1. The Political Economy of Bank Lending : Evidence from an Emerging Market
- Author
-
Agarwal, Sumit, Morais, Bernardo, Ruiz, Claudia, and Zhang, Jian
- Subjects
LOAN DATA ,INVESTMENT ,TAX ,LOAN PERFORMANCE ,LOAN CONTRACT ,LOAN MATURITY ,TREATIES ,BUDGET ,GOVERNMENT LENDING ,GOVERNMENT BORROWINGS ,SHAREHOLDERS ,PROJECTS ,EMERGING MARKET ,EMPLOYMENT ,MATURITIES ,BAD DEBTS ,BANK LENDING ,LENDING ,SUPPLY OF CREDIT ,BENEFICIARIES ,TERMS OF CREDIT ,SMALL BORROWERS ,PRODUCTIVITY ,BAILOUT ,FEDERAL RESERVE ,RESOURCE ALLOCATION ,GOVERNMENT BORROWING ,BANK PRIVATIZATION ,FINANCIAL CRISIS ,GOVERNMENTS ,RETURNS ,BALANCE SHEETS ,COLLATERAL ,DEBT MATURITY ,OPTIONS ,COLLATERAL REQUIREMENT ,GUARANTEE ,DEBTOR ,SHARES ,FINANCIAL MARKET ,BANK SIZE ,TRANSACTIONS ,NON-PERFORMING LOANS ,BANK ,MORAL HAZARD ,PUBLIC SPENDING ,LOANS ,CHECK ,LOAN SPREAD ,STRATEGIES ,MORTGAGE ,FINANCIAL MARKETS ,GOVERNMENT BANKS ,BORROWER ,GOVERNMENT BANK ,INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES ,BORROWERS ,INDUSTRY ,MARKETS ,PUBLIC SERVICES ,PROFIT ,INSIDER TRADING ,FINANCE ,LENDING DECISIONS ,BUSINESS CYCLE ,BUSINESS CYCLES ,DEFAULT PROBABILITY ,SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ,CREDIT AVAILABILITY ,BANKING INDUSTRY ,BANKING ,LOAN PORTFOLIOS ,LIABILITIES ,ENTERPRISES ,BASIS POINTS ,BALANCE SHEET ,OUTSTANDING AMOUNT ,INFORMATION SYSTEM ,MONETARY POLICY ,RENEGOTIATION ,REGULATORY REPORTS ,FOREIGN BANKS ,LIQUIDITY ,SERVICES ,DUMMY VARIABLE ,INSTRUMENTS ,SMALL BUSINESS ,PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS ,DEBT ,ARREARS ,MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT ,ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ,BANKING SECTOR ,DEFAULT RATE ,LOAN SIZE ,MARKET ,SAVING ,ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ,CAPITAL ALLOCATION ,DEBTS ,LENDING DECISION ,COMMERCIAL LOANS ,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ,COMMERCIAL CREDIT ,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ,RETURN ,FINANCIAL INFORMATION ,PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT ,INDIVIDUAL LOANS ,INTEREST RATE SPREAD ,FOREIGN BANK ,CORPORATE DEBT ,PRIVATE BANKS ,SMALL BANKS ,BANKRUPTCY ,BUDGET CONSTRAINT ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,EXCHANGE ,ACCOUNTING ,LENDER ,PORTFOLIOS ,TAXATION ,FINANCES ,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ,COMMERCIAL BANK ,VALUE ,RISK ,SMALL BUSINESS LENDING ,LOAN VOLUME ,GOVERNANCE ,LOAN MARKET ,RESERVE ,GOOD ,TELECOMMUNICATIONS ,LENDING INSTITUTIONS ,REVENUE ,SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT ,LOAN QUANTITIES ,TAXES ,BANK BALANCE SHEET ,BANKS ,TREASURY ,BANK LOANS ,BASIS POINT ,DUMMY VARIABLES ,OUTSTANDING DEBT ,BORROWING ,DEFAULT ,PRIVATIZATION ,DOMESTIC BANKS ,FINANCIAL STUDIES ,LOAN ,LOAN SPREADS ,CREDIT ,LEGISLATION ,LOAN DEMAND ,DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ,MATURITY ,CONSUMER CREDIT ,SECURITIES ,INTERNATIONAL BANK ,COMMERCIAL BANKS ,FUTURE ,BANK LIQUIDITY ,LOAN TERMS ,CONTRACT ,MARKET FAILURES ,ACCESS TO CAPITAL ,LABOR ,CREDIT QUALITY ,CONTRACTS ,PUBLIC SAVING ,POSITIVE COEFFICIENT ,HOUSING ,ECONOMICS ,BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ,INTEREST ,TRADING ,INTEREST INCOME ,TRANSPORT ,LAWS ,SAVINGS ,REVENUES ,BANK SUPERVISION ,PUBLIC BANKS ,CHECKS ,SHARE ,INTEREST RATE ,CREDIT MARKET ,ACCOUNTABILITY ,DEFAULT RATES ,CREDIT WORTHINESS - Abstract
This study investigates the existence of political rents in bank lending, using a comprehensive loan-level data set of the universe of commercial loans in Mexico from 2003 to 2012. Identification relies on changes in the state of origin of a senate committee chairman as a source of exogenous variation in firms' political relationship. The study finds that banks offer favorable loan terms to politically connected firms with larger loan quantities, lower loan spreads, longer maturities, and lower collateral requirements. Furthermore, political loans exhibit higher default rates. To isolate the bank supply channel, a rich set of fixed-effects is included with various specifications. The favorable lending increases with the strength of a firm's political connection, varies gradually along the political cycle, and is mainly offered by large and domestic banks. Consistent with the quid pro quo hypothesis, the study finds that banks that extend political loans receive significantly more government borrowings with better credit quality. The study also shows that the greater credit supply due to political connection leads to a large and significant increase in firm-level employment and assets. The study provides estimates of the total social cost of political lending and net revenue for banks that are engaged in rent provision activity. Finally, a series of robustness tests are performed to rule out alternative mechanisms and explanations.
- Published
- 2016