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O presente artigo teórico identifica as convergências e divergências entre as obras de Giorgio Agamben e de Michel Foucault. Pretende-se discutir o pensamento político de Giorgio Agamben no que concerne às suas formulações sobre estado de exceção em contraste com as formulações de Michel Foucault sobre biopolítica. Uma convergência visível é a importância da noção de dispositivo e de biopolítica na obra dos dois autores. Em Foucault o acento se dá nas práticas cotidianas, por assim dizer, do exercício de poder, tendo foco o conceito de genealogia. Agamben procura dar mais ênfase, sem dúvida, ao estado de exceção e à vida nua. No que diz respeito à postura dos dois autores em relação à resistência aos poderes, o artigo aponta, em Foucault, todo seu exercício voltado ao tema do cuidado de si e da vontade de verdade e, em Agamben, numa evidente inspiração messiânica ao gênero de Walter Benjamin, como é possível pensar na comunidade que vem, que tem a potência de superar o paradigma da vida nua e seu correlato imediato, a soberania.

Submitted by Simone Maisonave (simonemaisonave@hotmail.com) on 2021-02-05T14:16:41Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) A_filosofia_radical_de_Karl_Otto_Apel.pdf: 875763 bytes, checksum: 154369d60f85d3f1b9439f16f55ad3a9 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Aline Batista (alinehb.ufpel@gmail.com) on 2021-02-05T23:13:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) A_filosofia_radical_de_Karl_Otto_Apel.pdf: 875763 bytes, checksum: 154369d60f85d3f1b9439f16f55ad3a9 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-02-05T23:13:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) A_filosofia_radical_de_Karl_Otto_Apel.pdf: 875763 bytes, checksum: 154369d60f85d3f1b9439f16f55ad3a9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 A passagem da semântica formal à pragmática promoveu uma transformação na filosofia. O efeito foi consolidar a corresponsabilidade dos sujeitos coautores diante dos problemas de ordem local e mundial. No seu escopo, não há lugar para a metaética. Por isso,Apel pode ser considerado como um filósofo radical. Em termos filosóficos, a corresponsabilidade é sinônimo de coautoria, atitude voltada à convivência hospitaleira. Deste modo, a pragmática apeliana, através dos níveis A e B, exige um compromissoconsensual-comunicativo entre humanos,dos humanos para com os não humanos e o ecossistema como tal.

How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of the concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms themselves. 2nd-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do? In this study, we will review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for the aggregation and inter-theoretical comparison of different normative structures, cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address decision-making problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts.

The aim of this paper is to point to the possible approximations between the concept of Ethics by the Brazilian philosopher Álvaro Vieira Pinto and by the Argentinean Enrique Dussel. We discussed the reflections on Ethics provided by Álvaro Vieira Pinto in the books “Consciência e Realidade Nacional” and “Ciência e Existência” and glimpsed a complementarity between the two philosophers. The humanization of life conditions to the masses of underdeveloped countries is a confluent aspect in both philosophers’ reflections. We conclude highlighting the relevance of Álvaro Vieira Pinto’s thinking to the decolonial studies and the decolonization of Ethics.

A preocupação fundamental de K-O. Apel, diante de uma situação de crise da razão que leva à negação da filosofia, é articular um novo projeto da filosofia enquanto tal, a Pragmática Transcendental, que levanta a pretensão de articular uma profunda reformulação do projeto transcendental clássico, elaborado por Kant, a partir da reviravolta linguístico-pragmática do século XX. Apel articula a filosofia enquanto autorreflexão sobre os pressupostos necessários e irrecusáveis da atividade de argumentar enquanto tal como a nova forma de “Prima Philosophia”. O artigo procura mostrar que a Pragmática Transcendental, mesmo com sua reformulação pragmática do pensamento transcendental, conservou sua insuficiência ontológica e metafísica.

In the debate between Habermas and Apel on the foundation of discourse ethics, many things are mixed. The article reconsiders the debate, analyzes the form of the pragmatic-transcendental argument, and distinguishes two major issues in confrontation: questions about argumentative assumptions and questions about moral obligations. We try to show that, having made the appropriate distinctions, in the first question, Apel is more right than Habermas, and that, in the second question, Habermas is more right than Apel. The implications of each position are considered.

Este texto não apresenta resumo.

Trata-se, neste trabalho, de mostrar a irredutibilidade do saber, em especial do saber moral, ao conhecimento de tipo proposicional. A partir das contribuições da neurociência cognitiva para a epistemologia moral, argumenta-se que o saber-como (knowing-how) não pode ser completamente analisado em termos do saber-que (knowing-that). Critica-se, então, as tentativas recentes, em especial de Stanley, de mostrar que todo conhecimento é proposicional. Finalmente, o trabalho ilustra como o saber moral pode ser identificado em atitudes, por exemplo, saber-como cuidar de um indivíduo vulnerável, saber-como respeitar pessoas etc. A conclusão, então, é que o saber moral não é identificável com o conhecimento factual.

O objetivo deste paper é explicitar e fundamentar a virtude da solidariedade subjacente à teoria e à prática da Hermenêutica Filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer, a qual é imprescindível para alcançarmos nossa felicidade e criarmos um ethos de responsabilidade mútua. Embora Gadamer não tenha dito ou sustentado essa hipótese, mostrarei sua plausibilidade lógica bem como pertinência teórica e prática. Para tanto, mostrarei as relações íntimas entre Hermenêutica e Solidariedade enquanto jogos de fusão de horizontes regidos pelo pressuposto de que somos seres linguísticos que visamos, desde os primórdios da humanidade, de uma ou de outra forma, instituir um ethos de parceria, de harmonia e de cooperação mútua. Justificarei isso explicitando, inicialmente, significados e sentidos do termo Solidariedade em Gadamer, denominando-o um jogo com regras e finalidades próprias de uma virtude ética enquanto contenção de si e instituição do bem. Aprofundarei, a seguir, elos entre Hermenêutica e Solidariedade a partir dos temas da linguagem e da tradição enquanto exercícios de fusão de horizontes pautados pela instituição do acordo consigo mesmo e com os outros. Ao final, apontarei algumas implicações para nossa realização pessoal e social bem como para proteção da natureza.

A interpretação padrão da teoria da motivação humeana considera que a mesma subscreveria um modelo conativista baseado em desejos (paixões), enquanto intrinsecamente motivadores, que nos comprometeriam com uma concepção de internalismo motivacional e, por conseguinte, com uma posição não-cognitivista. Basicamente, esta interpretação padrão de Hume, sustenta que os juízos morais são de natureza puramente conativa, fornecendo, assim, ao agente uma razão ou motivo intrínseco para agir (internalismo motivacional), não exprimindo, no entanto, nenhum conteúdo racional cognitivo (não-cognitivismo). Dada a aproximação entre verdade e conhecimento, os cognitivistas afirmam também a tese de que há autêntico conhecimento moral. Os juízos morais possuem conteúdo cognitivo e não apenas, como querem os não-cognitivistas, expressões de atitudes, de preferências, de desejos ou de prescrições. Desta forma, o contraste entre cognitivismo e não-cognitivismo gira primariamente em torno da questão sobre a natureza do juízo moral. E, na interpretação clássica de Hume, a natureza do juízo moral seria não-cognitiva. Com este trabalho exploro uma linha de argumentação alternativa, em defesa de uma posição que privilegia a possibilidade de um conhecimento moral, segundo a filosofia moral de Hume. Os fundamentos da moral em Hume examinam a exigência motivacional tendo como alvo, a ser criticado, não o conhecimento moral (cognitivismo) e sim o racionalismo moral. No entanto, essa linha alternativa, não representa uma adesão pura ao cognitivismo. A estratégia seguida por essa argumentação, consiste em apontar o aspecto “prático” dos juízos morais, ou seja, o seu papel na orientação e na motivação das ações morais, e, em seguida, argumentar que, dada essa função primordial dos juízos morais, repetindo, o seu caráter prático, orientador de ações, não exclui, também, um conhecimento moral. De certa forma, o argumento é que, segundo a teoria da motivação de Hume, a natureza do juízo moral teria uma dimensão objetiva e prática (aquilo que realmente nos move para a ação).

In this article, after clarifying aspects of the claim to objectivity in the common moral judgments and general aspects of moral epistemology, I present and analyze the possibility of the existence and attainment of true moral beliefs, firstly, in skeptical positions contrary to this, as in the nihilistic perspective of error theory and in the subjectivist perspective of relativistic theories (social and individual), then, secondly, I present and analyze the traditional concept of moral knowledge in two favorable realist positions, the naturalist realism and the non-naturalist realism or intuitionism. A perspective normally considered contrary to obtaining true moral beliefs is the expressivist one, but I suggest and outline here how it, or at least some of its more sophisticated versions, can be epistemically friendly in the search for moral knowledge, in a more weak meaning of the concept.

O objetivo deste artigo é investigar o problema da ignorância moral, especificamente, quero saber em que medida uma ação errada cometida por um agente responsável pode ser apropriadamente censurada, considerando que a ação errada foi cometida por ignorância. Inicio com uma descrição do fenômeno da ignorância moral e uma definição. Posteriormente, investigo como a virtude epistêmica da autonomia e a virtude moral da justiça nos auxiliam a melhor lidar com o problema em questão a partir do escopo da responsabilidade coletiva. Por fim, ressalto os aspectos sociais deste tipo de ignorância, com destaque para os fenômenos do viés cognitivo e progresso moral. Proponho que a ignorância moral de um agente pode ser um alvo apropriado de censura apenas quando ele estiver justificado epistemicamente de forma moderada, mas não expressar as virtudes cidadãs da autonomia e justiça.

As a positive thesis, philosophical anarchism claims that political authority is always at odds with practical rationality insomuch as authoritative directives are best analysed as content-independent reasons. The aim of this paper is to clarify the metaethical assumptions behind such a claim. Since philosophical anarchists reject as irrational the possibility that an agent can follow content-independent reasons issued by another agent, emphasising agents’ responsibility to assess the content of every directive before acting in conformity with it, it is safe to say that philosophical anarchists must be cognitivist in metaethics. At the very least, were there no right or wrong answers to questions such as “what does one have reason to do in these circumstances?”, answers such as “one should follow authoritative directives” would be as good as any other. However, philosophical anarchism requires much more than metaethical cognitivism; indeed, it requires a very specific (and ambitious) type of cognitivism. I intend to show which one.

Person-Centered Healthcare (PCH) is interested in persons, but for many philosophers (at least in traditional accounts) not all human beings should be considered (strictly) “persons.” Nevertheless, if PCH is interested in persons, and if persons are truly all that matters, then we need to rethink about these traditional accounts on the ontology of personhood. After all, in PCH, it is not solely individuals with mature rational selves that demand healthcare needs. Newborns, toddlers, children, the mentally handicapped, and the elderly with chronic or progressive conscious disorders, as well as people endowed with severe disorders of consciousness (SDC), are certainly also persons with rights to healthcare. So, in taking PCH seriously, it seems necessary that the concept of the person be extended in order to include those individuals with insipient or immature levels of consciousness as well as those who are severely and permanently mentally handicapped. After all, it seems plainly acceptable that in clinical practice those individuals also need appropriate care and should be cared for and respected in the same way we care and respect all non-mentally disabled individuals. In this chapter, we will depart from some well-known philosophical concepts of what it means to be a person and try to offer a broader and more inclusive meaning. In our ontology, persons are human beings with a socially recognized biography, which implies recognizing those individuals as bearers of not only necessities, but interests and claims. Sometimes, those interests and claims, besides necessities and wellbeing, are not expressed by them due to severe disabilities, as is the case of individuals with SDC. With a PCH approach in patients that suffer from SDC, it is not only care that matters, but also respect. Caregivers therefore should not only sympathetically care for the wellbeing of these people but also be concerned with respecting their interests and claims by interpreting them empathetically, in the light of their biographical story. Our conclusion is that, in order to be coherent, PCH must consider individuals with severe disorders of consciousness as persons, and we think that our revised concept of personhood fits with this requirement.

Presentation to the ethic@'s issue: n. 01, v. 19, (2020).

Nessa pesquisa iremos tratar do projeto democrático de sociedade e os direitos humanos, no contexto da reformulação da teoria do discurso de Habermas em Direito e democracia (DD) e no seu ensaio O conceito de dignidade humana e a utopia realista dos direitos humanos (DH): as implicações da interpretação habermasiana da sua própria teoria dos direitos fundamentais (exposta em DD) à luz do conceito de dignidade humana (no ensaio DH). Conclusão: tal reformulação não é livre de problemas! Na fundamentação do direito enquanto tal, e especificamente dos direitos humanos, em DD, tal fundamentação não é posta de forma explícita e no outro texto, apresenta-se uma série de dificuldades, o que revela o caráter insatisfatório, do ponto de vista filosófico, de sua teoria do direito e dos direitos humanos.

Evânia Reich presents the argument that the veil laws in France—the banning of the full-face coverings in public and the banning of the headscarf in public schools—are consistent with the emancipatory project of French Laïcité. According to this argument, the veils that Muslim women wear are symbols of their oppression, whereas French education seeks to liberate each individual and Laïcité serves as a bulwark against the creeping oppressive influence of religion. Unveiling Muslim women, then, is an act of emancipation. In this essay, I argue that the view of French secularism as an emancipatory project to free women of the oppressive mechanism of the veil is an example of what Marilyn Frye calls the “arrogant eye.” In this essay, I offer an alternative approach on the veil following Frye’s notion of the “loving eye.”

This article is concerned with inclusive hermeneutics. Six attitudes will be developed in order for a hermeneutics to be inclusive. In the first four attitudes, we are inspired by the resolutions of Husserl's paradoxes in his book The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy , discussed in the paragraphs 52-54. After this, the term reversibility , reworked by Merleau-Ponty, will be essential to broaden our conception of inclusiveness. Finally, the new perspectives on the concept of otherness/alienness in Waldenfels will support an inclusive ethical-practical interpretation. This inclusiveness will lead us within an authentic judgment, fostering a realization of the Law in the context of the recognition of the differences, through a constant process of Law itself.

A reflexão acerca da natureza da fundamentação da moral possui uma longa trajetória na filosofia. Uma das principais é proposta desenvolvida pelo filósofo alemão Arthur Schopenhauer, que fundamenta a moralidade a partir da compaixão. Nesse artigo, analisaremos quais são os pressupostos metafísicos necessários para a formulação de uma ética da compaixão.

The Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that "not being responsible for" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p is true, and no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p ⸧ q is true, then no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that q is true. Here we argue that the principle is true if one accepts a truth-maker account of the relationship between non-responsibility and propositions. While non-responsibility transfers across conditionals, one upshot of the truth-maker account is that it allows one to be responsible for necessary truths.

Rousseau foi um dos maiores expoentes da intelectualidade europeia do século XVIII e que, juntamente com os demais, não escapou de reproduzir em seus escritos a visão da família patriarcal, sobretudo no Emílio. Wollstonecraft foi uma escritora e filósofa inglesa, conhecida defensora dos direitos das mulheres, que criticou Rousseau. O presente texto procura discutir diferenças e aproximações entre os dois, buscando ressaltar que o filósofo genebrino contribuiu com o debate, mesmo sem ter discutido o tema diretamente. Também procura demonstrar que é um equívoco interpretá-lo como um anti-feminista ou alguém que tenha sido contrário à educação da mulher, tal como o fez Wollstonecraft em seu livro A vindication of the rights of woman.

This paper presents a translation of the debate between Emmanuel Sieyes and Thomas Paine on the modern concept of representative government.

Nada claro é o sentido em que a filosofia se relaciona com seu próprio tempo e seu próprio presente. Da perspectiva da história do pensamento filosófico, vários modelos foram sugeridos, desde uma forte confiança na tradição, até a rejeição completa do presente e a demanda por uma “filosofia do futuro“; desde a suspeita de que a filosofia nada mais é do que uma ideologia entre outras, até a exigência de que ela se engaje nas lutas e conflitos de seu tempo a fim de se preparar para um futuro melhor. Este ensaio apresenta uma análise e uma problematização dessas abordagens e defende um ponto de vista que parte da relação precária, ambivalente e contingente da filosofia com seu tempo e sua contemporaneidade. Nem totalmente autônoma, nem inteiramente submetida ao seu próprio tempo, a filosofia pode ocupar uma posição instável na qual crítica e resistência são possíveis, mesmo que não garantidas derradeiramente.

These reflections aim at analyzing the question of the end of subject from the Western philosophical tradition. Thus, after a brief historical introduction beginning from Plato and passing through Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, the text intends to examine the question of subject and subjectivity in the modern and, principally, in the contemporary philosophy: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. From the Freudian and Lacanian perspective, it will be taken more explicitly into consideration the problematic of the end of subject, which essentially expresses itself through the paradox of an internal exclusion. Therefore, the philosophical and psychological subject is revalued, reinterpreted and surpassed, but from and throughout the same symbolic universe, in which it moves itself and from which it paradoxically excludes itself.

The aim of this article is to explore the different moments of the understanding of the concept of man in Heidegger's work, taking into account what has come to be known as the first and second periods of his writings. In this sense, short reflections are made to first show what is meant by Dasein (being there) and by man in Being and Time, emphasizing that in that work, "man" is a concept of minor importance. After that, the reintroduction of the concept of man in Heidegger's philosophy is presented based on a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach and its developments. Next, we describe what kind of role the concept of man plays in his thinking about the truth of being after 'the turn' (Kehre). Eventually, we show how central this concept is for the reflection on the appropriative event of being (Ereignis).

Esse artigo pretende reconstruir a crítica de Joan Tronto ao modelo da ética do cuidado de Carol Gilligan. A análise de Tronto compreende, por um lado, que o cuidado não se restringe a uma moral feminina, mas é possível verificar sua prática em grupos em condição de subordinação, e, por outro (em consequência disso), que não se pode teorizar o cuidado sem o aporte do social. Sob esse aspecto, Tronto observa na análise de Gilligan um discurso essencialista e elitista que pretende universalizar a experiência do cuidado a partir de grupos hegemônicos.

This paper argues that the future of capabilities approach lies on the theoretical development of the democratic political structure. For this purpose, we take into account Martha Nussbaum’s late theoretical works. Firstly, we argue that the capability approach can be divided into two main models: the top down and the bottom up. Nussbaum, for example, endorses a top-down model, which it begins from an abstractive theory of partial justice and then draws the issue of institutional implementation. On the other hand, Amartya Sem advocates the bottom-up model, which starts from the immanent demands of justice from public sphere and then up to normative and abstract questions (like his “idea of justice”). In the second part of this paper, we present Nussbaum’s partial theory of justice, arguing that it is mainly composed by four issues: (a) the elaboration of the list of capabilities, (b) the process of normative evaluation, (c) arguments for stability, (d) the implementation of the model. About this last topic, we argue in the third part that the current theoretical advance of the capabilities approach lies on the issue of the democratic political structure. In other words, the future of capabilities approach depends on the interaction between its own theory and a theory of democracy. Finally, in the last section we provide a re-elaboration of Nussbaum’s threshold level of capabilities (the list) in order to make it more adherent with the democratic political structure.

The aim of this article is to discuss and revisit what Sidgwick called the profoundest problem of ethics: the dualism of practical reason. I argue that Crisp’s dual source view provides a good solution for the dualism via the small cost principle showing that we have to balance agent relative and agent neutral reason in a kind of a rational “negotiation” between our egoistic and our altruistic motivations. I suggest, however, that in order to justify his solution it is necessary to go beyond Sidgwick establishing a limit for the acceptance of egoism as a legitimate method of ethics. I propose also that the dualism is not only the profoundest problem of ethics, but also one of the more serious, it is the biggest contemporary ethical puzzle of humankind, and whose practical solution is of paramount importance for the future of life on earth.

From a critical review of the literature, we analyze the incompatibility between the possibility of incorporating moral principles to the law and its authoritative nature, as argued by exclusive positivists, such as J. Raz. After presenting his argument in second section, we argue in the third section that it is incompatible with commonly accepted (even by Raz) premises of the theory of legal interpretation, or else it would lead to contradiction - unless one presupposes, within the premises, a strong version of the sources thesis (which is what Raz intends to prove). In conclusion, we return to the arguments presented, concluding with a possible difficulty for the adoption of exclusive positivism by people inside a legal practice.

A questão dos refugiados e dos apátridas não cessou de ser tematizada na filosofia contemporânea. Pensadores como Arendt, Foucault, Mbembe e Agamben refletiram em alguns de seus escritos sobre as tensões geradas pela emergência da figura do imigrante na política global. A contínua expansão dos fluxos migratórios é hoje uma realidade mundial, bem como as tensões advindas das políticas de contenção a determinados fluxos, com o fechamento das fronteiras, o “deixar morrer” à deriva em mares internacionais, ou a recusa da entrada e permanência de refugiados de guerras e de conflitos políticos. De outro lado, com o recrudescimento do terrorismo transnacional e com a construção discursiva da ameaça islâmica – pós-11 de setembro de 2001 –, as migrações passam a ser encaradas como ameaças permanentes ligadas ao terror. O crescente nacionalismo identitário e o reforço das fronteiras parecem se contrapor, todavia, ao discurso da globalização e do neoliberalismo, que se apresentavam como a promessa de dissipação das fronteiras nos blocos regionais em prol dos acordos de livre circulação. Nesse cenário de busca por asilo e refúgio, novos desafios, impasses e questões se impõem à reflexão filosófica e ao Direito Internacional, altamente fundamentado em uma concepção estadocêntrica. Este ensaio tem por objetivo analisar filosoficamente o problema contemporâneo do refúgio atrelado à questão dos terrorismos globais e das fronteiras raciais, a partir de algumas considerações elaboradas por pensadores contemporâneos.

A partir de uma passagem célebre da Dialética negativa de Adorno, segundo a qual haveria uma relação de parentesco originário ou de protoparentesco (urverwandt) entre princípio de troca e princípio de identificação, o presente artigo busca refletir sobre as transições intercategoriais da teoria crítica adorniana, como, exemplarmente, aquelas entre teoria do conhecimento e teoria social. Após discutir algumas formas de caracterização dessas transições, o artigo problematiza os seus fundamentos e limites.

Dentro de um esforço de fornecer uma definição filosoficamente coerente e rigorosa que parte do conceito comum de suicídio, o artigo se concentra numa compreensão dos aspectos mais fundamentais e gerais das crenças das pessoas que consideram seriamente essa possibilidade. A definição leva ao extremo de coerência as características marcantes da liberdade e da consciência, com atenção especial ao aspecto reflexivo e autorreferente. Por fim, esse enfoque centrado nas crenças do agente se presta a uma diferenciação do suicídio em relação a mortes autoinfligidas acidentais e por desconhecimento ou, mais amplamente, a ações parassuicidas.

In this article, I make the idea that poverty outcomes are not necessarily morally relevant for assessing policies as clear as possible by discussing a specific case within the global justice debate: sovereign debts. The claim I would like to defend is that generating poverty among the population of a poor state as a result of a loan is independent from the fact that such debt is morally binding. People might become poorer as a result of a loan, and the loan might still be binding; and people might not be negatively affected as a result of a loan, and the loan might be non-binding. It is of course often the case that there is something wrong with lending that generates massive poverty. However, in my view, the fact that lending and poverty exist parallel to each other is not what makes a loan binding or non-binding. Thus, it is misguided to measure poverty as a way of testing the bindingness of a debt. I will proceed as follows. First, I will explain in some detail Pogge’s view about lending and justice, as he is the main defender of the outcome-view that I am trying to refute. Second, I will show two possible worries about Pogge’s view. I will call the first one the “agnosticism objection” and the second one the “normative limitation objection”. Third, I will briefly describe my own account of the conditions under which lending would count as non-binding. This account does not necessarily rely on outcomes.

While carbon markets have been increasingly scrutinized for their moral merits, the egalitarian critique of carbon markets has been largely neglected. Many admit that emission-trading schemes (ETSs), in their actual form, reproduce pre-existing inequalities. However, this is often seen as a contingent, easily-fixed problem, as carbon markets can fulfill egalitarian goals as long as the initial allocation of permits is made according to an egalitarian ideal. The goal of this paper is to challenge this idealistic rejection of the egalitarian critique of carbon markets by underlying seven structural features of carbon markets that explain why, in all likelihood, ETSs will always reproduce pre-existing inequalities (without even curbing carbonemissions). First, carbon markets are bound to cover mainly the activities of wealthy and powerful corporations. Second, carbon markets are excessively complex and their operations typically lack transparency. Third, information asymmetries persist between public servants and private firms regarding ETSs. Fourth, target setting is a political, highly partisan process. These four features give private firms the power to manipulate at their advantage the rules of a carbon market. Three other features explain why the motivations of agents under an ETS will most of the time be corrupted: carbon markets trivialize the harm done by carbon emissions; they alter our perception of nature’s value; and they crowd-out our intrinsic motivations. Thus, influential private firms will have the power and willingness to bend carbon markets at their advantage.

This article seeks to rescue the normative foundations of bioethics so as to render its universalism defensible and compatible with its pluralism, without resorting, on the one hand, to the foundationalism of proceduralist models such as principialism, and to the particularism of given moral doctrines, such as the Christian, Jewish, and other religious approaches to bioethics, on the other. It will be shown that Tristram Engelhardt's conception of pluralism in bioethics allows for a recasting of Judeo-Christian bioethics as one of the most reasonable, defensible models that satisfy such normative claims, insofar as it promotes a pluralist humanism and universalizable views of human rights, sociality, and ecological concerns.

This article aims to show, based on the critical reading of the book Vorlesungen über Ethik, by Ernst Tugendhat (1930-) and the texts by the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) – in particular his main work Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung and his text about the Ethics, Über der Grundlage der Moral –, evaluate Tugendhat's reading and interpretation of the foundation of Schopenhauer's morality. We will be able to explain the reasons for Tugendhat’s

A questao norteadora consiste em indicar relacoes entre o tema da ausencia ou da supressao de individualidades e o surgimento de idolos. Dentre inumeros casos que a historia da filosofia ostenta, aqui sao indicadas razoes para assumirmos que Arthur Schopenhauer e Max Horkheimer ensejam dois exemplos de denuncias filosoficas de idolatrias e fanatismos. As simetrias no modo com que os pensadores tratam da questao sao possibilitadas nao apenas pela leitura cirurgica e original que o pai da Teoria Critica faz de Schopenhauer, mas tambem, e principalmente, pela assercao horkheimeriana de que “a doutrina de Schopenhauer tem significado no presente pelo fato de denunciar os idolos de maneira implacavel”. Deste, a critica a ausencia de individualidade, a banalidade e a in-diferenca dos “humanos comuns”. Daquele, a preocupacao com formas de atomizacao social que, ao surgirem, necessariamente ameacam e suprimem tudo o que se possa chamar de proprio e genuino.

The aim of this paper is to present three paradoxes involved in the notion of toleration and to analyze its possible solutions, using the results of this discussion to describe a possible fourth paradox, related to the value attributed to the toleration by the agents involved, which is considered as constitutive and therefore insoluble. For this, a structural notion of toleration as a moral ideal will be presented, discussing its elements. Then, from the relation with the specific components of this notion, the three paradoxes mentioned will be analyzed, two very well-known and a third little discussed and still without a name, and their possible solutions, that will require, respectively, the presentation of arguments in favor of toleration, the discussion of its limits and a demanding interpretation of the component of moral disapproval of that structure. Finally, starting from the discussion of the previous paradoxes and its solutions, a possible fourth paradox will be proposed, not explicitly formulated as such in these discussions, but whose constitutive elements have already been indicated since the eighteenth century, as well as the reasons for its insolubility.

Artykuł opisuje widzenie praw i wolności w Kazaniach sejmowych Piotra Skargi. We wstępie ukazano dzieło jezuity w kontekście innych traktatów społeczno-politycznych XVI wieku. We właściwej części artykułu przedstawiono rozumienie praw przez kaznodzieję. Zaprezentowano różne ich kategorie. Następnie dowiedziono konieczności istnienia ustaw państwowych. Kolejno przybliżono cechy dobrych praw, czyli: sprawiedliwość, krzewienie cnoty i obronę czci Boskiej. Ukazano błędy w polskim prawodawstwie, wśród których na plan pierwszy wysuwa się zniesienie jurysdykcji sądów duchownych oraz pobłażliwe traktowanie morderców. Zobrazowano zależność praw od obyczajów. Podkreślono znaczenie odpowiedniej władzy wykonawczej i przedstawiono kilka uwag w sprawie sądownictwa. W następnej części pracy przybliżono wizję wolności w dziele Skargi. Ukazano więc wartość złotej wolności szlacheckiej ze wskazaniem nieprawidłowości w jej pojmowaniu. Podniesiono złe traktowanie chłopów. Zwrócono uwagę na zagrożenia płynące ze strony innowierców. Kolejno przedstawiono cztery rodzaje wolności. Potem dowiedziono istnienia związku praw i wolności. Wykazano, że do zniewolenia często prowadzi grzech i dlatego należy zapewnić prawne wsparcie religii (katolickiej). Zobrazowano, że rolą praw jest ograniczenie sprawujących władzę — by nie naruszali autonomii innych. Stwierdzono, iż sprawiedliwe prawa mają chronić wszystkich członków narodu. Na końcu dowiedziono, iż posłuszeństwo prawu współgra z koncepcją wolności chrześcijańskiej — w jej tradycyjnym rozumieniu.

Naturalism is neither a consequence nor a presupposition of natural science in a threefold way: (1) the principle of matter, (2) the principle of supervenience and (3) the principle of the causal closure of the world are metaphysical principles. They are true, if naturalism is true. So, if you are a naturalist, you should find reasons for your worldview which are independent from natural science. But it is hard to see how this could work.

The main subject of this work is the concept of adequate food defined by the Brazilian Law No 11.346/06, whose implications are here discussed through a gender – especially ecofeminist – lens. The Law defines the right to food that is also considered a fundamental right in the Brazilian Constitution. At the same time, Brazilian economical politics is centered on crops production for exportation in a large-scale agricultural system. Based on that, the following question is addressed in this paper: is the concept of adequate food compatible with the economical privilege attributed to the massive and monoculture agricultural system and factory farms? The aim is to show that they are incompatible and the alternative is a defense of organic family farming and a plant-based diet, as it is presented in the government’s document “Dietary Guidelines for the Brazilian Population” (2014). Another problem that arises from this issue is that agriculture in this large-scale dimension reflects structures of power and domination (Karen J. Warren) and animals used for corpse eating disappears, becoming absent referents (Carol J. Adams). It reflects the structure of a patriarchal society, where men have power over women, animals and plants. The hypothesis is that in family farming women can participate more in the decision making process, reflecting equality and justice in the private sphere. We will analyze the Special Reports on adequate food, mainly the one related to the mission of the Special Rapporteur to Brazil, whose analysis brings information on the gender category. This analysis draws attention on the situation of women in their struggles to fulfill the right to adequate food.

In this article, I present philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s defense of political liberalism, understood as the liberal Enlightenment tradition that goes from Kant to Rawls. Many feminists have objected that the liberal conception of human nature and political philosophy cannot constitute an adequate foundation for women liberation. Nussbaum objects to this view by showing that liberalism offers universal concepts, which are essential values for the feminist movement and women's struggle, such as the notion of person, self-respect, capacity for choice, and equal consideration of the value and dignity of human beings. In addition, feminist movements currently use these concepts to grond their claims. In the end, I present the notion of capability, showing how this concept responds to criticism of universalist feminism.

In mainstream democratic theory, non-agents are only considered indirectly: their interests matter if and only if a group of agents cares about them. In this paper, I argue that democratic patients, non-agents whose interests are affected by democratic decisions, have a place of their own in democratic theory. That is, they are entitled to the fair consideration of their interests in the democratic decision-making process. I defend the case for democratic patients by building upon the idea of epistemic democracy as proposed by David Estlund . If democratic procedures ought to be epistemically designed towards achieving right decisions, as Estlund argues, they should consider all relevant evidence fairly, like a jury does. Since democratic patients’ interests are affected by democratic decisions, I argue that they do count as relevant evidence via the All-Affected Principle, which lies at the core of democracy. Then I present some candidates for being democratic patients, which include young children, severely cognitively disabled humans, non-existent future humans, sentient animals and even non-sentient life forms. Whether they turn out to be democratic patients depends on what theories one accepts about agency, interests, and the impact of the outcomes of democracy on interests. I illustrate that point by discussing future humans as possible candidates. Finally, I briefly explore the challenge of designing real-world institutions derived from my argument, outlining what objectives they should aim for and some of the problems they might face.

This research advocates a strategy to mitigate or prevent further anthropogenic climate change and preserve natural resources. The strategy takes into account mechanisms of social and moral norms, which are innate in humanity due to millions of years of evolution. Social norms themselves are not innate, but the mechanisms to acquire them and implement them are. To slow down anthropogenic climate change global forces, inclusive of governments, NGOs, and collective humanity, should help indigenous peoples to protect their territories and property. Important to the moral argument is highlighting the murder of Berta Caceres, a Honduran environmental activist, in 2015 by military members of Honduras at the instruction of the Honduran joint chiefs of staff as well as the likely involvement of an energy company. To conclude, if global forces were to enforce protection of indigenous communities affected by the negative effects of urbanization and globalization, then there would be a mitigating effect on anthropogenic climate change.

In this paper we will explore the widespread of congenital Zika virus syndrome in Brazil associated with abyssal social inequalities as a trigger to push for abortion legalization, from a human rights perspective. Brazil has a very restrictive regulation on abortion, which allows the procedure only when the life of the mother is in danger, in cases of sexual violence and when the fetus suffers from anencephaly. Due to the growing influence of ultra-conservative forces in the Parliament the legislative debate on abortion has been blocked for many years in Brazil, making social movements seek the courts for advancements in this area. In this paper, we will present general data on the Zika epidemic, social inequalities and unequal access to health services as a background for the discussion on advancing abortion legalization in the country through judicial procedures, from a human rights perspective.

The objective of this essay is to analyze two diatribes in which the Stoic philosopher Musônio Rufo defends the teaching of philosophy for women in order to verify if such a defense would allow to assign to his work a kind of “feminism”. On the one hand, it will be seen that there is a bold vision for the period that proposes equality between men and women based on humanist arguments, on the other hand, it should be noted that, in general terms, there is an unrestricted concession to the male dominion over women, as dictated by the Roman custom of the first century of our era. From this essay follow the translations of the two diatribes: Diatribe III: That women should also philosophize and Diatribe IV: From ‘If the daughters should be educated similarly to the sons’.

My research explores climate justice and non-ideal theory. Using Laura Valentini’s conception of non-ideal theory, this is applied to the distribution of climate mitigation obligations, with a particular focus on the common but differentiated responsibilities of developed and developing countries. I wish to evaluate this distribution of obligations and determine whether it is an effective method of climate change mitigation, with consideration to non-ideal elements of partial or non-compliance. Climate change is one of the biggest challenges faced by the international community, and it is a problem that requires collective action. However, due to ineffective international agreements and a lack of willingness to alter lifestyles, this action is often not achieved. Agreements commonly result in targets that are not sufficient to exact the change required, instead representing only the states’ willingness to mitigate the destructive aspects of climate change while maintaining economic growth. I suggest that a shift in focus is required to obtain relevant and effective agreements that will reach the required targets. I propose that an Ability to Pay approach and a turn to investment incentives may result in more favourable outcomes. Recent climate agreements have focused more on the investment in clean energy and sharing of resources, however, I argue that this needs to be taken further in order to achieve the collective goal of mitigating climate change.

In this paper, I will draw on the capabilities approach to social justice and human development as advanced, among others, by Martha Nussbaum, and seek to provide some theoretical resources for better understanding our obligations to future persons. My argumentative strategy is as follows: First, I’ll briefly reconstruct a capabilities approach to justice, examining this sort of view’s normative foundations and methodology. Using Nussbaum’s capabilities list as a basis, I will argue that various social and environmental functions which are threatened by climate change are crucial with respect to enabling morally and politically central capabilities for both current and future people. Here, I will draw on recent work by Breena Holland to establish the notion of a sustainable climate system as a necessary precondition for the enablement and protection of these entitlements. Then, I’ll extend this strategy to argue that the capabilities approach provides a uniquely useful threshold conception of harm to inform our thinking about our relationship to our posterity. It is my hope that the capabilities approach so applied can give us a novel way of understanding our responsibilities toward future people in a time where such an understanding is both unfortunately lacking and increasingly dire. Finally, I will discuss some implications of a capability-based account in the intergenerational context and some justifications for applying the approach in this way. Ultimately, I submit that this sort of view seems more well-fitted to this context than other approaches (e.g., contractarianism and consequentialism), and that it offers a unique vehicle for understanding our relations and obligations to future people.

The present study recognizes and aims to highlight the place of Simone de Beauvoir in the 20th Century History of Philosophy. From the understanding about the existence designed as freedom, as it is conceived by this author Existentialism. We will seek to address the relationship between thought and action, between philosophy and feminist engagement which unfold, in turn, in our understanding, in the opening for a possible Ethic in Simone de Beauvoir's Work.

The aim of this paper is to examine, comparatively, women’s place within the political systems of Plato, Aristotle and Hegel from a brief sketch of their conceptions about human nature and feminine nature. It will be intended to indicate to what extent there is a relation, sometimes of tension, sometimes of complementarity, in the way descriptive and prescriptive elements function to circumscribe the space of women from the household private sphere, from Aristotelian and Hegelian perspectives, and how the subordination of descriptive elements to prescriptive elements allow woman to ascend in the public sphere under the Platonic perspective. After tracing this sketch, it will be suggested how this tension, in the political philosophy of Hegel, will result, in a way, in an explicit denial of women's political rights and, in another way, in the possibility of envisioning civil and political equality between men and women from an internal and inherent device of the Hegelian system, the notion of “second nature” as ethical reposition of the natural.