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In the field of stimulus generalization, an old yet unresolved discussion pertains to what extent stimulus misidentifications contribute to the pattern of conditioned responding. In this article, we perform cluster analysis on six datasets (four published datasets and two unpublished datasets, included N = 950) to examine the relationship between interindividual differences in (a) stimulus identification, (b) patterns of generalized responding, and (c) verbalized generalization rules. The datasets were obtained from online predictive learning tasks where participants learned associations between colored cues and the presence or absence of a hypothetical outcome. In these datasets, stimulus identification and expectancy ratings were assessed in separate phases to a range of colors varying between blue-green. Using cluster analyses on performance during stimulus identification, we identified different subgroups of participants (good vs. bad identifiers). In all six datasets, we found a close relationship between the pattern of stimulus identification and the shape of the expectancy gradient across the test dimension between the identified subgroups. Furthermore, participants classified as good identifiers were more likely to report a similarity generalization rule than a relational or linear rule, suggesting that individual differences in stimulus identification are related to individual differences in generalization rules. These findings suggest that greater consideration should be given to interindividual variability in stimulus identification, inductive rules, and their relationship in explaining patterns of generalized responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Inhibitory stimuli are slow to acquire excitatory properties when paired with the outcome in a retardation test. However, this pattern is also seen after simple nonreinforced exposure: latent inhibition. It is commonly assumed that retardation would be stronger for a conditioned inhibitor than for a latent inhibitor, but there is surprisingly little empirical evidence comparing the two in either animals or humans. Thus, retardation after inhibitory training could in principle be attributable entirely to latent inhibition. We directly compared the speed of excitatory acquisition after conditioned inhibition and matched latent inhibition training in human causal learning. Conditioned inhibition training produced stronger transfer in a summation test, but the two conditions did not differ substantially in a retardation test. We offer two explanations for this dissociation. One is that learned predictiveness attenuated the latent inhibition that otherwise would have occurred during conditioned inhibition training, so that retardation in that condition was primarily due to inhibition. The second explanation is that inhibitory learning in these experiments was hierarchical in nature, similar to negative occasion-setting. By this account, the conditioned inhibitor was able to negatively modulate the test excitor in a summation test, but was no more retarded than a latent inhibitor in its ability to form a direct association with the outcome. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

One of the many strengths of the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model is that it accounts for both excitatory and inhibitory learning using a single error-correction mechanism. However, it makes the counterintuitive prediction that nonreinforced presentations of an inhibitory stimulus will lead to extinction of its inhibitory properties. Zimmer-Hart and Rescorla (1974) provided the first of several animal conditioning studies that contradicted this prediction. However, the human data are more mixed. Accordingly, we set out to test whether extinction of an inhibitor occurs in human causal learning after simultaneous feature negative training with a conventional unidirectional outcome. In 2 experiments with substantial sample sizes, we found no evidence of extinction after presentations of the inhibitory stimulus alone in either a summation test or causal ratings. By contrast, 2 "no-modulation" procedures that contradicted the original training contingencies successfully reversed inhibition. These results did not differ substantially as a function of participants' self-reported causal structures (configural/modulation/prevention). We hypothesize that inhibitory learning may be intrinsically modulatory, analogous to negative occasion-setting, even with simultaneous training. This hypothesis would explain why inhibition is reversed by manipulations that contradict modulation but not by simple extinction, as well as other properties of inhibitory learning such as imperfect transfer to another excitor. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A challenge for generalization models is to specify how excitation generated from a CS+ (i.e., positive evidence) should interact with inhibition from a CS- (i.e., negative evidence) to produce generalized responding. Empirically, many generalization phenomena are consistent with the monotonicity principle, which states that additional positive evidence should increase generalized responding, whereas additional negative evidence should decrease responding. However, a recent study (Lee et al.,, 2019) demonstrated that additional negative evidence can sometimes increase generalization, in direct contrast to animal data and associative accounts of generalization. The current study investigated whether a similar effect could be found in a symmetrical intradimensional discrimination procedure with two sources of negative evidence (CS-s) located on each side of a CS+. In three experiments, we compared generalization along a green-blue dimension between one group of participants who learned that an aqua-colored shape (CS+) predicted an outcome (Single Positive group) with another group who also learned that both a slightly greener and a slightly bluer shape led to no outcome (Double Negative group). Experiments 1A and 1B showed no effect of the additional negative evidence in increasing generalization around the CS+. However, changing a stimulus feature at test (shape) resulted in a higher gradient peak in the Double Negative group relative to the Single Positive group in Experiment 2. Although this result violates the monotonicity principle, an extended version of Blough's (1975) model applying cue competition to multiple stimulus dimensions (i.e., shape and color) successfully replicated the group differences. Our results suggest that associative mechanisms can account for some instances in which negative evidence increases generalization. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Learning of cue-outcome relationships in associative learning experiments is often assessed by presenting cues without feedback about the outcome and informing participants to expect no outcomes to occur. The rationale is that this "no-feedback" testing procedure prevents new learning during testing that might contaminate the later test trials. We tested this assumption in 4 predictive learning experiments where participants were tasked with learning which foods (cues) were causing allergic reactions (the outcome) in a fictitious patient. We found that withholding feedback in a block of trials had no effect on causal ratings (Experiments 1 and 2), but it led to regression toward intermediate ratings when the missing feedback was embedded in the causal scenario and information about the outcome replaced by a "?" (Experiment 3). A factorial experiment manipulating cover story and feedback revealed that the regression-to-baseline effect was primarily driven by presentation of the "?" feedback (Experiment 4). We conclude that the procedure of testing without feedback, used widely in studies of human cognition, is an appropriate way of assessing learning, as long as the missing data are attributed to the experimenter and the absence of feedback is not highlighted in a way that induces uncertainty. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

We have previously reported that human participants trained with a simultaneous feature negative discrimination (intermixed A+/AB- trials) show only modest transfer of inhibitory properties of feature B to a separately trained excitor in a summation test. Their self-reported causal structure suggested that many participants learned that the effect of feature B was somewhat specific to the excitor it had been trained with (modulation), rather than learning that the feature prevented the outcome (prevention). This pattern is reminiscent of the distinction between negative occasion-setting and conditioned inhibition in the animal conditioning literature. However, in animals, occasion-setting is more commonly seen with a serial procedure, in which the feature (B) precedes the training excitor (A). Accordingly, we ran three experiments to compare serial with simultaneous training in an allergist causal judgement task. Transfer in a summation test was stronger to a previously modulated test excitor compared to a simple excitor after both simultaneous and serial training. There was a numerical trend towards a larger effect in the serial group, but it failed to reach significance and the Bayes Factor indicated support for the null. Serial training had no differential effect on the self-reported causal structure and did not significantly reduce overall transfer. After both simultaneous and serial training, transfer was strongest in participants who reported a prevention structure, replicating and extending our previous results to a previously modulated excitor. These results suggest that serial feature negative training does not promote a qualitatively different inhibitory causal structure compared to simultaneous training in humans.

Traditional associative learning theories predict that training with feature negative (A+/AB-) contingencies leads to the feature B acquiring negative associative strength and becoming a conditioned inhibitor (i.e., prevention learning). However, feature negative training can sometimes result in negative occasion setting, where B modulates the effect of A. Other studies suggest that participants learn about configurations of cues rather than their individual elements. In this study, we administered simultaneous feature negative training to participants in an allergist causal learning task and tested whether evidence for these three types of learning (prevention, modulation, configural) could be captured via self-report in the absence of any procedural manipulation. Across two experiments, we show that only a small subset of participants endorse the prevention option, suggesting that traditional associative models that predict conditioned inhibition do not completely capture how humans learn about negative contingencies. We also show that the degree of transfer in a summation test corresponds to the implied causal structure underlying conditioned inhibition, occasion-setting, and configural learning, and that participants are only partially sensitive to explicit hints about causal structure. We conclude that feature negative training is an ambiguous causal scenario that reveals individual differences in the representation of inhibitory associations, potentially explaining the modest group-level inhibitory effects often found in humans.

The prototype distortion task demonstrates that it is possible to learn about a category of physically similar stimuli through mere observation. However, there have been few attempts to test whether different encoding conditions affect learning in this task. This study compared prototypicality gradients produced under incidental learning conditions in which participants performed a visual search task, with those produced under intentional learning conditions in which participants were required to memorize the stimuli. Experiment 1 showed that similar prototypicality gradients could be obtained for category endorsement and familiarity ratings, but also found (weaker) prototypicality gradients in the absence of exposure. In Experiments 2 and 3, memorization was found to strengthen prototypicality gradients in familiarity ratings in comparison to visual search, but there were no group differences in participants' ability to discriminate between novel and presented exemplars. Although the Search groups in Experiments 2 and 3 produced prototypicality gradients, they were no different in magnitude to those produced in the absence of stimulus exposure in Experiment 1, suggesting that incidental learning during visual search was not conducive to producing prototypicality gradients. This study suggests that learning in the prototype distortion task is not implicit in the sense of resulting automatically from exposure, is affected by the nature of encoding, and should be considered in light of potential learning-at-test effects.

In human causal learning, excitatory and inhibitory learning effects can sometimes be found in the same paradigm by altering the learning conditions. This study aims to explore whether learning in the feature negative paradigm can be dissociated by emphasising speed over accuracy. In two causal learning experiments, participants were given a feature negative discrimination in which the outcome caused by one cue was prevented by the addition of another. Participants completed training trials either in a self-paced fashion with instructions emphasising accuracy, or under strict time constraints with instructions emphasising speed. Using summation tests in which the preventative cue was paired with another causal cue, participants in the accuracy groups correctly rated the preventative cue as if it reduced the probability of the outcome. However, participants in the speed groups rated the preventative cue as if it increased the probability of the outcome. In Experiment 1, both speed and accuracy groups later judged the same cue to be preventative in a reasoned inference task. Experiment 2 failed to find evidence of similar dissociations in retrospective revaluation (release from overshadowing vs. mediated extinction) or learning about a redundant cue (blocking vs. augmentation). However in the same experiment, the tendency for the accuracy group to show conditioned inhibition and the speed group to show second-order conditioning was consistent even across sub-sets of the speed and accuracy groups with equivalent accuracy in training, suggesting that second-order conditioning is not merely a consequence of poorer acquisition. This dissociation mirrors the trade-off between second-order conditioning and conditioned inhibition observed in animal conditioning when training is extended.

In this paper, we test the effect of manipulating discrimination difficulty on subsequent generalization of learning and in particular, on the peak shift effect. Participants learned a discrimination where one stimulus led to an outcome (S+) and another stimulus led to no outcome (S-). Difficulty was manipulated by varying the degree of similarity between the S+ and S- across groups (easy/medium/hard). In contrast to similar studies in animals, we found that increasing the difficulty of the discrimination resulted in less peak shift. Using a hierarchical mixture model, we characterize the effects of discrimination difficulty on relational- and similarity based responding, and show for the first time, a similar mixture of responding on stimulus identification gradients. We conclude that peak shift on generalization and identification measures can be explained by mixtures of participants responding in different ways.

Single-cue delay eyeblink conditioning is presented as a prototypical example of automatic, nonsymbolic learning that is carried out by subcortical circuits. However, it has been difficult to assess the role of cognition in single-cue conditioning because participants become aware of the simple stimulus contingency so quickly. In this experiment ("n" = 166), we masked the contingency to reduce awareness. We observed a strong relationship between contingency awareness and conditioned responding, with both trace and delay procedures. This finding suggests that explicit associative knowledge and anticipatory behavior are regulated by a coordinated system rather than by functionally and neurally distinct systems.

The illusory causation effect describes the tendency to judge an unrelated cue and outcome to be causally related. The standard procedure for assessing the illusion is based on the implicit assumptions that participants start as naïve observers with no prior beliefs about the likely relationship between the cue and outcome, and that learning can be adequately captured as a point-estimate causal rating after null contingency training. Here, we use a novel distributional measure to assess participants’ beliefs over a range of causal relationships prior to, as well as after, exposure to non-contingent cues and outcomes. Across two experiments with different causal scenarios and 50% cue and outcome density, we show that participants have an initial bias towards expecting a causal relationship between the cue and outcome, and that this bias is mostly corrected after exposure to the null contingency. We conclude that distributional measures of causal beliefs can offer novel insights in understanding the illusory causation effect.

In a causal illusion task, participants rate a cue that has an objectively null contingency with an outcome as causal. Trials are usually organized according to a 2x2 table representing the presence/absence of a binary cue and a binary outcome. Cell A outcomes (cue, outcome) can be attributed to the cue. But how do participants interpret trials from cell C (no cue, outcome), where the cause of the outcome is unspecified? In two experiments we asked participants to provide causal explanations for cell A and C trials in a medicine-recovery causal illusion task. Participants who reported that the cause of cell C outcomes (e.g., strong immunity, spontaneous recovery) did not also apply to cell A outcomes showed the strongest causal illusion. Such a causal reasoning process undermines the logic behind the delta P metric typically used to define a contingency, and thereby provides a potential normative account of causal “illusions”.

Influential models of causal learning assume that learning about generative and preventive relationships are symmetrical to each other. That is, a preventive cue directly prevents an outcome from occurring (i.e., "direct" prevention) in the same way a generative cue directly causes an outcome to occur. However, previous studies from our lab have shown that many participants do not infer a direct prevention causal structure after feature-negative discrimination (A+/AB-) with a unidirectional outcome (Lee & Lovibond, 2021). Melchers et al. (2006) suggested that the use of a bidirectional outcome that can either increase or decrease from baseline, encourages direct prevention learning. Here we test an alternative possibility that a bidirectional outcome encourages encoding of a generative relationship in the opposite direction, where B directly causes a decrease in the outcome. Thus, previous evidence of direct prevention learning using bidirectional outcomes may instead be explained by some participants inferring an "Opposite Causal" structure. In two experiments, participants did indeed report an opposite causal structure. In Experiment 1, these participants showed the lowest outcome predictions when B was combined with a novel cause in a summation test, and lowest outcome predictions when B was presented alone. In Experiment 2, B successfully blocked learning to a novel cue that was directly paired with a reduction in the outcome, and this effect was strongest among participants who endorsed an Opposite Causal structure. We conclude that previous evidence of direct prevention learning using bidirectional outcomes may be a product of excitatory rather than inhibitory learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Punishment maximises the probability of our individual survival by reducing behaviours that cause us harm, and also sustains trust and fairness in groups essential for social cohesion. However, some individuals are more sensitive to punishment than others and these differences in punishment sensitivity have been linked to a variety of decision-making deficits and psychopathologies. The mechanisms for why individuals differ in punishment sensitivity are poorly understood, although recent studies of conditioned punishment in rodents highlight a key role for punishment contingency detection (Jean-Richard-Dit-Bressel et al., 2019). Here, we applied a novel 'Planets and Pirates' conditioned punishment task in humans, allowing us to identify the mechanisms for why individuals differ in their sensitivity to punishment. We show that punishment sensitivity is bimodally distributed in a large sample of normal participants. Sensitive and insensitive individuals equally liked reward and showed similar rates of reward-seeking. They also equally disliked punishment and did not differ in their valuation of cues that signalled punishment. However, sensitive and insensitive individuals differed profoundly in their capacity to detect and learn volitional control over aversive outcomes. Punishment insensitive individuals did not learn the instrumental contingencies, so they could not withhold behaviour that caused punishment and could not generate appropriately selective behaviours to prevent impending punishment. These differences in punishment sensitivity could not be explained by individual differences in behavioural inhibition, impulsivity, or anxiety. This bimodal punishment sensitivity and these deficits in instrumental contingency learning are identical to those dictating punishment sensitivity in non-human animals, suggesting that they are general properties of aversive learning and decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After discrimination learning between two stimuli that lie on a continuum, animals typically exhibit generalization on the basis of similarity to the physical features of the stimuli, often producing a peak-shifted gradient. However, post-discrimination generalization in humans usually resembles a monotonically increasing (e.g., linear) gradient that is better characterized as following a relational rule describing the difference between the stimuli. The current study tested whether rule-based generalization could be disrupted by reducing the applicability of a relational rule on test. We compared generalization following a difficult categorization task between a group who could use their rule consistently throughout test (Group Consistent), and a group who could only apply their rule effectively on 50% of test trials and thus could only use it inconsistently (Group Inconsistent). Across two experiments, a peak shift was found in the Inconsistent group and a monotonic gradient in the Consistent group. A post-hoc sequential analysis revealed that the Inconsistent group produced both peak-shifted and monotonic gradients as a function of whether or not the relevant rule was applicable on the previous trial. Reducing the applicability of a rule on test thus appeared to lead participants to revert to generalizing on the basis of similarity. Our results suggest that humans learn about the physical features of the stimuli alongside relational rules, and that rule- and similarity-based learning can interact in determining generalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]