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The article focuses on the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which outlines the powers of U.S. Congress. Topics include the unenumerated duties and powers of U.S. Congress, the implied and inherent powers of Congress, and sovereign authority within the U.S. Information is provided on the interpretation of the clause in 2014.

The mechanism established in what has now become Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly known as Article 235 and 308) has many names. One of the more common is to refer to the mechanism as the 'flexibility clause'. As the notion indicates, the basic purpose of the mechanism is to provide the European Union with a possibility of (flexibly) adjusting legislative powers to arising needs. Since the very purpose of the flexibility clause is to provide for the exercise of legal powers where none is to be found in the EU Treaties, the clause hereby defines the ultimate reach of EU competence. Remarkably, although use of the clause has often been contentious, the wording of the clause has remained unchanged ever since the Treaty of Rome. The aim of the article is to outline the function and development of the flexibility clause especially in light of the Treaty of Lisbon, which for the first time in the history of the EC/EU rewrites the flexibility clause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the lesson that was learned during the term of former U.S. President George W. Bush. One of the lessons under his administration that was taught is about the significance of the topic on executive power which emphasizes on its concepts as well as the law itself. Replica of presidential powers is the independency and challenging vision of the power, and the more adjustments and cooperative model of power between the President and federal government. As a result, it is appealing to consider the lesson of the Bush Administration to be that unilateral in attempts to expand executive power, yet, it is important not to indulge this tale because it might diminish the capacities of the public and other government institutions to check against abuses in the future.

Over the past half-century, discussions of constitutional war powers have focused on the scope of the President's "inherent" power as Commander in Chief to act in the absence of congressional authorizations. Professors Barron and Lederman argue that attention should now shift to the fundamental question of whether and when the President may exercise Article II war powers in contravention of congressional limitations, when the President's authority as Commander in Chief is at its "lowest ebb." This Article is the second part of a two-part effort to determine how the constitutional argument concerning such preclusive executive war powers is best conceived. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the existence and nature of the limited override power of Congress to Supreme Court decisions in the U.S. It presents a normative justification of it and the general structure of constitutional rights that underlies it. It examines the influential anti-balancing critique in constitutional law. It also offers a democratic justification for the modern structure of rights as presumptive shields rather than peremptory trumps against conflicting public policy objectives.

This paper examines whether constitutional interpretations of the proper roles of the executive and the legislative branches influence Congress members' voting decisions on use of force votes. Specifically, the authors examine the hypothesis that some members are presidentialists--those whose constitutional interpretations favor the executive--and others are congressionalists--those whose constitutional interpretations defend congressional prerogatives. We examined members of Congress who served continuously in either the US House of Representatives or the US Senate from 1990-1999. We identified possible congressionalists and presidentialists using all roll call votes of resolutions to authorize the use of force, and examined floor speeches in the Congressional Record to see how these members explained their votes. We conclude some members of Congress do take constitutional interpretations into account when casting these votes, and justify their actions based upon their reading of the Constitution. Thus, they shape congressional debate and voting outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the concept of implied powers within the U.S. constitutional law. The vocabulary of "implied powers" is frequently used indiscriminately with other terms. It is associated with not less than six different usages. The original use of "implied powers" was to contrast, rather than to explain, the powers that would vest in the United States. The national government would not automatically possess all the customary attributes of sovereignty, but only those expressly provided. As to these, James Madison declared in The Federalist #45: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which care to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite." Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in 1804, Chief Justice John Marshall, in United States v. Fisher, agreed that there were no implied-at-large national powers: "It has been truly said, that under a constitution conferring specific powers, the power contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised." More than a century later, Justice David Brewer in Kansas v. Colorado in 1907 confirmed the conventional wisdom: "The proposition that there are legislative powers [not] expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers." In this original sense, then, it may be said that the Constitution does not imply a government of general legislative, executive, and judicial powers; it establishes a government of limited, express, enumerated powers alone.

A common measure of the formal powers of American governors is examined over three time periods and compared with a more recently developed measure that emphasizes the chief executives' appointment power. The changes over time reveal that governors are gaining in formal authority primarily because of increased veto power and lengthier tenure. A multivariate statistical analysis reveals that governors with greater formal powers tend to be found among more affluent and Industrialized states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]