Search

Arrow’s axiomatic foundation of social choice theory can be understood as an application of Tarski’s methodology of the deductive sciences—which is closely related to the latter’s foundational contribution to model theory. In this note we show in a model-theoretic framework how Arrow’s use of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s concept of winning coalitions allows to exploit the algebraic structures involved in preference aggregation; this approach entails an alternative indirect ultrafilter proof for Arrow’s dictatorship result. This link also connects Arrow’s seminal result to key developments and concepts in the history of model theory, notably ultraproducts and preservation results.

Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (Econ Theory 48(2–3):341–375, 2011) have proposed a very general axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity, viz. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preference orderings. This paper investigates the problem of Arrovian aggregation of such preferences—and proves dictatorial impossibility results for both finite and infinite populations. Applications for the special case of aggregating expected-utility preferences are given. A novel proof methodology for special aggregation problems, based on model theory (in the sense of mathematical logic), is employed.

We modify the definable ultrapower construction of Kanovei and Shelah (2004) to develop a ZF-definable extension of the continuum with transfer provable using countable choice only, with an additional mild hypothesis on well-ordering implying properness. Under the same assumptions, we also prove the existence of a definable, proper elementary extension of the standard superstructure over the reals. Keywords: definability; hyperreal; superstructure; elementary embedding., Comment: 8 pages, to appear in Journal of Symbolic Logic

Coherence is a key concept in many accounts of epistemic justification within ‘traditional’ analytic epistemology. Within formal epistemology, too, there is a substantial body of research on coherence measures. However, there has been surprisingly little interaction between the two bodies of literature. The reason is that the existing formal literature on coherence measure operates with a notion of belief system that is very different from—what we argue is—a natural Bayesian formalisation of the concept of belief system from traditional epistemology. Therefore, formal epistemology has so far only been concerned with one particular—arguably not even very natural—way of formalising coherence of belief systems; it has by no means refuted the viability of coherentism. In contrast to the existing literature, we formalise belief systems as families of assignments of (conditional) degrees of belief (which may be compatible with several subjective probability measures). Within this framework, we propose a Bayesian formalisation of the thrust of BonJour’s coherence concept in The structure of empirical knowledge (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985), using a combination of Bayesian confirmation theory and basic graph theory. In excursions, we introduce graded notions for both logical and probabilistic consistency of belief systems—the latter being based on certain geometrical structures induced by probabilistic belief systems. For illustration, we reconsider BonJour’s “ravens” challenge (op. cit., p. 95f.). Finally, potential objections to our proposed formal coherence notion are explored.

In a recent paper, Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson [Studia Logica, 89(3):333-341 (2008)] have challenged the foundationalist rejection of infinitism by giving an example of an infinite, yet explicitly solvable regress of probabilistic justification. So far, however, there has been no criterion for the consistency of infinite probabilistic regresses, and in particular, foundationalists might still question the consistency of the solvable regress proposed by Peijnenburg and Atkinson.

In a recent paper [Journal of Logic and Computation, forthcoming (2014); doi:10.1093/logcom/ext009], it was claimed that a universal algebraic approach to general aggregation theory based on MV-homomorphisms could even cover linear probabilistic opinion pooling. This is not so, however. The reason is that there are no non-trivial homomorphisms from direct powers of the standard MV-algebra onto the standard MV-algebra itself; an analytic proof thereof is given in this note.

This note employs the recently established consistency theorem for infinite regresses of probabilistic justification (Herzberg in Stud Log 94(3):331-345, 2010) to address some of the better-known objections to epistemological infinitism. In addition, another proof for that consistency theorem is given; the new derivation no longer employs nonstandard analysis, but utilises the Daniell-Kolmogorov theorem.

This article establishes the existence of a definable (over ZFC), countably saturated nonstandard enlargement of the superstructure over the reals. This nonstandard universe is obtained as the union of an inductive chain of bounded ultrapowers (i.e. bounded with respect to the superstructure hierarchy). The underlying ultrafilter is the one constructed by Kanovei and Shelah [10]. (C) 2008 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.