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Holistic processing refers to the processing of objects as wholes rather than in a piecemeal, part-based fashion. Despite a suggested link between expertise and holistic processing, the role of experience in determining holistic processing of both faces and objects has been questioned. Here, we combine an individual differences approach with an experimental training study and parametrically manipulate experience with novel objects to examine the determinants of holistic processing. We also measure object-recognition ability. Our results show that although domain-general visual ability is a predictor of the ability to match object parts, it is the amount of experience people have individuating objects of a category that determines the extent to which they process new objects of this category in a holistic manner. This work highlights the benefits of dissociating the influences of domain-general ability and domain-specific experience, typically confounded in measures of performance or "expertise." Our findings are consistent with those in recent work with faces showing that variability specific to experience is a better predictor of domain-specific effects than is variability in performance. We argue that individual differences in holistic processing arise from domain-specific experience and that these effects are related to similar effects of experience on other measures of selective attention. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Several studies have found that individuals from small hometowns show diminished face recognition ability as compared with individuals from larger hometowns. We further this line of research by relating six measures of face recognition ability to hometown density. We predicted that the three face recognition ability measures which included a learning component would relate to hometown density whereas the three measures which did not include such a learning component would not. Instead, we found that none of the six measures related to hometown density. Interestingly, we found interactions between gender and hometown population density on many of these measures and on a general index of face recognition, with females from small hometowns outperforming males from small hometowns but no such differences in the large hometown group. In a follow-up re-analysis of a previous study, we found a similar interaction in one of two face recognition ability measures. Together, these results reveal a pattern of gender differences modulated by hometown population density. If indeed experience with faces in one's hometown influences face recognition ability, understanding these effects may require more than a quantification of the environment. Men and women growing up in the same environment likely have different experiences, which likely modulates effects on visual abilities.

Recent reports have shown that individuals from small hometowns show relatively poor face recognition ability as measured by the Cambridge Face Memory Test or CFMT (Balas & Saville, 2015, 2017), suggesting that the number of faces present in an individual’s visual environment relates to that individual’s face recognition ability. We replicate this finding in a sample from a different region (Nebraska) and with more variable age distribution. We extend the study by using another test of face recognition ability that does not require learning over trials, and with non-face object recognition tests that share the learning format with the CFMT. We find no hometown effect in these other tests, although more power would be required to show the CFMT effect is significantly larger. We use the same dataset to explore whether experience with more faces and cars in larger hometowns leads to specialization of these abilities. We find strong and substantial support for the hypothesis that the recognition abilities for faces and for cars are more independent from general object recognition in people from larger hometowns. This suggests that experience may be critical to the specialization of these abilities.

People with superior face recognition have relatively thin cortex in face-selective brain areas, while those with superior vehicle recognition have relatively thick cortex in the same areas. We suggest that these opposite correlations reflect distinct mechanisms influencing cortical thickness (CT) for abilities acquired at different points in development. We explore a new prediction regarding the specificity of these effects through the depth of the cortex: that face recognition selectively and negatively correlates with thickness of the deepest laminar subdivision in face-selective areas. With ultra-high resolution MRI at 7T, we estimated the thickness of three laminar subdivisions, which we term MR layers, in the right fusiform face area (rFFA) in 14 adult male humans. Face recognition was negatively associated with the thickness of deep MR layers, while vehicle recognition was positively related to the thickness of all layers. Regression model comparisons provided overwhelming support for a model specifying that the magnitude of the association between face recognition and CT differs across MR layers (deep vs. superficial/middle) while the magnitude of the association between vehicle recognition and CT is invariant across layers. The total CT of rFFA accounted for 69% of the variance in face recognition, and thickness of the deep layer alone accounted for 84% of this variance. Our findings demonstrate the functional validity of MR laminar estimates in FFA. Studying the structural basis of individual differences for multiple abilities in the same cortical area can reveal effects of distinct mechanisms that are not apparent when studying average variation or development.Significance StatementFace and object recognition vary in the normal population and are only modestly related to each other. The recognition of faces and vehicles are both positively related to neural responses in the fusiform face area (FFA), but show different relations to the cortical thickness of FFA. Here, we use very high-resolution MRI, and find that face recognition ability (a skill acquired early in life) is negatively correlated with thickness of FFA’s deepest MR-defined layers, whereas recognition of vehicles (a skill acquired later in life) is positively related to thickness at of all cortical layers. Our methods can be used in the future to characterize sources of variability in human abilities and relate them to distinct mechanisms of neural plasticity.

The Vanderbilt Holistic Processing Test for faces (VHPT-F) is the first standard test designed to measure individual differences in holistic processing. The test measures failures of selective attention to face parts through congruency effects, an operational definition of holistic processing. However, this conception of holistic processing has been challenged by the suggestion that it may tap into the same selective attention or cognitive control mechanisms that yield congruency effects in Stroop and Flanker paradigms. Here, we report data from 130 subjects on the VHPT-F, several versions of Stroop and Flanker tasks, as well as fluid IQ. Results suggested a small degree of shared variance in Stroop and Flanker congruency effects, which did not relate to congruency effects on the VHPT-F. Variability on the VHPT-F was also not correlated with Fluid IQ. In sum, we find no evidence that holistic face processing as measured by congruency in the VHPT-F is accounted for by domain-general control mechanisms.

Seeing pictures of objects activates the motor cortex and can have an influence on subsequent grasping actions. However, the exact nature of the motor representations evoked by these pictures is unclear. For example, action plans engaged by pictures could be most affected by direct visual input and computed online based on object shape. Alternatively, action plans could be influenced by experience seeing and grasping these objects. We provide evidence for a dual-route theory of action representations evoked by pictures of objects, suggesting that these representations are influenced by both direct visual input and stored knowledge. We find that that familiarity with objects has a facilitative effect on grasping actions, with knowledge about the object's canonical orientation or its name speeding grasping actions for familiar objects compared to novel objects. Furthermore, the strength of contributions from each route to action can be modulated by the manner in which the objects are attended. Thus, evocation of grasping representations depends on an interaction between one's familiarity with perceived objects and how those objects are attended while making grasp actions. (PsycINFO Database Record

The expertise hypothesis suggests the fusiform face area (FFA) is more responsive to faces than to other categories because of experience individuating faces. Accordingly, individual differences in FFA's selectivity for faces should relate to differences in behavioral face-recognition ability. However, previous studies have not demonstrated this, while the comparable association is often observed with nonface objects. We created a training paradigm with conditions sufficient to observe the same effect with faces. First, we selected subjects with a wide range of behavioral face-recognition abilities, then we manipulated experience with an artificial race of faces based on subjects' pretraining ability, maximizing variability in face individuation. Neural selectivity was measured for Caucasian faces and artificial-race faces relative to control objects. Selecting subjects for greater variability in face-recognition ability revealed an association between behavior and FFA selectivity for Caucasian faces, with an effect exclusive to the middle right FFA (FFA2). Manipulating experience with artificial-race faces led to stronger brain-behavior correlation for artificial-race faces, also in right FFA2. Group analyses showed an overlap of these effects for Caucasian and artificial-race faces in right FFA2. The right FFA2 appears particularly sensitive to experience with faces just as it is for nonface objects.

The part-whole paradigm was one of the first measures of holistic processing and it has been used to address several topics in face recognition, including its development, other-race effects, and more recently, whether holistic processing is correlated with face recognition ability. However the task was not designed to measure individual differences and it has produced measurements with low reliability. We created a new holistic processing test designed to measure individual differences based on the part-whole paradigm, the Vanderbilt Part Whole Test (VPWT). Measurements in the part and whole conditions were reliable, but, surprisingly, there was no evidence for reliable individual differences in the part-whole index (how well a person can take advantage of a face part presented within a whole face context compared to the part presented without a whole face) because part and whole conditions were strongly correlated. The same result was obtained in a version of the original part-whole task that was modified to increase its reliability. Controlling for object recognition ability, we found that variance in the whole condition does not predict any additional variance in face recognition over what is already predicted by performance in the part condition.

There is substantial evidence for individual differences in personality and cognitive abilities, but we lack clear intuitions about individual differences in visual abilities. Previous work on this topic has typically compared performance with only 2 categories, each measured with only 1 task. This approach is insufficient for demonstration of domain-general effects. Most previous work has used familiar object categories, for which experience may vary between participants and categories, thereby reducing correlations that would stem from a common factor. In Study 1, we adopted a latent variable approach to test for the first time whether there is a domain-general object recognition ability, o. We assessed whether shared variance between latent factors representing performance for each of 5 novel object categories could be accounted for by a single higher-order factor. On average, 89% of the variance of lower-order factors denoting performance on novel object categories could be accounted for by a higher-order factor, providing strong evidence for o. Moreover, o also accounted for a moderate proportion of variance in tests of familiar object recognition. In Study 2, we assessed whether the strong association across categories in object recognition is due to third-variable influences. We find that o has weak to moderate associations with a host of cognitive, perceptual, and personality constructs and that a clear majority of the variance in and covariance between performance on different categories is independent of fluid intelligence. This work provides the first demonstration of a reliable, specific, and domain-general object recognition ability, and suggest a rich framework for future work in this area. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

When there is a gender effect, women perform better then men in face recognition tasks. Prior work has not documented a male advantage on a face recognition task, suggesting that women may outperform men at face recognition generally either due to evolutionary reasons or the influence of social roles. Here, we question the idea that women excel at all face recognition and provide a proof of concept based on a face category for which men outperform women. We developed a test of face learning to measures individual differences with face categories for which men and women may differ in experience, using the faces of Barbie dolls and of Transformers. The results show a crossover interaction between subject gender and category, where men outperform women with Transformers’ faces. We demonstrate that men can outperform women with some categories of faces, suggesting that explanations for a general face recognition advantage for women are in fact not needed.

The fusiform face area (FFA) is defined by its selectivity for faces. Several studies have shown that the response of FFA to nonface objects can predict behavioral performance for these objects. However, one possible account is that experts pay more attention to objects in their domain of expertise, driving signals up. Here, we show an effect of expertise with nonface objects in FFA that cannot be explained by differential attention to objects of expertise. We explore the relationship between cortical thickness of FFA and face and object recognition using the Cambridge Face Memory Test and Vanderbilt Expertise Test, respectively. We measured cortical thickness in functionally defined regions in a group of men who evidenced functional expertise effects for cars in FFA. Performance with faces and objects together accounted for approximately 40% of the variance in cortical thickness of several FFA patches. Whereas participants with a thicker FFA cortex performed better with vehicles, those with a thinner FFA cortex performed better with faces and living objects. The results point to a domain-general role of FFA in object perception and reveal an interesting double dissociation that does not contrast faces and objects but rather living and nonliving objects.

Visual object expertise correlates with neural selectivity in the fusiform face area (FFA). Although behavioral studies suggest that visual expertise is associated with increased use of holistic and configural information, little is known about the nature of the supporting neural representations. Using high-resolution 7-T functional magnetic resonance imaging, we recorded the multivoxel activation patterns elicited by whole cars, configurally disrupted cars, and car parts in individuals with a wide range of car expertise. A probabilistic support vector machine classifier was trained to differentiate activation patterns elicited by whole car images from activation patterns elicited by misconfigured car images. The classifier was then used to classify new combined activation patterns that were created by averaging activation patterns elicited by individually presented top and bottom car parts. In line with the idea that the configuration of parts is critical to expert visual perception, car expertise was negatively associated with the probability of a combined activation pattern being classified as a whole car in the right anterior FFA, a region critical to vision for categories of expertise. Thus, just as found for faces in normal observers, the neural representation of cars in right anterior FFA is more holistic for car experts than car novices, consistent with common mechanisms of neural selectivity for faces and other objects of expertise in this area.

The fusiform face area (FFA) is one of several areas in occipito-temporal cortex whose activity is correlated with perceptual expertise for objects. Here, we investigate the robustness of expertise effects in FFA and other areas to a strong task manipulation that increases both perceptual and attentional demands. With high-resolution fMRI at 7T, we measured responses to images of cars, faces and a category globally visually similar to cars (sofas) in 26 subjects who varied in expertise with cars, in (a) a low load 1-back task with a single object category and (b) a high load task in which objects from two categories were rapidly alternated and attention was required to both categories. The low load condition revealed several areas more active as a function of expertise, including both posterior and anterior portions of FFA bilaterally (FFA1/FFA2, respectively). Under high load, fewer areas were positively correlated with expertise and several areas were even negatively correlated, but the expertise effect in face-selective voxels in the anterior portion of FFA (FFA2) remained robust. Finally, we found that behavioral car expertise also predicted increased responses to sofa images but no behavioral advantages in sofa discrimination, suggesting that global shape similarity to a category of expertise is enough to elicit a response in FFA and other areas sensitive to experience, even when the category itself is not of special interest. The robustness of expertise effects in right FFA2 and the expertise effects driven by visual similarity both argue against attention being the sole determinant of expertise effects in extrastriate areas.

In tests of object recognition, individual differences typically correlate modestly but nontrivially across familiar categories (e.g. cars, faces, shoes, birds, mushrooms). In theory, these correlations could reflect either global, non-specific mechanisms, such as general intelligence (IQ), or more specific mechanisms. Here, we introduce two separate methods for effectively capturing category-general performance variation, one that uses novel objects and one that uses familiar objects. In each case, we show that category-general performance variance is unrelated to IQ, thereby implicating more specific mechanisms. The first approach examines three newly developed novel object memory tests (NOMTs). We predicted that NOMTs would exhibit more shared, category-general variance than familiar object memory tests (FOMTs) because novel objects, unlike familiar objects, lack category-specific environmental influences (e.g. exposure to car magazines or botany classes). This prediction held, and remarkably, virtually none of the substantial shared variance among NOMTs was explained by IQ. Also, while NOMTs correlated nontrivially with two FOMTs (faces, cars), these correlations were smaller than among NOMTs and no larger than between the face and car tests themselves, suggesting that the category-general variance captured by NOMTs is specific not only relative to IQ, but also, to some degree, relative to both face and car recognition. The second approach averaged performance across multiple FOMTs, which we predicted would increase category-general variance by averaging out category-specific factors. This prediction held, and as with NOMTs, virtually none of the shared variance among FOMTs was explained by IQ. Overall, these results support the existence of object recognition mechanisms that, though category-general, are specific relative to IQ and substantially separable from face and car recognition. They also add sensitive, well-normed NOMTs to the tools available to study object recognition.

Just as people vary in their perceptual expertise with a given domain, they also vary in their abilities to imagine objects. Visual imagery and perception share common mechanisms. However, it is unclear whether domain-specific expertise is relevant to visual imagery. Although the vividness of visual imagery is typically measured as a domain-general construct, a component of this vividness may be domain-specific. For example, individuals who have gained perceptual expertise with a specific domain might experience clearer mental images within this domain. Here we investigated whether perceptual expertise for cars relates to visual imagery vividness in the same domain, by assessing the correlations between a widely used domain-general measure of visual imagery vividness (the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire; Marks in British Journal of Psychology, 64, 17-24, 1973), a new measure of visual imagery vividness specific to cars, and behavioral tests of car expertise. We found that domain-specific imagery relates most strongly to general imagery vividness and less strongly to self-reported expertise, while it does not relate to perceptual or semantic expertise.

Learning to categorize objects can transform how they are perceived, causing relevant perceptual dimensions predictive of object category to become enhanced. For example, an expert mycologist might become attuned to species-specific patterns of spacing between mushroom gills but learn to ignore cap textures attributable to varying environmental conditions. These selective changes in perception can persist beyond the act of categorizing objects and influence our ability to discriminate between them. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation, we demonstrate that such category-specific perceptual enhancements are associated with changes in the neural discriminability of object representations in visual cortex. Regions within the anterior fusiform gyrus became more sensitive to small variations in shape that were relevant during prior category learning. In addition, extrastriate occipital areas showed heightened sensitivity to small variations in shape that spanned the category boundary. Visual representations in cortex, just like our perception, are sensitive to an object's history of categorization.

According to the expertise account of face specialization, a deficit that affects general expertise mechanisms should similarly impair the expert individuation of both faces and other visually homogeneous object classes. To test this possibility, we attempted to train a prosopagnosic patient, LR, to become a Greeble expert using the standard Greeble expertise-training paradigm (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002). Previous research demonstrated that LR's prosopagnosia was related to an inability to simultaneously use multiple features in a speeded face recognition task (Bukach, Bub, Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006). We hypothesized that LR's inability to use multiple face features would manifest in his acquisition of Greeble expertise, even though his basic object recognition is unimpaired according to standard neuropsychological testing. Although LR was eventually able to reach expertise criterion, he took many more training sessions than controls, suggesting use of an abnormal strategy. To further explore LR's Greeble processing strategies, we assessed his ability to use multiple Greeble features both before and after Greeble training. LR's performance in two versions of this task demonstrates that, even after training, he relies heavily on a single feature to identify Greebles. This correspondence between LR's face recognition and post-training Greeble recognition supports the idea that impaired face recognition is simply the most visible symptom of a more general object recognition impairment in acquired prosopagnosia.

We examined whether temporal integration of face parts reflects holistic processing or response interference. Participants learned to name two faces “Fred” and two “Bob.” At test, the top and bottom halves of different faces formed composites and were presented briefly separated in time. Replicating prior findings (Singer & Sheinberg, Vision Research, 46, 1838–1847, 2006), naming of the target half for aligned composites was slowed when the irrelevant half was from a face with a different name rather than from the original face. However, no interference was observed when the irrelevant half had a name identical to the name of the target half but came from a different learned face, arguing against a true holistic effect. Instead, response interference was obtained when the target half briefly preceded the irrelevant half. Experiment 2 confirmed a double dissociation of holistic processing versus response interference for intact faces versus temporally separated face halves, suggesting that simultaneous presentation of facial information is critical for holistic processing.

Are there consequences of calling objects by their names? Lupyan (2008) suggested that overtly labeling objects impairs subsequent recognition memory because labeling shifts stored memory representations of objects toward the category prototype (representational shift hypothesis). In Experiment 1, we show that processing objects at the basic category level versus exemplar level in the absence of any overt labeling produces the same qualitative pattern of results. Experiment 2 demonstrates that labeling does not always disrupt memory as predicted by the representational shift hypothesis: Differences in memory following labeling versus preference are more likely an effect of judging preference, not an effect of overt labeling. Labeling does not influence memory by shifting memory representations toward the category prototype. Rather, labeling objects at the basic level produces memory representations that are simply less robust than those produced by other kinds of study tasks.

Recent studies indicate that expertise with objects can interfere with face processing. Although competition occurs between faces and objects of expertise, it remains unclear whether this reflects an expertise-specific bottleneck or the fact that objects of expertise grab attention and thereby consume more central resources. We investigated the perceptual costs of expertise by measuring visual thresholds for identifying targets embedded within RSVP sequences presented at varying temporal rates. Car experts and novices searched for face targets among face and car distractors, or watch targets among watch and car distractors. Remarkably, car experts were slower than novices at identifying faces among task-irrelevant cars, yet faster than novices at identifying watches among cars. This suggests that car expertise leads to greater functional overlap between cars and faces while reducing the functional overlap between cars and objects, a result incompatible with the notion of an encapsulated module for exclusive processing of faces.

Holistic processing (i.e., the tendency to process objects as wholes) is associated with face perception and also with expertise individuating novel objects. Surprisingly, recent work also reveals holistic effects in novice observers. It is unclear whether the same mechanisms support holistic effects in experts and in novices. In the present study, we measured holistic processing of music sequences using a selective attention task in participants who vary in music-reading expertise. We found that holistic effects were strategic in novices but were relatively automatic in experts. Correlational analyses revealed that individual holistic effects were predicted by both individual music-reading ability and neural responses for musical notation in the right fusiform face area (rFFA), but in opposite directions for experts and novices, suggesting that holistic effects in the two groups may be of different natures. To characterize expert perception, it is important not only to measure the tendency to process objects as wholes, but also to test whether this effect is dependent on task constraints.

Prior work suggests that nonface objects of expertise can interfere with the perception of faces when the two categories are alternately presented, suggesting competition for shared perceptual resources. Here, we ask whether task-irrelevant distractors from a category of expertise compete when faces are presented in a standard visual search task. Participants searched for a target (face or sofa) in an array containing both relevant and irrelevant distractors. The number of distractors from the target category (face or sofa) remained constant, whereas the number of distractors from the irrelevant category (cars) varied. Search slopes, calculated as a function of the number of irrelevant cars, were correlated with car expertise. The effect was not due to car distractors grabbing attention, because they did not compete with sofa targets. Objects of expertise interfere with face perception even when they are task irrelevant, visually distinct, and separated in space from faces.

Neuroimaging provides a unique tool to investigate otherwise difficult-to-access mental processes like visual imagery. Prior studies support the idea that visual imagery is a top-down reinstatement of visual perception, and it is likely that this extends to object processing. Here we use functional MRI and multi-voxel pattern analysis to ask if mental imagery of cars engages the fusiform face area, similar to what is found during perception. We test only individuals who we assumed could imagine individual car models based on their above-average perceptual abilities with cars. Our results provide evidence that cars are represented differently from common objects in face-selective visual areas, at least in those with above-average car recognition ability. Moreover, pattern classifiers trained on data acquired during imagery can decode the neural response pattern acquired during perception, suggesting that the tested object categories are represented similarly during perception and visual imagery. The results suggest that, even at high-levels of visual processing, visual imagery mirrors perception to some extent, and that face-selective areas may in part support non-face object imagery.

The presence of differential item functioning (DIF) in a test suggests bias that could disadvantage members of a certain group. Previous work with tests of visual learning abilities found significant DIF related to age groups in a car test (Lee, Cho, McGugin, Van Gulick, & Gauthier, 2015), but not in a face test (Cho et al., 2015). The presence of age DIF is a threat to the validity of the test even for studies where aging is not of interest. Here, we assessed whether this pattern of age DIF for cars and not faces would also apply to new tests targeting the same abilities with a new matching task that uses two studied items per trial. We found evidence for DIF in matching tests for faces and for cars, though with encouragingly small effect sizes. Even though the age DIF was small enough at the test level to be acceptable for most uses, we also asked whether the specific format of our matching tasks may induce some age-related DIF regardless of domain. We decomposed the face matching task into its components, and using new data from subjects performing these simpler tasks, found evidence that the age DIF was driven by the similarity of the two faces presented at study on each trial. Overall, our results suggest that using a matching format, especially for cars, reduces age-related DIF, and that a simpler matching task with only one study item per trial could reduce age DIF further.

The Thatcher Illusion or Thatcher Effect (TE—Thompson 1980, Perception9 483–484) reflects the difficulty in perceiving the local inversion of parts when the whole object, generally a face, is globally inverted. We tested the generality of the TE with a range of faces and non-face objects, and observed the TE with many non-face categories including cars, buildings, bikes, and letter strings. In terms of magnitude, the face TE is not exceptionally large compared to other object categories, and the magnitude of the TE can be predicted by performance on this task for upright stimuli, regardless of whether the object is a face or not. We did not observe evidence for a unique mechanism contributing to the TE for faces. We discuss factors that influence the magnitude of the TE, some common across domains and others more specific to a particular category.

Compared with other objects, faces are processed more holistically and with a larger reliance on configural information. Such hallmarks efface processing can also be found for nonface objects as people develop expertise with them. Is this specifically a result of expertise individuating objects, or would any type of prolonged intensive experience with objects be sufficient? Two groups of participants were trained with artificial objects (Ziggerins). One group learned to rapidly individuate Ziggerins (i.e., subordinate-level training). The other group learned rapid, sequential categorizations at the basic level. Individuation experts showed a selective improvement at the subordinate level and an increase in holistic processing. Categorization experts improved only at the basic level, showing no changes in holistic processing. Attentive exposure to objects in a difficult training regimen is not sufficient to produce facelike expertise. Rather, qualitatively different types of expertise with objects of a given geometry can arise depending on the type of training.

Researchers have used several composite face paradigms to assess holistic processing of faces. In the selective attention paradigm, participants decide whether one face part (e.g., top) is the same as a previously seen face part. Their judgment is affected by whether the irrelevant part of the test face is the same as or different than the relevant part of the study face. This failure of selective attention implies holistic processing. However, the authors show that this task alone cannot distinguish between perceptual and decisional sources of holism. The distinction can be addressed by the complete identification paradigm, in which both face parts are judged to be same or different, combined with analyses based on general recognition theory (F. G. Ashby & J. T. Townsend, 1986). The authors used a different paradigm, sequential responses, to relate these 2 paradigms empirically and theoretically. Sequential responses produced the same results as did selective attention and complete identification. Moreover, disruptions of holistic processing by systematic misalignment of the faces corresponded with systematic and significant changes in the decisional components, but not in the perceptual components, that were extracted using general recognition theory measures. This finding suggests a significant decisional component of holistic face processing in the composite face task.

What determines how much can be stored in visual short-term memory (VSTM)? Studies of VSTM have focused largely on stimulus-based properties such as the number or complexity of the items stored. Recent work also suggests that capacity is severely reduced for items within the same category. However, the importance for VSTM capacity of more qualitative differences in processing for different categories has not been investigated. For example, faces are processed more holistically than other objects. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that the processing of faces, objects that are crucial socially and for which we possess considerable expertise, overcomes these limitations. More faces can be stored in VSTM than objects from other complex nonface categories. As in prior studies, at short encoding durations we found that capacity for faces was less than that for other categories. However, at longer encoding durations, capacity for faces exceeded that for nonface objects, and this advantage was specific to upright faces. Because inversion reduces holistic processing, the interaction of orientation with VSTM capacity-which occurred for faces but no t objects in Experiment 3--suggests that it is holistic processing that confers an advantage for face VSTM when sufficient encoding time is allowed.

Humans can selectively attend to information in visual scenes. Learning from previous experiences plays a role in how visual attention is subsequently deployed. For example, visual search times are faster in areas that are statistically more likely to contain a target (Jiang and Swallow in Cognition, 126(3), 378–390, 2013). Here, we examined whether similar attentional biases can be created for different locations on complex objects as a function of their category, based on a history of these locations containing a target. Subjects performed a visual search task in the context of novel objects called Greebles. The target appeared in one half (e.g., top) of the Greebles 89 % of the time and in the other half (e.g., bottom) 11 % of the time. We found a reaction time advantage when the target was located in a “target-rich” region, even after target location probabilities were equated. This indicates that attentional biases can be associated not only with regions of space but also with specific object features, or at least with locations in an object-based frame of reference.

Face recognition ability varies widely in the normal population and there is increasing interest in linking individual differences in perception to their neural correlates. Such brain-behavior correlations require that both the behavioral measures and the selective BOLD responses be reliable. The reliability of the location of the fusiform face area (FFA) has been demonstrated in several studies. Here, we address reliability of a different kind: reliability of the magnitude of responses to faces within this localized region. We calculated split-half reliability of face-selective responses within functionally defined posterior and anterior face-selective patches in the fusiform gyrus (FFA1/FFA2). We used data from two published studies that included both a functional localizer for face-selective regions and independent data suitable for quantifying face-selectivity. We found highly reliable face selectivity in both hemispheres that was highest in the centermost voxel(s) compared to larger regions of interest. Differences in face-selectivity between the two face patches within one hemisphere and across hemispheres were also reliable. Our results reveal considerable reliability of face-selective signals in and across FFA in adults. Given the good reliability of behavioral measures of face recognition, prior failures to find a relationship between the mean response to faces in FFA and behavioral face recognition in normal adult subjects are unlikely to be due to limitations of the measurements.

There is growing interest in the study of individual differences in face recognition, including one of its hallmarks, holistic processing, which can be defined as a failure of selective attention to parts. These efforts demand that researchers be aware of, and try to maximize, the reliability of their measurements. Here we report on the reliability of measurements using the composite task (complete design), a measure of holistic processing that has been shown to have relatively good validity. Several studies have used the composite task to investigate individual differences, yet only one study has discussed its reliability. We investigate the reliability of composite-task measurements in eight data sets from five different samples of subjects. In general, we found reliability to be fairly low, but there was substantial variability across experiments. Researchers should keep in mind that reliability is a property of measurements, not of a task, and think about the ways in which measurements in a particular task may be improved before embarking on individual differences research.

How much do people differ in their abilities to recognize objects, and what is the source of these differences? To address the first question, psychologists have created visual learning tests including the Cambridge Face Memory Test (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) and the Vanderbilt Expertise Test (VET; McGugin et al., 2012). The second question requires consideration of the influences of both innate potential and experience, but experience is difficult to measure. One solution is to measure the products of experience beyond perceptual knowledge—specifically, nonvisual semantic knowledge. For instance, the relation between semantic and perceptual knowledge can help clarify the nature of object recognition deficits in brain-damaged patients (Barton, Hanif, & Ashraf, Brain, 132, 3456–3466, 2009). We present a reliable measure of nonperceptual knowledge in a format applicable across categories. The Semantic Vanderbilt Expertise Test (SVET) measures knowledge of relevant category-specific nomenclature. We present SVETs for eight categories: cars, planes, Transformers, dinosaurs, shoes, birds, leaves, and mushrooms. The SVET demonstrated good reliability and domain-specific validity. We found partial support for the idea that the only source of domain-specific shared variance between the VET and SVET is experience with a category. We also demonstrated the utility of the SVET-Bird in experts. The SVET can facilitate the study of individual differences in visual recognition.

Attention helps us focus on what is most relevant to our goals, and prior work shows that aspects of attention can be learned. Learned inattention to parts can abolish holistic processing of faces, but it is unknown whether learned attention to parts is sufficient to cause a change from part-based to holistic processing with objects. Here, we trained subjects to individuate non-face objects (Greebles) from two categories, Ploks and Glips. Diagnostic information was in complementary halves for the two categories. Holistic processing was then tested with Plok-Glip composites that combined the kind of part that was diagnostic or non-diagnostic during training. Exposure to Greeble parts resulted in general failures of selective attention for non-diagnostic composites, but face-like holistic processing was only observed for diagnostic composites. These results demonstrate a novel link between learned attentional control and the acquisition of holistic processing.

We evaluated the psychometric properties of the Cambridge face memory test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). First, we assessed the dimensionality of the test with a bi-factor exploratory factor analysis (EFA). This EFA analysis revealed a general factor and three specific factors clustered by targets of CFMT. However, the three specific factors appeared to be minor factors that can be ignored. Second, we fit a unidimensional item response model. This item response model showed that the CFMT items could discriminate individuals at different ability levels and covered a wide range of the ability continuum. We found the CFMT to be particularly precise for a wide range of ability levels. Third, we implemented item response theory (IRT) differential item functioning (DIF) analyses for each gender group and two age groups (Age ≤ 20 versus Age > 21). This DIF analysis suggested little evidence of consequential differential functioning on the CFMT for these groups, supporting the use of the test to compare older to younger, or male to female, individuals. Fourth, we tested for a gender difference on the latent facial recognition ability with an explanatory item response model. We found a significant but small gender difference on the latent ability for face recognition, which was higher for women than men by 0.184, at age mean 23.2, controlling for linear and quadratic age effects. Finally, we discuss the practical considerations of the use of total scores versus IRT scale scores in applications of the CFMT.

We document a seemingly unique case of severe prosopagnosia, L. R., who suffered damage to his anterior and inferior right temporal lobe as a result of a motor vehicle accident. We systematically investigated each of three factors associated with expert face recognition: fine-level discrimination, holistic processing, and configural processing (Experiments 1-3). Surprisingly, L. R. shows preservation of all three of these processes; that is, his performance in these experiments is comparable to that of normal controls. However, L. R. is only able to apply these processes over a limited spatial extent to the fine-level detail within faces. Thus, when the location of a given change is unpredictable (Experiment 3), L. R. exhibits normal detection of features and spatial configurations only for the lower half of each face. Similarly, when required to divide his attention over multiple face features, L. R. is able to determine the identity of only a single feature (Experiment 4). We discuss these results in the context of forming a better understanding of prosopagnosia and the mechanisms used in face recognition and visual expertise. We conclude that these mechanisms are not “all-or-none”, but rather can be impaired incrementally, such that they may remain functional over a restricted spatial area. This conclusion is consistent with previous research suggesting that perceptual expertise is acquired in a spatially incremental manner [Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. Unraveling mechanisms for expert object recognition: Bridging brain activity and behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 28, 431-446, 2002].

Expertise with print is likely to optimize visual processes for recognizing characters of a familiar writing system. Although brain activations have been identified for words and letter strings in contrast with other stimuli, relatively little work has focused on the neural basis of single-letter perception. English readers and Chinese-English bilinguals participated in an ERP study and performed a 1-back identity judgment on Roman letters, Chinese characters, pseudofonts, and their string versions. The Chinese-English bilinguals showed an enhanced N170 for both Roman letters and Chinese characters relative to pseudofonts. For the non-Chinese readers, the N170 amplitude was larger for Roman letters relative to Chinese characters and pseudofonts. Our results suggest that changes in relatively early visual processes underlie expert letter perception.

The brain processes images at different spatial scales, but it is unclear how far into the visual stream different scales remain segregated. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found evidence that BOLD activity in the fusiform face area (FFA) reflects computations based on separate spatial frequency inputs. When subjects perform different tasks (attend location vs. identity; attend whole vs. parts) or the same task with different stimuli (upright or inverted) with high- and low-pass images of cars and faces, individual differences in the FFA in one condition are correlated with those in the other condition. However, FFA activity in response to low-pass stimuli is independent of its response to high-pass stimuli. These results suggest that spatial scales are not integrated before the FFA and that processing in this area could support the flexible use of different sources of information present in broad-pass images.

Agnosia, the impairment in object and face recognition despite intact vision and intelligence, is one of the most intriguing and debilitating neuropsychological deficits. The goal of this study was to determine whether S.M., an individual with longstanding visual agnosia and concomitant prosopagnosia, can be retrained to perform visual object recognition and, if so, what neural substrates mediate this reacquisition. Additionally, of interest is the extent to which training on one type of visual stimulus generalizes to other visual stimuli, as this informs our understanding of the organization of ventral visual cortex. Greebles were chosen as the stimuli for retraining given that, in neurologically normal individuals, these stimuli can engage the fusiform face area. Posttraining, S.M. showed significant improvement in recognizing Greebles, although he did not attain normal levels of performance. He was also able to recognize untrained Greebles and showed improvement in recognizing common objects. Surprisingly, his performance on face recognition, albeit poor initially, was even more impaired following training. A comparison of preand postintervention functional neuroimaging data mirrored the behavioral findings: Face-selective voxels in the fusiform gyrus prior to training were no longer so and were, in fact, more Greeble-selective. The findings indicate potential for experience-dependent dynamic reorganization in agnosia with the possibility that residual neural tissue, with limited capacity, will compete for representations.

Recent exposure to a stimulus improves performance with subsequent identification of that same stimulus. This ubiquitous, yet simple, memory phenomenon is termed priming and has been linked to another widespread phenomenon called repetition suppression, which is a repetition‐induced reduction in human brain activation as measured using fMRI. Here, competing models of the neural basis of repetition suppression were tested empirically. In a backward masking paradigm, we found that effectively masked object stimuli showed repetition enhancement of brain activation instead of suppression. This finding is consistent with an Accumulation model, but is inconsistent with a Suppression model of neural activity. Enhanced activation and the improved behavioral performance usually associated with priming are both explained by a shift in peak latency of the population neural activity elicited during identification. Hum. Brain Mapping, 2005. © 2005 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.

Abnormal hypoactivation in the amygdala and fusiform gyrus, brain areas that participate in face processing and social cognition, has consistently been demonstrated in persons with autism. We investigated activity in these areas in a boy with autism, DD, who had a special interest in “Digimon” cartoon characters. DD individuates Digimon faster than familiar faces and objects, but he individuates familiar faces no faster than objects. In contrast, a typically developing boy with an interest in “Pokemon” cartoon characters is equally fast at individuating faces and Pokemon and faster at individuating faces and Pokemon than objects and Digimon. In addition, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we show that DD activates his amygdala and fusiform gyrus for perceptual discriminations involving Digimon but not for those involving familiar or unfamiliar faces. This pattern of activation is not seen in the typically developing control with an interest in Pokemon or in a second comparison case who has autism but no interest in Digimon. These results have important implications for our understanding of autism, cortical face specialization, and the possible role of the amygdala in the development of perceptual expertise.

Which image geometries count as face-like and which do not? Across multiple experiments [Vision Research 37 (12) (1997) 1673; Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 11 (4) (1999) 349; Psychological Science 13 (3) (2002) 250], novel objects called Greebles have been used to argue that face-specific effects can be obtained with non-face stimuli under certain situations, in particular with expert observers. However, this claim depends on the argument that these non-face stimuli are not a priori treated by the face processing system. To address this question, CK, a neuropsychological patient well-known for exhibiting severe visual object agnosia and dyslexia but intact face processing, was tested with Greebles. CK performed poorly on Greebles, indicating that his intact face-specific abilities do not extend to include Greebles. These results suggest that insofar as CK is relying on face-specific visual processes, these processes do not a priori treat Greebles as faces.

We measured brain activity during mental rotation and object recognition with objects rotated around three different axes. Activity in the superior parietal lobe (SPL) increased proportionally to viewpoint disparity during mental rotation, but not during object recognition. In contrast, the fusiform gyrus was preferentially recruited in a viewpoint-dependent manner in recognition as compared to mental rotation. In addition, independent of the effect of viewpoint, object recognition was associated with ventral areas and mental rotation with dorsal areas. These results indicate that the similar behavioral effects of viewpoint obtained in these two tasks are based on different neural substrates. Such findings call into question the hypothesis that mental rotation is used to compensate for changes in viewpoint during object recognition.

Efforts to understand individual differences in high-level vision necessitate the development of measures that have sufficient reliability, which is generally not a concern in group studies. Holistic processing is central to research on face recognition and, more recently, to the study of individual differences in this area. However, recent work has shown that the most popular measure of holistic processing, the composite task, has low reliability. This is particularly problematic for the recent surge in interest in studying individual differences in face recognition. Here, we developed and validated a new measure of holistic face processing specifically for use in individual-differences studies. It avoids some of the pitfalls of the standard composite design and capitalizes on the idea that trial variability allows for better traction on reliability. Across four experiments, we refine this test and demonstrate its reliability.

Some research finds that face recognition is largely independent from the recognition of other objects; a specialized and innate ability to recognize faces could therefore have little or nothing to do with our ability to recognize objects. We propose a new framework in which recognition performance for any category is the product of domain-general ability and category-specific experience. In Experiment 1, we show that the overlap between face and object recognition depends on experience with objects. In 256 subjects we measured face recognition, object recognition for eight categories, and self-reported experience with these categories. Experience predicted neither face recognition nor object recognition but moderated their relationship: Face recognition performance is increasingly similar to object recognition performance with increasing object experience. If a subject has a lot of experience with objects and is found to perform poorly, they also prove to have a low ability with faces. In a follow-up survey, we explored the dimensions of experience with objects that may have contributed to self-reported experience in Experiment 1. Different dimensions of experience appear to be more salient for different categories, with general self-reports of expertise reflecting judgments of verbal knowledge about a category more than judgments of visual performance. The complexity of experience and current limitations in its measurement support the importance of aggregating across multiple categories. Our findings imply that both face and object recognition are supported by a common, domain-general ability expressed through experience with a category and best measured when accounting for experience.

In classic category learning studies, subjects typically learn to assign items to one of two categories, with no further distinction between how items on each side of the category boundary should be treated. In real life, however, we often learn categories that dictate further processing goals, for instance with objects in only one category requiring further individuation. Using methods from category learning and perceptual expertise, we studied the perceptual consequences of experience with objects in tasks that rely on attention to different dimensions in different parts of the space. In two experiments, subjects first learned to categorize complex objects from a single morphspace into two categories based on one morph dimension, and then learned to perform a different task, either naming or a local feature judgment, for each of the two categories. A same-different discrimination test before and after each training measured sensitivity to feature dimensions of the space. After initial categorization, sensitivity increased along the category-diagnostic dimension. After task association, sensitivity increased more for the category that was named, especially along the non-diagnostic dimension. The results demonstrate that local attentional weights, associated with individual exemplars as a function of task requirements, can have lasting effects on perceptual representations.

Expertise effects for nonface objects in face-selective brain areas may reflect stable aspects of neuronal selectivity that determine how observers perceive objects. However, bottom-up (e.g., clutter from irrelevant objects) and top-down manipulations (e.g., attentional selection) can influence activity, affecting the link between category selectivity and individual performance. We test the prediction that individual differences expressed as neural expertise effects for cars in face-selective areas are sufficiently stable to survive clutter and manipulations of attention. Additionally, behavioral work and work using event related potentials suggest that expertise effects may not survive competition; we investigate this using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Subjects varying in expertise with cars made 1-back decisions about cars, faces, and objects in displays containing one or 2 objects, with only one category attended. Univariate analyses suggest car expertise effects are robust to clutter, dampened by reducing attention to cars, but nonetheless more robust to manipulations of attention than competition. While univariate expertise effects are severely abolished by competition between cars and faces, multivariate analyses reveal new information related to car expertise. These results demonstrate that signals in face-selective areas predict expertise effects for nonface objects in a variety of conditions, although individual differences may be expressed in different dependent measures depending on task and instructions.

Most theories of visual processing propose that object recognition is achieved in higher visual cortex. However, we show that category selectivity for musical notation can be observed in the first ERP component called the C1 (measured 40–60 msec after stimulus onset) with music-reading expertise. Moreover, the C1 note selectivity was observed only when the stimulus category was blocked but not when the stimulus category was randomized. Under blocking, the C1 activity for notes predicted individual music-reading ability, and behavioral judgments of musical stimuli reflected music-reading skill. Our results challenge current theories of object recognition, indicating that the primary visual cortex can be selective for musical notation within the initial feedforward sweep of activity with perceptual expertise and with a testing context that is consistent with the expertise training, such as blocking the stimulus category for music reading.

Faces are processed holistically, but the locus of holistic processing remains unclear. We created two novel races of faces (Lunaris and Taiyos) to study how experience with face parts influences holistic processing. In Experiment 1, subjects individuated Lunaris wherein the top, bottom, or both face halves contained diagnostic information. Subjects who learned to attend to face parts exhibited no holistic processing. This suggests that individuation only leads to holistic processing when the whole face is attended. In Experiment 2, subjects individuated both Lunaris and Taiyos, with diagnostic information in complementary face halves of the two races. Holistic processing was measured with composites made of either diagnostic or nondiagnostic face parts. Holistic processing was only observed for composites made from diagnostic face parts, demonstrating that holistic processing can occur for diagnostic face parts that were never seen together. These results suggest that holistic processing is an expression of learned attention to diagnostic face parts.

In typical perceptual learning experiments, one stimulus type (e.g., a bisection stimulus offset either to the left or right) is presented per trial. In roving, two different stimulus types (e.g., a 30' and a 20' wide bisection stimulus) are randomly interleaved from trial to trial. Roving can impair both perceptual learning and task sensitivity. Here, we investigate the relationship between the two. Using a bisection task, we found no effect of roving before training. We next trained subjects and they improved. A roving condition applied after training impaired sensitivity. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Neural habituation, the decrease in brain response to repeated stimulation, is a basic form of learning. There is strong evidence for behavioral and physiological habituation deficits in schizophrenia, and one previous study found reduced neural habituation within the hippocampus. However, it is unknown whether neural habituation deficits are specific to faces and limited to the hippocampus. Here we studied habituation of several brain regions in schizophrenia, using both face and object stimuli. Post-scan memory measures were administered to test for a link between hippocampal habituation and memory performance.During an fMRI scan, 23 patients with schizophrenia and 21 control subjects viewed blocks of a repeated neutral face or neutral object, and blocks of different neutral faces and neutral objects. Habituation in the hippocampus, primary visual cortex and fusiform face area (FFA) was compared between groups. Memory for faces, words, and word pairs was assessed after the scan.Patients showed reduced habituation to faces in the hippocampus and primary visual cortex, but not the FFA. Healthy control subjects exhibited a pattern of hippocampal discrimination that distinguished between repeated and different images for both faces and objects, and schizophrenia patients did not. Hippocampal discrimination was positively correlated with memory for word pairs.Patients with schizophrenia showed reduced habituation of the hippocampus and visual cortex, and a lack of neural discrimination between old and new images in the hippocampus. Hippocampal discrimination correlated with memory performance, suggesting reduced habituation may contribute to the memory deficits commonly observed in schizophrenia.