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Managed care plans, which contract with states to cover three-quarters of Medicaid enrollees, play a crucial role in addressing the drug epidemic in the United States. However, substance use disorder benefits vary across Medicaid managed care plans, and it is unclear what role states play in regulating their activities. To address this question, we surveyed thirty-three states and Washington, D.C., regarding their substance use disorder treatment coverage and utilization management requirements for Medicaid managed care plans in 2021. Most states mandated coverage of common forms of substance use disorder treatment and prohibited annual maximums and enrollee cost sharing in managed care. Fewer than one-third of states forbade managed care plans from imposing prior authorization for each treatment service. For most treatment medications, fewer than two-thirds of states prohibited prior authorization, drug testing, "fail first," or psychosocial therapy requirements in managed care. Our findings suggest that many states give managed care plans broad discretion to impose requirements on covered substance use disorder treatments, which may affect access to lifesaving care.

Introduction: Medicaid managed care organizations (MCO) play a major role in addressing the nation's epidemic of drug overdose and mortality by administering substance use disorder (SUD) treatment benefits for over 50 million Americans. While it is known that some Medicaid MCO plans delegate responsibility for managing SUD treatment benefits to an outside "carve out" entity, the extent and structure of such carve out arrangements are unknown. This is an important gap in knowledge, given that carve outs have been linked to reductions in rates of SUD treatment receipt in several studies. To address this gap, we examined carve out arrangements used by Medicaid MCO plans to administer SUD treatment benefits in ten states., Methods: Data for this study was gleaned using a purposive sampling approach through content analysis of publicly available benefits information (e.g., member handbooks, provider manuals, prescription drug formularies) from 70 comprehensive Medicaid MCO plans in 10 selected states (FL, GA, IL, MD, MI, NH, OH, PA, UT, and WV) active in 2018. Each Medicaid MCO plan's documents were reviewed and coded to indicate whether a range of SUD treatment services (e.g., inpatient treatment, outpatient treatment, residential treatment) and medications were carved out, and if so, to what type of entity (e.g., behavioral health organization)., Results: A large majority of Medicaid MCO plans carved out at least some (28.6 %) or all (40.0 %) SUD treatment services, with nearly all plans carving out some (77.1 %) or all (14.3 %) medications, mainly due to the carving out of methadone treatment. Medicaid MCO plans most commonly carved out SUD treatment services to behavioral health organizations, while most medications were carved out to state Medicaid fee-for-service plans., Conclusions: Carve out arrangements for SUD treatment vary dramatically across states, across plans, and even within plans. Given that some studies have linked carve out arrangements to reductions in treatment access, their widespread use among Medicaid MCO plans is cause for further consideration by policymakers and other key interest groups. Moreover, reliance on such complex arrangements for administering care may create challenges for enrollees who seek to learn about and access plan benefits., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest None., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Safety-net providers play a central role in the U.S. health care system because they provide the bulk of services to the poor and the uninsured. The health policy literature focuses a great deal on the capacity of these institutions to provide services and the forces that shape these institutions and the services they provide, yet little is made of safety-net providers' potential role as advocates for the poor and for disadvantaged groups. In this article, we draw on findings from a case study of Medicaid policy making in Connecticut to explore efforts by safety-net providers and other nonprofit organizations to advocate around health care policy for the poor. Our findings illustrate how the capacity of nonprofit advocates to represent the poor can be compromised when the rules of the game change and nonprofit providers are asked to compete with for-profit organizations. We find that under a change in the contracting regime--from collaboration to competition--nonprofit service providers may increase political activity to secure a favorable role under the new regime, but these efforts may compromise their ability to act as representatives of the poor.

With the recent exponential growth in managed-care plan enrollment by Medicaid beneficiaries, a variety of quality monitoring systems have emerged. This paper argues that existing quality monitoring systems, originally designed for use by employers in the private sector, are a useful starting point for quality monitoring in the Medicaid program, but that substantial enhancements are needed to provide adequate quality assurance for Medicaid beneficiaries. This paper describes the development of a range of indicators for monitoring the clinical aspect of the quality of care for Medicaid beneficiaries and offers a framework for adapting existing monitoring systems to the needs of the Medicaid population. This work is part of a larger collaborative effort by the Connecticut Department of Public Health and the Department of Epidemiology and Public Health of Yale University School of Medicine to develop a blueprint for state government's role in quality assessment and performance management for managed care.

An Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)-Medicaid managed care policy consensus has emerged in the American states. Although there are two main organizational forms--primary care case management and risk-based capitation models--states are converging on the risk-based approach for their AFDC recipients. Risk-based Medicaid managed care for AFDC recipients assumes a distinct purpose and meaning. The reform is not just about cost control and improving access but about enduring welfare concerns: deservingness, need, and empowerment. Despite recent federal policies that have essentially severed the eligibility link between AFDC and Medicaid, state policy elites still conceive of poor families on Medicaid as a "welfare" group. Assumptions about the need for behavior modification and the need to integrate this group into "mainstream" America shape perceptions about why Medicaid managed care is appropriate for AFDC-Medicaid recipients.