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This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 'Knowing How', ) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the two approaches to the paradox of knowability or the Church-Fitch argument, including denying that knowledge distributes over conjunction and moving to a typed logic. He argues that neither of the approaches works. He further argues that a Church-Fitch argument can be run with an assumption weaker than distribution of knowledge over conjunction. He adds that a modified Church-Fitch argument can be constructed in a typed logic.

The article focuses on the knowledge of counterfactuals of social epistemology. It states that its objective is to outline a picture of the average knowledge of counterfactuals and utilize it to bring up a problem for the conventional philosophical duality among a priori and a posteriori knowledge. It notes that the capability to judge counterfactuals registers all the cognitive capabilities to assess sentences.

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The article discusses the philosophical concept of possibilism and reflection of total systems. It focuses on the author's discussion which centres to the unqualified, question of truth or likelihood of very special, very complicated, most often many-dimensional sets of sentences, known as texts expressing philosophical systems. Moreover, the author concludes that semantic or ordinary language considerations cannot furnish valid arguments for an answer of impossible to the unqualified question, because one can rightly argue that the word impossible very often and especially in loose talk, is used for what is rather unlikely to believe in.

Discusses the intellectual synthesis and figurative synthesis of Immanuel Kant based on his book "Critique of Pure Reason." Relationship between intellectual synthesis and the a priori form of intuition; Distinct features of productive imagination; Role of figurative synthesis and forms of intuition in Kant's answer to his main question in the transcendental deduction.

0 Consider ‘I’ as used by a given speaker and some ordinary proper name of that speaker: are these two coreferential singular terms which differ in Fregean sense? If they could be shown to be so, we might be able to explain the logical and epistemological peculiarities of ‘I’ by appeal to its special sense and yet feel no temptation to think of its reference as anything more exotic than a human being. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Socrates (469-399 B.C.) formulated a unique method of teaching, of which the main characteristic is dialogue. We have no authentic record, but Plato has preserved the "Socratic conversations" in his dialogues. In the first part of this study, the Socratic strategy is examined through a comparative analysis of the early Platonic dialogues with the theories of critical rationalism and the cognitive theories based on motivation for achievement and learning. In the dialogues, Socrates invites his interlocutors to express their opinions, professing himself ignorant of the matter under discussion, but gradually challenges their certainties and moves from the particular and the egocentric to the general concept, using concrete examples. The second part of this study gives a detailed presentation of the elements of the Socratic strategy of teaching and learning: conversation, the exploitation of errors in teaching, aporia (confused doubt), critical reflection and intellectual honesty, and tolerance. These continue to be of relevance today and are timely in the context of shifting values and the need for a critical approach to knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion on logic and the Sachverhalte. Those who conceive logic as a science have generally favoured one of the few alternative conceptions as to what the subject-matter of this science ought to be. Concerning this, one conception sees logic as a science of special objects called Sachverhalte or 'states of affairs'. A view of this sort is present in simplified form in the works of Meinong, but it received its definitive formulation in the writings of Adolf Reinach. The laws of logic, according to Reinach, are 'nothing other than general principles expressing relations between states of affairs.'

This survey brings together a collection of epistemic logics and discusses their approaches in alleviating the logical omniscience problem. Of particular note is the logic of implicit and explicit belief. Explicit belief refers to information actively held by an agent, while implicit belief refers to the logical consequence of explicit belief. Ramifications of Levesque's logic include nonstandard epistemic logic and the logics of awareness and local reasoning. Models of nonstandard epistemic logic are defined with respect to nonstandard proportional logic to weaken its semantics. In the logic of awareness, an agent can only believe a concept that it is aware of. Closely related to awareness are S-1 and S-3 epistemic operators which can be used to model skeptical and credulous agents. The logic of local reasoning provides a semantics for representing the fact that agents can have different clusters of beliefs which may contradict each other. Other variations include epistemic structures which are generalizations of the logic of local reasoning and fusion epistemic models which provide an account that agents can combine information conjunctively or disjunctively. Another closely related approach is the logic of explicit propostions which captures the insight that agents can hold beliefs independently without putting them together. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Professor Susan Haack who mainly because of her well-known hooks is a central figure in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of logic. Her influence is not restricted to these areas, however. She has for two decades been one of the most perceptive commentators of the tradition of pragmatism, and many scholars find her papers among the very best written on the subject. Her works on pragmatism discuss not only the major neopragmatists, but also the classical ones.

There is an enduring debate in nursing regarding the art–science dualism, involving an articulation of two distinct 'kinds' of disciplinary knowledge: objective/scientific and subjective/artistic. Nursing identifies both as necessary, yet unbridgeable, which creates problems in constructing a coherent disciplinary knowledge base. We describe how this problem arises based on an ontological assumption of two different kinds of 'stuff' in the world: that with essential determinate properties and that without essential properties. We experiment with a solution by ontologically understanding the world as made from a single kind: That the most irreducible element of the world is process, in that reality is a continuous construction whereby subject and object are products, not independent constituents, of reality. Process philosophy overcomes nursing's ontological bifurcation and enables nursing's art–science dualism to be re‐conceptualized as a cohesive logic of skilled reality production. An unavoidable implication of a process turn in nursing philosophy is that the disciplinary goal no longer becomes a privileged 'body of knowledge' that authorizes, which has always been a defining challenge in nursing. Rather, and more productively perhaps, the aim is for greater sophistication and plurality in its ongoing commitment to attuning to reality in ways that shape disciplinary attainment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]