cocreated by multiple producers and aggregated into a common bundle by a producer-consortium or independent firm. Examples include in-home video entertainment, technology goods and services, multisourced data platforms, and patent pools. This paper develops an economic model to study demand, production choices, revenue sharing, and relative market power in such markets. Producers in these markets are not rivalrous competitors in the usual zero-sum sense, because output of each casts an externality on production decisions of others and total market demand expands with total output, albeit with diminishing returns. This property allows multiple producers to flourish in equilibrium (versus just one with the most favorable technological or cost structure), and more so when the market expands less quickly with total output. Equilibrium production quantities of competitors are strategic complements, yet competition between producers does manifest itself, for example, if one acquires better production technology (i.e., makes value units at lower cost) then the equilibrium production levels of other producers are reduced. Insights are also derived for alternative market structures, for example, producers have more output and earn higher profit when organized into a distribution consortium (e.g., Hulu or consortia of zoos or museums) versus relying on a separate retailer. Mergers between producers have similar effect. The formulation enables us to rigorously answer economic questions ranging from pricing, revenue sharing, and production levels in a static setting, to market dynamics covering both the causes and effects of changes in industry structure. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental issues drive the manufacturer to strive for green technology innovation. The manufacturer cannot strictly control all the activities in the production process, which may cause yield uncertainty. However, the existing studies that consider uncertainty factors usually assume that yield is deterministic. This paper constructs a green supply chain considering yield uncertainty and corporate social responsibility by a manufacturer and a retailer under different market power structures. We examine that yield uncertainty negatively affects the optimal decision-making strategies under four different power structures, especially in the centralized model. The retailer who adopts corporate social responsibility can alleviate the negative effects of yield uncertainty to a certain extent. Meanwhile, it is interesting that the manufacturer is not maximizing profits in the market dominated by himself and is subject to interference from yield uncertainty and corporate social responsibility. When the yield uncertainty is relatively small, the manufacturer's profit is the largest in the retailer-dominated market structure. However, when the yield uncertainty is significant, the revenue for the manufacturer is the largest in the manufacturer-dominated market. Regardless of how the yield uncertainty changes, the retailer's profit is always the largest in the retailer-led model. To alleviate the manufacturer's green costs, the retailer will share part of their revenue with the manufacturer under the Nash model. The Nash-revenue-sharing contract always benefits the manufacturer but hurts the profits of the retailer with a higher sharing coefficient. Finally, this paper provides prominent implications for managers and governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether banking transparency and competition affect financial stability of banks and transparency acts as a conduit in effecting the competition among banks to increase or decrease their financial stability. This study uses multiple variations of a two-step system generalized method of moments approach on annual data from 164 Chinese commercial banks from 2000 to 2014. The results of this study showed that transparency with market power lessens the insolvency risk of banks as well as credit market risk; one could infer that market discipline works more robustly in the presence of disclosure requirements. This study supports existing market literature that China's banking transparency is a significant determinant of changes in financial stability given the market structure of its banking system while controlling for several exogenous and endogenous variables. The results are robust by using alternate proxies for market structure, banking transparency and financial stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]