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The article presents information about two decisions that were given recently by the California Supreme Court and by the District Court of Appeals. In the case of Arais v. Kalensnikoff, in California, a question arose regarding the utilization of the results of blood grouping tests in a paternity determination. At the trial the results of the test were admitted and they indicated the impossibility of the defendant's being the father of the child in question. Nevertheless, because of other evidence introduced at the trial the court found in favor of the plaintiff. The court ruled that the law makes no distinction whatever between expert testimony and evidence of other character. Although it encourages the demonstration of the truth of the issues before a court by any means which are generally accepted as tending to prove the facts in dispute, when there is a conflict between scientific testimony and testimony as to the facts, the jury or trial court, must determine the relative weight of the evidence.

This article discusses the Pipher v. State court case. The defendant was found guilty of an assault to murder. It appears the injured woman and her party had visited several taverns before coming to the defendant's liquor dispensary and there, after a short time, engaged in a heated argument with the defendant, who brandished a revolver and ordered the party off the premises. The defendant alleges that when she displayed the weapon, one of the women held her arm while the victim came behind the bar to grapple for the gun and was accidently shot. The examining physician, after describing the wounds, testified that there was no evidence of powder burns. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the trial court and ruled the defendant's objection was not well founded because she did not present any evidence to corroborate her claim of accidental shooting or show that the gun was within twenty inches of the wound, which it inflicted at the time of firing.

The article focuses on the case Commonwealth v. Peronace, in Pennsylvania. An expert testified that a revolver such as that used by the defendant would throw shells a certain distance if held in a normal position. Upon appeal from the trial court's conviction the Supreme Court stated that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, appellant having admitted firing the gun, the jury could infer that he held it in a normal position.

The article presents information about the qualification of expert witness in a case involving firearms identification. In the case of State v. Couch, an expert witness testified to the effect that various shells were fired from certain guns in evidence, which testimony served to secure a conviction against the defendant. Upon appeal the defendant contended that since the witness was not a ballistic expert he should not have been permitted to testify. To this objection the Supreme Court of Missouri said that the witness did testify that he was not a ballistic expert, but that he had much experience in the work of identifying firearms, that the term ballistic expert did not apply to his line of work. In this the witness may be technically correct. But, be that as it may, the witness' testimony disclosed that he was an expert in the identification of firearms and bullets by the comparison method by means of a microscope. The rule is now settled that such evidence is competent and may be considered by the jury in arriving at a verdict.