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This paper challenges the conventional understanding among many legal ethicists that environmental harm can be a necessary, if regrettable, collateral effect of lawyerly work. It argues that lawyers sometimes do things that cost society too much and that legal ethics (being the rules of ethical conduct set out by regulators of lawyers and broader theories of 'good' lawyering) has the potential to act as a mediator on lawyers' environmental harm-causing action. The paper begins by examining lawyers' formal rules of professional conduct in England & Wales, showing how those rules require lawyers to provide active counselling to clients but do not fully address clients' legally permissible choices that may result in environmental harm. The paper then turns to theories of legal ethics that go beyond these baseline rules. Here, I argue that the dominant 'Standard Conception' of lawyers as neutral technicians is not only implausible in the context of environmental law but also fundamentally incomplete. The paper also considers the ethical implications of a lawyer's initial decision to represent a client. The commonly held belief that 'Everyone deserves legal advice' often masks a simple ethical choice, where lawyers prioritise commercial concerns over environmental considerations, unburdened by more complex ethical constraints. However, this rationalisation rests on unsound premises and frequently clashes with lawyers' personal moral boundaries; a problem I label 'Meatloaf Lawyering'. Ultimately, I argue that lawyers have significant ethical agency and that their professional obligations do not impede (and sometimes require) an active, ethically responsible stance towards environmental harms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we look at the contested role of in-house lawyers in regulated organisations in the financial sector. A recent Financial Conduct Authority consultation on whether to designate the head of legal of banks, insurance companies and other financial firms as 'Senior Managers' and the decision which flowed from it, reflected a flawed view of lawyers as a neutral technocracy of mere legal technicians; we show how the FCA's decision is potentially damaging to the public interest and failed to take into account that in-house lawyers are often important decision-makers and influencers within their organisations. We put the case for an alternative view; that in-house lawyers are professionals, with agency that requires them to act in accordance with ethical norms and means they should be made more accountable for their conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws on interviews with 57 corporate finance lawyers working from global law firms based in the City of London. Drawing on this data, we highlight common themes of taking deals at ‘face value’, being the lawyer-technician who uses the law to effect his client’s wishes, and not ‘pushing’ ethics. We suggest that there is an apathy – a lack of concern or interest – about ethics on the part of corporate lawyers. This apathy stems from various sources. It is linked to assumptions about the sorts of clients that large law firms are willing or not willing to act for, and assumptions about the ‘right sort of people’ the firm hires and retains; it is linked to strong notions of role morality; and it is founded on the classic legal ethics ‘standard conception’ principles of neutrality and non-accountability. Our data also highlights a lack of ethical infrastructures in large firms, and a lack of ethical leadership from law firm partners for the associates and trainees working for them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various articles within the issue on topics including lack of legal ethics in corporate lawyers; lawyer–client relationship; and risk management inside large law firms.